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T his book was born as a treatise on what is often termed schizophrenic speech, but, increasingly, it has become clear that such speech also 
can occur in manics and other patients. Therefore, it is more accurate to 
speak of psychotic speech. This does not mean that there is no difference 
between schizophrenic and other psychotic speech. As this book shows, 
there is, but it is a difference in degree rather than one in kind. The 
argumentation over terminology that so delights scholars will be addressed 
in the body of this book, so I shall leave it now and briefly discuss my 
own role in the field as a linguist, one versed in scienta linguarum, the 
science of language.
What special value does a linguistic analysis have? For one thing, the 
linguist focuses on language itself, on interpreting data in light of what 
we know of how people learn and use language, spoken or written. Then 
those analyses are compared to the situations which evoke them. Unlike 
those of other fields who simply take language as a given, without 
examining it in its own right, the linguist always takes language as 
something to be analyzed in its own right.
Much of the argumentation in the literature over whether or not 
schizophrenics suffer from thought disorder or whether or not their 
speech is ungrammatical, whether or not it is deliberate, and certainly, 
disagreements over what it means are artifacts of not understanding what 
language is and how it is normally produced and understood. Every 
psychological test in some way depends upon language, even when it 
doesn’t purport to. For instance, directions are given and understood —or 
misunderstood —via the medium of language. All psychoanalysis, all 
therapeutic situations, in fact, are mediated by language, but, often, the 
therapist has not looked at language in its own right, has never asked 
questions like, “How do I know X is implying that?” “Why do I feel that 
this speech is strange?” “What exactly is it to be tangential?” “What does 
it mean to keep to a topic? What is telling me that this person is or is not
v i i
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keeping to one?” “Why am I so sure that this patient is using a metaphor, 
and really means something quite different from what he says?”
That, then, is the business of this book. In it, I show what the features 
of schizophrenic speech are, how they deviate from normal speech, and 
what accounts for our feeling that it is, after all, crazy talk. I distinguish 
between speech of schizophrenics which is structurally deviant and that 
which is not. The relation of speech to thought is also explored. It is vital 
that those concerned with the mentally ill understand the differences 
between language and thought and understand as well how languages 
are structured. To some degree, this can be described as a quickie course 
in linguistic concepts, but, at no time is any concept of linguistics presented 
unless it is immediately applied to psychotic speech.
This is true as well of the chapters of discourse analysis presented 
here. What is metaphor, how do we know when one has been made and 
how do we know how to interpret it so as to garner the meaning intended? 
What is intention and how is it signalled in speech? What are the laws, so 
to speak, of implication. What is the difference between poesy and 
schizophrenic speech? What constitutes a valid experimental procedure 
to uncover any deficits in linguistic production? How is speech made 
relevant?
This book is not only about a linguist’s contribution to schizophrenia, 
however. Linguists are as contentious a lot as scholars in any other field 
are, and I have to admit that my 17 year career studying psychotic 
language has certainly shaped my own views about normal language and 
linguistic theory itself. To be most accurate, this is a book by one 
linguist, one who falls into the camps of those who believe in a context- 
dependent model of language, not a context-free one. There is a reason 
that this is called “Beyond Chomsky” as well as “Beyond Freud.”
I have avoided technical talk as much as possible, but one matter must 
be touched upon: the matter of phonetic symbols. The only ones used in 
this book are
[j ] for the <j> in judge 
[c], for the <ch> in child
[D] for the < tt>  in betting and the <dd> in bedding
[0 ] for the <th>  in thing
[U], for the vowel in talk as pronounced in British and New York City 
English (and a few other places as well).
[ae] for the vowel in cat
[I ] for the vowel in is
viii
P re fa c e i x
[u] for the vowel in put
[e] for last vowel in sofa 
Brackets with special meaning are:
[ ] = phonetic symbol for actually pronounced sound 
/ / = phoneme, sound hearer thinks has been made 
< > = conventional spelling
Additionally, first mention of any technical term is in small caps and 
is included in the index so that the reader can easily go back to its first 
mention in the text.
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UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOTIC SPEECH: 
BEYOND FREUD AND CHOMSKY
Chapter One
T H E  FEA T U R E S O F PSYC H O TIC  SPEEC H
The strange speech of some psychotics has baffled clinicians 
and laypersons alike, exciting all kinds of extraordinary interpre­
tations. Some even have assumed that there is nothing wrong 
with schizophrenic speech, claiming that it is deliberate. An 
analysis of the linguistic forms of such speech demonstrate that 
it is definably different from normal speech, and the many kinds 
of deviations evinced are all disruptions of normal speech 
processes. This chapter demonstrates the kinds of disruptions 
responsible for psychotic speech.
[1] The Value of a Linguistic Analysis.
3
Caplan (1980, p. 235) sums up the value of linguistic analysis of aberrant speech production:
. . .  i t  u t i l iz e s  p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c  a n d  l in g u i s t i c  c o n s t r u c t s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  
s c i e n t i f i c  s t u d ie s  o f  l a n g u a g e  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  p r o c e s s i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  
i n t u i t iv e  t a x o n o m i e s  a n d  a n a ly s e s .  A s  a re s u l t ,  it  a c h ie v e s  . . .  s p e c i f i c i t y  
in  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  l i n g u i s t i c  a n d  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  d e f i c i t s . . .
Such an analysis bears heavily on the question of whether or not 
schizophrenic speech shows structural deviation, as well as the nature of 
any deviation. It can be shown that such speech can be deviant although 
not all is. Furthermore, the kinds of deviation manifested in schizo­
phrenic speech must be taken in account in any interpretation of it.
[2] The Cyclic Nature of Schizophrenic Speech.
One of the most baffling characteristics of the kinds of speech that is 
associated with schizophrenia (henceforth SD) is that it is intermittent. 
Not all schizophrenics speak this way, and those who do, do so at some 
times and not at others. It is not only schizophrenics who are likely to 
speak this way. Manics do, and so do some with schizoaffective disorders.
4 Understanding Psychotic Speech
For this reason, the term psychotic speech is more accurate than schizophrenic. 
Unless findings show that only schizophrenics manifest certain features 
of speech, and there are some that do, the former term will be used. 
Because some psychotics show no structural deviations in their speech, 
those who do will be termed SD, speech disordered speakers, as opposed 
to NSD, nonspeech disordered. A m ajor problem in research has been 
that investigators have not ensured that they were testing only SD psy- 
chotics so that, often, studies seem to contradict each other because like 
populations have not been compared with each other.
Because of its intermittent character, many observers have assumed 
that it is deliberate and that the patient can speak differently if he or she 
so wishes. Laffal (1965), for instance, assumes that one of his patients 
resorted to deviant speech because he wished to avoid the therapeutic 
situation. Forrest (1965, 1976) maintains that SD patients are trying to say 
what it is to be schizophrenic, but that ordinary language is not sufficient 
for this task. It will subsequently be argued that as attractive as these 
positions are, they are untenable.
Bateson (1972, pp. 202-217) advanced the interesting theory that schizo­
phrenics were caught in a double bind as children because they had 
unloving parents. When the child accused the parent of being unloving, 
he or she was punished and the parent denied lack of love. H ence, 
Bateson posited, the child did not learn to communicate properly.1 
Bateson offered no observational proof of this theory, nor has anybody 
else done so. There is no case history proof that all schizophrenics or 
even most schizophrenics were ever caught in such a bind. Nor is there 
any evidence that normals have not been caught in such a double bind. 
T h e intermittent character of SD speech negates the double-bind theory. 
It cannot be the case that schizophrenics haven’t learned how to com­
municate, because there are times when their communication is normal 
in structure. Another point of information relevant to the double-bind 
theory is that children learn language as much from peers and other 
adults as from their parents. In fact, sociolinguistic studies have deter­
mined again and again that the peer group is the primary source of a 
child’s language, not the parent. Peer learning is one reason that lan­
guage changes in every generation. In contrast, even when schizophrenic 
speech is displayed, it coincides with psychotic bouts. Most likely, then, 
it is psychosis which causes the speech, not failures in early language 
learning.
T h e cyclic character of SD speech must be explained, as well as the
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particular deviations. SD patients might evince difficulty in a different 
stratum of linguistic production at different times, even in the same 
discourse. That is, at one time, a patient might have intact syntax but 
evince word-creation difficulty; yet, at another time, might show disor­
dered syntax although words used seem to be usual words in the lan­
guage (Chaika 1974; Rochester and Martin, 1979, pp. 177-178).
That I here and earlier (Chaika 1974, 1977, 1982a) present a list of 
the kinds of speech disruptions associated with schizophrenics does 
not mean that these are a “checklist” of symptoms as Herbert and 
Waltensperger (1982, p. 244) claim. No one patient may display all of the 
deviations reported in conjunction with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
nor will any particular deviation occur in all patients, both circum­
stances that I have always stressed. Even though no one patient may have 
evinced them all, many patients have evinced some of them, some 
patients have evinced them all, and, of course, some patients have 
evinced none of them, all circumstances which must be accounted for in 
any discussion of psychotic speech. All of the deviations presented here 
have been reported again and again as occurring in some schizophrenic 
patients at least some of the time. These are the deviations that have long 
excited comment, and those who evaluate psychotic patients rely on 
these symptoms for diagnostic purposes.
Still, researchers like Maher (1972), Fromkin (1975), Cohen (1978), and 
Herbert and Waltensperger (1980, 1982) claim that there is nothing 
structurally wrong with schizophrenic speech. Maher (1972, p. 13) says, 
“What seems to be most clear is th a t. . .  perhaps most of the disturbances 
of language found amongst schizophrenic patients do not involve syntac­
tic errors . . . ” With the exception of Fromkin, none of these are linguists 
so that their evaluations are essentially lay evaluations. Fromkin asserts 
that schizophrenic speech is normal creative language, and Cohen (1978, 
p. 1) stated that “ . . .  as cryptic or disorganized as schizophrenic speech 
may sound, it rarely (if ever) includes hard instances of agrammatism or 
word-finding deficits.” Yet word salads, outright gibberish, and other 
severe syntactic errors have long been reported in the literature. Hard 
instances of agrammatism have long been noted in the literature and are 
quite easy to find, as we shall see.
Lecours and Vanier-Clement (1976) assert that schizophrenics do not 
suffer from semantic errors or word-finding differences, although they 
do admit that schizophrenics make unusual, abstract, and bizarre word 
choices. This in itself, as they note, is not a sign of linguistic dysfunction.
6 Understanding Psychotic Speech
Unusual word choices abound in witticisms, good prose, and artistic 
language, but these are quite different from schizophrenic unusual word 
choices. Witticisms, good prose, and artistic language in some way eluci­
date a message in a memorable or aesthetic manner. In contrast, schizo­
phrenic “unusual” word choices rarely have any such relevance. Similarly, 
the “abstract speech” of schizophrenics differs from normal abstract speech. 
Any scholar indulges in the latter, but the abstraction is in aid of presen­
tation of intellectual constructs and the abstract language in which such 
presentation is embedded is relevant to the points being made. Moreover, 
the scholars can bring it up again, discuss its import, rephrase it. In 
contrast, schizophrenic abstractions show no coherence to any point, 
nor can they usually be discussed, much less rephrased and refined. 
Paraphrasability is a hallmark of normal speech production. It is part of 
the essential character of language. Every normal utterance can be 
paraphrased. The paraphrase may not be as beautiful as the original or 
as succint, but it can convey the same meaning. All psychotic utterances 
cannot be paraphrased. Here, and in subsequent chapters, we will see 
distinct definable and testable differences between the most creative of 
normal speech and psychotic speech itself.
Lecours and Vaniers-Clement do acknowledge schizophrenic gibber­
ish but attempt to distinguish it from those in aphasic productions by 
claiming that schizophrenics reemploy their nonwords. However, there 
is no support in the literature to substantiate such a claim beyond the fact 
that, occasionally, within one stretch of speech, the same nonword might 
be repeated. There is presently no hard evidence that such reemployments 
last beyond that one interaction. My own study of psychotic narrative, 
The Ice Cream Stories, henceforth referred to as ICS (Chaika 1982e, 1983b; 
Chaika and Alexander 1986; Chapter 8), did yield some gibberish, but, 
the next week when patients were asked to recall their stories, they never 
reemployed the gibberish, nor did they even in the first telling. In 
addition, as the next chapter shows, apart from repetitions of a given 
word or nonword in one speech situation, there may be many other kinds 
of perseveration (Chaika 1982a; Manschrek, Maher, Hoover, and Ames 
1985). It is the sum of repetitions and perseverations which must be 
accounted for.
Gibberish and neologisms are clear instances of word-finding deficits, 
and they, too, are easy to find. ICS yielded both syntactic and lexical 
deficits as well as deviations in global narrative structure. These lexical 
deficits included circumlocution reminiscent of mild anomic aphasia in
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which the meaning is inappropriately spread over too many words 
(Chapter 8).
Schizophrenic utterances have been likened to poetry, sleeptalking, 
and the aphasias (e.g., Forrest 1965, 1976; Sullivan 1964 [originally 
published 1944]; Brown 1977; Chapman 1966; Benson 1963; Chaika 1974a, 
1977; Buckingham 1974 [personal communication]). These comparisons 
are apt, and that they can be made at all is, in itself, revealing. There 
may well not be any single deviation which can’t be found in other 
speech pathologies, or even in normal creativity and error. What charac­
terizes speech as being particularly schizophrenic is some combination of 
errors depicted below, occurring cyclically, intermittently, but, in a 
given interaction, persistently.
[3] T h e  Features of Psychotic Speech.
Clinicians themselves have long considered the speech disruptions 
illustrated below as pathognomic of positive symptom schizophrenia. 
Andreasen’s (1979a, 1979b) widely used diagnostic guidelines actually 
center on these kinds of speech disruptions although her terminology 
differs from mine (Chapters 2, 10, and 11) reflecting our mutually differ­
ent backgrounds, but the characteristics she cites seem to accord with 
mine—or mine accord with hers.
Viewed in comparison with the levels of normal language, the features 
of schizophrenic speech are:
• gibberish
• neologisms
• opposite speech and other erroneous retrievals of words
• glossomania
• rhyme and alliteration inappropriate for the context
• intrusive errors
• word salad and other syntactic disruptions
• perseveration and other repetitions.
Any interpretation of schizophrenic speech and any hypothesis of its 
provenance must take these into account.
8 Understanding Psychotic Speech
[4] Gibberish and Neologizing.
The first kinds of speech disruption are perhaps the most disruptive 
of all and seem to occur more rarely than the others
[I] Gibberish:
1A. . . .  gao, itivare. . .  ovede (Forrest 1976)
1B. [speaking about a pet] He still had fooch  [fUc] with taykrimez 
[theikraimz] I ’ll be willin’ to betcha. (Chaika 1974)
Assuming that Forrest spelled his examples of nonwords as accurately 
as the orthographic system of English allows, then his examples of 
gibberish conform to the phonetic rules of English. Naive spellings, 
spellings which are used by those unversed in phonetic transcription, 
are frequently an accurate index to pronunciation. Most of our informa­
tion about Colonial American English, for instance, derives from the 
study of semiliterate spelling errors. Of course, I am not calling Forrest 
semiliterate. Forrest is a sensitive psychiatrist, but the principle is the 
same. If one does not know a standard spelling for a word, then one will 
substitute letters from the ordinary orthography that would usually spell 
the sounds in question.
Fortunately, I was able to transcribe the gibberish I present, so I can 
attest to the fact that both the sounds used and their combinations are 
allowable in English. This is both interesting and significant as it suggests, 
but of course does not prove, that the speaker intended to utter an actual 
word in the language. The patient who uttered taykrimez above, for 
instance, aspirated the initial [t] as is required by English phonetic rules. 
Although these productions are gibberish, they seem to be gibberish in 
English. Phonologically and phonotactically, the only things wrong with 
any of these nonwords is that they do not happen to be words in the 
language, and a perusal of the venerable OED reveals that they never 
were.
[II]. Neologizing
2A . . .  you have to have a plausity of amendments to go through for the 
children’s code, and it’s no mental disturbance of puterience, it is an 
amorition law. (Vetter 1968, p. 189)
2 B  . .  with syndicates organized and subsicates in the way that look 
for a civil w ar. . .  (Herbert and Waltensperger 1982)
2C. I ’m don’t like the way I ’m puped  today in thought. . .  because of
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the slash of my wrist like I’m was puped to do. I ’m be puped  tall 
letter I ’m write to you . . .  (Herbert and Waltensperger 1980)
As with the gibberish, all of this neologizing forms distinctly English 
nonwords, using unremarkable English roots and morphemes. Plausity 
has what appears to be the same root as the plaus in plausible, and the 
-erience in puterience occurs in words like experience. Similarly, subsicates 
is formed out of the common morphemes sub- and -icate. Since neither 
Vetter nor Herbert and Waltensperger provide IPA transcription, we 
can’t know whether or not the put- is pronounced like putrid or like 
the verb put. For the same reason, we can not determine how the < u >  in 
puped  was pronounced. I would assume that it was not the < oo>  in 
pooped  or they would have spelled it that way. I also have to assume that 
the other morphemes were pronounced as American speakers usually 
pronounce syllables spelled that way, for untrained ears typically adhere 
to spellings commonly used for given syllables. That is, if the patient 
pronounced -ity, -erience, and -ition normally, then the naive transcriber 
is most likely to spell those as he always does. In contrast, a linguist 
would use IPA and spell plaus- with a [z] not an < s> , -erience with an [s], 
not a < c> , and -ition with an [s] rather than a < ti> . Vetter and Herbert 
and Waltensperger also do not indicate meaning, presumably because 
the patient did not, and the context did not provide clues.
The gibberish and neologizing above are two halves of the same coin. 
Their only substantive difference is that gibberish is composed of sounds 
that do not form any recognizable word or morpheme. Neologisms, on 
the other hand, while still not forming words now in the language, do 
contain recognizable morphemes or other nonmorphemic parts of words. 
They are alike, however, in that neither results in recognizable lexical 
items in the language, nonwords.2 Furthermore, the patient who utters 
either does not or cannot say what it is that they have said. Robertson 
and Shamsie (1958) claim that the gibberish they observed in a multilin­
gual belonged to different languages although they don’t say how they 
determined this and, of course, they provide no phonetic transcription 
as a check. They admit that although the patient uttered a great deal of 
such gibberish, he wasn’t “prepared” to explain what he said.
There are two logical reasons for this circumstance. One is the one 
Robertson and Shamsie presuppose: that the patient simply did not want 
to explain it. The other is that the schizophrenic intended to say something, 
but it would only come out as gibberish. In point of fact, if SD patients
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do not explain what their gibberish means, there is no basis for the 
assumption that their gibberish is intentional. Gibberish is gibberish 
because no meaning can be extracted from it, just as neologisms are 
discerned as such because they convey no meaning.3 Therefore, all we 
can do is compare it to normal language and to other features of SD 
productions; thereby finding a consistent, rational and verifiable analy­
sis for all of them.
[5] Explaining Gibberish and Neologisms.
Chapman (1966) and Chaika (1974a, 1977, 1982a), albeit on somewhat 
different grounds, argue that gibberish and neologizing are indicative of 
word finding difficulties. Considering that human languages are so 
constructed that new words can be made up and old words can be used in 
new ways to effect new meaning, it is not likely that neologizing and 
gibberish are a sign of creativity (LaFerriere 1977; Forrest 1976; Fromkin 
1975). That is, there is usually a recognizable difference between normal 
creativity and unusual schizophrenic usages, although some find that 
link tenuous at best. For instance, Nancy Andreasen (1973), a psychiatrist 
with the rare qualification of also having earned a Ph.D. in literature, 
questions the artistry in James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake, claiming that 
much of it is merely schizophrenic speech, and that portions of this were 
rated as schizophrenic by raters, a claim sure to be contested by some 
Joyce scholars.
The gibberish and neologizing noted above occur within sentences 
with otherwise recognizable words, lending credence to the belief that 
the patient is trying to convey an actual message, but is undergoing 
problems in retrieval of words. Because anybody can use a new word in 
such a way that another can understand it, we have to count this as a real 
deficit since the patients seem not to be able to provide enough context 
for this to happen.
Over the years, those who would explain psychotic speech have imputed 
intention to such incomprehensible speech, claiming that it is deliberate. 
However, it is the very production of gibberish and neologizing which 
must be explained, not what it means, for it may mean nothing and even 
if the patient intended a meaning, we cannot always derive it. Trying to 
derive intent from grossly disordered speech is akin to an English 
speaker’s making an interpretation of a Populucan sentence if she were 
dropped into the remote corner of Mexico in which that language is
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spoken. If natives used graphic enough gestures, she might get some 
meaning and determine intention from them, but on the basis of their 
words, she could not impute intention because she can’t understand the 
meaning of their utterances. It is true that we derive meaning partially— 
indeed largely—on the basis of what we perceive the intent of the 
speaker to be, but this is done by matching the words and syntax to the 
context of utterance and to the conventions of the social group in which 
it was uttered (Chaika 1989, pp. 114-115, and Chapter 7).
Moreover, we can never get away from the incontrovertible fact that a 
person who is having difficulty explaining an experience does not sud­
denly launch into gibberish or spout unexplained neologisms to do this. 
That is why schizophrenic speech has been labeled as schizophrenic and 
it is why psychiatrists and other researchers have devoted so much time 
and effort to explain it.
This does not mean that I think all psychotic speech is uninterpretable, 
as Hoffman and Sledge (1984, p. 153) strangely claim. They assert that I 
have said that “schizophrenic irregularity is identified according to its 
nondecodability.” Chaika (1974, 1977, 1981, 1982a,c,d,e, 1983a,b) has shown 
the contrary. One can’t decode gibberish. That’s why it has been called 
gibberish. Nor, frequently, can one decode word salads. That’s why they 
have been called word salads. But many other less disrupted utterances 
of schizophrenics can be decoded very sensibly by reference to what we 
know of normal linguistic production and normal decoding strategies. 
By using such tactics, I have even been able to show that some schizo­
phrenic discourse can be understood by our usual strategies, and, in fact, 
is quite normal (Chaika 1981). It is part of the beauty of our natural 
linguistic abilities that we can decode imperfect speech. If we couldn’t, 
then we would never be able to understand toddlers, foreign speakers, 
and those with various speech impediments. It is only the most highly 
disrupted speech which we cannot understand by usual means. Some 
schizophrenic speech is comprehensible. Some is not. Some comprehen­
sible schizophrenic speech may still be definably bizarre or “schizophrenic” 
in the sense that term has long been used.
[6] Slips of the Tongue, Neologizing and Gibberish.
The relationship between neologisms and gibberish is that both may 
be caused by a failure in retrieving an intended word from the mental
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lexicon. They appear to be severe instances of what in normals are called 
slips of the tongue.
Fromkin (1975) asserted that such schizophrenic errors were no more 
abnormal than normal slips of the tongue, providing as instances of 
normal slips:
3A. Soul hecond path
3B Slee throwed sloth
She says that if one did not know the context or the reference . . .  “soul 
hecond path” for “whole second half,” or “slee throwed toth” for “three 
toed sloth,” these would seem to be gibberish as much as the schizo­
phrenic “He still had fooch with teykrimez.” (X reported in Chaika 1974). 
In this evaluation Fromkin ignores a crucial difference between normal 
slips and psychotic ones. Normal slips show distinct patterns and are in a 
sense orderly as one can retrieve the speaker’s intended words quite 
easily. For instance, one need only isolate the consonant phonemes in 
each phrase Fromkin mentions and move them to corresponding posi­
tions in other items in the phrase until the apparently intended words 
appear. For “soul hecond,” only the initial consonants need be transposed. 
Path can be explained easily on the grounds of similarity of phonetic 
features. Both the intended lexical item and its substitute contain acousti­
cally similar consonants initially and finally,4 and have the same vowel 
sound. Furthermore, confusion of /0/ for /f/ is a common cross-dialectal 
and child language phenomenon as when mouth is pronounced “mouf.” 
“Slee throwed toth” is correctable by moving the initial consonants to 
their proper places. This is a typical anticipatory slip in which the /sl/ of 
sloth replaced the initial consonant cluster of three; then the initial 
cluster of three replaced the initial cluster of toed; finally, the initial 
consonant of toed replaced the initial cluster of sloth, so that the error 
constitutes a retrievable round robin.
This is not possible with the gibberish reported in Chaika (1974a). Trans­
position of phonemes does not correct “[fUc] ’fooch’ with [thekraimz] 
’teykrimez’ ” or [sUwendan] ’sawendon’ saw [th3 rc]’turch’ [fU ]’faw’ [jue 
ri] ’juerie” (Chaika 1974a, p. 260). These schizophrenic errors are not 
orderly as are those presented by Fromkin (1971, 1975). Like a child’s 
errors or a foreigner’s, a normal slip can usually be understood by 
regular human decoding ability. Psychotic gibberish can’t be.
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[7] Synonyms and Glossomania.
GLOSSOMANIA, also known as ASSOCIATIONAL CHAINING, is often cited 
as a particularly schizophrenic verbal display (Werner et al. 1975; Lecours 
and Vanier-Clement 1976). It is related to s y n o n y m y . It seems to me that 
glossomania is related to the fact that synonyms are never complete. 
Even when two or more words share some meaning, typically they do 
not share them all, and even when they do share meaning, they often 
cannot be used in the same contexts. That is, synonyms typically have 
different COLLOCATIONS, words they may co-occur with. They are syno­
nyms only to the extent that they share a common meaning.
For instance, note the differences in the semantically almost identical 
words roast and bake:
• Roast the peppers and the beef.
• Roast the pork.
• Bake the ham.
• Bake the cake or the cookies.
• Bake the potatoes.
• Roast the potatoes.
The kind of potatoes referred to changes according to the verb selected. 
Although both roast and bake refer to cooking in an oven, roast potatoes 
are peeled and cooked with a roasted meat, but baked potatoes are cooked 
with jackets on, often apart from any other foodstuffs in the oven. 
Synonyms, even very close ones, can allude to quite different things in 
certain contexts. Despite their shared semantic features, they often don’t 
easily substitute for each other.
Glossomania is a chaining in which shared meanings of words prog­
ress linearly, so to speak, from one phrase to another, getting progressively 
further and further away from whatever meaning was apparently intended 
as in the following excerpts:
4A. Did that show up on the X-rays?
You’ll see it tonight
I’ve been drinking phosphate.
You’ll see it in the dark (inaudible)
Glows.
We all glow as we’re glowworms. (Patient X reported on in Chaika
1974.)
Here, the mention of X-rays appears to have triggered the mention of
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phosphate, which triggered the statement that something will be seen in 
the dark, which triggered the word glows, which triggered the statement 
about glowworms.
4B. My mother’s name was Bill.
(low pitch, as in an aside, but with marked rising question intonation) 
. . .  And coo?
St. Valentine’s Day is the official startin’ of the breedin’ season of the 
birds.
All buzzards can coo.
I like to see it pronounced buzzards rightly.
They work hard.
So do parakeets. (Patient X reported on in Chaika 1974)
In the above, the name Bill reminded X of the now almost archaic 
expression bill and coo, which is a reference to lovebirds. Hence, St. 
Valentine’s Day, the holiday of love, is mentioned, followed by com­
ments about birds, including another repetition of coo, this time attributed 
to buzzards. Expressions like “they work hard” are common short phrases 
of the sort that are often spoken in full almost as automatic responses. In 
fact, it is such bizarre couplings, here of buzzards and working hard, that 
are especially indicative of the automatic nature of glossomanic chaining. 
Phrases and words related to each other in some way elicit each other, 
although they are inappropriate.
The following samples of glossomania were elicited by Bertram Cohen 
(1978) from first admission acute schizophrenic males describing 
Farnsworth-Munsell color disc #2, a salmon pink:5
5A. A fish swims. You call it a salmon. You cook it. You put it in a 
can. You open the can. You look at it in this color. Salmon fish.
Here, the color reminds the speaker of the color of a fish, a salmon. 
Salmon is typically eaten after it has been cooked and canned, hence the 
allusions to this process. What is especially interesting in this response is 
that the very first statement of identification is the generic “a fish swims,” 
even before the color is identified. The swimming has nothing to do with 
the color naming task, but fish swim and the color reminded him of a 
fish.
5B. Pancake make-up. You put it on your face and they think guys 
run after you. Wait a second! I don’t put them on my face and guys 
don’t run after me. Girls put it on them. (Cohen 1978, p. 29)
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In this, Cohen’s subject apparently correctly identified the discourse 
as being the color of pancake make-up which goes on the face and which 
is something identified with girls who want to attract guys. This leads to 
the comment that the speaker doesn’t use it, so that guys don’t run after 
him which is followed by the avowal that girls use pancake make-up.
The following were all elicited from Disc #35
5C. How blue I am (singing). If I were blue, I ’d like to be this green 
instead, I really like it. You could put it in a salad and eat. (Cohen,
p. 28)
Here the green color chip apparently reminds the patient of a com­
monly sung or spoken phrase involving the color blue which is related to 
green, and like green has a special metaphorical sense. Blue is associated 
with melancholy in English, and green with youth or innocence.6 Both 
can appear syntactically after the verb be to indicate the state mentioned, 
as in “I am blue/green” or “She is blue/green.” The mention of the target 
word green triggers the food that is usually green, salads, and that, in 
turn, elicits eat.
5D. Green (SHOUTS) Hold on, the other is too! In the garden 
such a green is unlikely. Too synthetic! The other is more gardenreal 
[Cohen’s spelling as one word], piecemeal, oatmeal green, greenreal, 
filmreal, greenreal. (Cohen, p. 28)
This shows still other kinds of associations. Green is evocative of 
gardens, but the speaker feels that this particular green is not the green 
of gardens. It is synthetic. Synthetic is the opposite of real, so the speaker 
combines into one word repetitions of both garden and real. This evokes 
the rhyming association of piecemeal, which leads to another compound 
word with meal, then the green is picked up again, this time wholly 
inappropriately as oatmeal is not really green. Then both green and real 
are triggered, this time in a new compounding. Cohen gives the spelling 
of real in filmreal, but the association could very well have been reel of 
film. The homophony of real and reel could have triggered the word film. 
As will be shown shortly, glossomanic chaining may also occur because 
of other kinds of similarity between words such as their rhyming or 
alliteration, and then we have to see the differences caused by antonymy.
In all of the above passages, chains of utterances are related to each 
other on the basis of partial semantic similarity of immediately prior 
statements. As Vonnegut (1976) wrote of his own schizophrenic episode,
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the schizophrenic pays too much attention to everything at once. Irrele­
vant associations which are norm ally suppressed come to the fore 
inappropriately, leading the SD speaker to hop from one to the next 
without relating them to a topic. Many of these synonymous chains also 
have common expressions like “they work hard,” “I am blue,” and 
“picnic on the green” interlarded with the semantically triggered retrievals.
Such output indicates a lack of control of normal speech processes in 
which such phrases and lexical associations do not usually figure. That 
this can happen even in relatively constrained environments is amply 
shown in Cohen’s study.
[8] M orphemic Glossomania.
Glossomania can also be triggered by chance repetition of morphemes 
with or without shared meanings:
6 . . . .  Das ist vom Kaiserhaus, sie haben es von dem Voreltern, von 
der Vorwelt, von der Urwelt, Frankfurt-am-M ain, das sind die 
Franken, die Frankfurter Wurschtchen, Frankenthal, Frankenstein . . .  
(M aher 1972, p. 9)
Besides the semantic connection of the Kaiserhaus with the Voreltern, 
ancestors, there is the repetition of the morpheme Vor- in Vorwelt, and 
the -welt in Urwelt, and, of course, the Urwelt is literally the Vorwelt as 
well. Since the Kaisers were descended from the Franks, there is a 
semantic connection between Kaiserhaus and Franken. The city Frankfurt- 
am-Main was named for the Franks, therefore eliciting mention of die 
Franken. Frankfurter Wurschtchen, little sausages made in Frankfurt, repeats 
the morpheme Frank, as does the name of the city Frankenthal and, of 
course, Frankenstein. We certainly have no difficulty seeing the connec­
tions between the phrases in 6 above, but we still feel its bizarreness. In 
addition to the repetition of morphemes, this passage also displays 
alliteration. In  German, a word initial V as in Vorwelt and von and the F  
in Frank are both pronounced as [f]. Th is chance alliteration might also 
have prompted the mention of these words.
This passage consists of words that are especially tightly related both 
morphemically and semantically in certain features. It is, nevertheless, 
incoherent and recognizably schizophrenic because it is not subordi­
nated to a topic. Each phrase is glued to others by inherent features in the
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lexicon of German. The phrases in which some of the words are embedded 
are themselves trite phrasing serving as a vehicle to present the words.
[9] Rhyming and Alliterating.
Glossomania may also be triggered by chance phonological features of 
words, resulting in rhymes and alliterative strings inappropriate to the 
topic or occasion of discourse, as in:
7. [in response to Farnsworth-Munsell disc #2]: Looks like clay. 
Sounds like gray. Take you for a roll in the hay. Hay day. May day. 
Help! I just can’t. Need help. May day. (Cohen 1978, p. 29)
8. [in response to statement “Hello, anyone here want some coffee?”]: 
Head, heart, hands, health. (Chaika, 1974a)
The alliterative chain “head, heart, hands, health” appeared to have 
been prompted by an exceptionally strong aspiration on “Hello . . .  here 
. . .  ” the h ’s elicited the “four H ’s” (of the young farmers’ organization). 
This is virtually a clang response. Clark (1970) comments that this kind 
of response occurs in word association testing, especially if subjects are 
forced to respond rapidly, although 8 did not result from any limit on 
response time.
The following two were produced in the ICS:
9A. Little girl in candy store. Mommy and Daddy away [pause] that 
day. . . .
9B. Little girl in candy store. [pause] Runnin’ free. Her parents did 
not really care. So she just gets up and takes to the air.
The last two, 9A and B, were produced by the same person one week 
apart. In both instances, the patient uttered these with a strong repetitive 
beat, and paused before the rhyming line just as if he were reciting 
poems in grade school.
[10] Intrusive Matters.
At times, psychotics may start talking on a topic and suddenly slip into 
another. This differs from glossomania because there is no chaining on 
the basis of morphemic or phonological similarity. Rather while speak­
ing of one thing, the patient suddenly starts to recount another. The 
following narrative was elicited by asking a patient to describe the ICS
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videotaped sequence. The videotape showed no boys, nor did it have 
anything to do with anybody looking out for anybody else, or anybody 
getting blamed for anything or anything about men using other people. 
The narrator here did mention that the video brought back memories, 
but there was no elucidation of “that area” or what it is that people will 
do every time. There seems to be a general mixing up of various ideas 
and memories of actual events:
10 . . .  I was watching a film of a girl and um s bring back memories 
of things that happened to people around me that affected me 
during the time I was living in that area and she just went to the 
store for a candy bar and by the time oooh of course her brother 
who was supposed to be watching wasn’t paying much attention he 
was blamed for and I did not think that was fair the way the way they 
did that either so that’s why I ’m just asking yah could we just get 
together and try to work it out all together for one big party or 
something ezz hey if it we’d all in which is in not they’ve been here 
so why you just now discovering it. You know they they’ve been 
men will try to use you every time for everything he wants so ain’t 
no need and you trying to get upset for it. That’s all. That’s all.
Harrow, Lanin-Kettering, Prosen, and Miller (1983) employ the termi­
nology “intermingling and loss of set” for such speech. They use this 
terminology for glossomanic chaining as well (Chaika and Lambe 1985). 
Their terminology just labels the behavior. It does not explain it in any 
way. In what ways does it intermingle? How is this different from normal 
recollection of the “Oh, that reminds me . . .  ” variety? As we shall see, 
changes of topic, hence “loss of set” is a normal and usual phenomenon. 
Yet, 10 above is typical of psychotic speech. How does it differ from 
normal changes of topic and what can have caused it?
[11] Automatic and Controlled Processes.
Comparing psychotic glossomanic productions to normal ones subor­
dinated to the topic or nature of the social interaction makes manifest the 
difference between controlled and automatic retrieval of linguistic forms. 
Glossomania sets off a round of synonyms, rhymes, alliterations, or 
personal memories not germane to the matter at hand. This seems to be 
an automatic process. Normal speech is controlled, subordinated to both
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the social situation and the intent of the speaker. There is no such control 
in glossomanic chaining and related intrusions.
[12] Antonomy, Opposite Speech, and Semantic Feature.
Schizophrenics also have been reported to use an antonym of an 
appropriate word or to otherwise select the wrong word for what apparently 
would be the correct meaning.
11A. Dr. Dean, come here.
Pt. What, you said go already.
Dr. No, I didn’t say go. I wanted to sit down near you Dean.
(Patient leaves room, and doctor follows)
Dr. Mr. Redfield, come on, I want to talk to you.
Pt. You want to talk to him? (pointing to another patient)
Dr. No, I want to talk to you. Laffal (1965, P. 84)
11B. [the patient said] yes for no, always for never, I  do know for I  
don’t know. (Laffal, 1965, pp. 31-35).
11C. I seen a little girl lookin’ in the window ’n ah say wan’ 
some ice cream so but didn’t have money to get it so she asked 
her mother ’n her mother said not now because it’s near 
suppertime uh the kid was put down so he goes to the father ’n 
the father say ch-told where to go gave him the money so she 
could buy ice cream . . .  she was sittin’ there . . .
Laffal believes that the patient used opposite speech in order to avoid 
the therapeutic situation. It is entirely possible, however, that the patient 
was having difficulties in discriminating between words which share 
semantic features. 11A, for instance, was produced after a stretch of 
gibberish. The patient who produced 11C was telling me what he had 
seen in a video I had presented the week before. He confused masculine 
and feminine pronouns, and the sittin’ there referred to the girl’s standing 
there. It is surely not without significance that the substitutions seen 
here parallel the kinds of error prevalent in normal slips of the tongue. 
Fromkin (1971, p. 46) says
The literature and my own data attest the fact that, besides the 
phonological similarity in substituted words, errors often involve 
semantic features in common or substitution of antonyms, i.e., words 
having the same features with opposite values.
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She gives as examples of antonymous slips:
• I really like to—hate to get up in the morning
• It’s at the bottom—I mean—top of the stack of books
• This room is too damn hot—cold
• The oral—written part of the exam.
Normal slips of the tongue commonly consist of antonyms or other 
words in sets so that people say up for down, more for less, big for little, or 
stove for refrigerator. Children typically use one-half of an antonymous 
set to stand for each, for instance saying up when they are in your lap and 
want to go down. Additionally, in word association testing, antonyms are 
the most common response, even more likely than synonyms. The rea­
son for this is that antonyms are actually more alike than synonyms are. 
They typically can appear in the same linguistic environments and 
share all features of meaning save the one that distinguishes between 
them. For instance,
• This elevator goes u p / This elevator goes down.
• I want m ore/ I want less.
• He’s so big/ He’s so little.
• Put it in the stove/Put it in the refrigerator.
Antonyms and related words in sets, unlike synonyms, are easily 
substitutable for each other, which explains why they are more likely 
to be given in word association tests than synonyms are. This is true 
of words that belong in the same semantic sets, such as color words. 
Such responses are called paradigmatic associations (Clark and Clark 1977, 
pp. 477-483). It is generally conceded that testing of word associations 
gives us a picture of the probable organization of the mental lexicon. It 
is important, therefore, to note that schizophrenic errors implicate word 
sets that are common responses in word association testing.
There is corroborating evidence for the position that opposite speech 
and other confusions of semantic features on words are not deliberate. A 
patient, here called Y, presented me with what appeared to be some 
interesting confounding of closely related words. Consequently, I devised 
a simple test to see if he could distinguish whether or not certain 
sentences and words meant the same thing or not (Chaika 1977). During 
our first interview, Y commented:
12. I think you can [help me]. You’re an open system.
I’m an open system.
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Knowing that the verbs have and be (Chapter 5 ) have the same 
meaning in certain paraphrases, I suspected that he might have meant 
’You have an open system. I have an open system.’ In 12, the verb be is 
inappropriate. Humans usually can’t be systems. However, in certain 
sentences, those involving locations, have and be alternate depending 
upon the subject of the sentence. If a location is the subject of a sentence, 
a form of the verb have must be used, but a synonymous sentence with 
the location postponed to the end of the sentence would require be, as in
• The box has toys.
• The garden has roses.
Here, the box is the location of the toys, and the garden is the location of 
the roses. Because the locative noun is in subject position, it does not 
take a preposition, although speakers know that the subject is the location. 
If the location appears at the end of the sentence, then the preposition 
must be stated and the verb is a form of be,7 as in
• Toys are in the box.
• Roses are in the garden.
One can’t say Toys have in the box.
Because Y told me that he was a cookware salesman, in the same 
conversation I asked whether he gave discounts. He replied
13. Yes, I ’m 75%, 50%.
This makes sense only if one assumes that Y meant ’Yes, I give 75%, 
50%. This again appears to be a confusion between two words with shared 
semantic features.
As Bendix (1966) showed, a componential analysis of English verbs 
reveals that there is a large set of verbs which share a great many 
semantic features, and, like antonymous pairs, differ from each other 
only by one value. Although the verb take is not the issue here, it will be 
used to illustrate componential analysis of semantic features. Give and 
take share the meaning of “be in possession of.” These are reciprocal 
verbs, indicating the same action. They differ in that the source of one 
action is the object of the other. If Jack gives me something, then I took it 
from him. There is also a feature of time involved. To take is to be in 
possession at the time one is speaking of; that is, it is to have possession. 
To give is not to be in possession at that time; that is, it is not to have 
possession. Give (and its reciprocal take) contain both the features of be 
and of have. Notice the four-way synonymy of the following:
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• I gave him arms.
• He took arms.
• He was armed.
• He had arms.
If Y had a disruption in his ability to assign semantic features to 
lexical items, he could easily confuse have, give, and be. The disruption 
need not be permanent. It coincided with his psychosis at the time of the 
interviews. To test this hypothesis, I devised a simple test. After receiv­
ing informed consent, Y was asked to tell whether two short sentences 
differentiated only by antonyms were alike or different. These were 
presented orally with the verbs in different persons and tenses and the 
order of presentation was randomized. Typical sentence pairs were:
• I have an open system/I am an open system.
• You are 75%/ You give 75%.
• John brought books/John took books.
• Henry lost his watch/Henry found his watch.
He said that each pair above was the same. His incorrect judgment on 
the first two pairs coincided with his incorrect production of 12 and 13 
above. He did confuse the pairs of verbs have and be, and be and give, 
saying they meant the same thing in contexts in which they didn’t. Thus, 
as Fromkin noted in slips of the tongue, he substituted words with 
semantic features in common. He also substituted antonyms, words 
having the same features with opposite values, such as brought and took, 
and lost and found.
Y did not have complete inability to judge antonyms8 for he correctly 
identified the following pairs as being different.
• I became 40/1 am 40.
• Jack is tall/Jack is short.
• I take 75%/I give 75%.
He was then tested on sets of words, some of which differ in their 
morphological structure, notably affixes, and some of which are antonyms. 
He had no difficulty in distinguishing the following pairs as being 
different.
• lie-liar
• lie-truth
• tall-short
• trap-trapper
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• hypnotize-hypnotist
• tall-taller-tallest
However, again, he judged the following as being the same when 
given as individual words.
• is-has
He also rated as being alike:
• getting into-getting off.
Both the opposite speech presented by Laffal and patient H’s twin 
difficulties with antonymy and synonymy match Fromkin’s slip of the 
tongue data.
Kaplan (1957) claimed that “opposite speech,” the use of the antonym 
of a target word, comes from “a relatively lower stratum in the develop­
ment of linguistic thought organization.” That is, it represents a step 
prior to the selection of an intended word. Jason Brown (1977), speaking 
more broadly, says, “Even pathological speech forms can be thought of as 
a preliminary level in normal language that pathology has brought to 
the fore.” That is, the word actually uttered is not the one intended, but 
one related to it in one or more different ways. Such a view explains the 
correlation of opposite speech with slips of the tongue and responses in 
word association testing, as noted above. It also explains the occurrence 
of opposite speech in schizophrenia. That, too, can be seen as an instance 
of retrieval of words semantically related to target words. In a sense, 
opposite speech and other such retrievals are severe and persistent 
examples of the slip of the tongue phenomena.
Although he interprets these data differently from me, Laffal (1965) 
demonstrates that the words in opposite speech are antonymous to those 
appropriate for the context. “I do know” vs “I don’t know” is an antonymy 
at the level of syntax as well as of semantics, as the language encodes that 
meaning onto a grammar rule operating at the level of the clause.
[13] Effects of Synonymy, Antonomy, and Phonology on Schizo­
phrenic Speech.
Interestingly, errors caused by retrieval of antonyms of apparently 
target words do not seem to be implicated in the kinds of verbal chaining 
that are strongly associated with psychotic speech. The reason for this 
might be that the antonymic set is completed with two words or phrases,
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the two opposites, whereas synonyms, rhymes, and alliterative sets are 
far longer and more complex. There are typically several synonyms and 
paraphrases for any given word or phrase, there are potentially many 
rhymes, and, of course, many words start with the same sound. Therefore, 
once a synonymic, rhyming, or alliterative chain is accessed, it can 
literally go further than an antonymic set. There is not so much of a 
natural brake for these as there is for antonyms which can be considered 
chains with only two links.
[14] W ord Salad and O ther Disruptions in Syntax.
The picturesque term WORD SALAD was coined to describe an odd 
jumble of words which sound like connected discourse, but are lacking 
the syntactic markers to subordinate them to syntactic structures. This, of 
course, leads to incomprehensibility even when the words themselves 
are quite ordinary and usual, as we see in:
14. After John Black has recovered in special neutral form of life 
the honest bring back to doctor’s agents must take John Black out 
through making up design meaning straight neutral underworld 
shadow tunnel. (Lorenz, 1961)
Allied to word salads are stretches of discourse which, for the most 
part, conform to normal sentence structures but in which some syntactic 
markings are, nevertheless, missing. As in the following, it is often 
possible to decode these simply by adding the missing syntactic cues. In 
15A, for instance, the verb and noun suffices -ing and -ion are missing, 
and in 15B, verb tense and possessive endings are missing as indicated in 
the boldfaced words, as is -ize on memory. Also, such syntactic markers as 
the use of the auxiliary do in “I still not have . . . ” is omitted:
15A. . .  succeeded in the pull of a perfect crime . . .  framed by the 
artificial inseminate Detroit Michigan is in danger of have of World 
War I I I  site Russia and Israel is try to drive me to approve of war 
against Canada. (Herbert and Waltensperger, 1980, p. 85)
15B. I am being help with the food and the medicate. . .  to speak 
and think in a lord tongue . . .  the memory knowledge . . .  I still not 
have the thought pattern. . . . (courtesy of Dr. Bonnie Spring)
The above show clear instances of errors in sentence syntax and 
certainly falls into the category of agrammatism. Syntactic markers such as
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the -ing morpheme to indicate gerunds, the -ion morpheme to change a 
verb to a noun, and the -ing indicating the present progressive of try are 
all missing.
[15] Perseverations.
Besides missing syntactic markers, the larger discourse in which 15B 
was embedded also showed perseveration beyond the requirements of 
the discourse (Chapter 7, 9, 10, 11), resulting in the repetition of words 
and phrases such as the food and the medicate. The pathological nature of 
this perseveration can be appreciated only by seeing the entire. There 
can be no explanation for psychotic speech without also taking into 
account such perseverations
16. well I want to work for god9 in the mission and to work for god 
in the mission you have to be able to speak and think in a lord 
tongue in my opinion now to speak and think in a lord tongue you 
have to be able to memory the process memory the parle- the 
process in the bible the thought pattern the brain wave and your 
thought process must be healthy enough and your legs must be 
healthy enough to when you want to study and and from when you 
want to study and progress in the way of the lord you should you 
should read the bible and as you read the bible you should if you 
are in good shape physical and mental and mental good shape and 
physical good shape you should be able to with your thought process 
your mental process and your brain wave you should be able to 
acquire the memory knowledge necessary as to study the bible to 
speak and think in a lord tongue you should be able to memory all 
the knowledge down on down on the page in the bible book to work 
for god in the mission now in the position I am in now with the 
medicate andwith the hospital program I am being helped but at 
the same time that I am being help with the food and the medicate 
and the the food and medicate and the ah same process that I am 
being help by the food and medicate and the and the ah rest I feel 
that I still do not have this I still not have the thought pattern and 
the mental process and the brain wave necessary top open up a page 
open up the old testament and start to memory it the old te- the old 
new testament page of the bible start to have me-memory knowledge 
necessary to speak to think in the lo- speak and think in the lord’s
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tongue while you study while you study the bible while you study 
the bible the memory the knowledge necessary to go to work for god 
in the mission so when your thought problem your brain wave and 
your mental process is quick enough you will be able to memory the 
knowledge in in the old testament and new testament bible and 
from memory knowledge in the old testament and new testament 
bible you are able to memory the knowledge necessary to to mem­
ory the knowledge necessary necessary to think and speak in the 
lord’s tongue and go to work for god in the mission. (Data courtesy 
of Dr. Bonnie Spring)10
Rutter (1985) claims that psychotic speech emanates from a social 
dysfunction, that the speaker fails to take into account the needs of the 
listener. The kinds of anomaly laid out in this chapter make manifest 
the difficulty with such an interpretation. We have seen disruption at 
every level of language, from word formation to discourse.
We all at least sometimes fail to take into account the needs of our 
listeners. Bores frequently do, as do the overly taciturn, but such failure 
does not take the form of gibberish, word salads and the kinds of circular 
discourse we have just seen. These all indicate a larger problem.
The next chapter will attempt to give a unified explanation of this 
almost bewildering variety of linguistic dysfunction, exploring as well 
what schizophrenics have said about their own condition.
Notes
lUsing participant observations, researchers can devise a wide variety of tasks, 
e.g. asking for directions, both during an SD patient’s psychotic bout and when in 
remission.
2Robertson and Shamsie (1958) do claim that a multilingual patient was speaking 
different languages in gibberish, but they offer no proof that this was actually so and 
none of the gibberish I have ever heard or seen mentioned in the literature supports 
their conclusion.
3When new words are coined, they typically are not heard as neologisms, but as 
slang or metaphor. For instance, whoever coined the metaphor uptight in the 1960s 
would not have been perceived as uttering a neologism as it was understandable by 
normal means of decoding.
4For the uninitiated, both [f] and [0] (th ) are made by forcing air between the lips 
and upper teeth (for the [f]) and the tongue held behind the teeth (for [0]). Because 
friction is produced, these are both called fricatives. Additionally, both are produced 
with the vocal cords spread apart so that a hissing sound is produced. This results in
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voiceless sounds. Both are voiceless fricatives. When sounds are so similar they often 
are involved in slips of the tongue. (Voiced sounds occur when the vocal cords are 
relaxed and air pushed through them vibrates, as in making a [v]).
5Cohen’s interpretation of these data did not agree with mine, however, and he is 
in no way responsible for my interpretation.
6Notice that other primary colors like red, orange, or white cannot be used alone 
to indicate some other state.
7Actually, other verbs could also be substituted for be with slight differences in 
connotation, such as “The toys are lying in the box" and “Roses are growing in the 
garden.” This does not affect the analysis here, however, since the alternation 
between have and be still holds, so that a confusion between them still can occur.
8The reader may disagree that be and become are true antonyms. They pattern 
with antonyms because they can be inserted in the same environments in most 
instances.
9The transcript of this monologue capitalized the first person pronoun and 
nothing else. I have adhered to this practice.
10Dr. Spring does not necessarily endorse my interpretations of these data, however.
Chapter Two
THE NATURE OF DEVIATION 
IN PSYCHOTIC SPEECH
The variety of deviations associated with schizophrenic speech 
can be seen to arise from a deficit in speech production, one 
probably related to other known deficits in schizophrenics and 
their relatives, such as those revealed in studies of eyetracking. 
Viewing schizophrenic deviations in terms of path control allows 
us to see an underlying unity in what appears to be a bewildering 
variety of deviations. The kinds of deviations long classified 
as being schizophrenic differ from normal errors. Even such 
matters as cliches arise from different conditions in the two 
populations.
[1] Out of Many One.
As one looks at the apparently bewildering variety of SD productions, it is easy to see the reasons for the many conflicting theories about 
what causes it and what it can mean. It is also easy to see why so many 
different kinds of experimental protocols have been attempted, each 
designed to test for some apparent feature of such speech. Insofar as 
these rested upon simplistic views about what language is, their results 
were flawed. A corollary problem has been an incomplete understanding 
of what psychotic language is. This, too, has foiled attempts at an adequate 
understanding of the problem.
It bears repeating that any explanation also must account for the 
variability in the degree of deviance manifested in the speech of 
schizophrenics, especially in terms of linguistic structure (e.g., Brown 
1973; Cohen 1978; Rochester, Martin, and Thurston 1977; Cromwell 
1984; Fraser, King, Thomas, and Kendell 1986; Andreasen and Grove 
1986). It must also explain why only a subset of patients diagnosed 
“schizophrenic” produce structurally deviant speech, and why those that 
do produce it do so intermittently (e.g., Maher, McKeon, & McLaughlin 
1966; Reilley, Harrow, & Tucker 1973; Benson 1973; Chaika 1974a,b,
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1977; Lecours & Vanier-Clement 1976). In evaluating any study, we must 
ensure that the researchers have selected their subjects from among 
those who are SD (Chapter 8). DiSimone, D’arley, and Aronson (1977), 
for instance, say that schizophrenics did not perform like aphasics on an 
aphasia test battery, but they nowhere indicate that they have selected an 
SD population. Even if they had, it is entirely possible that SD psychotic 
speech proceeds from different underlying sources than does aphasic 
speech.
The explanation offered here uses as its empirical base all of the kinds 
of speech data that have been reported as pathognomic to schizophrenics. 
Most important, perhaps, the power of the explanation presented here is 
that it takes a set of ostensibly confusing data and shows that they make 
sense when looked at in a certain way. In the words of Morton (1979, p. 109) 
“Inasmuch as . . .  the model accounts for data and generates further 
understanding, it fulfills its purpose as a psychological model.”
As disparate as the features of schizophrenic speech seem on the 
surface, closer inspection suggests that all of these deviations may actu­
ally be different manifestations of two underlying dysfunctions: lack of 
control over selection of linguistic material combined with inappropriate 
perseverations (Chaika 1982a). Actually, even inappropriate perseverations 
can be seen as a process of getting stuck, which is also a problem in 
controlling one’s speech.
As we have seen, the lack of control leads to the word finding difficul­
ties revealed by gibberish, neologizing, opposite speech, and other erro­
neous word retrieval. It also manifests itself by morphological and syntactic 
errors ranging from relatively transparent failures to attach noun or verb 
morphemes appropriately to speech so disordered that it creates a word 
salad in which individual words are recognizable but their syntactic 
frames are not. Then there are problems at the discourse level, such as 
intrusive material not germane to the task at hand or the general context. 
These are so called because the resultant output is as if incidental or 
unintentionally produced material has intruded. Intrusions actually 
occur on the level of word selection as well as that of discourse itself. 
Glossomanic chaining is as much an intrusion as the wandering narra­
tive in which someone starts talking about events or ideas having no 
relevance to the matter at hand. Lack of control leads to intrusions 
because unwanted or unintended material has intruded into target utter­
ances as a byproduct of problems in speech production.
There is evidence to suggest strongly that at least some SD speakers
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themselves are aware that they are not controlling their speech processes. 
Chapman (1966) interviewed schizophrenics after they recovered from a 
psychotic episode. They told him that they were trying to talk but what 
was coming out of their mouths was not what they intended to say, and 
they could not correct themselves. Similarly, in my own studies, many 
patients apologized for their speech, saying, for instance, that they stuttered 
or couldn’t speak correctly. One patient I observed whose speech was 
larded with gibberish, after seeing himself in a videotaped interview, 
commented “No wonder people don’t understand me. I heard myself on 
tape before but I thought the tape was distorted.”
This same patient said a chipmunk brought him his special language 
in seeds. As is well known, other patients complain that a spirit or some 
other being has taken over their minds or supplied them with a new 
language. Such delusions can possibly arise from their feelings of lack of 
control, of not being able to control what they want to say. People are 
always trying to explain their behavior, especially if they feel that it is 
inappropriate or outlandish. I am not offering this suggestion as God’s 
Truth, but as a hypothesis which explains both the weird language of 
some psychotics, and their own consequent belief that they can no longer 
control their speech and other mental activities, including perceptions.
Such feelings may also be the origin of the intense interest in religion 
evinced so many schizophrenics. They may ascribe the auditory and 
visual hallucinations to their being inhabited by spirits or to special 
messages brought to them by Jesus or a saint or other spirit. In support 
of my speculation here there is independent corroboration of the 
psychotic’s awareness. Chapman (1966) also showed that schizophrenics 
reported distorted vision as well as a lack of control over their speech.1 
Therefore, they assume that they are being controlled by other spirits, 
and that their inability to control their speech is because spirits, good 
or bad, have taken it over. They know that strange things had happened 
to their very perceptions as well as to their ability to speak. Maher 
(1983, p. 154) gives a number of first person accounts of schizophrenics. 
In these, they say they cannot control what they notice. This suggestion 
as to the genesis of schizophrenic claims of being possessed may very well 
also explain paranoia. If one no longer can control what’s coming out 
of one’s mouth—or what one hears as in auditory hallucination—it 
must be very frightening, and the sufferer might well suspect that some 
ones or some things have taken adverse possession or want to do 
that.
T h e Nature o f Deviation in Psychotic Speech 31
[2] The Cycle of Speech as a Symptom.
The analysis presented here not only accounts for all of the kinds of 
deviant speech data reported in the literature, but for the cyclicity of 
their occurrence. Schizophrenic speech disruption is frequently cyclic in 
that a given patient might evince difficulty in a different stratum of 
linguistic production at different times, even in the same discourse. That 
is, at one time, a patient might have intact syntax but evince word- 
creation difficulty; yet, at another time, might show disordered syntax 
although words used seem to be usual words in the language (Chaika 
1974; Rochester and Martin 1979, pp. 177-178).
As Brown (1977, p. 4) noted, “a symptom is a scientific datum no less 
than a sine wave or a synaptic cleft.” Structurally deviant speech is a 
symptom in and of itself and, as such, must be analyzed in its own right. 
This necessarily entails examining speech without reference to the thought 
behind it. The relationship between language and thought will be discussed 
in Chapter 3. Even if one’s scientific or philosophic principles, or both, 
allow one to deduce thought disorder from speech disorder, the exact 
nature of the speech disorder still must be characterized in and of itself. 
If one is basing an assumption of thought disorder on speech disorder, 
then the disordered thought still has to be related to the disordered 
speech.
Often, patients have deviations interspersed between otherwise nor­
mal discourse. This circumstance also must be taken into account in any 
explanation. As Kean (1980, p. 242) emphasizes, “deviant linguistic behav­
ior arises as a consequence of an interaction between impaired and intact 
components of the language faculty.” In all that follows, this must not be 
forgotten.
[3] Punning.
There are, to be sure, occasions for producing normal speech accord­
ing to chance associations as in a punning situation. This occurs if there 
is some way that both meanings of a word can be forced into the topic at 
hand, e.g., read vs red, as in “What’s black and white and read all over?” 
Even here, topic and social situation constrain whether or not the chance 
association is appropriate. In recent years, American advertising has 
been characterized by a fit of punning. These puns have to be carefully 
constructed so that readers or viewers will stop a millisecond or so to
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decode the double meaning. Such puns have got to be clever enough to 
catch the ear and eye and to imply good things about the product. For 
example, a face lotion advertising that it is pH balanced, advertised “A 
balancing act for your skin.”
In contrast, Maher (1972) gives an example of what appears to be 
punning gone wild. Phonological shapes of words cause the puns, which 
seem clever enough at the outset, but degenerate into a punning 
glossomania:
1. To Wise and Company,
If you think that you are being wise to send me a bill for money I 
have already paid, I am in nowise going to do so unless I get the 
whys and wherefores from you to me. But where fours have been 
then fives will be and other numbers and calculations and accounts 
to your no-account no-bill noble nothing.
We see here intricate puns on wise and whys, including nowise, and the 
association of the common expression whys and wherefores all of which 
seem related to the complaint to the company, but the pun on -fores and 
fours, like other kinds of glossomania start veering off the topic. The 
number word five seems to be an intrusion of the number after four, just 
as the words calculations and accounts seem to have been triggered by the 
mention of numbers and of bills. Since accounts are bills, the writer then 
makes another pun, this one on the negative evaluation of a person, a 
no-count, which leads to no-bill which reminds the person of noble. Given 
the tightness of these associations and our love for puns, this passage 
seems enormously clever, but the irrelevant punning and the chaining 
character of each successive pun puts it squarely in the camp of glossomanic 
chaining. Once in a while, such chaining can be felicitous. Usually it is 
just baffling and strange.
Note that none of these perseverations involve unusual or “strong” 
association per use, contrary to Chapman et al. (1964) and Chapman et 
al. (1976). For instance, the relationship between wise, nowise, no bill and 
noble is quite unusual, so much so that the chaining is startling. Nor does 
such glossomanic perseveration show “weakening of constructs” (Bannister 
1960, 1962). Indeed, the bond of meaning that causes associational chaining 
is, if anything, stronger than in normals since the chaining is based upon 
accidental sharing of morphemes, accidental rhyming and alliterating, 
and accidental sharing of partial meanings. In normal speech words and
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phrases are chosen to advance a topic, not because their structures are 
similar.
[4] W ord Finding and Creativity.
Chapman (1966) and Chaika (1974), albeit on somewhat different 
grounds, argue that errors like gibberish and neologizing are indicative 
of a word finding difficulty. Considering that human languages are so 
constructed that new words can be made up and old words can be used in 
new ways to effect new meaning, it is not likely that incomprehensible 
neologizing and gibberish are a sign of creativity (Forrest 1976; Fromkin 
1975). When new words or new meanings on old words are created 
normally, they are subordinated to a target meaning. Moreover, they can 
be utilized again by speakers or writers, and admit of discussion by their 
creators. None of these conditions seem to apply to psychotic neologizing.
There is usually a recognizable difference between normal creativity 
and schizophrenic novel usages although, as we have seen, in instances 
such as James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake, there may be question (Andreasen, 
1973). It is not without significance, however, that Joyce like other artists 
of his day was experimenting with presenting the reader with the 
protagonist’s stream of consciousness, that interior dialogue usually hid­
den from public view. This explanation does not depend upon the 
question of whether or not Joyce or any other stream-of-consciousness 
artists actually studied Freud, but psychoanalytic constructs were exhila­
rating to the intelligentsia and the works of many artists were stimulated 
by him whether or not they actually read him. Freud’s belief in the inner 
reality of a well-developed unconscious had an undeniable effect on 20th 
century artists who then tried to explore the unconscious in their works.
As opaque as many such artistic works may be, if the artist develops 
them, refines them, works on them over and over, and can discuss his or 
her productions, we can still count them as art, in the sense of deliberate 
working of linguistic material. Joyce, for instance, is said to have worked 
painstakingly on Finnegan’s Wake for 17 years. Joyce scholars claim that 
he reworked older sections in accordance with newer ones. His highly 
intricate verbal and mythic motifs definitely showed an artist’s control. 
This is all in great contrast to the random output of psychotics, output 
that is rarely repeated on two consecutive days, if even in two consecutive 
conversations. All the evidence that I have been able to gamer from the 
psychiatric literature and my own contacts with SD schizophrenics shows
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a random associational course usually dependent on what their first 
sentence or phrase was, then in response to someone else or not. SD 
nonce-productions, then, are random, show no development, and show 
no working-over of material, nor do they show the relationship between 
the parts of a discourse to the whole (see Chapter 9). Genius often 
consists in being able to forge connections between new and dispa­
rate phenomena, but this forging is controlled. In contrast, psychotic 
slippage causes phrases, both usual and bizarre, to be juxtaposed with no 
control and usually with no further development, and this is true even 
when we can point to the presence of overtly stated cohesive devices (see 
Chapter 6).
[5] Perseverations.
We have seen several kinds of perseveration: repetitions of morphemes 
like -welt and Frank- or of phonological shapes like whys, wise, no-bill and 
noble. Sometimes the perseverations simply repeat words, as in
2 A . . .  Send it to me, Joseph Nemo, in care of Joseph Nemo, and me 
who answers by the name of Joseph Nemo and will care for it 
myself. Thanks everlasting and Merry New Year to Mentholatum 
Company for my nose, for my nose, for my nose, for my nose, for my 
nose. (Maher 1968, p. 30)
In word association testing, Clark and Clark (1977, pp. 477-483) also 
speak of syntagmatic associations, words that commonly precede or 
follow another word. These figure in responses in word association tests, 
such as whistle eliciting stop or long eliciting fellow. In schizophrenics, 
syntagmatic responses also occur, but, besides such usual ones shared by 
many speakers of a language, apparently idiosyncratic syntagmatic 
responses may occur, as in the connections between the parts shown 
below, such as the questions about Paradise or the comments about 
liking the families on Mill Avenue:
2B. Mill Avenue is a house in between avenues U and avenue T  I 
live on Mill Avenue for a period of for now a period of maybe fifteen 
year for around approximate fifteen years I like it the fam—I like 
every family on Mill Avenue I like every family in the world I like 
every family in The United State of America I like every family on on 
Mill Avenue I like Mill Avenue is a is a block with that is busy 
cars always pass by all the time I always look out the window of
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my front porch front porch at time when I s- when I ’m not sure if 
it’s possible about the way I think I could read people mind about 
people’s society attitude plot and spirit so I think I could read their 
mind as they drive by in the car sh- will I see Paradise will I not 
see Paradise should I answer should I not answer I not answer w- 
their thought of how I read think I could read their mind about 
when they pass by in the car in the house pass by in the car from 
my house I just correct for them for having me feel better about 
myself not answer will I should I answer should I not answer will I see 
Paradise will I not see Paradise I just correct them to have me feel 
better about myself about the way I think I can hear their mind r- 
about the way I think I could read their mind as they pass by the house 
Mill Avenue is also Mill Avenue is also a place of great event for 
all the families that live on Mill Avenue always eht- receive world 
wide attention and I am o- I am just one of the families live on 
Mill Avenue that always receive world wide attention so therefore 
[unintelligible] to receive world wide attention is receive world wide 
attention is some some you should be proud of you should be 
proud of world wide attention (unintelligible) there’s the family 
are just too out in the open not to have world wide attention so 
they all have world wide attention by the cars pa—that pass in 
the front cars that pass by all the time so therefore Mill Avenue 
is also a a I like a quiet residential n- block like a quiet residential 
block with a Italian people talk outside by the fence discuss their 
feelings their attitudes their opinions opinion about any story feeling 
concept idea or sentence that they may have and once again when I 
look outside the window because I think I could read people’s minds 
about people’s society attitude plot and spirit w- should I answer 
should I not answer will I see Paradise will I not see Paradise I not 
answer correct them have me feel about better about myself like I 
said before I ’m not sure if it’s possible about the way I think I 
could read people mind about people’s society attitude plot and spirit so 
I not answer them I just correct them have me feel better about 
myself Mill Avenue is also a place where people gather in back yards 
to have people gather in back yards to have a barbecue in the back 
yard to have relative over to have friend over to talk in the back yard 
to be merry with each other. (data courtesy of Dr. Bonnie Spring)2
Even where phrases are repeated such as the “should I answer should I
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not answer. . .  Will I see Paradise will I not see Paradise . . . ” the repeti­
tions serve none of the usual purposes. They are reminiscent of refrains, 
but they fail as true refrains for four reasons. First, they do not come at 
predictable points as a true refrain does. Second, they do not function to 
strengthen some message or to create cohesion. Third, all the repetitious 
phrases in this passage are not repeated entirely and in the exact way as 
true refrains are. Rather, they seem to be randomly accessed sometimes 
after the start of a word which is then broken off. Fourth, the repetitions 
often seem to be broken off willy-nilly again in the middle of a phrase. 
The effect is that of a broken record in which the needle keeps getting 
stuck at certain points as well as skitters over tracks, accessing parts of 
refrains.
Both the glossomanic chaining and the pseudo-refrains are perse­
verations. In the case of the chaining, accidental similarities of mor­
phemes or of meanings of words cause the chaining. It is as if the patient 
accesses one word or morpheme, and then, instead of ignoring its affiliates, 
so to speak, simply continues accessing other words connected to the first 
in some structural manner. In contrast, one normally accesses the word 
or phrase one wishes in order to express an idea or to otherwise give 
information, but then one goes to the next item which will advance one’s 
topic, all the while avoiding those which do not do that regardless of 
whether or not they show some structural similarity to a word just 
expressed. To do otherwise is to lose what Werner et al. (1975) termed 
“path control” in fashioning utterances.
The inappropriate rhyming and alliterating associated with psychotic 
speech are also manifestations of inappropriate perseverative chaining. 
In these instances, chaining is on the basis of repeated final syllables 
(rhymes) or first sounds (alliteration), or both. Perseverations may be on 
several planes all at once, not simply one of rhymes or of morphemes.
The intricacy and intertwining of perseveration is beautifully illus­
trated in the sequence mentioned earlier “Looks like clay. Sounds like 
gray. Take you for a roll in the hay. Hay day. May Day. Help!” Cohen 
(1978, p. 29). This started out as an appropriate response to the color 
naming task which evoked this sequence. Besides the perseverating of 
the -ay in making the rhyme of ‘’clay and gray, the two first sentences 
share the paradigmatic “looks like” and “sounds like,” both part of the set 
of two-part verbs used for describing the senses. Since “sounds like” is 
wholly inappropriate here, it can be seen both as an intrusion of a 
member of a set, but also as a perseveration of the construction [verb of
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sense] +  like. Additionally, the color gray seems to have been mentioned 
because it is a color and this was a color-naming task, as well as because of 
its chance phonological association with clay.
Although clearly the initial motivation for saying “mayday” may have 
been the rhyme, the end of the sequence, “Mayday. . .  Help! I just 
cannot. Need help.” are semantically related. Even without positing that 
the patient really wanted help, which is entirely possible, the round- 
about way of asking for it is peculiarly schizophrenic, arising as it does at 
the end of a rhyming sequence. This passage, so notable for its rhyming 
and its ultimate semantic chaining, also shows syntactic chaining. Its first 
three sentences are all [Verb +  Object] without overt subjects. That is, 
“Looks like clay,” “Sounds like gray,” and “Take you for a roll in the hay” 
and, later “Need help” all show the same basic syntactic frame. Then, 
too, looks like and sounds like are part of a paradigm of verbs + like that 
are used for describing experiences of the senses. Intrusions, then, are 
irrelevant but structurally similar items, and perseverations continue 
down what may have originated as an intrusive pathway.
The richness of the possible perseverations and intrusions in psy­
chotic speech is matched by the richness of the associations of words in 
our brains which range from phonological, syntactic, semantic, cultural, 
and personal connections (Miller 1978; Forster, 1978; Morton 1979; Clark 
1970; Deese 1965; Clark and Clark 1977, pp. 411-414; Foss and Hakes 
1978, pp. 105-110, 122-124. Lieberman (1984, p. 47), for instance, lays out 
the way words in memory form associational networks in which phonetic 
representations serve as addresses to semantic readings. For his purposes, 
he considers initial sounds, positing a dictionary-like mental lexicon. 
The data from SD speech suggests that these phonetic addresses are even 
more complex, including final syllables, for instance, so that words are 
also connected to those that rhyme with them. Lieberman’s model of 
“associative distributive neural models” is certainly consistent with the 
interpretation presented here for glossomania. Every word in the lexicon 
is associated with many others. Further, each word is associated in many 
ways: according to shared sounds, number of syllables, shared meanings, 
shared registers, shared derivations, shared topics likely to elicit them, 
and the like (Miller 1978). Given this richness, the apparent diversity of 
psychotic speech is explicable. The underlying process of impaired 
retrieval itself can be quite simple, but because this process can tap into 
an intricate and extensive set of networks, the output seems bafflingly 
varied.
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Whatever factors that lead normals to screen out irrelevant associa­
tions and to control their output somehow fail for SD schizophrenics. As 
Rose (1976) said of free associating
Once the brain has “chanced upon” a particular state, perhaps as a 
result of random or spontaneous firing, as in dreaming, the ensuing 
states will follow almost by necessity. (p. 262)
[6] Failures in Subordinating.
There is an alternate way of looking at the same data, that of failing to 
subordinate at different levels of linguistic processing. Neologisms and 
gibberish can also be seen as failure to subordinate sounds to appropriated 
word shapes, just as word salads show a failure to subordinate words to 
sentences. Failure to use appropriate inflectional markers is also a failure 
in subordination, as is failing to use appropriate syntactic markers like 
-ize, -tion, or -s’ Intrusive matters not pertaining to any discernible topic, 
as in glossomania, are also failure of subordination.
Topic is to discourse what sentence is to word and what word is to 
sound. T he question of topic itself and its role both in producing dis­
course and understanding it merits a chapter in itself (Chapter 10). For 
now we note that language forms a hierarchy of subordinating structures. 
Failing to subordinate any level in this hierarchy into its appropriate 
higher structures leads to deviations.
These failures are major disruptions in speech production. In normal 
discourse, sounds and morphemes (such as Vor- or pu p)  are always 
subordinated to word shapes. Words have to be subordinated both to the 
syntactic requirements of the sentence and to the topic at hand. If a given 
word reminds the normal speaker/hearer of another topic, a signal is 
given announcing that. For instance, one says, “Ooh-that reminds m e,” 
or “not to change the topic, b u t . . . ” In some way, change of topic is 
announced, and subsequent utterances become subordinated to the new 
topic. By contrast, SD schizophrenics flit from one associated word or 
phrase to another, often with far fewer and shorter pauses than normal 
speakers (Rochester et al. 1977b; Silverman 1973). This last suggests a 
lack of planning in their productions.
Speech often considered most pathognomic of schizophrenia typically 
is not controlled by any discernible topic (Lecours and Vanier-Clement 
1975; Werner et al. 1975). As already noted, even if the utterance starts
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out with a phrase relevant to the context and topic at hand, it quickly 
veers away from it. Grice (1975, pp. 51-55) and Van Dijk (1977, p. 109) 
consider mention of matters extraneous to the topic at hand a far more 
serious failure in discourse than omissions of what might be considered 
relevant. Part of our normal decoding strategy is to figure out what has 
been left out. Adding too much detail actually makes discourse less 
interpretable for two reasons. One is obviously the load of remembering 
so much. The other is that if someone does mention something that can 
be figured out, the hearer assumes that there has been a special reason 
for doing so and then has to try to figure out that reason. If the point of 
the discourse is not germane to the overdetailed presentation, its entire 
point is soon lost.
VanDijk (1980, pp. 29-50) convincingly shows that meaning and coher­
ence are dependent on the macrostructure of discourse and the sub­
ordination of microstructures, such as phrases and sentences, to that 
macrostructure. Furthermore, he emphasizes that normal discourse has 
a discernible macrostructure, what is often idiomatically called “the 
point” and “the gist,” as well as “the theme” or “the topic.” It is this 
macrostructure that seems to be missing from much of the discourse 
presented in the literature as “schizophrenic,” even that in which the 
individual words and syntax are not deviant. The importance of a topic 
as a determinant of meaning will be explored later (Chapter 10).
It is the schizophrenic’s failure to subordinate to macrostructure that 
leads to the impairment of communicability found by researchers like 
Salzinger et al. (1978). They used the Cloze procedure on schizophrenic 
discourse. That procedure asks subjects to guess what deletions have 
been made in a given discourse. When decoding normal speech, one 
guesses at parts left out or not heard by referring to what is being talked 
about. Since SD schizophrenics veer off the topic erratically, it is much 
more difficult to guess what they have left out. All the Cloze procedure 
does is show the result of such veering. It is another way of saying that 
SD speech is not controlled and subordinated to a topic. There is a 
similar difference between schizophrenic rhyme and alliteration and that 
of artists. The former is random, caused by intrusions and perseverations 
whereas the latter adheres to a larger topic (Chaika 1977; LaFerriere, 
1977).
Like normal discourse SD schizophrenic output often seems to start 
out motivated by context and purpose. However, subsequent utterances 
may not be so motivated. Rather, unlike normal production, the rest of
40 Understanding Psychotic Speech
the SD production may travel through associated words, cycling through 
them with no checking back to context or purpose, resulting in a cycling 
through associated words, referring back to syntax to put those words 
into a syntactic frame. In the case of complete word salads there is no 
reference back to syntax. In other instances, in fact, in glossomanic 
strings very frequently the syntactic frame of a previous utterance is 
perseverated.
Neologizing, gibberish, and wrong word, including opposite speech, 
are explained by the same circumstance. In these instances, the target 
word is not hit. Rather, as when normals are fatigued or excited, a word 
related to the target is retrieved. With neologizing and gibberish, the 
purposeless course of speech production interferes with the process of 
matching lexicon to proper phonology. If at least some morphemes are 
matched up, then neologisms result. If not, then gibberish does.
Punning, rhyming, alliterating, or other kinds of repeated words are 
also perseverations. If the perseveration cycles through the same syntax 
and words, then repeated phrases or sentences will occur, sometimes but 
not always as a refrain. All perseverations may be interspersed with 
apparently uninhibited “firings” of associated words.
This explanation accounts for one phenomenon that Reilly, Harrow, 
Tucker, Quinlan, and Siegel’s (1975) describe in schizophrenic speech. 
They believe that
. . .  a certain portion of schizophrenics who show marked looseness 
during the acute phase may have always been somewhat vague. . .  
tend[ing] to grasp at the jargon of the mom ent. . .  by virtue of the fact 
that this form of speaking does not give away. . .  the speaker’s funda­
mental disorganization, confusion, vagueness, or lack of comprehension.
A more likely explanation, and one which has the merit of referring to 
observable data, is that cliches are accessed just as individual words are 
accessed. In Chapter 8, we will see such accessing of cliches interspersed 
throughout psychotic narratives.
[7] T h e Relative Rarity of Agram m atism .
There are two possible reasons that there seems to be less agrammatism 
than associative chaining. First, as Bradley et al. (1980) point out, gram­
matical function words are treated differently psychologically than the 
far larger class of lexical words with referential meaning. Disruption in
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grammar, then, is not necessarily mirrored by disruption in word usage, 
and vice versa.
Second, there are fewer possible choices in syntax than in lexicon. 
This suggestion is borne out by the observation of Maher et al. (1966) 
that speech disruption in schizophrenics most frequently occurs at the 
ends of sentences. Under conditions of relatively free speech, speech 
unconstrained by experimental tasks, for instance, in English and most 
European languages, new information typically comes at the end of 
sentences. New information requires the most heavily modified phrases. 
Hence, there are more choices to be made at the ends of sentences, so 
that more mistakes can be made.
Because of the many ways words can be associated in the mental 
lexicon, and because of the complexity of language in general, the 
surface results of such firing appear to be great, resulting in deviations 
such as those presented in deviations 1-8 above.
[8] T h e Explanatory Value of This Explanation.
It should be noted that the explanation given here accounts for all 
data and does not posit steps in speech production for which we have no 
evidence, e.g., Cohen’s (1978) model. He, for instance, explains glossomanic 
chaining in terms of sampling responses and rejecting them for fear of 
punishment. Yet, in all of his examples, it is clear that the first response 
is almost always correct, with each subsequent utterance becoming more 
and more “punishable,” in behavioral terms because it becomes more 
and more bizarre for the context. Furthermore, there is no proof that 
such sampling for punishable responses takes place in production of 
speech, normal or not. Nor does the explanation tendered here ascribe 
putative motivations to the speakers, motivations which cannot be checked. 
One does not get very far asking an SD psychotic what he or she meant 
by what was just said.
The explanation offered here accounts for all of the aberrations consid­
ered typical of SD psychotic speech, including the differing degrees of 
incoherence. The intensity of the inhibitory dysfunction in each patient 
at varying times determines the degree of speech disorder, accounting 
for relatively minor intrusions as well as the most severe.
It also explains the often noted similarity between schizophrenic speech 
and poetic speech. What the poet does deliberately, subordinating to 
intended meaning, is to find new and unusual connections between
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words. The schizophrenic chances upon such connections, although he/she 
cannot control them (LaFerriere, 1977, pp. 33-37). Some claim that 
schizophrenics are being creative, noticing new connections when they 
utter strings as in 5(a) above (Forrest 1976). Sometimes patients may even 
claim that they are noticing new relation between words. Other patients 
complain, however, that what got uttered is not what they intended to say 
(Chapman 1966). While I was doing an experiment at Butler Hospital, 
one SD patient listened to a tape recording of his speech made during a 
psychotic episode. He wonderingly commented that it was no wonder 
that no one understood him, and that he had heard himself on tape 
before, but he assumed that the tape was distorted.
Even if the patient feels as if he or she is noticing new connections, as 
noted above, the kinds of rhymes one finds in schizophrenic associative 
chaining are usually quite ordinary, about the level one hears from 
young children first experimenting with end rhyme.
Finally, the explanation offered here also shows why speech during 
psychotic episodes is more disorganized than at other times. Our inhibitory 
mechanisms do vary according to our mental states. During excitement 
and times of stress, for instance, “path control” is often lessened even for 
normals, and intrusions and slips increase. At these times, but to a lesser 
degree than SD schizophrenics, normals produce some of the same kinds 
of errors.
[9] Confirmation From Other Research.
Shimkunas (1978, p. 211) claims that schizophrenics show excessive 
verbal-temporal activation as compared with normal controls. Studies 
have shown that “Heightened general arousal, as indicated by skin- 
conductance levels, appears to be primarily mediated by the left hemi­
spheres of acute . . .  schizophrenics.” That is, the language hemisphere 
shows the kinds of overactivation that could lead to the kinds of intru­
sions discussed above. Rochester and Martin (1979, pp. 192-193) agree 
that “it is necessary to suppose some impairment in the left-hemisphere 
processes of schizophrenic patients.”
[10] Autom atic and Controlled Processes.
Comparing psychotic glossomanic productions to normal speech sub­
ordinated to the topic or nature of the social interaction makes manifest
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the difference between controlled and automatic retrieval of linguistic 
forms. Glossomania sets off a round of synonyms, rhymes, alliterations, 
or personal memories not germane to the matter at hand. This seems to 
be an automatic process. Normal speech is controlled, subordinated to 
both the social situation and the intent of the speaker. There is no such 
control in glossomanic chaining.
Stilling, Feinstein, Garfield, Rissland, Rosenbaum, Weisler, and Baker- 
Ward (1987, pp. 55-60) in quite a different context discuss several studies 
of automated processes and how they can interfere with controlled 
processes, the latter being any goal-directed behavior. Typically, in such 
studies subjects first are trained to learn an automatic procedure. Once 
they have, they then are asked to do the controlled tasks. Researchers 
have found that the automatic processes can interfere with the task at 
hand if they they redirect attention from it. Although none of these 
studies seem to have dealt with a psychotic population, they nevertheless 
predict incoherence arising from a state in which automatic processes 
dominate conscious controlled behavior.
Optimal skilled performance seems to balance the speed and high 
capacity of automatic processes with the goal-directedness and flexibil­
ity of controlled processes. A system that acted only by allowing the 
currently most active automatic procedure to carry through to comple­
tion without any influence by goals would be incoherently impulsive 
without consciousness as we know it. [boldface mine] (Stillings et al. 
pp. 59-60)
Glossomania in any of its forms provides perfect examples of the 
takeover of automatic processes, as do word salads and even gibberish.3 
The lack of control seen in these productions is certainly as if word and 
syntactic selection has gone on automatic pilot, so to speak. This is 
probably why gibberish seems to conform to the phonotactics of the 
language, but doesn’t happen to form words. Wandering narratives in 
which personal memories are interspersed, memories which are not 
subordinated to what the patient is supposed to be narrating are also 
examples of automatic processes.
[11] Eyetracking Dysfunction.
That the above analysis is essentially correct is suggested by a quite 
different study by Holzman et al. (1978). This research provides some 
interesting parallels to SD verbal output. Briefly, Holzman et al. found
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that 65 to 85 percent of schizophrenic patients, in contrast to only 6 
percent of normals, show disordered eye pursuit movements. In order to 
pay attention to the swinging pendulum in such studies, subjects must be 
willing participants, but once they look at the pendulum, the pursuit 
system is triggered, so that the eyes follow the pendulum. This kind of 
eyetracking is involuntary attention, unaffected by motivation (Holzman 
et al. 1978, p. 297).
There are two kinds of eyetracking dysfunction. The first character­
ized by short, fast movements, sacades, of the type used to focus, repre­
sents failure to turn on the pursuit system. In the second, “spiky” type, 
the pursuit movement starts, but is interrupted by brief, frequent eye 
arrests. It is as if other interferences do not switch off (Holzman et al. 
1978, p. 300). Not surprisingly, the latter seems to be prevalent in schizo­
phrenics and their relatives.
The speech data presented here are consistent with such spiky-type 
eye movements. The perseverations of syntactic frames or words and 
phrases are like the arrests in spiky-type pursuit. Random travel along 
associative networks of linguistic material is like the spikes. The triggering 
of associated words not relevant to the context seems to be another 
instance of interferences, here previously uttered words, not switching 
off.
It must be emphasized, however, that even if the eyetracking studies 
did not exist, the speech data would still admit of the explanation given 
above, of random triggering of linguistic material (i.e., intrusions) com­
bined with unmotivated perseverations along any of the language networks. 
Both phenomena suggest problems in neurotransmissions affecting the 
speech production capability of some schizophrenics.
[12] Parallels to Other Populations.
Holzman et al. (1978, p. 304) note that eyetracking dysfunction is not 
specific to schizophrenia. Nonspecificity is a help in the understanding 
of dysfunction in schizophrenia. When we see similar effects with known 
or better understood causes, we may extrapolate to the less well known. 
For this reason, with speech data, reference is often made to those normal 
states which most approximate the SD states. Eyetracking becomes impaired 
with age. The older the person, the greater number of eye arrests. 
Besides that found in old age, spiky-type tracking has been described in 
patients who have Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, brain stem and
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hemispheric lesions, as well as alcohol or barbiturate intoxication, all 
indicative of CNS involvement.
Holzman et al. (1978) point out that the movements in spiky-type 
tracking suggests that random, asynchronous neural firing is occurring. 
So do the linguistic data from SD patients. Since the tracking dysfunc­
tion occurs
. . .  in degenerating conditions, including aging, it would be likely that 
the high speed, asynchronous firing reflects not an increased activity of 
some parts of the nervous system, but a failure of inhibiting, modulating, 
or integrating con tro l. . .  to assume that failure of such central nervous 
system inhibitory activities also accompanies schizophrenic conditions. 
(p. 305)
This explanation holds for the language data as well. T he mention of 
words inappropriate to the speech situation, but related phonologically, 
morphologically, semantically, or syntactically, seems to represent lack 
of inhibition of matters extraneous to the context. Maher (1972) made a 
similar observation, positing some sort of attentional dysfunction in 
schizophrenia. Inability to “pay attention” and to subordinate speech 
output may be caused by failure of inhibitory mechanisms. Indeed, since 
normals do not evince inattention by uttering gibberish, random alliter­
ating and rhyming, or making gross syntactic errors, the special quality 
of schizophrenic inattention must be delineated. Dysfunction in inhibitory 
mechanisms seems to discriminate between normal and SD schizophrenic 
inattention.
Brown (1980, p. 294) notes that neologistic jargons are a disorder of 
elderly aphasics. Recalling that the aged also show the kind of eyetracking 
abnormality of schizophrenics, it is reasonable to assume that the degen­
eration of CNS of inhibitory function might also be responsible here, as 
well as for the neologistic jargon of SD schizophrenics.
Green (1985) as a result of dichotic listening testing shows that acute 
schizophrenics could not focus attention on one ear in the presence of 
competing stimulus to another. This, too, is evidence of CNS dysfunction.
[13]  W hy Some Schizophrenics Are N ot SD.
Viewing SD psychotic speech production in this light may help explain 
why all schizophrenics do not evince structurally impaired speech. 
Traditionally, those who do have been termed “thought disordered,” 
whereas those who do not are termed “nonthought disordered.” This
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terminology implies that some who are diagnosed as schizophrenic have 
unimpaired thinking (Chapter 3).
If schizophrenia causes a dysfunction in neurotransmission however, 
then the SD patient can be viewed as one in which the difficulty has 
affected the speech production areas of the brain. Those who do not 
evince SD symptoms, but do have other schizophrenic symptoms, includ­
ing hallucinations and systematic delusions, are affected in other areas of 
the brain, including those that store visual imagery. Some patients may 
be affected in different areas at the same time, or at different times. Note 
that this explanation, although not identical, is accordance to Shimkunas 
(1978, pp. 225, 227-228), for both assume CNS involvement and both 
assume that the schizophrenic is affected by internal stimuli more than 
normal.
Allen and Allen (1985) disagree that schizophrenics suffer from a 
“general loss of control in producing speech” as outlined here. They do 
not offer any actual samples of schizophrenic speech to verify their 
position, nor do they analyze any of the disordered speech easily gathered 
from the literature, including that presented here and in Chaika (1974, 
1982a; Chaika and Alexander 1986) to show how and why such speech is 
not disordered. If, indeed, their experiment did not yield evidence of 
weakness in linguistic path control, such evidence is not lacking in other 
studies and still must be accounted for. In other words, if they can refute 
the long-standing assumption that schizophrenics do not suffer from 
problems in path control, then they must show that the data presented in 
defense of that position can be explained in another way. This is espe­
cially important since glossomanic speech has so long been considered 
particularly pathognomic of this illness. How do they explain the speech 
in 2B above, for instance?
The task upon which Allen and Allen base their conclusions, the 
Thematic Apperception Test gave each patient only 2 minutes to describe 
each of 4 pictures. It has repeatedly been shown that the more bounded 
the task, the less psychotic speech disintegrates. This was one of the 
earliest points made by Maher, for instance. As we saw above, glossomanic 
chaining often starts out fine, but as the speech event continues it 
becomes more and more bizarre (also see Cozzolino 1983, p. 121). Within 
the confines of a 2-minute output constrained by a picture, we would not 
expect loss of path control. It is vital that researchers use comparable 
tasks to compare results. Allen and Allen also consistently interchange 
the word ideas with words for linguistic structures, as in:
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At a local level this involves connecting elements in the previous or 
immediately following part of the discourse. It is this which distinguishes 
meaningfully integrated ideas from collections of unrelated ideas. (p. 75)
As the next chapter shows, terms like ideas are poorly defined. What is 
an idea? How does it correspond to speech? To date there is no firm 
correlation between any linguistic structure and ideas or thoughts. The 
very polysemy of language makes it unlikely that there ever will be. The 
most we can do is to correlate speech structures with meanings, and 
meanings with possible speech structures. That is how languages work.
[14] W h at T h is Exp lan ation  Explains.
This has attempted to explain the diverse speech phenomena long 
associated with those schizophrenics who evince structurally abnormal 
verbalizations. In words of Shimkunas (1978):
Given the complex psychobiological problem that schizophrenia repre­
sents, broad, structurally oriented theorizing appears to be a necessary 
step in the ultimate construct validation of the phenomenon. (p. 228)
The analysis presented here is also consistent with a wide variety of 
findings of attentional and filtering deficits in schizophrenia (e.g., Hemsley 
1976, 1977; Oltmanns 1978; Maher 1972; Schwartz 1978) but goes further 
in offering an explanation for all of the peculiarities of “schizophrenic” 
speech, especially in the combinations in which it is manifested.
It also accords with findings of hemispheric asymmetry in schizo­
phrenics (e.g., Flor-Henry 1976; Shimkunas 1978. Rochester and Martin 
1979, p. 192) as well as with first person accounts of schizophrenic experi­
ences (Chapman 1966; Vonnegut 1976).
It also correlates with at least one other aspect of schizophrenic behavior: 
the eyetracking studies. Furthermore, it does not seem to be inconsistent 
with studies explaining the effects of antipsychotic medication on schizo­
phrenics (Snyder 1978; Sachar et al. 1978; Davis 1978; Matthysse 1978). 
These claim that such medication inhibits the action of biochemicals 
associated with facilitated neurotransmission. In other words, they slow 
down mental functions. T he speech data indicate that SD psychotics can 
use such slowing down.
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[15] Academ ic Disciplines and Point of View.
One problem in studies of psychotic populations is that researchers 
come from diverse academic backgrounds, each with his or her own set 
of constructs into which any data are fit. We are all creatures of our 
training. Linguists have been trained to view language objectively as a 
system of interrelated levels; hence, they are often struck by the disrup­
tion in levels of language evinced by schizophrenic patients. My earliest 
papers had noticed that speech pathognomic of this population could be 
described in terms of disintegration in each of these levels. The well- 
known linguistic scholar Eugene Nida, after listening to one of my 
papers, independently observed to me about a schizophrenic friend:
Observation of pathology is first evident in discourse, second in syntax, 
third in morphology, and lastly in phonology. I could almost predict 
the number of days he had refused to take his medication by the degree 
of disintegration.
Clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, more used to thinking of 
language holistically, and, furthermore, used to equating language with 
the thought behind it rather than as a structure in and of itself, have 
come to different conclusions. For instance, Lanin-Kettering and Harrow 
(1985, p. 3) cite the well-known characteristic of schizophrenic speech, its 
failure to maintain a topic. They refer to this as “an intermingling of 
personal material into speech when it does not fit neatly with the exter­
nal context of the conversation.” They see this as a “mixing of ideas 
related to conflicts and issues of personal concern to the patient.”
This same phenomenon, as we have just seen, can more simply be 
explained by random triggering of interlocking semantic networks. The 
latter explanation requires no assumptions about the patient’s inner 
conflicts, conflicts for which we often have no evidence. This is not to say 
that such conflicts don’t lead to intrusions. They can and do, but that is 
not the same thing as saying that all digressions represent a patient’s 
inner conflicts. For instance, the following excerpt from a monologue by 
X, reported on in Chaika (1974) shows such a digression:
3. Did that show up on the X-rays?
You’ll see it tonight.
I ’ve been drinking phosphate.
You’ll see it in the dark (inaudible)
Glows.
We all glow as we’re glowworms.
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Aside from the veracity of the claim that she was drinking phosphate, 
a claim prompted apparently because of the mention of X-rays, not out of 
any conflict over phosphate, there is the peculiar statement that “we all 
glow as we’re glowworms.” This is semantically related to phosphate, 
which has the property of glowing. In order to validate Lanin-Kettering 
and Harrow’s claim about schizophrenic digressions, we would have to 
try to find some personal conflict related to glowworms. Since X fails to 
mention glowworms elsewhere and her psychiatrist could report no 
other evidence of a concern with glowworms, we can only validate the 
semantic connection between the lexical items in the monologue. That 
is, we can’t correlate it with the speaker’s “conflicts and issues of personal 
concern.” In short, we can explain the digression in terms of the lexical 
structure of English, but we ourselves have to digress from the data in 
order to explain them in terms of thought. The entire question of the 
allowable degree of creativity in extrapolating meaning will be deferred 
until Chapter 11.
Notes
1The schizophrenic preoccupation with religion has frequently been commented 
upon. Many samples of schizophrenic speech over the years have religious material 
in them. Many, many patients whom I interviewed easily derailed onto all sorts of 
religious matters: a concern with salvation, interest in Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
other Eastern religions, claims of communicating with Jesus or Mary or the like. 
Why this should be so has never been explained in the literature, at least so far as I 
can determine.
2I repeat that Dr. Spring does not necessarily endorse my interpretations of these 
data.
3Some Pentecostals and Charismatic Catholics are insulted by terming such 
gibberish “glossolalia” as that term refers also to “speaking in tongues” in a religious 
setting. For that reason, I have chosen the lay term gibberish to indicate this behavior. 
However, it is not surprising that the output of both states, schizophrenic and 
religious, are so alike since both proceed from rising above ego constraints.
Chapter Three
LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT
Because language is used to encode thoughts, many believe 
that thought and language are the same. Frequently, this is 
an unexamined assumption, one held by scholars, clinicians 
and laypersons alike. There are many problems with such an 
assumption, however. The position defended here, a position 
dependent upon language data, is that thought and language 
are separate entities. Although we often convey thought by 
language, this does not mean that language and thought are the 
same.
[1] T h e  Interface between T h ou gh t and Language.
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Until we are forced to examine their relationship, we assume that language and thought are one and the same. Before embarking on 
any discussion of psychotic speech, it is essential to separate the concept 
of language as opposed to thought. As a linguist, one oriented to prag­
matics and discourse analysis, my position has been and still is that one 
analyzes discourse according to verifiable constructs and, from those 
analyses, one proceeds to the thoughts behind the discourse (Chaika 
1974, 1981, 1982a, d, e; Chaika and Lambe 1985). Such an insistence on 
the separation of language from thought has excited much debate, but it 
has been gratifying to see that others have begun to see the value of such 
an approach (Andreasen 1982a; Neale, Oltmanns, and Harvey 1985). 
Harvey and Neale (1983, p. 165) remind us that Bleuler (1950) himself 
made the point that thought and language are not one and the same. 
Still, the issue is clouded for many.
Lanin-Kettering and Harrow (1985, p. 1) claim that my position is that 
“we often see disordered speech in patients who have adequate underly­
ing thoughts and ideas.” Not only have I never made any such claim, I 
do not even see how such a claim can be made at all at this time or in the 
foreseeable future. Not only are there as yet no infallible instruments for 
measuring the adequacy of underlying thoughts, but there has certainly
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been no widespread cognitive testing of speech disordered patients. 
What I have said is that we must first consider in what ways schizo­
phrenic speech is disordered and then determine what mechanisms must 
have gone awry to produce such speech. Then, perhaps, speech data can 
be correlated with thinking.
I have also insisted that any explanation for schizophrenic speech 
must be based upon all the data as elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2. 
Certainly, some schizophrenics show no structural deviation in their 
speech and even those who do, do not necessarily do so all of the time. If 
we do not insist upon the separation of thought and language, then we 
would be in the odd position of claiming that schizophrenics with 
structurally intact speech have no thought disorder. Thought disorder is 
not necessarily accompanied by any of the speech disorders discussed in 
the previous chapters, nor, so far as we know, does it necessarily indicate 
disordered thought (sec. 5).
Andreasen and Scott (1982) and Andreasen (1982b) have revived the 
concept of negative versus positive schizophrenia with the latter includ­
ing hallucinations, delusions, and TD  but the former showing flattened 
affect and paucity of speech. Their specification of negative and positive 
symptoms provides a welcome distinction between the terms TD  and 
SD, and yet unites them on a scale. As the last chapter showed, hallucina­
tions and delusions are related to speech dysfunction even if they are not 
one and the same. As with SD, not all patients have hallucinations and 
delusions and those who do, do not always have them. 2
[2] Schizophrenic Speech or Language?
Holzman, Shenton, and Solovay (1986, p. 361) argue that the term 
thought disorder (TD) should be retained rather than adopting speech 
disorder (SD), because schizophrenics do not share a language or even a 
dialect. This, of course, is very true. In some measure, I myself may have 
contributed to their criticism of the term SD. Chaika (1974) made the 
tactical error of referring to “schizophrenic” language. All language is 
polysemous. The word language can mean either the system that is a 
separate language or it can refer to a specific kind of language within one 
language. For instance, if we hear profanity, we could say, “such language,” 
or strong language as in movie ratings. Neither of these is referred to 
as speech. More recently, in his impressive review of the subject, Cozzolino 
(1983) many times speaks of schizophrenic language as I did, as in enti-
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tling a section The Importance o f Language Analysis fo r  Diagnosis (p. 105.) 
Since I erred in that 1974 article by referring to an intermittent aphasia, 
many scholars devoted themselves to arguing about whether or not 
schizophrenics were aphasic in the sense of the term meaning organic 
impairment. I had used aphasia in its generic sense of speech dysfunction.
The position here is that there is schizophrenic speech, but not a 
schizophrenic language. As already demonstrated, there is a constella­
tion of errors in speaking performance which is associated with some 
schizophrenics, but, to date, there is no solid proof that the underlying 
language system is impaired. To the contrary, Grove and Andreasen 
(1983) have shown that psychotics can process speech, but that their 
output is dysfunctional1 (p. 32). The fact that their processing shows no 
deficit certainly argues for an intact underlying system.
The most compelling evidence that SD psychotics are suffering from a 
speech disorder is that they manifest the same symptoms whether or not 
they have ever even been in contact with other schizophrenics. Non SD 
patients do not necessarily themselves become SD even if they are 
hospitalized together.2 There are many kinds of speech dysfunction, 
ranging from childhood aphasics to stutterers to severe pathologies 
preventing clear pronunciation to that caused by physical damage to 
parts of the brain. Disordered psychotic speech is another of those 
pathologies.
In support of this contention, it has often been reported that there is 
high interrater reliability in discriminating between normal and schizo­
phrenic speech and that lay judges can discriminate between such speech 
and that of normals as well as psychiatrists can (Andreasen 1979a; Kertesz 
1982; Maher, McKeon, & McLaughlin 1966; Rochester, Martin, & Thurston 
1977). Andreasen’s Scale for the Assessment o f Thought, Language, and 
Communication, henceforth TLC, is a widely used scale which engenders 
high interjudge rater reliability. Allen (1985) shows that “a clinician’s 
acumen” can reliably discriminate between SD schizophrenic speech and 
normal speech. This concurs both with previous studies and with the 
contention by linguists that, by and large, native speakers of a language 
can judge if it is being used deviantly without any particular training. 
Gleitman, Gleitman, and Shipley (1972) found that young children 
could make such judgements.
Allen (1985) also makes the interesting claim that “the speech of all 
schizophrenics does indeed differ from that of normals but in as yet 
unspecified ways.” Given the large literature on the characteristics of
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schizophrenic speech, this is a startling conclusion. In contrast to Allen, 
Fraser, King, Thomas, and Kendell (1986) made a linguistic analysis of 
schizophrenic speech and found that schizophrenics did produce syntacti­
cally simpler sentences with more errors than did manic and control 
populations. The judgements of deviance have to proceed from actual 
deviations in the message given.
[3] Thought Disorder or Speech Disorder?
Some clinicians characterize the population of schizophrenics as being 
either TD  (thought disordered) or NTD (non-thought disordered). 
Rochester and Martin (1979, pp. 4-6, 169) argue convincingly that the 
diagnosis of TD is circular since it depends on the patient’s speech. In 
their words, “The clinician proceeds from a personal experience of 
confusion to infer that the patient is confused.” Despite the fact that they 
see the circularity of this concept, still they use the terminology through­
out their work, a study of cohesive ties in narratives.
Several investigations have shown that thought disorder, or what is 
called thought disorder does not distinguish between patient populations. 
Simpson and Davis (1985) found that manics were more likely to be TD 
than were schizophrenics. Harvey, Earle-Boyer, and Wielgus (1984) using 
the TLC found it reliable for discriminating schizophrenics from manics, 
but they also found that the concept of TD was not useful for discriminat­
ing between the groups. Although TD  was present at the outset, “the 
majority of the differences between the two groups were apparently due 
to verbal productivity and not other aspects of “thought disorder (p. 462).” 
Their results vis a vis manic and schizophrenic TD  were different 
from Simpson and Davis.” Harvey et al. found that TD  somewhat was 
more stable in schizophrenics than in manics.
Andreasen (1982) herself makes some compelling arguments that the 
term thought disorder should be revised, also noting its circularity, by 
virtue of its being inferred from speech. She also comments on the 
vagueness of that term. She (p. 296) demonstrates that
Thought is a philosophical term rather than a medical or scientific one 
and therefore should probably be avoided in scientific writing. When 
the concept of thought is invoked, thought process should be distin­
guished from thought content.
She suggests that either the term dysphasia or dyslogia be substituted, a
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suggestion apparently not followed. Some investigators have adopted 
SD, a nomenclature I suggested as it is parallel to the already entrenched 
TD  (Chaika 1982d) Andreasen and Grove (1986), revive thought disorder 
in a discussion of the reliability of the TLC. However, they do reiterate 
that a diagnosis of thought disorder is inferred from speech; thus, is 
circular. It is undeniable that the TLC does work as a diagnostic tool. 
Notice that this doesn’t mean that it reliably measures thought or speech. 
What it does is to allow clinicians to diagnose schizophrenics and manics 
reliably. Andreasen and Grove (p. 356) conclude that “ ‘thought disorder’ 
should not be considered to be pathognomic of schizophrenia or diagnos­
tic of it.” They found that mild abnormalities in language behavior even 
occur in normals, as did Rochester and Martin (1979) and Chaika (1982e, 
1983b; Chaika and Alexander 1986. See Chapter 8).
Harvey and Neale (1983, p. 175) maintain that “ . . .  the term thought 
disorder in its present use is misleading and should be split into two 
categories. . .  discourse failure . . .  deviant cognitive processes that relate 
to discourse failure. They (p. 160) show that “ . . .  a simple designation of 
a patient as thought disordered or not on the basis of a clinical evalua­
tion of speech is not a useful diagnostic sign.”
[4] Is Language Is Based on Thought?
Simpson and Davis (1985) say that “Disordered thought structure 
results. . .  from abnormalities in the pattern of speech such as . . .  word 
salad. . . ” (boldface mine). It is not clear how word salad, which is a 
collection of words lacking syntactic markers, causes thought disorder. 
The term word salad refers to an agrammatical collection of words. It is 
not clear how these can change the structure of thought, especially since 
all humans have collections of words in their mental lexicons, but few are 
psychotic.
More likely, syntactic rules have been violated in word salad, or 
haven’t been brought into play, but anthropological and cognitive lin­
guistics have repeatedly shown that syntax itself does not affect thoughts 
(Kay and Kempton 1984; Scribner 1977; Macnamara 1977; Bickhard 
1987). Rosch (1977, p. 519) insists: . . .  it has not been established that the 
categorizations provided by the grammar of the language actually corre­
spond to the linguistic units.” Macnamara (1977) says that it is not likely 
that we will find a physical resemblance between language and thought. 
McNeill (1979, p. 294) puts it well when he says that grammars describe a
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language, but do not describe “ . . .  (however ideally or abstractly) the 
cognitive functioning of individual users.” Kreckel (1981, pp. 37-38) 
emphasizes “the predominance of cognitive categories over linguistic 
expressions. . .  the predominance of principles of organizing knowledge- 
. . .  over the way of expressing this knowlege. In other words, thought 
and language are not the same, and it is thought that motivates language, 
not the reverse.
Aha! I can almost see the scholarly thrust to the jugular. If thought 
does direct language, then doesn’t that mean that disordered thought 
produces disordered speech? No. There is no evidence at all from 
cognitive or social science studies that there is such an equation. T he one 
thing we can say with assurance is that language does not control thought, 
but we cannot say that thought always controls speech. Commonsensically, 
we can think one thing and say another. We need not say anything at all 
about what we are really thinking. Casual chit-chat and other forms of 
phatic communication often has little to do with conveying thoughts.
[5] T h e  Disjunction Between T h ou gh t and Language.
Although it is thought that determines what language forms we select, 
there is still no one-to-one correspondence between the two. Many scholars 
disagree. Holzman (1978, p. 373) declares “Speech is, after all, spoken 
thought,” an idea reiterated in Holzman et al. (1986). Even though 
speech is often spoken thought, it does not follow that all speech directly 
reflects an individual’s thoughts, nor that all thought is accompanied by 
speech, nor that all deviant speech proceeds from deviant thought 
processes. People can be crazy in quite ordinary speech (sec 6).
Chaika (1974, 1982d) and Chaika and Lambe (1985) have consistently 
maintained that there is a fatal circularity in claiming that speech is 
thought because thought is encoded in speech. In response, Lanin- 
Kettering and Harrow disclaim that
. . .  the inference that strange speech suggests strange thinking is not 
circular since the schizophrenic patient’s strange speech can fit into a 
construct about his disordered thinking that is grounded in a larger 
nomological n e t . . .
In other words, strange speech is caused by strange thinking because 
the strange thinking is grounded in the net of nomology (the laws of the 
mind). Not only does this fail to prove causation, it fails to prove correla-
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tion between strange speech and disordered thinking. Thought is expressed 
through the medium of language, but it does not follow that language is 
a direct expression of thought. That is a logical fallacy. Structurally 
deviant speech can contain logical thoughts that are appropriate for the 
matter at hand. For instance,
In temperance due I don’t see any reason why two men can’t proceed as 
popular as ever both in themselves as a duocratic and as a democratic 
premise. I mean the God-given greatness of this country, and I hope 
there are no more triangular conflicts in a two-party government. 
(reported in Laffal, 1965, p. 133)
As one raised on the premise that two-party systems are essential to our 
democracy, but that a three-party one would weaken it, I find this 
patient’s plea for temperance, the ideation expressed, far from bizarre, 
although the deviations in expression are evident as they are in the 
following from the nonproficient writing of aostensibly normal college 
freshman.
Generalizations have no place in terms of different opinions insofar as 
the discussions of heroes or any other topic.
Again the ideation here is perfectly normal. The student was simply 
trying to say that we cannot make generalizations about heroes or related 
topics. As I was the professor for whom this was written, I was able to 
verify what it was the student meant. This kind of fractured writing is 
not at all unusual from the pens of incompetent writers. The point is that 
the kinds of deviance we see in incompetent normal writers may occur as 
well in psychotic speech and writing. The incompetence in deviant 
sentences in each group arises from different underlying causes. What­
ever causes the incompetence, however, the result is the same. In neither 
instance, is it possible to correlate thought structures with language 
structures.
Another kind of evidence for the separation of language and thought 
comes from Curtiss (1977). She studied the tragic case of Genie, a girl 
tied to a bedpost with no human companionship until she was pubescent. 
Despite intensive training, and a willingness and enthusiasm on her 
part, Genie’s speech remained syntactically like a two year old’s but her 
cognitive processes, including solving problems, were far beyond that of 
a child whose syntax was as rudimentary as hers.
Kuczaj (1983) has also studied the child’s self-learning strategies. As a 
result, he affirms that children are far more sophisticated in language
Language and Thought 57
learning than in any other cognitive sphere at the same age, pointing out 
that children have to deduce such things as abstract form classes and 
rules for manipulating them. The enormous literature on first language 
acquisition has demonstrated time and again that nobody could teach 
children to do what they do when learning to speak (e.g., Menyuk 1971; 
Brown 1983; Bickerton 1981; Wanner and Gleitman 1982). They analyze 
language and show evidence of abstraction and logical deductions from 
their analysis before their second year. There is a great disjunction 
between speech and other cognitive processes in childhood. This argues 
that speech and thought are separate and develop separately.
[6] W hat Is a Thought?
The very concept “thought” is ill-defined. Cummins (1983) has sum­
marized the difficulty psychology has had in defining thought in any 
general way. Thought remains an undefined entity. How then can we 
correlate speech with a concept so nebulous as thought? If we cannot 
make such a correlation, then we cannot define thought in terms of 
speech or vice versa. Nor can we readily determine the interface between 
them.
Is a thought equivalent to a word, a phrase, or a sentence? Traditional 
grammar equates thoughts with sentences, as in the well-known defini­
tion of a sentence as a complete thought. There are many problems with 
this formulation. The first deals with the problem of subordinate clauses. 
Since sentences with subordinate clauses can be broken down into several 
sentences, does each clause contain one thought, or does the entire 
structure punctuated as a sentence represent the thought? Consider the 
following:
1. The boy who dated Griselda before he dated Maria went to his 
prom with Zelda who used to date Oscar.
This can broken down into four sentences: (1) the boy went to his prom 
with Zelda, (2) the boy dated Griselda before, (3) the boy dated Maria, (4) 
Zelda used to date Oscar. How many thoughts are contained in 1 then? 
One or four? If one claims that language and thought are identical and 
that disruption in speech is the same as disruption in thought, then one 
must be able to correlate thought with speech structures.
A second problem concerns the ubiquity of ambiguity and paraphrases. 
In themselves, these show that language and thought are not identical.
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One statement such as “exciting women can be dangerous” can mean two 
very different things like:
2A. Women who are exciting are dangerous.
2B. If you excite women, that is dangerous
If one can get two entirely different thoughts from an identical sentence, 
then language and thought cannot be the same. Similarly, if one can give 
the same thought in divergent ways, then, too, language and thought 
cannot be the same, as in
3A. Despite years of trying, nobody has ever been able to prove that 
language and thought are the same.
3B. Scholars have not demonstrated that linguistic functioning and 
cognitive activities are identical although they have tried to do so 
for a long stretch of time, years, in fact.
Other problems with assuming an identity of thought and language 
structure is that normals frequently make slips of the tongue and other 
errors in speech production. If speech and thought were one and the 
same, these would always indicate disruptions in thought processes, a 
conclusion few would care to make. Rather, it is usually assumed that 
such errors proceed from momentary lapses in retrieving correct words 
or sounds, or lapses in self-monitoring (Fromkin 1971.)
Those patients who do produce abnormal speech during psychotic 
bouts may themselves verify that such speech does not reflect their actual 
thoughts. Chapman (1966) presents several such comments from patients, 
and the patient mentioned in Chapter 2 who was surprised at his speech 
when he saw himself on video is another.
Thoughts cannot be directly observed although speech can (Chaika 
1982d; Chaika and Lambe 1985). If speech shows structural deviance, 
that does not constitute proof that thought does. It is possible for nor­
mals to create nonsense words and sentences although their thinking 
processes may be intact. The classic example is Lewis Carroll’s Jabberwocky, 
which is structurally normal but has words which do not happen to 
appear in the language. So far as we know, the ability to produce this 
kind of nonsense is part of one’s natural linguistic ability. Conversely, 
one can create structurally abnormal sentences from known words such 
as “am girl yesterday went come boy.” One can produce total gibberish as 
Sid Caesar and Danny Kaye did in their comedy routines. They went 
one better. They produced gibberish that sounded like different languages.
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None of these kinds of deviant productions, not even the gibberish, 
derives from any dysfunction in thought. There is also religious GLOSSO- 
lalia  in which people utter concatenations of sounds and others in the 
congregation interpret these as meaning something. Lee (1982) reports 
on two intellectual (his term) glossolalists who claim to remember their 
glossolalic utterances and what they meant. Upon observation, “ . . .  it 
was observed that the form of their utterance changed and did not 
correspond to the given interpretation in a consistent way” (p. 552). As 
much as one might disagree with Pentecostal Christianity’s belief in 
speaking in tongues, one certainly cannot say that those who do this are 
necessarily demented in any way. Many very brilliant people, highly 
intellectual and productive, who seem normal in every way, engage in 
this activity. No researcher into this population has ever found evidence 
that they are thought disordered.
The opposite may also be true. A patient might utter structurally 
normal sentences which indicate impaired cognition. One complained to 
me, “That tape recorder is reaching out and destroying my brain cells.” 
Another asked me if I was still talking. When I said, “no?” He said, 
“That’s not you talking?” He was having auditory hallucinations and we 
were in a private room alone with no person in earshot. I had not said a 
word. Such comments and questions indicate either hallucinations, grossly 
impaired ability to deduce cause and effect, or failure to discriminate 
between animate and inanimate objects, all of which impinge directly on 
thought. Yet there was no disruption of language itself.
[7] Language-less Thought.
Most telling, perhaps, is that there are several cognitive tasks for 
which language is of little or no value, although they certainly seem to 
demand thinking. Language is notoriously poor for describing how to 
use tools or how to construct something. For this reason, descriptions of 
mechanical devices typically contain copious diagrams. The best way to 
teach someone how to sew or to use any kind of tool is to demonstrate it 
physically. No language is needed at all. Anyone who has to put together 
a complicated toy from verbal directions knows how little good verbosity 
is for a guide in this sphere. It is with good reason that trade schools 
emphasize hands-on experience. Yet, certainly, figuring out what one 
needs to do to achieve certain ends with tools involves problem-solving 
skills as well as other thought processes.
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One sees this disjunction in academic pursuits. Richard Lambe pro­
vides the example of teaching statistics. Many concepts in the text become 
comprehensible to the student only after he or she has begun to put the 
techniques to practice when solving statistical problems. Similarly, many 
teachers have had the experience of difficulty in verbalizing abstract 
material when they have had to teach it, although they were able to solve 
complex problems using the same principles when they were students 
themselves.
Neisser (1976) cites the complex mental imagery involved in the 
orienteering of the Puluwat as they travel hundreds of miles over the 
open seas in their canoes. He shows that their orienting schemata accept 
visual information and direct action with no necessary interface of 
verbalization. Similarly, city dwellers have recursive cognitive maps 
upon which they act daily, but do not necessarily—indeed, frequently 
cannot—verbalize the landmarks upon which they base their actions.
Note that all of the above disjunctions between language and cognition 
involve very different kinds of thinking: verbal, mechanical, mathematical, 
concrete, abstract, orienteering. What constitutes “thoughtness” of all 
these kinds of thinking?
[8] Confusion Between Language and Thought.
There is an essential distinction between speech, an overt behavior, 
and thought, a cognitive process inferred on the basis of many different 
overt behaviors including speech. The fundamental importance of this 
distinction requires the fullest possible analysis of psychotic speech qua 
speech since no inference can be more secure than its base in observation.
We have first to explain the observable linguistic behavior and not 
confuse the issue by talking about thought disordered (TD) vs non- 
thought disordered (NTD) speakers. Indeed, if one is using structural 
deviation as the basis of dividing schizophrenic patients into TD  vs. 
NTD, then one is in the peculiar position of claiming that some schizo­
phrenic patients, those with structurally normal speech, are not thought 
disordered. Why then do we consider them schizophrenic? One would 
assume that all psychotic patients suffer from an impairment in thinking, 
but structural deviations in speech in and of themselves are not the proof 
of that nor are they proof of the nature of the impairment.
Lanin-Kettering and Harrow (1985, p. 4) provide an example of the 
problems attending undifferentiated constructs of language and thought.
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They argue that “a flexible boundary should be maintained concerning 
what is considered a problem in thought versus what is considered a 
problem in language.” Such a procedure obviates all science. One cannot 
push the boundaries of analysis around willy-nilly. One needs princi­
pled reasons for establishing, changing, and maintaining boundaries. 
The alternative is to advance ad hoc explanations. By definition, this is 
the stuff of fable and prejudice, not medicine or science.
They ask, “When we discover stretches of discourse that show prob­
lems in cohesion, should we attribute them simply to a speech-language 
dysfunction independent of and subsequent to thought?” As Chapter 6 
shows, cohesion in discourse is effected by syntactic means. It is not at all 
unusual for speakers to fail to apply the appropriate means in speech or 
in writing. Effecting cohesion for one’s listeners/readers is an ongoing 
problem even in the most ordinary of interactions. Hence, comments 
like, “I don’t follow” or “Run that by me again” or even “Huh?” If 
language were one with thought, such promptings would not be necessary.
Following Chaika and Lambe (1985), the position here is that we must 
first unearth the nature of schizophrenic speech behaviors in and of 
themselves, and then we must correlate those with other cognitive and 
problem-solving tasks. We are in a poor position to use speech as an 
inferential base for claims about thought until we understand more 
clearly the interface between speech and thought in normal as well as 
well as nonnormal populations.
If we seek to explain speech in terms of cognition, then the underlying 
cognitive skills for which we are testing must be those known to figure in 
speech production. This, of course, forms the basis to my objections 
about word association testing as a way to determine dysfunction in 
speech. Since speech is never normally produced on the basis of associa­
tions between semantically or phonologically-related words, results of 
word association tests do not explain production. Even if people give 
weird word associations to words given in isolation, that doesn’t explain 
weird sentences or discourses because sentences aren’t formed on the 
basis of word associations. Similarly, theories like faulty pigeonholing 
do not explain speech dysfunction because speech is not produced on 
the basis of pigeonholing.
62 Understanding Psychotic Speech
[9] Inference from Perform ance Versus Evidence.
There is a difference between what we infer or suppose or imagine and 
what we observe. For instance, Lanin-Kettering and Harrow say that we 
may justifiably deduce from the outward facial expression of a frown that 
someone is depressed. However, such an inference is justifiable only 
after specific neuromuscular pathology has been ruled out such as tardive 
dyskinesia. Moreover, a frown does not only indicate depression. It may 
indicate intense concentration or it may be only a pretended frown 
assumed for purposes of discipline or humor.
In defense of their equation of thought with language, Lanin-Kettering 
and Harrow (1985, p. 2) make the interesting claim that “we do not 
understand all of the details about many of our best constructs. . .  [but] 
they can still be useful and valuable even before we have gained com­
plete understanding of them” and then “prove” this by saying that 
intelligence is one such construct, “e.g., highly intelligent people per­
form better on intellectual tasks than less intelligent people.” This is a 
classic example of circular reasoning. If you define intelligence as what 
is measured by certain tests, then obviously those who do well on those 
tests are intelligent, but that doesn’t mean that intelligence is a valid 
construct, or a construct at all, or that people who do well on those tests 
are genuinely more intelligent than those who do not.
Their second example of a poorly understood construct is that of the 
“concept of the gene which was at the level of construct for many years 
until recent advances provided strong evidence for the physical existence 
of genes.” The problem here, counters Richard Lambe, is that as these 
advances were made, in observation as well as inference, the entire 
concept of what a gene is itself changed as well, so that the original 
constructs were modified or altogether abandoned. In sum, utilizing the 
construct of thought in the absence of hard data about it is as likely to 
yield fallacious correlations with speech as it is to yield valid ones.
[10] Discriminating Between Competence and Perform ance.
Lanin-Kettering and Harrow argue for discriminating between compe­
tence and performance, what deSaussure long ago termed la langue 
versus la parole. Although Chaika (1974) did assume a deficit in compe­
tence, subsequent research has indicated that this was putting the cart 
before the horse. Chaika, like previous authors, was attempting a charac-
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terization of performance, extrapolating from that a characterization of 
competence.
The entire question of competence vs performance when applied to 
research in a linguistically impaired population is a can of worms. 
Neither de Saussure nor Chomsky derived their theories from mucking 
about with real people. Chomsky himself has repeatedly warned that his 
theories are not necessarily applicable to the real world. He has on 
several occasions specifically disavowed any practical applications of 
transformational grammars to teaching or psychology. This is not to say 
that they cannot be so used. It is just that he claims no necessary 
psychological or pedagogical validity for them.
The problem with questions of underlying competence rests largely 
on the problem of deciding what constitutes competence in the first 
place. For instance, some aphasics with known lesions do know that their 
utterances are faulty. Does this mean that their competence is all right, 
but their performance is not? Recall also that Chapman (1966) interviewed 
schizophrenic patients after psychotic episodes. He reports that they 
complained that while they were psychotic they were not able to say what 
they intended. They recognized the deviation in their speech but at that 
time were not able to correct it. Can we say that their competence is 
diminished because they can’t say what they want? Or do we say that it is 
only a performance error? If they recognized the deviation, then that 
argues for intact competence, but if they cannot produce structurally 
nondeviant speech, is not that a matter of competence as well? Or is it 
performance?
If upon release, a patient evinces surprise at a tape recording of his 
disrupted speech during a psychotic bout, does that mean that he was not 
linguistically competent before the viewing, but he was after? Or did he 
simply have performance problems before? In a subsequent hospitalization, 
should we consider his performance but not his competence impaired 
just because he was able to judge his speech as deviant during a prior 
hospitalization?
Consider also patients who claim to be possessed by spirits or other 
outside agencies and that this accounts for their garbled speech. What 
does this mean in terms of competence vs performance? It may be that 
such an explanation derives from the patient’s desire to explain what he 
or she perceives as deviant speech. If so, does this argue that the patient 
suffers only from a deficit in performance? Given a patient whose speech 
is so disintegrated that he or she descends into uninterpretable gibberish,
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can we really say that competence is not affected at least during the time 
of the disordered performance? It is incumbent on any scholar to describe 
how they distinguish between competence and performance if they wish 
to use that distinction in their explanations.
[11] T h e Lexicon Has Fi x e d  Concepts.
The strange associational chaining seen in schizophrenia is evidence 
of lexical storage with interlocking networks between lexical items. As 
Chaika (1982a; Chapter 2) observes, the triggering in these chains often 
seems to be “thought-less” although the individual lexical items in other 
contexts would communicate thoughts. What makes these chains so strange 
is that although we can figure out why one lexical item is triggered by 
another on the basis of semantic or phonological features, there is no 
meaningful connection in terms of the communicative situation. That is, 
we know why the chaining occurred but we can’t derive meaning from it.
Lanin-Kettering and Harrow employ a static conception of language. 
They assume that “language provides an intricate system of concepts 
that is the foundation and instrument of conceptual activity.” For lan­
guage itself to be the foundation of concepts, the meaning of lexical 
items would have to be fixed. However, a crash course in the Oxford 
English Dictionary quickly reveals just how drastically meanings change 
over time, and they do because lexical items do not have fixed meanings, 
constructs, or concepts. Nor do speakers and writers have to redefine a 
word used in a somewhat new context. They need only be skillful 
enough to use it so that a hearer can figure out its meaning in a given 
context. Hence, some years ago, an innovative use of rip off resulted in a 
meaning of “steal” added to the original one of “tearing something off 
of something” and gay has pretty much lost its earlier meaning of 
“lighthearted fun.”
Meanings of words are the most changeable part of a language. Unless 
we assume that our “foundation . . .  of conceptual activity” changes every 
time someone uses a word in a new way, then there must be some 
differences between the words and the thoughts behind their selection. 
Also, the very fact that any concept may be conveyed by many different 
words and sentences, that is, can be paraphrased, indicates that language 
may be the instrument of thoughts, but words are hardly a static system of 
concepts.
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[12] Strange Speech Is an Undifferentiated Given.
Unfortunately, many of Lanin-Kettering and Harrow’s arguments are 
weakened by imprecise terminology. For instance, they repeatedly refer 
to “strange speech.” Do they mean “strange in the sense of structural 
strangeness,” or “strange in the sense of bizarre imagery or claims?”
Content and form in speech are two very different things, constituting 
situations that may well take very different explanations. Paraphrases 
often take very different forms even when they mean the same thing. By 
definition, paraphrase must be in a different structure and use different 
words than the item paraphrased. As the next chapter will show, the very 
selection of a synonymous verb may result in a very different sentence 
form. It would be difficult to the point of impossible to figure how many 
possible paraphrases any given sentence might engender, even one quite 
semantically simple. The problem is that any speaker can be skillful 
enough to employ an old word in a new sense. Therefore, even though 
one person might finally hit a point beyond which his or her ingenuity 
can think up a new paraphrase, another person might be able to come up 
new ones. There is no fixedness of form in language.
[13] Explanation of the D ata.
Any explanation for schizophrenic speech must account for all of the 
data observed. We cannot sweep data embarrassing to our personal 
scientific constructs under the rug. In addition, any explanation must 
accord with what we know of the structure of normal language and 
speech, how it is acquired, how perceived, and how performed. We know 
that speakers do make slips of the tongue and have other temporary, 
even transient, problems with encoding their thoughts, such as not being 
able to explain to another exactly what one means in a given instance. 
Whether in writing or in speech, “the right words” may be a long time 
coming.
A behavioral explanation for schizophrenic speech would have to 
show how one class of people was stimulated to respond linguistically 
with the peculiar combination of features of SD speech, and, at that, only 
during psychotic bouts. Even in a family with a history of schizophrenia, 
all children do not become schizophrenic and even of those that do, not 
all evince archetypal schizophrenic speech. Berenbaum, Oltmanns and 
Gottesman (1985) showed that twins do not necessarily both evince
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formal thought disorder. Berenbaum et al are careful to say (p. 4) that by 
thought disorder they mean speech disorder, “—such as derailment, 
incoherent speech, and non sequitor responses to questions—and not as 
an inference of underlying pathology in cognitive processes.” Moreover, 
there are also SD patients who do come from families with no other 
schizophrenics surrounding them, SD or not. How could they have 
“trained” to speak this way?
Behavioral explanations for schizophrenic speech have been advanced 
since Bleuler (1950) because of the “associational” character of glossomanic 
chaining. Behavioral psychologists study the ways that one event is 
associated with another. The problem in schizophrenic speech is that 
normal speech is never produced by chance associations of shared semantic, 
phonological, or syntactic relations of one word with another. What 
makes such speech deviant is the fact of the chaining itself.
Rutter’s (1985) theory that schizophrenics fail in communication because 
they don’t take into concern the needs of the listener fails on similar 
grounds. He is correct. However, it is a usual thing in discourse for 
people to fail to take into account the needs of listeners. These include 
bores, nags, long-winded pests, professors whose lectures are “over the 
heads” of their students. However, none of these break into word salads, 
gibberish, neologizing, and glossomanic strings. What requires explana­
tion is why one class of people, psychotics, behave linguistically in a 
manner perceived to be bizarre by laypersons and scholars alike. Rutter’s 
theory begs the question.
[14] Vygotsky.
Vygotsky’s ( 1934a,b3) Thought and Language has taken on fresh impor­
tance in recent years partly because of his early insistence on the cultural 
origins of language learning (Hickman 1986; Lee 1987; Paprotte and 
Sinha 1987; Lucy and Wertsch 1987; Holzman and Newman 1987), and 
partly because of his discussions of word associations and, as we shall see, 
of his formulation of the concept of INNER speech , a form of speech 
completely unlike overt speech. The latter two domains of inquiry have 
been attractive to clinicians as well (Harrow and Quinlan 1985; Kozulin 
1986).
By inner speech, Vygotsky does not mean the internal dialogues 
and monologues which we all regularly indulge in. These are in our 
normal everyday tongue, using our regular vocabulary and syntax.
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These differ from outer speech only in that we utter these inaudibly or 
not at all. However, if we did utter them, we would be using our normal 
pronunciations. Grumet (1985, p. 185) quotes research which shows that 
such internal dialogues are accompanied by sensorimotor excitation in 
the larynx, tongue, and lower lip measurable by electromyographic 
impulses. It is not unusual to notice normal people moving their lips 
and tongue while actively engaging themselves in such self-speech. 
However, this kind of internal speech is subauditory normal speech, not 
the kind of speech which has its own laws.
We can pay tribute to Vygotsky’s brilliance, but still acknowledge that 
many of his ideas have been superceded in the half century since his 
death. Vygotsky’s theorizing about schizophrenia forms a very small part 
of his work. He believed (1934b, p. 129) that schizophrenics can only 
think concretely, a position with which Kozulin (1986, p. xxxiii) and 
Harrow and Quinlan (1985, p. 159) concur. Vygotsky bases this belief on 
the erroneous one that primitive people think concretely, a view no 
longer held. We have come to realize that such judgments derived from 
the inability of anthropologists to come up with tests that elicited the 
mental operations being investigated. We still don’t know how to test 
unerringly for cognitive skills. As Scribner (1977) pointed out, in her 
studies of the Kpelle in Liberia, she regularly saw them using cognitive 
skills in daily life although in formal testing they couldn’t seem to use 
them. Similarly, many of Vygotsky’s pronouncements on how children 
think have to be modified in view of more recent research.
Perhaps Vygotsky’s greatest appeal to clinicians is because of his 
conception of inner speech. He4 (1934b, p. 30-32) posited that children 
first accompany their activities with EGOCENTRIC speech (pp. 30-34) and 
that this develops into inner speech (pp. 225-235). He conceives of this 
inner speech as originating in truncated external speech. In time, it 
develops into everything preceding speaking, except thought itself (p. 249). 
Moreover,
. . .  it is a specific formation with its own laws and complex relations to 
the other forms of speech activity . . .  the opposite of external speech. 
The latter is the turning of thoughts into words . . .  With inner speech, 
the process is reversed, going from outside to inside. Overt speech 
sublimates into thoughts. (p. 225-230)
Nowhere does Vygotsky describe this formation, give us any of its 
laws, nor tell us how he knows what these relations are. He also ( 1934a, 
P. 135; 1934b, p. 230) claims that his formulation of inner speech unfolding
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inwards, so to speak from egocentric speech, is “ . . .  a fact and facts are 
notoriously hard to refute.” Kozulin (1986) sums up Vygotsky’s position 
as
. . .  the predominance of sense over meaning, of sentence over word, 
and of context over sentence are rules of inner speech. While meaning 
stands for socialized discourse, sense represents an interface between 
one’s individual (and thus incommunicable) [italics mine] thinking and 
verbal thought comprehensible to others. . .  in inner speech words 
must sublimate in order to bring forth a thought. In inner speech, two 
important processes are interwoven: the transition from external com­
munication to inner dialogue and the expression of intimate thoughts 
in linguistic form, thus making them communicative. (p. xxxviii)
Kozulin says that inner speech is incommunicable. If it can’t be conveyed 
to someone else then we know neither what it is nor how it relates to 
outer speech. If it is incommunicable, then we can’t know anything about 
it. Nobody can observe it. Nobody can communicate it. What, then, is 
inner speech? Vygotsky (1934b, p. 225) denies Kurt Goldstein’s formula­
tion of it as the preverbal stage, the stage in which ordinary language 
does not figure, that shadowy area of motive and “the whole interior 
aspect of any speech activity.” Vygotsky especially descries such “inartic­
ulate inner experience” because it “dissolves” separate structural planes. 
The construct of inner speech can be tempting. Psychiatrically, for 
instance, one could assume that the strange verbalizations of SD schizo­
phrenics is inner speech breaking through. The problem is that, despite 
Vygotsky’s claims, what he describes, the very development of inner 
speech in the child and the existence of inner speech itself, are not facts.
By his own definition, Vygotsky’s definition of inner speech is unobserv­
able, unknowable, and untestable, hence, unscientific. Even so uncritical 
a pair of reviewers as Lucy and Wertsch (1987, p. 81) demur that Vygotsky 
“did not sufficiently account for the differentiation of the egocentric 
function from the social function of speech.” Vygotsky died long before 
the significant research into linguistics, cognition, and language acquisi­
tion that we have today. Research methodology has become more 
sophisticated, as has the uses of statistical measures. None of my argu­
ments mean that there is no inner speech. I cannot prove that it does not 
exist any more than Vygotsky proved that it does. Like Freudian and 
Chomskyan interpretation, this one aspect of Vygotsky’s work remains a 
matter of faith.
Because they impinge on questions of schizophrenia, Vygotsky’s views
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on language learning also require some mention. Vygotsky died long 
before the explosion of research into language acquisition and linguis­
tics that we can draw upon today. In part, his conceptions rested 
unavoidably upon an inadequate view of the complexity of the task. For 
instance, he (1934b, p. 219) thinks that children start out expressing 
single words because their thought is “an amorphous whole” and that as 
they develop inner speech, they learn to map their thoughts onto larger 
structures.
Intensive study into language acquisition has confirmed that the map­
ping actually goes in the other direction. The toddler frequently uses 
single words to indicate sentential communication before he or she has 
had a chance to learn syntactic rules. We now know that the reason that 
children start out with one word utterances is that it is not possible 
simply to imitate language (Ervin 1964; Chaika 19895, pp. 17-18). At the 
time of the one-word stage, children haven’t figured out the complexity 
of rules for word formation, much less for syntax and discourse, but this 
doesn’t mean that their thinking is so limited. Gleitman, Gleitman, and 
Shipley (1972) showed that children under the age of 4 use adult stan­
dards to make grammatical judgments about the well-formedness of 
speech, even though the children themselves are still making the errors 
in their own productions that they detect in others.
Their knowledge is in advance of their actual linguistic skills. For 
instance, children confuse most sets of antonyms and other words in sets, 
such as wife, mother, and sister (Donaldson and Wales 1970; Clark 1971, 
1972, 1973)6 for the same reasons that adults have so many slips-of-the- 
tongue involving them (Chaika 1974, 1977). Antonyms are used in the 
same syntactic environments and share a good many semantic features 
with each other. The child may confuse the words big and small, but this 
does not mean that he or she doesn’t distinguish between a big piece of 
cake and a small one.
More recently, Slobin (1982), who has studied language acquisition in 
children learning languages as diverse as Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, and 
Italian, warns against assuming that a child’s immature syntax mirrors 
similarly immature thinking. He suggests the metaphor of a waiting 
room. Children make use of the linguistic means at their disposal to 
express what they wish “while ‘waiting’ to master the adult forms 
(p. 168).” Lois Bloom (1970) even earlier made the point that even when the 
child was limited to a two-word utterance, like “Mommy sock,” he or she 
would use that utterance for a variety of meanings, such as “this is
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Mommy’s sock,” “Mommy, put on the sock,” “the doll has on Mommy’s 
sock,” or “let’s find Mommy’s sock.” The child certainly knows the 
difference between these meanings, but has to use what is at his or her 
disposal, depending on the adult to match the utterance to the context to 
get the right meaning.
Vygotsky’s conclusion (1934b, p. 231) is unwarranted that a child’s 
egocentric speech derives from “insufficient individualization of pri­
mary social speech,” such that children do not separate it from social 
speech and is “a correlate of the insufficient isolation of the child’s 
individual consciousness from the social whole” (p. 232).
To the contrary, study after study on child language acquisition has 
given us a picture of the child as an active investigator, controlling his or 
her input, setting up his or her own practice drills, deciding what he or 
she will learn (e.g., Brown 1973; Menyuk 1969; Kuczaj 1983). A particu­
larly American experience illustrates. Children of European immigrants 
have regularly failed to learn their parents’ native language despite 
being raised in homes in which it was spoken regularly. The United 
States provides us with a virtual laboratory of the baby’s sense of auton­
omy from social speech as represented by the languages spoken in its 
home. A very common occurrence in immigrant homes was—and is—that 
children as young as 2 years old make no attempt to imitate or practice a 
language spoken by grandparents, or even parents.7 The fate of bilingual­
ism in America shows clearly that toddlers have already separated their 
individual goals from their families’. The family language constitutes 
the first social speech of the child.
In quite a different context, Cook-Gumperz and Green (1984) show the 
dangers in assuming that egocentricity8 in speech causes a child’s speech 
productions, such as narrating a story in what appears to be a highly 
idiosyncratic way. What they found was that apparent deviations in such 
narrations actually represented a first step, so to speak, in relating 
stories. They examined books written for young children to see what 
effect these books might have on narration, finding that children include 
in their verbalizations representations of the pictures which accompa­
nied the stories. Stories by children which researchers thought had no 
form actually do have the form of the books read to them including the 
graphic forms and their pictorial representations.
How Vygotsky’s formulations would have changed had he lived we do 
not know. His conception of inner speech depended upon his beliefs 
about how children learn language and he claimed that these were based
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upon experiments. Unfortunately, he did not describe them in any 
detail, nor did he show explicitly how his conclusions related to his 
results. In fact, he considered poems and passages from novels adequate 
proof and it is these which he specifically cites in defense of his opinions.
Vygotsky (p. 213) does remain fresh in his conception of the cultural 
origins of learning and how these are mediated by language learning. 
That is, as the child learns language, he or she does learn strategies for 
understanding as well as for speaking. For instance, Scollon and Scollon 
(1981) show how Athabaskan children learn how to abstract themes from 
stories as part of the child rearing practices in their culture. Ochs (1987), 
based on her study of Samoan children, demonstrates that even when 
one understands words in nonnative culture, one may not understand 
the point of those words. She claims that even though children may 
display egocentric speech, it means different things in different cultures, 
going so far as to suggest that Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s sharply differing 
views on egocentricity of early speech may have been because of the 
differences between Russian and Swiss societies.
[15] Common Sense and the Thought-Language Distinction.
Finally, common sense must prevail. If thought does not exist prior to 
language, then how does the speaker or writer know which l e x i c a l  i t e m s  
(what are commonly called “words)” to choose? If, indeed, thought and 
language are one and the same, we have no way to account for the words 
and syntax that are selected by the speaker. Since the speaker has many 
choices for any given thought or thoughts, it cannot be that the language 
is prior. There has to be a step previous to selection of language forms.
Notes
1They attribute this deficit to a short term memory loss.
2This is actually a question of some interest. There are tales of people learning to 
"speak schizophrenic" either because of being hospitalized for long periods with 
them, or because they were nurses or orderlies. However, I can find no longitudinal 
studies which confirm this. Nowadays, few patients remain in a hospital setting for 
very long, so the opportunities for observing such a phenomenon may no longer be 
present.
3Rather than entering these by the dates of the translations, I have opted for 
this perhaps unconventional dating for the two versions. Kozulin’s translation is 
substantively different from Hanfmann and Vakar’s; he has revised the text; and has
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provided his own extensive notes and preface. This preface, “Vygotsky in Context,” 
and the endnotes constitute another interpretation of Vygotsky’s work. What I have 
done is listed Kozulin’s lengthy prefatory essay as a separate work, which indeed it is. 
This was done in order to lessen confusion between the Kozulin preface and notes 
and the Vygotsky translations themselves.
4Actually, Vygotsky and Piaget both dealt with this issue. Vygotsky disagreed 
with Piaget’s formulations of inner speech.
5The literature is literally loaded with examples of children’s inability even to 
know what an adult is getting at. One of my favorites provided by Fromkin and 
Rodman (1983, p. 333) is:
Child: Want other one spoon, Daddy.
Father: You mean, you want the other spoon?
Child: Yes, I want other one spoon, please, Daddy.
Father: Can you say “the other spoon”?
Child: Other . . .  one . . .  spoon.
Father: Say . . .  other.
Child: Other.
Father: Spoon.
Child: Spoon.
Father: Other. . .  spoon.
Child: Other. . .  spoon. Now give me other one spoon?
6It is often said that autistic children do not distinguish their ego boundaries 
because they confuse the words you and me. All children confuse words used in sets 
like these. How they ever learn you and me correctly is a wonder. The children are 
always referred to as you and the other person always refers to him or herself as I. 
The child somehow has to learn to reverse these references despite the fact that they 
never hear them that way. Autistic children notoriously have language learning 
difficulties. We should expect that their problem with the words for first and second 
reference persist longer than in other children.
7A friend of mine recently told me that he and his twin visited their grandmother 
every single day of their childhood, but, since she spoke no English, they never had 
any conversations with her and they really know nothing about her except for her 
baking prowess. They never learned her language at all. Similarly, a Cuban emigre 
acquaintance told me of the problems his son had with his father, the child’s 
grandfather. It seems that the father speaks no English, and the child knows no 
Spanish. When I asked why the child never learned Spanish which is spoken in the 
home, the answer I got was classic, “He’s American.”
8They do not discuss this in the Vygotsian context, nor do they speak specifically 
of egocentric speech. However, the deviant narrations they are investigating seem to 
qualify.
Chapter Four
TH E LEVELS OF LANGUAGE
Laypersons typically confuse the written and spoken language, 
assuming that the former is true language. This is a fallacy.
Spoken language is both prior to and different from writing. 
Language is actually composed of interrelated levels, each with 
its own rules, but each of which leaks into the other, so to speak. 
Language has fuzzy borders between levels, a fact that has to be 
considered in all explanations for how we use it. Here we shall 
see the unsuspected complexity of even the simplest part of 
language, the sound system. The problems of defining what a 
word is has relevance for a great deal of research which depends 
upon its results by assuming that words are self-evident entities. 
Although we know a good deal about how words are created, a 
definition of what a word actually is, has proven to be elusive.
[1] Message and M eaning.
Human language is not an isomorphic system. That is, there is no one-to-one correspondence between meaning and message. A human 
message can equal more or less than its meaning. A speaker need overtly 
say only enough for a hearer to deduce the message. In addition, any 
meaning can be given in a variety of ways. That is, all language is 
paraphrasable. To illustrate, the preceding sentences can be paraphrased 
by
Human language is not isomorphic, lacking any necessary exact 
conjunction between the linguistic signals given and the meaning 
of those signals. This allows a plurality of paraphrases for any one 
meaning intended.
or
The communication system of humans is not isomorphic resulting 
in meanings not equalling the sum of the parts of the linguistic 
items actually spoken as well as paraphrasability for any particular 
meaning.
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In the first paraphrase, lacking any necessary. . .  means “human lan­
guage lacks. . . ” Here, we see that the message delivered is less than 
meaning expressed in actual words and syntax. In the second paraphrase, 
note that resulting actually means “the lack of isomorphism results in” 
and the linguistic items actually spoken means “the linguistic items that 
somebody actually speaks.”
It is because language is not an isomorphic system that linguists find 
behaviorism an insufficient model for language. One cannot explain 
such a system in terms of responses to stimuli. There is no way to ensure 
that any given utterance will result from any particular stimulus. There 
is no way to ensure that one paraphrase will be chosen over another, or, 
for that matter, is there any way to predict what new combination of 
words and syntax that someone can come up with to express a meaning.
[2] Language is Spoken.
This title seems like a bad pun. Of course, language is spoken, as in 
“French is spoken here.” The problem is that literate people assume that 
language is what resides on the printed page. Language does not reside 
on the printed page. What is on the page is only an evocation of language. 
Language itself is in the brain, or, if you will, in the mind.
Throughout all but the past 4000 or so years, humans have not had 
written language. What they needed to remember, they remembered by 
linguistic mnemonic devices. These, in short, comprise what we think of 
as poetry: rhyme, assonance, alliteration, melody, strong beat, unusual 
imagery. All of these can be seen to have an origin in the need for 
remembering, a need especially necessary for the essentially weak, 
defenseless creature homo sapiens is and was.
All of these devices aid memory by promoting an overabundance of 
connections in the brain. If one forgets a line, one can access it by 
recalling something that rhymed with a word in it. If one forgets one 
word in an alliterative string, then recalling the others helps one fill in 
the blank, so to speak. Beating out a rhythm or beginning to hum a tune 
allows one to access the words that were learned to it. This is a common 
occurrence when one tries to remember the words to a song which one 
thinks one has forgotten. As one hums it, however, the words unfold in 
snatches.
There are two reasons for mentioning this matter. The first is to 
underscore the primacy of speech. In this text, we are talking about
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speech, not writing. This is not to say that schizophrenic writing is not 
germane. It is, and much that we say of speech is true mutatis mutandi of 
writing, and, where appropriate, may be taken as applying to the latter.
The second reason is that we do find schizophrenic deviations in the 
use of poetic devices such as inappropriate rhyming or what seems to be 
a creation of a metaphor. These can be seen as a true dysfunction in 
linguistic abilities. Poetry and other figurative speech are part and 
parcel of what it means to possess a language.
[3] Sounds and Letters.
The sounds of language are not letters. Literacy causes people to think 
that real language is on the printed page, not in the head and certainly 
not in the ephemeral evanescence of sound. The reverse is actually true. 
Letters on a page are merely reminders of the sounds in a language. For 
most of human existence, there was no writing. As with technologically 
primitive peoples today, language resided in the head and in the waves 
of sound produced by speakers.
Throughout this work, when we speak of sound, we refer only to oral 
production. Even this disclaimer is not sufficient, because the orthogra­
phy for English is a mess. The same sound in English can be represented 
by different letters. The same letters can represent different sounds. 
Sometimes two sounds are represented by one letter, such as the usual 
use of < x >  to stand for the sounds [ks] or [gz] as in exercise and example, 
respectively. The opposite situation holds as well. One sound can be 
represented by two letters, such as the digraph <sh> .
Worse yet, letter-to-sound correspondences are as close to chaos as 
they can be and still function. For instance, the same sound occurs in 
each of the following words represented by the boldfaced letters: should, 
sugar, Cheryl, fashion, tissue, and nation. In contrast, the same letters 
stand for very different sounds in head, meat, great, ear, teat, and heart.
[4] T h e Perils of the Literacy Fallacy.
It is not merely scholarly intransigence, a pedantic insistence on 
details that leads me to expound on the problem of confusing language 
with writing. The ramifications for research can be very great. For 
instance, Brendan Maher’s (1983) analysis of schizophrenic utterances 
suffers because he confounds the conventions of writing with the produc-
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tion of speech. It is important to note that, in general, Maher’s work 
stands out both in breadth and depth as careful, objective, well-reasoned, 
insightful, and inclusive of all relevant data. In my opinion, any explana­
tion for the etiology of schizophrenic speech has to consider the evidence 
Maher has presented over the past quarter century. The experimental 
protocol in Maher (1983) is a very promising one. Still his basic miscon­
ceptions severely compromise his conclusions regarding schizophrenic 
speech. There could be no more compelling evidence of the necessity of 
understanding language as an entity in itself before discussing schizo­
phrenic speech than to look at this article. It shows that nobody is 
immune to erroneous preconceived notions about language.
Basically, what Maher has done is what most naive literate people do. 
They treat the written language as if it were the only real language. In 
this instance, he seemed unaware that commas and other punctuation 
marks are an artifact of writing. Such things don’t occur in speech. They 
are not pronounced. Yes, we’ve all had English teachers who have said 
things like, “Put the commas in where you pronounce them” in sentences 
like
1A. My oldest brother, who is a doctor, just won the lottery.
1B. After the ball was over, Lizzie took out her false teeth.
It is true that if we are actually reading these aloud before an audience, 
we may drop our voices at the commas, but in normal speech no such 
drop necessarily occurs. Actually, even in reading, the commas are a cue 
for the reader to adopt a downward intonation contour, so that such 
contours are an artifact of the writing system, not of speech practices. 
There are not any comparable commas marking all of the syntactic 
junctures in the sentences, even the most important.
Maher (1983) even reports a famous study by Fodor and Bever (1965) 
as having committed the same fallacy, although it did not. Maher under­
took a modification of this study in order to investigate his long-held 
theory of an attentional deficit in schizophrenia (Maher 1972; Maher 
1983, pp. 24-26).
Fodor and Bever developed an ingenious test in which subjects listened 
to sentences. At various junctures within the sentences, these researchers 
inserted a click. They found that subjects displaced the clicks, reporting 
them as having occurred at syntactic boundaries when, in fact, they had 
not. For instance, if a click was within in the middle of a clause, subjects 
reported that it as having occurred instead at the boundaries of two
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constituents, such as that between the subject and predicate. For instance, 
in a sentence like
2. That he was happy was evident from the way he smiled.
subjects reported the click to have occurred after happy even if, in fact, it 
actually occurred on evident. This showed that people process language 
by syntactic structures, not word by word. That is, in 2, listeners grouped 
“That he was happy” together and then “was evident from the way he 
smiled.” They reported the click to have occurred at the boundary of the 
subject and the predicate, the major constituents of the sentence.
Maher reports the Fodor and Bever experiment erroneously, saying 
that a click moved to “a nearby comma or period.” Commas and periods 
are not in speech. They cannot be heard. Furthermore, they do not 
invariantly mark out syntactic structures. No comma or period can occur 
anywhere in 2 above, except at the end of the entire sentence. Certainly, 
there is no comma or other punctuation allowed at the juncture at which 
the click was perceived.
In fact, commas cannot be used to separate any of the major constituents 
of the core sentence: subjects may not be separated from their predicates, 
and verbs may not be separated from their complements, whether these 
be direct and indirect objects or predicate nominatives or adjectives. In 
the following, a forward (/) slash indicates the major constituent break 
between the subject and predicate, a backwards slash (\) indicates the 
break between a transitive verb and object, and an asterisk (*) separates 
an intransitive verb and its complement. Notice that no commas or other 
punctuation can be used where constituent breaks occur:
3A. The little old man over there/has become*senile.
3B. The little old man over there/broke\his leg
No matter how long we make the subject or the predicate, still no 
internal punctuation can occur. For instance
3C. The little old man over there whom I was telling you about the 
other day while we were at lunch/finally became*senile which was 
evidenced by his forgetting to let the cat out or the dog in all week. 
3D. The little old man over there whom you met last Tuesday and 
thought was so wonderful/unfortunately broke\the leg which had 
already been injured in the Battle of the Bulge during World War II.
Another consequence of the confusion between speech and writing 
causes Maher (1983, p. 25) to make a corollary error, saying that “Ordinary
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speech does not, of course, include explicit utterance of syntax markers.” 
Actually, it does. All human language relies on syntax. It is syntax that 
allows us to signal and comprehend the relationships between the words 
in a sentence and between sentences themselves. For instance, in “John 
loves Mary” we know that John has the emotion and Mary is its object 
because of the word order. This relationship can be signalled in other 
ways as well, as by the paraphrase, “Mary is loved by John.” In this 
instance, the markers of the passive (a form of the verb be followed by a 
verb plus the participial ending -ed) tells us that Mary is the recipient. 
In some languages special prefixes or suffixes on nouns indicate such 
relations. In Latin, for instance, if Mary is the one loved, then she would 
be referred to as Mariam, but if she did the loving, her name would be 
stated as Maria.
Any analysis of spoken or written language must rest upon syntax, and 
for that, punctuation is not a reliable guide. Nor is the written language. 
The unsuitability of orthographic conventions for analyzing syntax is 
well illustrated by the fragment above. During my high school years in 
the 1950s, the proscription against punctuating a phrase like this was so 
strong that we received an automatic F for writing fragments of this sort. 
Nowadays, this is considered a justifiable fragment. In terms of modern 
syntactic theory, we can say that this is justifiable because any native 
speaker would recognize that it represents “The written language is not a 
reliable guide to syntax.” By omitting the repeated material, and signal­
ling that fact with nor, we have actually effected superior cohesion, as 
demonstrated in a subsequent chapter. The corollary to this proposition 
is that any analysis which does not recognize the syntactic origins of 
language production is suspect.
For instance, in the same work, Maher presents a model of speech 
based upon word associations. This is a shaky base for an analysis, 
because word associations have little to do with ordinary speech produc­
tion (Chaika 1974, 1981, 1982a,c; Chapter 5,6,7). Word associations have a 
great deal to do with slips of the tongue, as when one substitutes refrigerator 
for stove or up for down, and we can show a correlations between these 
and some schizophrenic errors in word selection. What is deviant about 
much schizophrenic speech is the fact of associating. Normal speech is 
not produced according to word associations.
One can find passages in normal speech in which a word association 
seems to have produced a subsequent word. Maher provides several
The Levels o f Language 79
examples of normals involuntarily punning in this way. For instance 
(1983, p. 32) he gives
4. A stable economy requires continual reinvestment in industrial 
plant. Tax reductions now are a case of locking the stable door after 
the horse has gone.
In contrast to schizophrenic associational chaining, the repetition of 
stable is not simply the case of uttering the word once and then having 
that instigate the next use of it. The second occurrence lies several words 
away from the first in its own separate grammatical sentence. Moreover, 
the second occurrence is embedded in an aphorism, and is subordinated 
to and increases the sense of the former.
Speech is not produced one word at a time. We have known that since 
Lashley (1951). Fromkin (1973) showed conclusively that we plan our 
utterances before producing them. Although we are not conscious of it, 
we select our syntactic vehicle and the words which we are going to use in 
advance of our saying them. In Chapter 5 we shall see that there is no 
sharp dividing line between syntax and semantics, but at the same time, 
relations between them are arbitrary. For instance, we can and do have 
two words which share meaning, words which might elicit each other in 
word association testing, but which cannot appear in the same kinds of 
syntactic structures. An example is the syntactic difference allowed by 
the verbs diminish and deplete
Our water supplies are diminishing.
We are depleting our water supplies.
Our water supplies are being depleted.
*Our water supplies are depleting.
An asterisk indicates that the sentence is not grammatical in the sense 
that speakers feel that it is wrong in some way involving sentence structure. 
The verb deplete is transitive. It must have a direct object either after it 
or as the subject of the passive are being depleted. Testing for associations 
between individual words does not truly reflect the entire language 
process. Except for slips of the tongue, it does not give us adequate 
information upon which to explain errors in speech impaired populations.
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[5] W hat is a Rule?
Language is not a unitary phenomenon. It is actually a set of interrelated 
systems, each with its own logic and each with its own rules. Salzinger et 
al. (1978) suggest alternative words like principles or concepts, but these do 
not sufficiently capture the regularity of innumerable processes in lan­
guage on any of its levels. Then, too, they lend unwanted connotations, 
connotations which I feel would obscure the conclusions of this study.
In some quarters there is a real stigma attached to the word rule. It 
touches a raw nerve, especially in behavioral psychologists (Mowrer 
1980). Mowrer (1980, pp. x-xi) speaks of a “strange revolution instigated 
by Chomsky” (boldface mine). The very word instigate shows Mowrer’s 
ad hominem  approach to Chomsky’s argumentation, as does his speaking 
of Chomsky’s theorizing “as a strange revolution.” When a word becomes 
so loaded with far-reaching connotations that it bars reasoned argument, 
avoiding it is preferable. Nevertheless, it will be used in the subsequent 
discussion, but only because we are lacking a better term. Certainly, 
Chomsky’s own bitter sarcasm towards behaviorists has elicited such 
responses, but Chomsky’s arguments are intellectually serious. One need 
not concur with Chomsky to acknowledge the multitude of empirical 
studies which have effectively demonstrated that behaviorism is not a 
viable explanation of even the most ordinary language behavior.
The important thing to remember here is that this work is not an 
apologia for Chomsky or for his followers. It is strictly empirical, and 
one to which Occam’s razor has been applied. On the one hand, it is not 
oriented towards behaviorism in the Skinnerian sense, because that 
doesn’t explain the linguistic data that I have gathered or that is in the 
literature. On the other hand, Chomsky’s works have never explained 
naturalistic linguistic data, normal or not.
In this discussion, rule is used in a weak sense, referring to whatever 
processes we use to encode and decode words, sentences, and discourses. 
It also may refer to whatever it is that makes us feel that a certain 
utterance is wrong in the sense of “abnormal” or “deviant.” This inter­
sects with what Chomsky called the internalized linguistic competency of 
native speakers of a language. In short, we are faced with the paradox 
that we can’t necessarily define what a rule is and what its form is, but, 
empirically, we know that there have to be rules. I make no claim as to 
the form or forms of such knowledge, either that used to create, to 
understand, or to “feel” that something is deviant. I am not talking about
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quasimathematical rules which account for all of the grammatical sen­
tences of the language nor am I talking about Chomsky’s distinction 
between co m petence  and per fo r m a n ce , which, as we have seen, is 
fraught with complications.
I am mindful that the very mention of the word rule or of competence 
versus performance in language causes scholars to derail, to get into 
squabbles over what is or isn’t a rule, if there are rules, what is or isn’t 
competence and whether it relates to performance. It would be too 
disruptive of our central concern to get caught up into such arguments, 
so the terms rule, competence and performance are used here only in the 
vaguest sense that a layperson would have of them: THE SOMETHING 
THAT ACCOUNTS FOR OUR LANGUAGE BEHAVIOR AND THAT CAUSES US 
TO EVALUATE LINGUISTIC PRODUCTIONS AS BEING PATHOLOGICALLY 
DEVIANT OR AS BEING NORMAL ERROR, On this even the most diehard 
behaviorists have to agree: that they have been attracted to the study of 
psychotic speech because of its weirdness which even they feel requires 
special interpretation. Something is distinctly wrong with that speech. If 
it weren’t, they wouldn’t be trying to explain it. The dissection of the 
kinds of deviance that occur in psychotic speech implicitly rests upon 
inner rules.
We certainly know when we hear or read sentences incorrect for our 
language. By this, I am not referring only to correctness in terms of 
politeness, such as not using double negatives in English but to sentences 
like
5A. I am here since six years.
5B. That dog all the time here comes.
In the absence of their being language-specific rules, there is no way to 
account for our judgment that such sentences are incorrect. If language 
is not governed by rules, how can we say that a language does or does not 
allow certain phrasings? How can we say that these sentences are not 
correct in English?
A clear example of a syntactic rule is what is often called the “dummy 
do” or “dosupport” rule in English. In order to make a question or 
negative in these tenses, one must use an empty auxiliary do. For instance,
6A. John goes every day. (present goes)
6B. Does John go every day?
6C. John does not go every day.
6D. John went every day. (preterit went)
82 Understanding Psychotic Speech
6E. Did John go every day?
6F. John did not go every day.
The d o ’s and did ’s here add no meaning. Their sole function is to fill 
the slot that an auxiliary verb would occupy if there was one in the 
sentence, as in
7A. Has John gone every day?
7B. John has not gone every day.
Examples such as these show clearly that language is governed by 
rules, many of which laypersons are not even aware of using. Language 
rules can be flexible, but can still be rules. J.R . Martin (1987, pp. 65-76) 
argues against this idea. His argument centers on the definition of the 
word rule itself. Since he has to admit that language contains regularities 
which must be obeyed if one is to be understood, he says that language is 
governed by conventions (pp. 77-82) which people abide by in order to 
get their messages across. These work because “the speaker wants to 
signal the audience and the audience wants to be signaled” (p. 82).
Surely, this is not necessarily the case. People do talk to themselves for 
a variety of reasons, and when they do, they don’t usually utter gibberish 
or deformed sentences. Those who do are considered to have a pathologi­
cal condition. Then, too, in social situations, how often does one find 
oneself listening without really wanting to? Or even speaking when one 
wishes not to? In lexicon, sound system, sentence patterns, and discourses, 
certain words and structures must be used, others may be, and yet others 
cannot be used at all. For instance, Kreckel (1981, p. 204) found that, in 
assigning stress in a sentence, there is enough agreement between speakers 
to show that “ . . .  there exist phonological regularities which are part of 
the linguistic knowledge of naive, native speakers,” but, within those 
rules, “ . . .  the speaker has more than one option . . . ” in stress placement, 
according to the pragmatic function or for “ . . .  distributing semantic 
weight.”
Native speakers of a language know ill-formed sentences when they 
meet them. They can tell if a speaker has made a mistake in the structure 
of a sentence or, even, a discourse. Mistake, here, does not mean “solecism,” 
but the sort of error which is made in speech pathologies like aphasia or 
schizophrenia. The following errors in applying do-support were made 
by an aphasic and a schizophrenic, respectively:
8A. [aphasic patient] I know you’re talking, but I not talking you
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like I can talk you ’bout. (Buckingham, Whitaker, and Whitaker, 
1979, p. 344)
8B. I still not have the thought pattern. . . . (courtesy of Dr. Bonnie
Spring)
Notice that both of these violate the do-support rule seen in section 6 
above. Laypersons, even illiterate ones, readily apprehend slips of the 
tongue, errors made by foreign speakers and children. All such recogni­
tion rest upon a rule-governed basis in language production. People also 
readily discriminate between well-formed and deviant discourse. Every­
day terms for evaluating discourse, such as saying it is rambling, incoherent, 
or irrational presume violation of rules for making sentences cohere into 
a discourse (Chapter 6).
As early as the 1920s, T h e  Prague School linguists presented by 
Vachek (1964) exam ined the mutual dependence of semantics and syntax 
as well as correlations between phonology and the other levels of language, 
and, as a result, realized that discourse requirements determined the 
grammar of the individual sentence. In  effect, they showed that the 
discourse itself has a grammar (Chapters 7 and 11).
[6] R ules an d  Strategies.
It is never the case that only one rule can be chosen to deliver a given 
message. T he meaning of any given utterance usually cannot be shown 
to inhere only in the actual syntactic rules of its sentences, even when we 
try to combine those with the meanings of the words used. Rules exist at 
all the levels of language, including the discourse level, but com prehen­
sion also depends heavily on the interaction between syntactic and 
lexical choice, the discourse itself and nonlinguistic strategies. These can 
be isolated and can be shown to be orderly. In essence, cospeakers both 
rely upon and control strategies along with linguistic rules in order to 
convey or yield meaning.
Speaking only of nondeviant, normal speech, Sanders (1987, p. 26) 
explains that speech production is INTELLIGENT ACTIVITY. By this he 
means that there are elements which one can fashion in different ways to 
achieve one’s goal. There are always alternatives. Also, there is no guar­
antee that one will get the results one wants by any given organization of 
such elements although there are connections between what one wants, 
what one has chosen, and the result one gets. Therefore, despite the lack
84 Understanding Psychotic Speech
of a sure result, one can calculate the possibilities of what can happen. 
Sanders includes one other characteristic of intelligent action: there are 
elements which must be arranged according to constraints.
He avoids calling these constraints “rules,” possibly to avoid a possible 
linkage with Chomsky’s insistence on the rule-governed nature of language, 
an insistence which limited the linguist’s domain to a very narrow 
domain of inquiry, one dominated by mathematical formulations of 
rules divined by syntacticians dipping into their own intuitions about 
language. This method necessarily entailed context-free interpretations 
of sentences. Chomsky originally insisted that the task of the linguist was 
to find context-free rules that would generate all and only the sentences 
possible in a given language. In practice, this has proven impossible. 
Chomsky’s conception of transformational grammars is still not dead, 
having been revised to provide for the context-sensitivity of language 
(p. 123) while still affirming its context-free nature (Berwick and Weinberg 
1986). In my opinion, this is an untenable position. All language is 
context-dependent. There is no way to achieve meaning in speech or 
writing without reference to context. That is the nature of the beast.
[7] Syntax and Context.
Quirk and Svartvik (1966) investigated the degree to which native 
speakers of English agreed upon their judgments of what is grammatical 
in the Chomskyan sense. They found that there was more disagreement 
than one would expect given the claims of transformational grammars. 
However, they pointed out (p. 101) that such lack of agreement on 
sentences was partially an artifact of the test itself. Had they provided a 
context for the sentences, their results might have been different. They 
quote Dwight Bolinger’s dictum that “stripping a sentence to its minimum 
. . .  is a risky test of grammaticality; it often falsifies the potentialities 
of the construction.”
More recently, Fauconnier (1985) lays the blame for ambiguity on 
uncertainties in the discourse situation itself, not in the syntax or lexicon. 
Wisely, studies of the accuracy of judgments of schizophrenic speech 
have been based upon transcripts of connected speech. This explains the 
high interjudge reliability. Context-free grammars based upon individ­
ual decisions of grammaticality rest on shaky foundations. Context is the 
key word. That is what was missing in T -G  theory. More recently some 
attempts have been made to make rules context-sensitive, but even so, we
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are still faced with the abstract set of transformations—only now they 
include the context-sensitive rules, which are also both abstract and 
unproven.
[8] T h e G ram m ar of the Discourse.
Discourse itself has its own grammar, one that is partially autonomous, 
separate from sentence grammars, with its own phonological, lexical, 
and syntactic rules (Carlson 1983, p. 150; Sanders and Wirth 1985; Seuren 
1985; Fillmore 1985; Halliday 1985; Ferrara 1985). Different kinds of 
discourses have their own rules of well-formedness. Gerald Prince (1982), 
for instance, has written a grammar of narrative structure and Livia 
Polanyi (1985) shows that conversational storytelling is constrained by 
culture-specific rules which are comparable to dialect differences in 
syntax. Phonologically, intonation contours mark out syntactic structures, 
prominent focus, and such paralinguistic messages as surprise, anger, 
and disgust (Carlson 1983, pp. 151), a point elaborated on as well by 
Kreckel (1981), Sanders (1987), and Lyons (1977). Sanders (1987, p. 11) 
likens the speaker’s choice of what to say next in a discourse to “ . . .  the 
selection of lexical entries” in the sentence. Just as one chooses a word in 
a sentence according to sentential constraints, so one chooses the syntax 
of the sentence in the discourse.
Therefore, even if individual sentences taken out of context are well- 
formed, the discourse within which they are embedded may not be. 
VanDijk (1977) calls the level of phrases and sentences the MICRO- 
STRUCTURE, as opposed to the discourse or text, which is the MACRO- 
STRUCTURE. In the circumstance that microstructures by themselves 
show no deviance, but the discourse does, one would have to conclude 
that such sentences are deviantly produced because they do not properly 
form a macrostructure. Just as the meaning of a sentence is ultimately 
a function of the discourse within which it is embedded, so is the 
appropriateness of a sentence.
In actual usage, there is no way to separate sentences from their 
context and no way to judge well-formedness without considering both. 
Deviance at the macrostructural level comprises disruption of linguistic 
abilities. For instance, each of the sentences in example 9 below is 
well-formed, yet the entire is bizarre. In the original presentation of 
these data (Chaika 1974; Chapter 1), there were three utterances com­
posed of gibberish interspersed throughout this monologue. Here, they
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have been omitted in order to prevent a contamination effect. Thus, the 
following monologue has actually been normalized to mitigate the effect 
of deviance, but the entire remains as deviant as before.
9. Good mornin’ everybody.
I don’t know what that is
Oh! It’s that thorazine. I forgot I had it.
That’s Lulubelle.
This one’s Jean. J-E -A -N
I’ll write that down.
Speeds up the metabolism.
Makes your heart bong.
Tranquilizes you if you’ve got the metabolism I have.
I have distemper just like cats do ’cause that’s what we all are,
felines.
Siamese cat balls.
They stand out.
I had a cat, a Manx, still around somewhere.
You’ll know him when you see him.
His name is G I Joe, he’s black and white.
I had a little goldfish too like a clown.
On the microlinguistic level, the above phrases and sentences are 
well-formed, but they fail on the macrolinguistic level, and that alone 
establishes their deviance. Judgments of deviance depend as much on 
the fit of the sentence to the discourse as they do on the fit of phrases and 
words to sentences.
Each genre of discourse has its own set of rules. Constraints on narra­
tives in our culture, for instance, may not operate on sermons, lectures, 
making small-talk, or communication of factual information (e.g., Goffman 
1981; Chafe 1980; Chaika 1989, pp. 98-192). Narratives are governed by 
temporal ordering whereas sermons are not. Sermons require an overt 
moral whereas narratives do not. Such constraints on the macrostructure 
operate analogously to the rules for micro-structures like phrases and 
sentences. Additionally, there is cross-cultural variation in what is allow­
able in a genre and even in what is necessary, what must be included and 
what may not be (Labov 1969, 1972; Scollon and Scollon 1981; Tannen 
1984; Jarrett 1984; Chaika 1989, pp. 98-192.) Violation of such cross- 
cultural constraints are more likely to be perceived as rude or pointless 
than as bizarre.
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[9] Rules to Create.
Rules on each level of language aid in our ability to be creative. Every 
language has within it permissible sound combinations, some that have 
not yet been used, hence can be used to create new words. For instance, I 
could invent a game called “Bilotec” or a product called “Marfem.” 
There could even be a new theory of psychiatry, called “Logology” (the 
science of words). Sentence and discourse-forming rules allow even 
greater creativity, albeit creativity constrained by rules. Frequently, if 
not most always, speakers either use old words in new contexts to force 
new meanings rather than make up brand-new words, although that, too, 
does happen. Alternatively, compounding is used, as occurred when the 
first person referred to stealing as ripping off. A third avenue of creativity 
is to borrow words from another language. This is typically done because 
of admiration for another culture, as when Latin and Greek words were 
adopted for the budding sciences of the 17th and 18th centuries. Native 
words could have been created, but the Classical languages were associated 
with scholarship. Neologisms and gibberish don’t fail because they’re 
creative. Language is structured to foster creativity. They fail because 
they are not used so that cospeakers can apply rules or strategies for 
decoding. T his is a direct result of language’s not being an isomorphic 
system.
[10]  N otational Variations.
Why insist on the word rule? Why not use Martin’s term and simply 
call them conventions, or, as Sanders does, call them constraints? Why not 
refer to expectations in discourse? These are n o tation a l v a r ia tio n s , 
different words for the same phenomena. T he problem is that these 
three terms, although referring to the same phenomena, imply that 
adherence is not necessary, when it clearly is. Is it mere constraint, 
expectation, or convention that prevents
9. A: Where did you go last night?
B: No
9C. A: Are you coming?
D: I wore a yellow tulip.
Such matters as adverb placement not using the progressive form with 
stative verbs or the use of do  when negating verbs are obligatory. In
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verbs are obligatory. In the same way, one can’t answer a question asking 
where by either a yes or no. The where demands a location or an “I don’t 
know.” These are grammatical error on the level of the discourse itself.
These aren’t just conventions, expectations, or constraints. Native 
speakers know that 9 A-D are wrong, and can be righted by following the 
rules for adverb placement or verb conjugation. The errors in 9 A-D  are 
discourse errors, and anyone, even a quite young child would be likely to 
say of 9B, something like “You can’t answer that question with ‘no’ ” or of 
9D “You can’t answer that with ‘I wore a yellow tulip.’ ” One might, 
instead, say something like, “What kind of an answer is that?” to either 
9B or 9D. This is another way of saying, “You can’t answer that question 
with . . . ” The very normal and usual choice of can’t indicates the exis­
tence of tacit rules. It takes no particular training or expertise for people 
to recognize and be able to correct a wide variety of linguistic errors.
[11] T h e Levels of Language.
As part of its lack of isomorphism, language consists of layers of 
interrelated rules. Each layer has its own rules, and rules which connect 
it to the others. ph o netic  rules, those indicating pronunciation of 
individual sounds, form ph onological rules. These in turn form 
MORPHEMES which form lexica l  ITEMS which form sentences which in 
turn form discourses.
[12] Phonetics, Phonemes, and M orphemes.
A brief consideration of the intricacies of the sounds of language 
illuminates both the rule governed nature of language and the FUZZY 
borders that are also its nature. Beyond such enlightenment, phonol­
ogy illuminates for us what must be accounted for in any theory of 
psycholinguistics. The level of phonetics is the most describable, most 
limited part of language, but its complexity is nevertheless boggling. In 
fact, even such apparently simple matters as articulating specific sounds 
is loaded with intricacies unsuspected by the novice in linguistics.
One would expect that schizophrenics suffering from severe speech 
disruption would show difficulties even at this level. Unfortunately, our 
phonetic record of schizophrenic articulations is almost nil. Over the 
years, the few researchers who have discussed gibberish have not been 
equipped to make phonetic transcriptions so that their discussions have
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been little more than vague impressionistic descriptions. Laffal (1965, 
p. 85), for instance, speaks of a patient who “launched into gibberish that 
sounded like a mixture of Chinese and Polish, with a distinct conversa­
tional prosody.” Why Laffal attributed the gibberish to these quite differ­
ent languages is not clear, nor does he tell us if the patient was a 
bilingual in these or any other languages. Robertson and Shamsie (1958) 
also attributed the gibberish their patient produced as belonging to 
different languages. If gibberish has sounds that occur in a language not 
native to the speaker, or one not known by the speaker, then that would 
indicate a deficit in the phonetic and phonemic systems. These are the 
lowest levels of linguistic structure, those most automatic; still they are 
highly sophisticated and intricately rule-governed phenomena. It is not 
inconceivable that severely SD patients would make errors at this level. 
No two languages share the same phonetic and phonemic systems; errors 
can be made in these systems.
Unfortunately, except for my own transcriptions of gibberish (Chaika 
1974; Chaika and Alexander 1986), there are no transcriptions of reported 
gibberish. My own transcriptions do not reveal disruption at these levels. 
Holzman et al. (1986, p. 361) claim that “It is noteworthy that as the 
exemplar group of psychotic patients, schizophrenic patients do not 
violate these phonotactic rules.” They do not cite corroborating studies. 
Looking at the pattern of linguistic disintegration, one would expect 
very little disruption at this level, but it is possible that some patients 
could regress to the point of phonetic and phonemic error. Laffal’s and 
Robertson and Shamsie’s impressions that they were hearing foreign 
language gibberish might arise from such regression unless the patients 
in question were multilingual and their gibberish could be traced to 
their other languages. There has not been sufficient transcription of 
gibberish and neologisms by trained phoneticians to verify whether or 
not disruption occurs at this level. If and when such studies are under­
taken and even if it is found that schizophrenics do not ever make 
phonotactic errors, there is still plenty of evidence at the other levels of 
language that structural disruption does occur in schizophrenia. The 
rest of this chapter is devoted to showing these disruptions. In addition, 
it will be argued that analysis in terms of linguistic disruption does not 
posit factors that we cannot observe and does not demand adherence to 
any particular psychodynamic theory.
The above discussion shows the importance of having a basic under­
standing of how phonetic and phonemic systems work. Even when lan-
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guages share a sound, it won’t necessarily be pronounced the same way in 
each language. This occurs for two reasons. The first is that any sound 
can be articulated somewhat differently. For instance, in English, we 
pronounce a [t] by placing our tongue tip on the alveolar ridge behind 
the top teeth, but many European languages do so by placing the tongue 
tip behind the spot where the upper and lower teeth meet which is where 
English places the tongue to make a [0], th in thing. Different languages 
also hold each sound for a different length of time. American English 
does not hold consonsants as long as some other languages.
Another reason for the impression that gibberish might be in a foreign 
language has to do with another complexity in sound systems: the 
PHONEME. Each sound we think we hear is actually a group of sounds. In 
American English, for instance, the PHONEMES /p/, /t/, and /k/ are 
actually aspirated  before stressed vowels as in pill, till and kill. This can 
be felt by pronouncing these words holding a finger in front of the lips. 
A puff of air will be felt. No puff, or a much weaker one, will be felt when 
pronouncing spill, still and skill, as they are not aspirated if they follow an 
/s/ or occur at the end of a word, as in spill, still, skill, rap, rat, and rack. 
Additionally, in American English (but not British), intervocalic /t/ and 
/d/ are both pronounced alike, as a [D], the medial consonants heard in 
both betting and bedding  which are pronounced alike. Disparity in pho­
netic rules across languages accounts for misperception of sounds in the 
foreign language. This, of course, is what causes us all to have foreign 
accents in our nonnative languages.
What this all means is that if a patient who is a monolingual native 
speaker produces neologisms and gibberish that sound like a foreign 
language, their speech may be so disrupted that they are misapplying 
phonetic and phonemic rules of their language. So far, there is no hard 
evidence of this occurring, but, so far, to my knowledge, no phonetician 
or linguist has transcribed large amounts of gibberish. Harry Whitaker, a 
neurolinguist, says that there are aphasics with what he calls the foreign 
accent syndrome as they misapply phonemic rules so that they sound 
foreign. It may also be that modem practices of medication for psy- 
chotics forestall such a complete disruption of speech that even the 
phonetic and phonemic systems disintegrate. If a patient is found whose 
gibberish shows such disintegration, not only is it caused by the most 
profound disruption of speech possible, it is not the sort of thing one can 
control. People are unaware of the intricacies of phonetic and phonemic 
rules until they are introduced to them by courses in linguistics, and the
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rules are so below the level of awareness, that such matters are very 
difficult to learn and next to impossible to manipulate.
To complicate matters, what we hear as separate sounds on the phone­
mic level may become one sound during certain word-forming processes 
known as m o r ph o ph o n em ic s . For instance, /s/ and /t/ are different 
sounds as in sat and tat. They are phonemically distinct. However, in sets 
of words like idiot -idiocy, the [t] alternates with [s] The < c >  in idiocy is 
pronounced as an [s], but we still perceive idiocy as being formed from 
idiot with a suffix that indicates “state of being an idiot” (Chomsky and 
Halle 1968). Examples of morphophonemic regularity can be multiplied 
logarithmically. Think of alternations of the actual sounds in critic- 
criticize, music-musician, persuade-persuasive, and acquire-acquisition. Some­
times, as in the latter two examples, the sound change is indicated in the 
spelling. At others, as in the previous examples, it is not indicated. Still, 
we have no particular trouble alternating the final [k] in critic with the [s] 
in criticize. All languages are subject to such alternations in their word 
creation systems. The miracle is not that some patients with disrupted 
speech do produce gibberish but that there is not more disruption at 
these levels as they are fraught with complexities.
These examples alone show that language is neither perceived nor 
created by any simple equation of stimulus and response. They also 
show that we do not have a list of forms in our heads from which we draw 
when we speak. There is probably a good evolutionary reason for this. 
Communication would be hindered greatly if speakers had to scan 
through the enormous lists of words in their lexicons every time they 
wanted to say something, conversation would be considerably slowed. It 
would be slowed even more when, in the heat of talk, they first selected 
one word, say an adjective, and then decided to recast their sentence so 
that the same meaning has to be achieved by the related form of a verb, 
as in
• He gets red — uhh—reddens when Lola says, “h i!”
• Try to make it prettier — uhh—beautify it
• I hate to be critic . . .  uhh—criticize.
If language were not rule-governed, such switching of morphologically- 
related words would entail scanning the lexicon until one came upon the 
related word. Furthermore, it would be highly inefficient to store each 
form with a common root word separately. That would take a great deal 
more “brain space” than does applying rules to sets of words. Also, if we
92 Understanding Psychotic Speech
store critic-criticize holistically as two separate forms, why do we have 
entire sets of words which follow the same rule? If there were no rules, 
that would be the most inefficient system of all.
Certain schizophrenic errors can be explained as failure to apply 
morphophonemic rules. In fact, the schizophrenic data show that such 
rules exist. The following response came from one patient:
10A. I am being help with the food and the medicate . . .
10B. You have to be able to memory the process. . .
10C.  . . . to open up the old testament and start to memory it.
Each of these errors was repeated in the monologue. Each boldfaced 
word fails morphologically by failing to add the appropriate derivational 
m orphem es, those which change words from one part of speech to the 
other. The patient has not added the -ion morpheme to turn the verb to 
its corresponding noun. He has failed to convert medicate into medication. 
Note that the final [t] sound in medicate turns to the sound represented 
by < sh> in our orthography in medication, so that this failure represents 
a morphophonemic one as well as a morphological one, and in 10B and 
C, he failed to change m em ory  to memorize. It is not the case that the 
patient has had a general failure in syntactic rules because his word 
order and marking of syntax like the noun determiner the correctly. We 
can explain the deviation in 10 A-C only by referring to the morphone- 
mic rules of noun formation from Latinate verbs. This argument is 
bolstered by the fact that his syntactic failures devolve upon inflectional 
m orphem es: failure to put the preterit ending of help in 10A and the 
possessive in
10D . . .  to speak and think in the lord tongue
These inflectional morphemes are also governed by morphophone- 
mic rules. The preterit ending is variably pronounced as [t], [d], or [Id] 
depending on the last sound of the verb. Consider the pronunciation of 
this morpheme in “picked, played, and lifted.” They are all spelled the 
same, but pronounced differently. The possessive is variably pronounced 
as [z], [s], and [Iz], as in “lord’s, patient’s, and Tess’s.” Again, the spelling 
gives no clue. The patient fluctuated between omitting verb and noun 
morphemes and not. Given the fact that these rules are among the most 
every-day ordinary ones in the language, this argues for a generally 
impaired ability to apply morphemic rules.
The Levels of Language 93
In other instances, as we have seen, a patient forms recognizable 
morphemes into neologisms like puterience and plausity.
[13] Words.
Many researchers have attempted to find a schizophrenic deficit on 
the level of the word, basing their research completely upon their con­
ception of what a word is. This is natural, but it can also lead to invalid 
experiments and fallacious conclusions. In order to illustrate this, we 
must consider the question, “What is a word?”
We all know that we form speech from words, that we give our word, 
and that we have words for things. In practice, however, it has proven 
remarkably difficult to come up with an all-encompassing definition of 
word. Phonetically, the distinction between the level of the word and the 
sentence is frequently obscured because inter-word phonological rules 
do get applied to phrases, as when we speak of “coffee to go.” Typically, 
we pronounce the /t/ in to as a [D] in this expression. The opposite also 
occurs: sentence intonation may be applied to a word, as in “Coffee?” 
The rising intonation gives this the force of a full sentence, such as “Does 
anybody want some coffee?” Actually, if the full syntactic form of the 
question is given, the intonation is usually like that of a statement with 
the voice dropping at the end of the sentence.
Orthographically, for the European languages at least, we frequently 
think of a word as a group of letters surrounded by a space. This was not 
ever thus. Medieval manuscripts, for instance, crowded as many letters 
as possible onto a page. Consequently, such niceties as spaces between 
words were not provided. So ingrained is this concept that one some 
researchers have simply assumed that this is how a word is defined. For 
instance, Hart and Payne (1973) taped interviews with schizophrenics, 
aiming for 500 word discourse. These researchers counted as a word “a 
group of letters not containing a space which is preceded by and followed 
by a space which corresponds to a word listed in a dictionary.” Dictionaries 
vary greatly in their listings of words, so they are hardly a foolproof 
source (p. 645). They say that they excluded “letter groups” such as “uh.” 
These are not letter groups. They don’t even appear in writing, unless 
the writing purports to be a representation of speech.
Hart and Payne report that they had to prompt most patients to get 
the quota of 500 words, leading one to question how natural the resulting 
data were. In any event, eliciting a 500-word corpus from each subject is
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an impossible task, even if one has a foolproof definition for word which 
as the next section shows, we do not. In any event, the researchers had a 
typist transcribe the tapes so that the Type-Token Ratio (TTR) could be 
ascertained. This is the ratio of the number of different words used to the 
total number of words in the sample. T T R  has been used as a measure of 
cohesion, but it fails because one need not repeat the same word to effect 
cohesion. One can use its synonym or a phrase which means the same 
thing. In fact, in Chapter 6 we shall see that repetitions of a word or even 
its synonyms can impair cohesion drastically.
In order to get the T T R , there has to be an accurate word count, of 
course. As is true of every other study that I have ever seen utilizing a 
T T R , Hart and Payne do not seem aware of any of the difficulties in 
their procedure. For instance, does one count the sequences like have to 
or want to as two words or one? These are certainly pronounced as one, 
e.g., “hafta” and “wanna.” They certainly function as one as well, being 
verb auxiliaries, part of a large system known as CATENATIVE auxiliaries. 
Should we count contractions like can’t, won’t, they’ve, or they’ll as one 
word or two? Is won’tcha two words or three? Given misspellings like 
< should of > for should have, we certainly know that some even highly 
educated native speakers aren’t sure of what the elements in a contrac­
tion actually consist of. This, too, is part of the fuzzy border phenomena.
Worse yet for T T R  data, consider pronouns which refer to long noun 
phrases, such as the it in
11. Max bought the big old Victorian house on the corner. It 
needed a lot of work.
Does this it count as one word? Or does it count for the entire phrase 
which it replaces, “the big old Victorian house on the comer.” There’s 
another problem in 11: is a lot o f three words or one? Phonologically, it is 
usually counted as one: “alotta.”
Even as a definition for the written word the “space surrounding the 
word” test doesn’t work. For example, consider words like hardhearted, 
hard-hitting, hard hit, and hardihood. The English orthographic system is 
notoriously inconsistent in applying hyphens to some compounds, writing 
others as one word, and still others as two. How, then, does one reliably 
count what a word is simply by counting those surrounded by a space the 
typist has inserted?
Regardless of the written conventions, we can tell that words are 
compounded by the fact that there is a special stress pattern in com-
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pound words. This is realized by the rise and fall of the voice, as well as 
the length of the vowel. Try saying the pairs greenhouse vs green house, 
blackboard vs black board. Notice that if you say safe house in the sense of a 
hideaway operated by the police for the protection of witnesses, you get 
the same rise and fall that you do for greenhouse and blackbird. If, instead 
you are speaking of a house which has been well-constructed, it is 
pronounced with the same patterns as green house and black bird, but the 
same spelling is used whether safe and house are being used as a com­
pound or as two separate words. The writing is not as good a guide to 
compounding as the spoken sound patterns.
In English (and many but not all languages), part of our feeling of 
what constitutes a word derives from our grammatical morphemes such 
as plurals and tense markers. The thing that we put these morphemes on 
is what we consider a word, so that in roses and played, we feel that the 
words involved are rose and play, both of which can stand alone with no 
endings. In contrast, the vagaries of the English possessive play havoc 
with this concept of a word. Notice the way English allows a possessive to 
be put upon an entire phrase, such as
The woman next door’s sister . . .
The guy who I dated last year’s car.. . .
As awkward as these are in writing, they are commonly used in 
speech. Some are used even in formal writing, such as
The Queen of England’s jewels.
Therefore, the definition of a word as the formation which can take 
inflectional endings fails.
Cross-linguistically, the problem of what a word is is even more 
vexatious. In some languages, however, there are few “stand-alones.” For 
instance, note the Swahili-English equivalences:
• atanipenda “he will like me”
• atatupenda “he will like us”
• tutampenda “we will like him”
• unamsumbua “you are annoying him” (data from Gleason 1955)
Most English speakers would agree that each of the above glosses is 
composed of four words, the pronoun subject, auxiliary, verb, and pro­
noun object. The pronouns and the auxiliary are gram m atical w ords, 
also known as function  w ords, and the verbs are full lexica l  item s
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have to be placed on lexical items according to the rules of that particular 
language.
The corresponding forms to our four-word sentences look strangely 
like one word in Swahili. Whoever collected these data wrote the Swahili 
forms so that they appear as one word. In fact, anthropologists who 
collected languages which to us are exotic have reported that there are 
languages in which there are no words as we know them. Rather, what we 
would think of as a phrase or sentence, those languages treated as a word.
In languages which are declined like Russian, there are far fewer 
words that stand alone than in a language like English. Russian, being a 
highly inflected language, requires words to have endings on them 
which tell how they are being used in a sentence. English conveys such 
messages largely by word order. Therefore, English speakers think of 
Russian words, nouns, for instance, as roots to which inflectional mor­
phemes are bound.
An even more fallacious concept of words is that they are some kind of 
fixed entity. Bleuler’s belief that the glossomanic chaining of schizo­
phrenics results from associative loosening rests upon such an assumption, 
as does Bannister’s (1960, 1962) theory that schizophrenics fail to use 
constructs as fixed points. By “constructs” Bannister (1960, p. 135) 
apparently means “words.” Bleuler’s, Bannister’s and Chapman, Chapman, 
and Daut’s (1976) explanations based upon word association testing 
depend upon static constructs, but words have no fixed meanings. By 
their very essence, they are fluid. Lieberman criticizes those who equate 
words with tokens, pointing out that
. . .  one of the most salient characteristics o f . . .  words . . .  [is that]. . .  they 
are not tokens for things; they instead convey concepts. The meaning 
of a word never is precisely equivalent to a thing, a set of things, or 
even a property of a set of things. (Lieberman 1984, p. 80)
An even more salient characteristic of words is their inherent flexibility. 
By their very nature, they change according to the ingenuity of speakers 
in employing them in different contexts. Such change is the heart of 
metaphor, the ability to take a word or words from one domain and apply 
it to another. Without such flexibility in word usage, language wouldn’t 
be so immediately accessible for swift encoding of messages in response 
to new contexts. Given the context of an utterance hearers usually can 
ascertain the intended meaning. In the course of a day, we all may use, 
hear or read new usages of old words. Zippy writing in car magazines,
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news weeklies, and ads attest to our abilities both to produce and 
comprehend. It must be emphasized, however, that I am not here refer­
ring only to artistic or professional word usage, but to an everyday 
capability of everyday people in everyday circumstances.
Looking at words historically shows us how pervasive the plasticity of 
words are, resulting over time in drastic changes in intension, all the 
meanings of a word. Take the word bulb. It originally referred to an 
onion, then to any plant with a bulb-like root with fleshy long, narrow 
leaves, then to any round bulb-like swelling as in the bottom of a 
thermometer, then to the round glass vehicle for the incandescent light. 
Now it can also mean tube-shaped lights such as fluorescent bulbs. There 
is even a nautical meaning referring to a cylindrical shape at the forefoot 
of certain ships. Bulb seems to have extended its original referents. 
Sometimes words lose their original meanings entirely. Hackney was 
originally a fine riding horse, then a horse for hire, then a worn-out 
horse, then, in the 17th century, a prostitute, and now a trite expression. 
It is easy to see how these meanings became extended with ordinary use. 
Perusing any historical dictionary reveals the omnipresence of changes 
in word meaning.
There is nothing remarkable in schizophrenic failure to maintain 
“fixed constructs.” What is remarkable, in its original sense of “worthy of 
remark,” is that in some way, the normal flexibility in word usage goes 
awry so that schizophrenic creations are perceived as being abnormal 
and difficult to follow.
Chapter Five
SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, AND METAPHOR: 
BEYOND CHOMSKY
Although many laypersons assume that the Chomskyan para­
digm for language reigns supreme, here it is shown that other 
models of syntax, specifically context-bound ones, have far 
greater explanatory power. Syntax and semantics are intertwined 
and must be understood as such in order to analyze language 
data including that from psychotics. This examines the ways 
that semantics determines syntax and the ways that syntax can 
be manipulated for implications and direct meaning. The nature 
of metaphor, how it works, and what constitutes reasonable 
exegeses of it are also elaborated upon. It is shown that meta­
phor is not random nor can metaphorical meaning be claimed 
without basing it on the processes by which all metaphor is 
created and understood.
[1] T h e  Im portance of Syntactic Theory.
A ny theory of human behavior implicitly or explicitly rests upon language. Faulty notions of the ways language works have consistently 
resulted in fallacious interpretations of psychotic speech. So complex is 
language that even when clinicans have paid some heed to linguistic 
theory, they have embraced too readily or rejected too summarily. A 
prime example is Edelson’s (1978) desire to develop a psychoanalytic 
model based upon Chomskyan grammar. Unfortunately, formulating a 
theory of syntax which will explain the ways that humans speak has not 
proven easy. So rich are language data that a variety of explanations 
serve to explain at least parts of the ways grammars work. Over the years, 
indeed the centuries, scholars have been content to stop at the data their 
theories account for, seeking no further.
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[2] T h e  Chomskyan Paradigm .
Many scholars continue to equate linguistics with Chomsky. Julia’s 
(19831) Explanatory Models in Linguistics argues solely against the earlier 
Chomskyan grammars. One facet of the Chomskyan paradigm that has 
been seductive to linguists as well as to psychoanalysts was the quasi- 
mathematical derivation of each sentence discussed, starting from an 
abstract deep structure which, by a succession of stages upon which 
certain transformations were applied, yielded a perfect surface structure, 
complete with undeniable meaning. Such analysis held out the promise 
of our being able to prove exactly what each sentence means. This would 
have been an ultimate triumph of mathematics over language since the 
latter clearly has much fuzzier rules and boundaries between levels. Of 
course, T -G  grammarians did not recognize that borders are fuzzy and 
all cannot be explained by rules.
Edelson (1978, p. 162) unabashedly looked toward the day that psycho- 
analysis would achieve the degree of theoretical sophistication that 
Chomsky had provided for linguistics. Edelson spoke of psychoanalysis 
as being in the state that linguistics was in before Chomsky, implying a 
primitive state. It is not hard to see why Edelson was so ready to embrace 
Chomskyan analysis with its apparent precision and abstraction utilizing 
the symbols and equations of mathematical logic. He (p. 159), for example, 
showed that the generalization “All dreams are hallucinatory wish- 
fulfillments” could be formulated by the Chomskyan-inspired:
No matter what value of x is chosen, if x is a dream, then x is a 
hallucination of the fulfillment of a wish.
Edelson then points out that even this requires more explication, as:
Whatever x is chosen, there is at least one y, and there is at least one z, 
such that: if x is a dream, and if y is a wish, and if z is a condition, and 
if F is a relation “fulfills” which holds between a condition z and a wish 
y, then x is a hallucination of F(z,y)-or G(x,Fzy). (Edelson, p. 160)
Aside from the fact that one gains no new insights by subjecting this 
sentence to such an elaborate rephrasing, there is the other fact that 
the statement is no more valid than when it was stated in ordinary 
language. As one who was originally caught up in the T -G  fervor of the 
late sixties, however, I can attest to the seductiveness of trying to bend 
language into such precision. To use the very term Chomsky coined, 
co u n ter ex a m ple  upon counterexample has already shown that T -G
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sentence-based grammars could not explain how people produced or 
understood even quite simple sentences. The pragmatists among us, 
sociolinguists, psycholinguists, neurolinguists, any of us mucking about 
with real data have found other models more felicitous.
It has turned out to be exceedingly difficult to find deep structures 
and transformational rules which unerringly explain very many surface 
sentences at all, much less to explain all possible ones. As counterexamples 
to Chomsky’s original formulations cropped up with disturbing regularity, 
T -G  grammars have had to be revised again and again. This has been 
done both in and out of the Chomsky circles (e.g., Montague 1973; 
Berwick and Weinberg 1984; Jacobson and Pullum 1982.). New forms of 
grammars multiplied, each resembling classical Chomsky to a greater or 
lesser degree, and each supposed to take care of data the others couldn’t: 
generative semanticist grammars, Montague grammars, relational and 
arc pair grammars, grammars of the extended standard theory, and of 
government-binding.
Even a cursory glance at the literature debating these different schools 
of syntax shows how unlikely it is that any of them are to shed much light 
on the speech of psychosis or even of normal conversation. Their pages 
are filled with discussions of it-raising, node pruning, constraints on 
deep structure movement out of NP, “shunting” c-command domains 
(Radford 1981; Berwick and Weinberg 1984, p. 181), all of which are 
operations during different stages of the derivation of a sentence, stages 
which are nonobservable, devoid of words, and below the level of the 
speaker’s awareness. That any of these post-hoc deep operations actually 
figure in speech production,2 normal or not, has never been proven. Of 
course, I speak here as a pragmatist, but, as we shall see, hardly a lone 
one.
There are far more useful constructs in linguistics today, powerful 
models of conversation and comprehension. The meaning-free sentence 
grammars of traditional, structural, and transformational grammars have 
been replaced by semantico-syntactic grammatical models sensitive to 
the requirements of the discourse. We now know that the particular 
grammatical form of any sentence is dependent upon the requirements 
of the entire discourse, and that there is no meaning without context. 
Moreover, we know that the very verb one chooses will constrain the 
forms of the sentence in which it appears. There is, in fact, no syntax 
separate from the discourse, no phonology separate from the word, and
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no discourse the unconstrained by the social situation or the text. There 
are levels in language, but they are all interrelated and work in concert.
All meaning derives from context. We compare an utterance or other 
snatch of language to its context. That is how old words come to take on 
new meanings. The appropriateness of the syntax used and the words 
chosen depend ultimately on the context in which they appear (Lyons 
1968; Seuren 1985). Lauri Carlson (1983, p. 152) maintains that we can 
find a context for any juxtaposition of sentences, but he does not discuss 
SD psychotic discourse or that from any linguistically impaired population. 
Truly, for some such discourse, we could provide connecting links, but 
these are always pure conjecture. We are justified in supplying such links 
only on principled grounds such as we have will see in our discussion of 
implication.
There is no context-free meaning. There is no context-free syntax. 
There is no meaningless generative cycle which produces an infinity of 
sentences. Actually, I should amend that last sentence. It seems to me 
that psychotic glossomania is the archetypal meaningless generative 
cycle which can be uttered as an infinite number of sentences.
[3] Case Gram m ars.
The Chomskyan “revolution” had barely gotten off ground before 
troublesome data started to pile up. There were too many data from even 
quite simple sentences that could not be explained by the use of Chomskyan 
deep structures upon which transformations operated to produce surface 
structures.
Fillmore, in what he originally called CASE grammars (1966; 1968) and 
now calls frame sem antics pointed out that syntactico-semantic rules 
are intertwined rules in all languages. For instance, the verb selected 
in a sentence determines which sentence slots can or must be filled. 
In English, a word order language, there are three basic slots: subject, 
indirect object, direct object. Which gets filled depends upon the verb 
chosen. For instance, 1A allows an indirect object position to be filled with 
the dative but 1B does not. (An * indicates an ungrammatical sentence.)
1A. Max gave the church money.
1B. * Max donated the church money.
However, both verbs allow the indirect object to be used with a preposi­
tion at the end of the sentence.
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1C. Max gave the money to the church.
1D. Max donated the money to the church.
There are even more complex examples of this phenomena:
2A. Oscar planted peas in the garden.
2B. Oscar planted the garden with peas.
2C. The garden was planted with peas (by Oscar).
2D. Peas were planted in the garden (by Oscar).
Fillmore and others (Chafe 1970) that the very positions that can be 
filled in a sentence depends wholly on the verb chosen, independently of 
semantic content. Synonyms do not necessarily allow the same grammar. 
For example, put can be chosen as a paraphrase of plant, but with 
different consequences:
2E. Oscar put peas in the garden 
but not
2F *Oscar put the garden with peas.
Although 2E is paraphrasable by 2A, the selection of the verb put in 
2E prevents the locative garden from appearing without a preposition. It 
also prevents the object, peas, from appearing with the preposition with.
Bresnan (1978) in her aptly named article “A realistic transformational 
grammar” recognizes that verbs have markings on them in the lexicon 
that indicate whether or not they take objects, datives, and the like.3 
Similarly, Montague (1973) starts his derivations with words which are 
then mapped onto phrases as a corresponding semantics is simultaneously 
developed. Dowty (1982, p. 100) virtually takes it as a given that verbs 
govern whether or not transformations such as Dative Shift4 can occur. 
Seuren (1985, p. 61) flatly avows that “There is no semantics without 
grammar.” Halliday (1985, p. xix) insists “ . . .  there is no clear line 
between semantics and grammar, and a functional grammar is one that is 
pushed in the direction of semantics.” McNeill and Levy (1982) maintain 
that language is generated directly from patterns of meaning, not through 
grammatical representation, a view now shared by many syntacticians 
(Halliday 1967, 1968; Chafe 1970; Lyons 1968; 1977).
Originally, Fillmore (1982, pp. 114-115) called these noun positions 
relative to verb cases, but later he employed the concept of VALENCY, also 
employed by Lyons (1977, pp. 488-489). Valency, a term originally used 
in chemistry, refers to the capacity of an entity to affect or interact with 
another in some special way. Thus, to use Lyons’ (1977, pp. 488-490)
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examples kill is bivalent , requiring an agent and an object, and has a 
CAUSATIVE relationship to die which is MONOVALENT. Give is TRIVALENT, 
requiring that agent, object, and dative be specified.
[4] Im plication, Lexical Choice, and Syntax.
Why would a mental health professional care about the differences in 
syntactic theories? Of what utility is a knowledge of case grammars or 
frame semantics, however it is called? One answer is that patients make 
syntactic errors explicable only in terms of such syntactico-semantic 
rules. The second reason is that recognition of these processes enlarges 
our awareness of what is grammatical and what not, surely an important 
issue in a scholarly field in which the thrust of much debate is whether 
or not the population under investigation does or does not evince 
deviant syntax. Another reason is that our interpretations are rendered 
more precise by such recognition. The last is that much implication is 
achieved by manipulation of syntax, and this is done according to regu­
lar syntactic rules of the language.
At times, implication is achieved by using one paraphrase or the 
other. There are two ways that speakers can manage such implication: by 
selecting one verb over another and by choosing one paraphrase of over 
another. We saw the latter condition with plant above. When peas were 
made the subject or object an implication was made that other items were 
planted as well; when garden was made subject or object, the implication 
was that peas were all that were planted.
A somewhat less benign example also illustrates the possibility of 
paraphrase. When a speaker selects one verb rather than its synonym, 
different implications become possible. For instance, selecting die rather 
than kill limits implication considerably.
3A. Jack died.
3B. Jack was killed.
The two can be synonymous in many instances, but 3B implies that 
someone or something caused Jack to die. 3A carries no such implication. 
Therefore, if a speaker wishes a hearer to be suspicious of Jack’s death, 
but does not want to make a bald statement to that effect, the choice of 3B 
serves that purpose because English speakers know that the verb kill 
takes an agent or a CAUSE as well as an object. There is no way to avoid 
the object if kill is chosen, but by placing that object, here Jack, in the
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subject position as in 3B, one avoids naming the agent or cause. The use 
of the passive implies that there was an agent or cause. In 3A, Jack  is 
merely the pa tien t , one who undergoes a process.
As noted above, there are errors in schizophrenic speech that can be 
analyzed in terms of syntactico-semantic relations, some involving case 
and some not. For instance, the error in 4A is caused by the inappropri­
ate preposition by which seems to indicate that cars are the cause of the 
attention. Even if that is what the patient meant, and even if it is true, the 
prepositional phrase because o f  is required to indicate cause here. With 
the verb have, by usually is reserved for a temporal phrase, such as 
having it by 10 o’clock:
4A. They have world wide attention by the cars. . .
In 4B, below, we see a different kind of syntactico-semantic error. 
Here, the article a is used erroneously. The problem is that people  has a 
plural meaning and is used with plural verbs, but its form is singular. 
The article a can only precede a singular noun. Some must be used with 
people. There is an inevitable mismatch between form and plurality in 
English, so it is not surprising that a psychotic would make an error even 
in the face of fact that a phrase like “some Italian people” would be quite 
common in the speech of a New York City resident. The error itself is 
not likely to have come about because of reinforced stimuli. As with the 
mistakes of toddlers, the speaker says what he has probably not heard.
4B. Mill Avenue is also a a I like a quiet residential n- block like a 
quiet residential block with a Italian people talk. 5
[5] T h e Semantics of Syntax.
Actually, American linguists came late to a theory of grammar in 
which it was recognized that the components of language are not strictly 
separated. Chomsky actually inherited that view from the structuralist 
grammarians before him. Oddly, the reason that they propounded a 
strict separation of levels was because they were influenced by the very 
behaviorism that Chomsky despised. Structuralists assumed that we sim­
ply heard a message and that triggered a response. We have already seen 
that this doesn’t even work for our processing of the sound system of 
language, its simplest most automatic level. Once this last vestige of 
Behaviorism dissolved, the way was open for powerful new meaning.
Eventually Fillmore came to think of lexical items as being in frames
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which evoke scenes (Fillmore 1982, pp. 116-117) that are to a great extent 
culturally determined. He points out that a word like vegetarian is impor­
tant only in a meat-eating culture and that our understanding of judge is 
bound by our culture’s modes of judging.5 He also shows (p. 123) that 
what appears to be a grammatical category such as verb tense shapes the 
image of a given verb. His example is the pluperfect progressive in
5. She had been running.
The lexical item run gives us one image, but the pluperfect progres­
sive shapes the image of running given here, so that it may explain at the 
narrative time why she is panting, sweating and tired. As a result of these 
insights, Fillmore now speaks of f r a m e  s e m a n t i c s .
McCawley (1986) also demonstrates the impossibility of segregating 
different levels and processes of language, illustrating from other gram­
matical constructions. He shows other syntactic ~ semantic configurations. 
For instance, it is generally conceded that making a sentence negative is 
a grammatical procedure according to the grammar of a given language. 
Even so, negation is not completely a matter of grammar. There are 
certain words and expressions which arbitrarily can not be used in the 
negative and others that can only be used as positives. That is, it is word 
choice itself and not grammar p e r  se which forces the negative or positive 
polarity. McCawley gives as arbitrarily positive polarity:
6A. I would rather be in Philadelphia.
6B. *I wouldn’t rather be in Philadelphia.
6C. The meatloaf is delicious.
6D. *This meatloaf isn’t delicious.
6E. You could have just as well have rented a car.6
6F. *You couldn’t have just as well as rented a car.
Examples of negative polarity [examples mine]:
7A. It couldn’t be all that bad.
7B. *It could be all that bad.
7C. Max isn’t all that bright.
7D. *Max is all that bright.
7E. He didn’t do much for his family.
7F. *He did do much for his family.
Patricia Strauss (personal communication) commented that many of 
the starred (*) sentences can be used for emphasis, what linguists call 
contrastive situ a tio n . For instance, if someone demurs “Oh, things
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couldn’t be that bad.” The hearer, probably the complainer, retorts, 
“Things could be that bad” (with stress on the could). As Strauss remarked, 
the effect of playing with polarity works because the speaker is consciously 
playing with the known grammar. In turn, the hearer understands the 
emphasis conveyed also because he or she knows that the grammar 
doesn’t allow this polarity on that expression.
It has occurred to me that the intertwining of lexical choice, semantics, 
and syntax explains the reason that paraphrases can differ so radically in 
their surface forms.
[6 ] Sem antic Features.
Some meaning is derived from factoring of features as in cub, puppy, 
child, calf which share the semantic features of [young] [offspring], but differ 
in the features of [human], [wild], [ursine], and [canine], so that child  is 
[+human, -w ild ], cub is [-h u m an , +wild, + ursine, + canine], and 
p u p p y  is [-h u m an , -w ild , +canine]. The very fact of being human 
automatically negates being ursine or canine, so those features need not 
be mentioned in a discussion of semantic features. However, being 
[ -hum an] opens far more possibilities, so that features like [+canine] or 
[ + ursine] have to be specified.
Certain features subsume others. Baby, for instance, is [ + human], so 
that one need not specify species if that word is used for humans. If, 
however, it is referring to other mammalian offspring, that must be 
specified, as in “animal babies” or “baby Chow [a breed of dog].” Often, 
when attempting to be colorful or witty, people indulge in these kinds of 
violations of feature attachment onto words. Sometimes these can be 
heard as insulting to humans, as when referring to someone as a “baby 
whale.” The conditions fostering such a meaning as opposed to one of 
“offspring of a whale” are rooted in the communicative situation (Chapter
7).
Weinreich (1966) tabbed another way that semantic features can be 
used. He noted that in expressions like pretty boy, the feature of [ + female] 
that inheres in pretty becomes transferred to boy, thus giving an implica­
tion to that word, implying that whoever he is, he is effeminate. Dylan 
Thomas’ line, a g r ie f  ago similarly transfers the feature of [+tim e] onto 
grief, thus implying that, at least to Thomas, life is such woe that its times 
can be measured in grief. Expressions like salty h u m o r  or the bouquet o f  
the wine are other instances of transfer features. Using words together
Syntax, Semantics, and Metaphor: B eyond Chomsky 107
that have semantic features that don’t quite jibe is a regular way of 
achieving implication.
A good deal of meaning does reside in inherent semantic features of 
lexical items, although any item can be used in novel ways. Still, there 
are errors in lexical choice attributable to semantic features, such as
8. Doctor, I have pains in my chest and hope and wonder if my box
is broken and heart is beaten.7 (Maher, 1968 cited in Forrest 1986).
In the absence of strong contextualizing, box does not usually subsume 
the features of a human’s chest. Moreover, hearts may be beating, but they 
are not usually beaten. The connection between chest and box is easily 
seen if one considers semantic features. Boxes fall into the category of 
chests in some usages. Both are concrete nouns which share the meaning 
of [+ container, +  rectangle, —animate]. However, the other meaning of 
chest, that of human anatomy, is neither rectangular nor inanimate. This 
error is like those of glossomania discussed in Chapter 1 and 2. First one 
meaning is taken, one appropriate to the context. Then a synonym of 
that word is evoked, the one inappropriate to the context, the [ -  animate] 
meaning. One result of linkages of words based upon shared lexical 
features is glossomanic chaining (Chapter 1, 9).
[7] T h e M ental Lexicon.
Over the years, in many models of grammar including the earliest 
Chomsky formulations, it has been assumed that our internal vocabularies, 
what is now usually called our mental lexicon  consisted of a listing of 
words out of which our syntactic operations plucked, so to speak, the 
correct word for our intended meaning, and put it in its correct slot in 
the phrase or sentence we were formulating. Early on, Chomsky noted 
that there were syntactic constraints on some words which he termed 
SELECTIONAL RESTRICTIONS. For instance, assassinate is restricted to a 
human subject and a politically important human object, unless, of 
course, we are talking of a cartoon world in which, perhaps, a penguin 
could assassinate a polar bear. Even so, T -G  grammars, like their 
structuralist predecessor, considered lexical selection somewhat apart 
from the purely syntactic generation of a sentence.
George Miller (1978, p. 61) emphasizes that items in our mental 
lexicons have so many kinds of information attached to them that they 
cannot be autonomous, that even the concept of selectional restrictions is
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too modest to portray their role in speech and thought. Each item carries 
with it syntactic information such as its part of speech, inflections it may 
or must carry, morphological information such as possible suffixes or 
prefixes, variety of pronunciations possible (e.g., the variation in the 
ending “-ing” as opposed to “-in’ ” as in singing, singin’), ways it can be 
written or printed, what its synonyms are, common phrases it may be 
embedded in, conceptual relations to other words or spheres of thought, 
specific cultural information, general information about what it refers to, 
mental pictures evoked by the word, and even etymologies. He likens 
our verbal storehouses to encyclopedias and affirms that the lexicon is 
also tied up to “ . . .  thoughts, memories, percepts, desires, feelings, 
intentions.” Kearns (1984, pp. 85-108) also speaks of experience as being 
part of the language system.
M iller reminds us that “cognitive economy depends on the intelli­
gible organization of what is learned,” so that it is not likely that our 
mental lexicons are mere lists of words. In essence, we saw the complex­
ity of the relations of words when we considered glossomania, showing 
that it can be explained by involuntary out-of-control triggering of 
lexical items, and all the forms that triggering can take are explicable by 
the complicated networks of words and phrases in our mental lexicons. 
Glossomanic chaining seems to be a trip through the mental lexicon, 
leaping from synonyms to rhymes to phrases to subject matter related to 
a word to emotional reactions. What it also indicates is that there is no 
sharp, dividing line between syntax and semantics, or, for that matter, 
the other components of a language. Yes, we can define separate levels of 
phonology, morphology, sentential syntax, and discourse, but, no, there 
is no sharp demarcation among categories. Language by its very nature 
has fuzzy borders.
[8] M eaning and M etaphor.
Interpretations of psychotic speech rest heavily on metaphor, at least 
on the assumption, and it is a reasonable one, that such speech is 
metaphorical. In this discussion, the word metaphor is used in its broadest 
sense to indicate all figurative uses of language, the tropes, including 
metonymy, synonymy, irony, simile, and synecdoche.
Over the past several years more and more linguists have been acknowl­
edging the metaphorical nature of meaning, claiming that much of what 
we say even in ordinary speech, is metaphorical and all our abstractions
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are rooted in and extended from words with originally concrete meanings, 
with rooted here being a prime example of the process itself. The great 
analysts have said all along that all language is metaphorical, but this 
does not mean that analysts and linguists perceive metaphor the same 
way.
Psychoanalytical exegeses of metaphor do not necessarily concur with 
the kinds of interpretations offered by linguists and others currently 
involved in unraveling the mysteries of metaphor. Of course, scholarship 
being what it is, variation runs rampant even in a given field. The exact 
nature of metaphor, its relationship to concrete language, its basis in 
perceptual and cognitive structures, and the ways in which it is con­
strued have been hot topics in linguistics, cognitive science, and philoso­
phy for the past several years (e.g., Levin 1977; Rosch 1973, 1975, 1981; 
Ortony 1979; Mac Cormac 1985; Lakoff 1987).
As indicated above, there are many theoretical questions about meta­
phor and its nature, most of which are beyond the bounds of this book. 
Although we cannot claim a consensus in all matters, there are already 
significant insights into the relations between metaphors, the world, and 
meaning. By examining fields of everyday metaphor, we get good insights 
into the ways that metaphors are built and what should be the possible 
bounds on our interpretations of them. Except for pathological language, 
even highly metaphorical language is interpretable in terms of the words 
and grammar their creator used. Metaphors and other figures of speech 
operate according to certain principles.
Although figurative language has traditionally been considered to be 
apart from literal meaning, and still is by many scholars (Levin 1977, 
p. 31), it can be seen as well as part of ordinary, everyday meaning. Ortony 
(1979) points out that metaphor, if taken literally, is false, but that there 
are regular processes by which metaphors are given and received.
The specialized metaphors in the verbal arts are, by definition, more 
difficult to understand. It is acknowledged that they are created to cause 
readers and listeners to stop and ponder, to see new and unusual 
connections, but they are but one end of a cline of figurative meanings. 
Furthermore, no matter how difficult such metaphors may be to decipher, 
still the author had in mind some meaning and he gives clues as to what 
these are. It is not the case that any author creates a work of art such that 
the language in it can mean anything a reader thinks it does. For 
instance, consider Emily Dickinson’s metaphor about “Cambridge ladies.” 
She said they had furnished souls. The almost oxymoronic juxtaposition
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between furnished and souls shows us what smug, closed-minded, insensi­
tive women these were. They were as immutable as furnished rooms.8 
Whether or not the reader instantly gets the same meaning as I did, he 
or she is capable of concurring or dissenting on the basis of the words in 
question. This is in direct contradiction to Forrest’s interpretation of the 
passage in example 9 below. He has followed a long-standing practice in 
psychiatry of giving a global and highly individual interpretation of the 
entire passage rather than one based upon individual words within it.
Adrienne Lehrer (1983) shows that metaphor is achieved in expres­
sions like velvety wine by ignoring the inherent features of velvet as a 
fabric, transferring its meaning of “soft.” Literally, wine like velvet would 
be disgusting.
A major problem in schizophrenic speech has been whether or not 
its characteristic bizarre or opaque utterances are instances of wildly 
metaphoric language, and, if so, how may they be interpreted. This 
entire question impinges on discourse analysis (Chapters 7 to 11) and 
will be explored further then. The question we ask today is, “How do 
metaphors relate to what it is that they mean?” For instance, looking at 
the passage also discussed in sec. 6, Brendan Maher and David Forrest 
have come up with dramatically different interpretations of 8 above, here 
repeated:
9. Doctor, I have pains in my chest and hope and wonder if my box 
is broken and heart is beaten for my soul and salvation and heaven, 
Amen. (Maher, 1968 cited in Forrest 1986).
Maher, I believe correctly, interprets this as the patient’s complaint 
about physical chest pains. Forrest, on the other hand, says that this is 
metaphorical. “The listener is told if he has ears for it what it is like to be 
schizophrenic. . . ,  but as no one who is not schizophrenic can fully 
empathize with this experience, the message is redirected to God’s ear.” 
Is this passage metaphorical or is it intended as a literal message, one 
that has gone wrong because of a speech dysfunction?
We can compare this with passages presented by Hallowell and Smith 
(1983) in which a patient describes himself as imprisoned, then speaks of 
ebbing sand below him, and of plummeting downward towards corrosive 
and sharp knife-like objects, such as acid, spikes, cobra spears, “tiger- 
hunting forks,” and numerous blades. The vivid imagery of ground that 
is not firm and items which give horrendous pain seem to me to be a 
description of what it is like to be schizophrenic. Those of us who have
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never had the experience of being schizophrenic certainly can feel the 
horror that this patient is going through.
Forrest argues within a long established tradition. Levin (1977), for 
instance, believes metaphor is rooted in deviance9 and is caused by a 
desire to be vivid, striking, or colorful (p. 31). He also says that meta­
phors are used to fill lexical gaps, giving as examples foot (of a mountain) 
and neck (of a bottle). One cannot deny the former assertion. Clearly, 
one reason for metaphorizing is to say something in a new way so that it 
will command attention or become more memorable, and just as clearly, 
sometimes, metaphors are used to fill lexical gaps. However, it is never 
the case that a metaphor must be employed to fill lexical gaps. For 
instance, a foot of a mountain can also be called its base or its bottom, or 
some totally new word, like “ponge”10 could have been made up to 
indicate the lowest points on a mountain. It is never the case that a 
lexical gap has to be filled by a metaphorical meaning of an existing 
word. It is the case, nevertheless, even across languages, that metaphors 
are often used, that certain types of metaphors are made and that meta­
phors show certain directions of semantic flow. To use Levin’s example 
again, French piedmont is a metaphorical extension of foot. Metaphors 
based upon the human body are legion: the leg of the table, the arm of 
the law, the head on the beer.11
Levin (p. 31) gives as an example of deviant usage, one which calls for 
special construal the term “devouring books,” in which a term for eating 
transfers to reading. Actually, there is an entire set of metaphors correlat­
ing cognitive and gustatory ingestion and excretion: juicy story, food  for  
thought, consuming knowledge, gulping down facts, digesting information, indi­
gestible news, regurgitating facts, spilled the beans and spewing words. Like 
food, knowledge is assumed to enter the body, adding to whatever is 
already there, and, eventually, to exit the body as well, in English by 
metaphors evocative of vomiting. The very fact that we can find so many 
metaphors analogous to Levin’s indicates that we are dealing with nor­
mal aspects of language, not deviant usages.
This is confirmed by several studies. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and 
Lakoff (1987) have dissected everyday metaphors, showing that metaphor 
making is not simply a matter of creativity. They show that metaphors 
refer to cognition, that there is “a coherent conceptual organization 
underlying” metaphorical expression (Lakoff 1987, p. 381-405). Meta­
phors for anger, for instance, relate to the actual physiological changes 
wrought by anger: increased body temperature including a rise in the
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heat of blood, increased blood pressure, redness in the face, interference 
with accurate perception, the body as a container for emotions, and 
agitation. To give a very few examples of these, consider
• get hot under the collar
• a heated argument
• letting off steam
• blind with rage
• burst a blood vessel
• face red with anger
• blood was boiling
• shaking with anger
• reach the boiling point
• let him stew
There are even metaphors for extreme anger which refer to exploding, 
a combination of heat, agitation, and pressure rising to the point of 
explosion, as in
• she flipped her lid
• blew his stack
• hit the ceiling
• went through the roof
Lakoff (p. 386) observes that certain otherwise inexplicable idioms for 
anger actually are caused by these physiologically-based metaphors. For 
instance, expressions like “she had kittens when I told her” are based 
upon the model of “something that was inside causing pressure bursts 
out.” This is related to metaphors like “he vented his anger.”
M iller (1982, p. 68) shows how deixis, actually pointing to something, 
which is usually considered to be straightforward and literal, can also be 
metaphorical. For instance, in a restaurant, a waiter can point to a ham 
sandwich and say “the man in red” to mean “he ordered it” or “bring it to 
him.” Similar usages occur with “the hot fudge sundae practically licked 
the plate clean” meaning “the person who ordered the hot fudge sun­
dae . . . ” There is an added metaphor here, that of a dog or other animal 
who likes its food. Metaphor suffuses every aspect of language and any 
utterance can contain several. Outside of Dick and Ja n e , it is hard to find 
speech which is not suffused with metaphor.
Sternberg, Torangeau, and Nigro (1979) themselves using a metaphor 
of a rubber band, point out that one can stretch a meaning of a word only
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up to a point, and then it snaps (pp. 334-335). The very metaphor they 
use to delineate the limits of metaphor seems to be one of those 
physiologically based metaphors which Lakoff and Johnson so aptly 
showed to be at the foundation of human metaphorizing. Meaning is 
elastic, we stretch the truth, we bend the meaning to our purpose, meaning is 
flexible. All of these are based upon the tactile and visual experience of 
bending and stretching materials to fit a purpose. It also occurs to me 
that we bend and stretch our bodies for purposes, such as stretching to 
reach something or bending to fit under something. Their metaphor 
aside, Sternberg et al. make an important point, which is that there are 
limits on metaphorical meaning. One cannot take a word and use it to 
mean anything else. The hearer has to be able to expand the meaning of 
the word(s) used and it is part of our normal linguistic baggage both as 
speakers and understanders that we recognize when the extension has 
snapped. One has to question seriously interpretations so strained (another 
metaphor of the stretch set) that normal decodings, even normal informed 
decodings cannot be traced to the words used according to any of the 
known strategies for producing or comprehending metaphors. By insisting 
upon such a restriction on interpretation, I am not saying that unusual 
metaphors are not interpretable. The essence of wit, of comedy, of 
drama, of the verbal arts in all their forms all depend upon novel 
metaphorizing, and, as we all know, sometimes we have to have meta­
phors explained to us. That is one function of the Talmudic scholar, the 
preacher of the Gospels, and the English professor. What I am saying is 
that those explanations must be based upon the kinds of extensions of 
meaning discussed here. They are word based. They are context based. 
One cannot claim a meaning for an entire discourse without referring it 
to its parts, and relating them to regular processes of meaning.
Rumelhart (1979) claims that the same comprehension strategies are 
used in interpreting figurative language as literal. He (p. 83) cites a study 
in which a student of his found that it took no longer to assign a 
figurative meaning to a sentence in context than it did to assign a 
nonfigurative one. What did take longer was assigning a meaning to a 
sentence out of context. This is not surprising since we get meaning in 
context.
Clark and Lucy (1975) had somewhat different results in an ingenious 
study. They provided subjects with pictures and asked them to deter­
mine if the picture matched an indirect request that they were given. In 
this study, indirect requests took longer to process if their underlying
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meaning was negative, so that “Must you open the door?” took slightly 
longer to match to an appropriate picture than did “Can you open the 
door?” Notice that “must you” is affirmative in syntactic form, but 
negative in actual meaning. Since other testing has shown that negative 
sentences can take longer to process than equivalent affirmative ones, 
Clark and Lucy interpreted their results to mean that people first com­
pute a literal meaning and then match it to the context to derive the 
metaphorical one, a stage which Rumelhart denies. These are empirical 
issues, resolvable in the laboratory. Many philosophers such as Grice 
also assume that a literal reading is made first and then the figurative 
sense is construed. It must be emphasized, however, that even in the 
Clark and Lucy study, we are not talking about large time differences. 
They speak of time differentials like 0.3 seconds and many of their 
examples are confounded by another problem: in some of their exam­
ples they have mixed registers of formality. For instance, they paired 
“Can you open the door?” with “Must you open the door?” but the latter 
is more formal than the former. T he equivalent would be “Do you have 
to open the door?” The specific outcome of questions like this is not an 
issue. What is the issue is that metaphorical language is processed the 
same way as literal language, using the same context-matching strategies, 
and, in ordinary circumstances, if there is a time differential between 
decoding literal and figurative speech, it is very tiny.
Since we can find pan-human metaphorizing, we can find it in the 
simplest of speech amongst all peoples, we cannot in justice assume that 
metaphorizing p er  se is deviance. Creating metaphors is normal. So is 
understanding them. We have to expect that schizophrenics can suffer 
disruption in this language activity as they do in others.
Fraser (1979, pp. 181-184) confirms again that context is as powerful a 
shaper of what metaphorical meaning as it is in literal meaning. I would 
go one step further and point out that metaphor is possible because of 
the context-dependency of language. That is, all linguistic constructions 
ultimately mean what the context allows them to mean. For this reason, 
we can use phrases that are patently untrue, but still manage to convey a 
real meaning. Fraser gave subjects 30 zero-context short metaphorical 
sentences. He avoided culturally common ones like “he’s a dog” except 
as an example. The metaphors he crafted consisted of such things as 
“He/she is a peanut butter and jelly  sandwich/octopus/compass, and ripe 
banana." Although there wasn’t necessarily one “most probable” inter­
pretation, what he did find was that certain words definitely gave nega-
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tive or positive connotations and that the same words used with she were 
interpreted quite differently from their use with he. This conforms to 
more literal uses of language as well, as in “He/she is a tramp, or 
professional or “He/she is loose.12”
A distinction is commonly made between dead and “live” metaphors, 
with expressions like the heart o f the matter being recognized as having 
their origin in metaphor, but which are now so common that they are 
virtually literal. I think that this is a false dichotomy. Virtually any 
nonconcrete word can be seen to have as its origin a concrete one. It must 
be that human language started out with words only for the palpable, the 
visible, the smellable, and, by extension, these became more and more 
abstract. It is impossible to conceive of a word so concrete that it couldn’t 
be used metaphorically. Somebody might even find a new way to use 
heart in yet another metaphorical sense. Perhaps we should view meta­
phors as ranging from those which everybody would accept in a given 
meaning to those which only a few would agree upon. Fraser’s examples 
are proof of this. In American culture, what could be more concrete and 
specific than a peanut butter and jelly sandwich? Yet, before Fraser, I 
never heard of its being used to refer to a person. I daresay most of 
Fraser’s subjects hadn’t either, but they did give metaphorical interpreta­
tions of it, all different, to be sure, yet understandable to a member of 
this culture.
The issue of metaphor can even be construed politically. Szasz’ (1976) 
vehement insistence that schizophrenics are political prisoners is based 
upon his faulty conception of metaphor. Like the psychiatrists he so 
roundly condemns, he sees metaphor holistically, as chunks of language 
to be analyzed as a whole, not in terms of the parts that comprise it, nor 
does he bow to any psycholinguistic understanding of how people actually 
use language. His interpretation of schizophrenia is that sufferers are 
imprisoned in hospitals because they persist in talking in “metaphors 
unacceptable to [their] audience, in particular to [their] psychiatrist” 
(p. 14). That is, if you say things psychiatrists don’t like, don’t believe, or 
don’t understand, you better watch out or they’ll imprison you in a 
mental hospital.
Everyday metaphorizing requires no special talent, and examination 
of the epics of primitive peoples reveal that it is not a product of special 
cultural achievement. Artists, of course, may have special talents in 
creating novel metaphors, but the ability itself is a general human one. 
Technologically-primitive peoples have again and again been shown to
116 Understanding Psychotic Speech
have the very same language capabilities that technologically advanced 
ones do. So-called primitives create poetry as brilliant and using the 
same devices as those of us who are supposedly of an advanced culture. 
Meaning is derived by regular strategies. It has to be or else language 
would be ultimately meaningless. Anything that anyone said could mean 
what anyone else says it does and that is patently untrue. One can’t even 
imagine such a system evolving, and human language certainly has 
taken a special evolution. Even in the most figurative of language, there 
is meaning which can be rationally derived. When language is so devi­
ant that none of our normal strategies for comprehending what is said, 
we have to say that the fault lies in the speech itself. T he speaker 
has a dysfunction in verbal expression at that time.
[9] Im plications for Theory.
The multileveled structure of language correlates with the almost 
bewildering variety of deviations in schizophrenic speech seen in the 
previous chapter. This will be confirmed when we consider psychotic 
deviations on the level of discourse. If these levels of language have any 
psychological reality, we should expect that deviance occurs in each, 
deviance which can be explained only by reference to each level.
Disruption proceeds from the top (discourse level) down, with the 
lower levels of language becoming disrupted as the patient deteriorates. 
This is probably the reason that there is no evidence at this time that 
phonological processes per se are disrupted as their realization is the 
most automated, whereas the higher the level of language, the more 
choices there are, the more judgments must be made. Hence, gibberish 
and neologizing which apparently arise from difficulties in word retrieval 
seem to represent the most severe level of SD schizophrenia and the 
fewest, albeit them most ill, patients have this difficulty.
Specifically, using the terminology of behavioral psychology—but not 
to its purposes—in language, two or more stimuli can —and certainly 
do—evoke the same response, and the same stimulus can —and certainly 
does—give two or more responses. Both processes seem universal, that 
is, appear in all languages. These are not rare phenonema, but pervasive 
in all languages. For instance, by their very nature, different allophones 
are heard as one phoneme, so that all phonemes in a language are 
instances of two or more stimuli evoking the same responses, and all 
cases of neutralization involve the same stimulus being responded to as if
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they were different. Moreover, the same disjunction between stimulus 
and response is observable on the levels of morphemes, words, and 
higher structures like phrases and sentences. All cases of ambiguity, for 
instance, are cases of the same stimuli being responded to as if they are 
different. In fact, since all words typically have several meanings, under­
standing them is clearly never a case of simple response to a stimulus. 
There is no isomorphism between the given signals and the received 
messages in any language.
At all levels of language, the processes used both to encode and 
decode are not amenable to casual introspection, nor are they amenable 
to deliberate manipulation. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that 
psychotic gibberish, neologizing, word salads, and incoherent discourses 
are deliberate.
Notes
1Julia does not even mention the newer Chomskyan constructs such as Government- 
Binding theory. Nor does he mention Montague grammars, or case and discourse 
grammars. He dismisses generative semantics and functional grammars in footnotes 
only, and he completely ignores pragmatics, systemic grammars, and the entire 
body of work in text linguistics.
2Testing to see how long it takes subjects to process sentences with various kinds 
of syntactic structures has been used to “prove” that one or another derivation is 
real. The supposition is that if subjects take longer to process a sentence with one 
kind of syntactic structure than another, the former has more complex derivation 
than the latter.
3In my now hopelessly outmoded dissertation (Chaika 1972), I showed that a 
grammar based upon such interrelationships can be used to explain deviant sen­
tence production, whereas transformational grammar could not.
4This refers to putting the indirect object at the end of a sentence with the 
preposition to, as in “Mary gave Kevin candy” and “Mary gave candy to Kevin.”
5Fillmore also shows that miscommunication can occur because of frame conflict, 
as when laypersons understand one meaning of innocent but lawyers understand it 
differently.
6These examples are not McCawley’s. Neither he nor I have even attempted a 
complete listing. Readers should be able to supply more examples on their own.
7It has struck me that the patient might really have said beating using the 
pronunciation “beatin’.”
8In Emily Dickinson’s day, people didn’t usually change their furniture every few 
years as they do today. What was bought was bought for life. There is the added 
meaning here of furnished rooms for rent, which certainly indicated that the 
furniture was about as forever as the landlord could get away with.
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9By deviance, he does not mean “pathological,” but deviant in that the word is 
not being used in its original sense which here he assumes is physical eating of 
actual food.
10As one examines language change over centuries, be it in lexicon, syntax, even 
some aspects of phonology, one cannot help but be struck by the degree to which 
items already in the language are extended and eventually even changed to effect 
new meanings brought about by technological or other changes in a culture. Although 
it is possible to make up entirely new words, it is more usual to extend the meanings 
of old ones.
11It has always struck me that heads on beer are based upon human heads rather 
than those of other mammals because human heads are on top, but most other 
mammals have heads in front of their bodies, but legs of a table or chair are more 
easily construed on the picture of a four-legged animal.
12This is changing for younger speakers who are used to finding women in the 
professions of law, medicine, and college professorships. When I was an adolescent, 
however, “she’s a professional” was a metaphor for “she’s a prostitute.” This usage 
still survives in the expression, “The world’s oldest profession.”
Chapter Six
COHESION AND COHERENCE
Cohesion and coherence are Siamese twins and one cannot be 
discussed without the other. Overt cohesive ties do not necessar­
ily create coherence, however. Some kinds of cohesive ties can 
lead to incoherence. A study of schizophrenic, manic and nor­
mal narrations showed differences between these populations 
but these were not caused by incidence of cohesive ties. Rather 
the number of ties were related to other factors.
[1] T h e Difference Between Coherence and Cohesion.
All studies of discourse are really studies of cohesion and coherence, of the ways that discourses are formed. The meanings of the words 
coherence and cohesion overlap. There are times when one is substitut­
able for the other, but a distinction can be made between the two. 
Typically, coherence refers to the logical macrostructure of discourses 
and texts to which all must relate, whereas cohesion refers more specifi­
cally to devices in the linguistic code which overtly mark what goes 
together. This last includes ellipsis, the omission of repeated material as 
well as cohesive ties like and, but, or, however, if, after, and unless, any of the 
words used to join two sentences together or to indicate how the parts of a 
discourse are related. It is not necessary to use actual overt ties in the 
linguistic code in order to produce coherent discourse. That is, discourse 
can be coherent with or without overt linguistic devices. For instance,
1. S: Do you think dolphins can really talk the way people do?
H: We don’t know yet.
S: Better not eat tuna!
This is coherent provided both parties know that tuna fishermen are 
killing over 100,000 dolphins each year. There is no other overt, thus 
countable, cohesive tie linking H ’s comment with S’s admonishment. 
VanDijk (1977, p. 46) demonstrated that “ . . .  connection [of parts of a
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discourse] is not dependent on the presence of connectives” a proposi­
tion echoed by researchers like Fauconnier (1985) and Sanders (1987).
If one is trying to determine coherence on the basis of cohesion, the 
problem arises that much cohesion is effected by knowledge shared 
because of mutual histories as well as by the cultural and perceptual 
bonds usually referred to as common knowledge. A shared history is 
highly idiosyncratic so that communications sometimes fail because S 
has presumed that H knew about an event when, in fact, the H does not 
remember it. Still people usually know how much to give in an interaction, 
and, most of the time, if they err they can repair their contribution upon 
receiving clues from cospeakers such as “Huh?” “What are you talking 
about?” “Cycle me into a subject!1” or even a facial expression.
[2] Sentence, Discourse, and T ext.
It is possible to create a set of sentences which remain just that: a set of 
individual sentences. Although spoken and written discourses also con­
tain sets of sentences, they are distinguished from collections of sen­
tences in that they are perceived as belonging together: they cohere and 
they are coherent. A major issue in determining whether or not schizo­
phrenics manifest linguistic deviance has centered on the issue of 
coherence. It is possible to produce a series of sentences, each of which is 
structurally nondeviant, without producing a coherent or cohesive 
discourse. The whole simply may not hang together.
Meaning typically is achieved beyond the unit of the sentence. Each 
sentence relates to others in the text or interaction so that the entire 
forms a macro meaning such that each sentence is interpretable in terms 
of the whole. Even on the relatively rare occasions when an individual 
sentence comprises the entire vehicle of linguistic expression, the mean­
ing is achieved by comparing it to the nonlinguistic context.2 Failure to 
achieve a coherent discourse is a problem of linguistic deviance as much 
so as is failure to produce a syntactically correct sentence. Just as people 
have slips of the tongue in which they catch themselves and self-correct a 
word, they have them in which they start a discourse, abandon it and 
start over to self-correct their presentation of a discourse. These can be 
signalled by messages like, “Wait a minute. Uhmmm. . . ” “Oops!” “Scratch
that. . . ” “Oh- hold up. I forgot to tell you that first. . . . ” and even “Let
me start over.. . . ” This is evidence of actual discourse structure analo­
gous to sentence structure.
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The ICS (The Ice Cream Stories) was based loosely upon Wallace Chafe’s 
(1980) The Pear Stories. In the latter, subjects were shown a movie, then 
asked to narrate what it was that they had seen. Although it was only 
about six minutes long, the movie was both too long and potentially too 
disturbing to be shown to a psychotic population as it dealt with theft of 
pears as well as a fall from a bicycle. Because Chafe wished to elicit 
narratives from speakers of a wide variety of languages, there was no 
dialogue in the movie. In terms of a psychotic population, a movie with 
its attendant paraphernalia was potentially far too distracting.
A very simple 124-second videostory, henceforth called the ICS, was 
prepared. The storyline was simple, but it related an incident familiar to 
most Americans. The first scene pans a shopping center, closing in on 
the figure of a little girl looking through the window of a Baskin 
Robbins store. The next scene shows a woman setting a table, and the 
same girl walking into the room asking, “Mommy, can I have some ice 
cream?” whereupon the mother leans down, puts an arm around her and 
says gently, “No, honey, it’s too close to suppertime.” Then a man is seen 
walking into the house. The child walks up to him, touching her body to 
his. He says, “Hello, Stefanie.” Then she asks, “Daddy, can I have ice 
cream?” The father looks into the camera with a grin, and his hand 
moves towards his pants pocket. The next scene shows the child walking 
towards the Baskin Robbins store, entering, leaning against the counter 
as she waits fidgeting. Then a clerk comes into view, asking it he can help 
her. She responds inaudibly, but the man repeats clearly, “Double grape 
ice. The child plays with coins, still leaning on the counter. The man 
returns with a very large double-decker cone. The girl gives him the 
money which he looks at, then rings up on the register. A bell chimes on 
the register. The man gives her change, and says, “Thank you. Come 
again.” The girl turns towards the camera with a triumphant smile, 
pushes the door and goes out. A sound of “Oh wow” comes from outside 
the door. The film ends there.
Dialogue was intentionally included in this video in order to test if 
patients comprehended normal speech. The father is not actually shown 
giving the child the money because I wanted to see if patients would 
make the logical deduction that he must have given her the money. The 
beauty of such a study is twofold. First, showing it on a small TV in a 
lounge area emulated a common occurrence, one familiar to all partici­
pants in the study. Second, it was easy to correlate what was said to what 
it was the narrator was ostensibly trying to encode.
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categorized. There are four4 subcategories of causal conjunctions, for 
instance:
Simple causal: so, then, hence therefore.
Emphatic: consequently, because o f  this 
Reason fo r  this reason 
Result in consequence
and subcategories of temporal conjunctions:
Sequential then, next 
Simultaneous just then, at the same time 
Preceding previously, before that 
Conclusive finally, at last
Note the overlap of form and function on even this brief sample of 
their listing. That the same words do double and triple duty—or more—is 
no surprise, but what it means is that we are not dealing with simple 
unambiguous connectors. They have to be interpreted within the context 
that they are used, a circumstance that renders counting with attendant 
statistical verification dependent upon the researchers’ judgment.
Ellipsis, leaving out repeated words and structures, is a powerful 
cohesive device (Halliday and Hasan 1976, pp. 144, 204-5; Halliday 
1985, pp. 317), as it forces hearers or readers to fill in the blanks, so to 
speak, by reference to a prior or, more rarely, following utterance, as in 
(examples mine)
2A. Maxwell totaled his new car, his father’s, and his sister’s.
2B. Having totaled his new car, Maxwell left home.
In 2A, cohesion is effected by the hearer’s having to provide the 
elements Maxwell totaled. . .  car which have been left out after their first 
appearance. The recipient of the message is forced to go backwards to fill 
in the obviously missing constituents. In 2B, the hearer anticipates that 
the subject of having totaled will be provided shortly.
Chomskyan grammar called such processes d e l e t i o n  of repeated 
material, implying that one has created the entire structure and then, 
before uttering it, deleted repeated material. A more pragmatic view of 
grammar assumes that one knows what one has just said, so one just 
doesn’t repeat it. Rather, one utters only what is not repeated. Either way, 
leaving out repeated elements is a prime way of indicating cohesion 
between clauses and sentences. One must remember, however, that one 
cannot just leave out repeated material. Cohesion is forced because the
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• Gibberish
He had [fUc] with [theykraimz]
• Glossomania, chaining of words or phrases which are not perti­
nent to a governing macrostructure, such as a topic of a conversation, 
as in:
. . .  My mother’s name was B i l l . . .  and coo? St. Valentine’s day is 
the official startin’ of the breedin’ season of the birds. All buzzards 
can coo. I like to see it pronounced buzzards rightly. They work 
hard. So do parakeets. . . . ; (Chaika 1974, p. 260)
• Rhyming and alliterating inappropriate to the topic or occasion 
of the discourse: I had a little goldfish like a clown. Happy Hallowe’en 
down. (Chaika 1974, p. 261)
and, in response to “Hello, anyone here want some coffee?: “Head, 
heart, hands, health.” (Chaika 1974, p. 269)
• Neologisms: " . . .  you have to have a plausity of amendments to go 
through for the children’s code, and it’s no mental disturbance of 
puterience, it is an amorition law.” (Vetter, 1968)
• Word salads and other disturbances in syntax: " . . .  you should be 
able to acquire the memory knowledge down on down on the page 
in the bible book to work for god in the mission now in the position 
I am in now with the medicate and with the hospital program.” 
(Chaika 1982a)
• Inappropriate repetitions: “ . . .  I am being helped but at the same 
time that I am being help with the food and the medicate and the 
food an medicate and the an the ah rest I feel that I still do not have 
this I still not have the thought pattern . . . ” (Chaika 1982a)
It was not expected that any one would necessarily produce all or even 
most of these, and, in fact, nobody did. As with other disrupted speech 
most of each narrative was decodable, albeit not necessarily by the usual 
strategies for comprehension. Of the original 24, 2 were dropped because 
it was discovered that they probably had drug-induced psychoses. As a 
result of the selection procedure, 22 patients completed the experimental 
task. Of these, 14 had discharge diagnoses of schizophrenia and 8 had 
discharge diagnoses of mania.
Butler Hospital is a mental hospital affiliated with Brown University 
Medical School. Treatment and care is, and was at the time of this study, 
a staff matter. All mental health workers met daily with other staff,
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that exophora is a less worthy category of reference than endophora 
(Bernstein 1971; Schatzman and Strauss 1972). The reason for this appears 
to be the assumption that the illiterate are more likely to use exophora 
than the literate.7 Even Halliday and Hasan admit that exophora is a 
cohesive device because it ties the utterance to the immediate context 
even though it points out of the narrative itself. It seems to me that an 
effective cohesive device is effective whether or not it points out of the 
narrative. In fact, an argument could be made that use of anaphora when 
exophora would be more direct and equally cohesive comprises faulty 
utilization of cohesive resources. However, it is not the business of this 
study or any other to decide a priori that some modes of cohesion are 
more equal than others, much less superior.
More traditionally, in the sense of what scholars take as conventional 
wisdom, Halliday and Hasan (1976, p. 18) feel that “Exophoric reference 
is not cohesive, since it does not bind the two elements together in a text.” 
This conclusion is a natural one given their emphasis on cohesion as 
opposed to coherence. Moreover, their position is clearly tied to written 
language, in which exophoric reference is highly limited. In oral 
communication, exophoric reference to the physical setting can be just as 
cohesive as endophoric reference to prior verbiage.
Ehlich (1982, p. 327-329) suggests that anaphora and deixis actually do 
different things. Anaphora binds, but deixis focuses. It includes terms 
like over here or that one. If too much deixis occurs, he says that it is 
tantamount to a constant request for focusing, which is confusing if you 
are already focused. In other words, he sees frequent instructions like, 
“the one over here” or “that one over there” as being confusing by asking 
hearers to focus. Unfortunately, neither the Rochester and Martin study 
nor my own elicited examples of such refocusing, so this contention 
could not be re-examined. However, just as skill is required in using 
anaphora so as not to confuse, there is skill in deixis. One is not necessar­
ily inferior to the other in interaction. As we shall see, such apparently 
trivial differences in how one views one type of cohesive tie as opposed 
to another, can lead to quite different interpretations of results. Again, as 
so often, linguistic analysis is tricky, fraught with innocent perils.
Halliday and Hasan (1976, p. 10-11) and Halliday (1985) do recognize 
that discourse is held together by covert as well as overt cohesive ties, 
noting “Cohesion refers to the range of possibilities that exist for linking 
something with what has gone before.” Cohesion includes relations in 
meaning, a set of semantic resources. Since one can easily find some kind
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of semantic relationship between disparate sentences not occurring in a 
discourse, Halliday and Hasan offer as a guide a useful heuristic, saying 
a meaning relationship that is coherent is “ . . .  one in which ONE 
ELEMENT IS IN TERPRETED  BY REFERENCE TO ANOTHER” 
(Halliday 1985, p. 195) (caps Halliday’s). The taxonomy of overt cohesive 
ties presented by Halliday and Hasan produce overt messages telling 
how one segment relates to others. In contrast, semantic ties are covert 
features signalling relationships among parts of the whole discourse. My 
criticism is that their taxonomy creates a confusing welter of terminology 
without providing superior explanatory power.
Brown and Yule (1983, p. 24) explain that Halliday and Hasan’s 
categories derive from a text-as-product view, which does not take into 
account how a text is produced. Brown and Yule’s view is “best character­
ized as a discourse-as-process view,” a view implicit in Kreckel (1981), 
Levinson (1983), and Sanders (1987), as, of course, in my own work. 
Halliday (1985) claims that cohesion itself is a property of text, but how it 
is used makes the difference between something which is a text and 
something which is not, as well as the difference between one kind of text 
and another.
Halliday and Hasan (1976, p. 7; Halliday 1985, p. 54) actually warn 
that it is a mistake to use their categories of cohesion as a method of text 
analysis. Why have they developed them, then? Their position is that 
text itself is a semantic creation, so that, ultimately, all textual analysis 
depends upon interpretation.
Strangely, Halliday (1985, p. 54) also perceives grammar as arising 
from an “automatic realization of the semantic choices (p. 54).” It is true 
that one is not aware of the grammatical choices one makes, but there is 
never just one choice available to convey a meaning; therefore, choices 
cannot be automatic. All meanings are paraphrasable. It is precisely the 
automatic character of much SD speech which causes its deviance. This 
poses an interesting paradox. By looking at other elements in the utterance, 
we can explain glossomania because we can see how the words used are 
related in terms of formal description of the lexicon. However, we cannot 
interpret that same glossomania. There is never just one way to actuate 
cohesion. Therefore, to gain insight into our sense that speech does or 
does not cohere, it is fruitful to discuss the ways that language is made to 
cohere in discourse. The researcher is essentially working as a hearer, 
first figuring out what someone is trying to say and then diagnosing the 
locus of error.
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[4] Ellipsis and Cohesion.
Ellipsis is a vital cohesive device, and must be included in any analysis 
of cohesion in any linguistic production. Ellipsis works because missing 
elements of sentence structure can be supplied. That is, the parts of 
the sentence which have not been overtly produced are retrievable by 
reference to prior utterances in the given situation. Occasionally, they 
are retrievable by looking forward, warning the hearer that something is 
on its way to elucidate. Participles commonly are placed at the start of a 
sentence in writing so that one knows that the missing subject is coming 
as in “Having totalled the car, Max left home.”
Ellipsis can be seen to work across interactions so that one need not 
state what is known from previous interactions. Kreckel (1981) found that 
people who interact a great deal understand each other the most as they 
have a shared history. In other words, the more people know each other, 
the less they have to say to convey information.
With nouns, ellipsis omits the entire noun phrase, as
2A. The cat in the hat ate the mat and said his prayers.
2B. Mary, Kay, and Elizabeth went downtown, bought purple high 
heels, and wore them to the prom, dancing all night and getting 
terrible blisters on their toes.
Here the cat in the hat is not repeated, nor is Mary, Kay, and Elizabeth.
With verbs, ellipsis involves leaving out the entire repeated construction 
as in 3A and 3:
3. Max has been buying junk bonds, Bartholomew has been buying  
preferred stocks, and Andy, penny stocks.
In 3A, the entire verb phrase has been buying was omitted in “Andy, 
penny stocks,” but we have no difficulty in supplying it. If a ques­
tion “Who was buying junk bonds?” is asked, however, then the 
answer would include only the auxiliary, as in “Max has.” This 
option is also open in instances of exact repetition of the entire verb 
phrase including the object, as in “Max has been buying junk bonds 
and Bartholomew has, too.”
Ellipsis is not to be confused with unjustified omissions, items left out 
that are not retrievable by the hearer. In my study of schizophrenic 
narration (Chaika 1982e, 1983b; Chaika and Alexander 1986; Chapter 8) 
schizophrenic narratives were found to contain aberrant omissions. These 
were not ellipses because the omitted words did not refer to anything
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prior or subsequent in the narrative. These omissions were especially 
notable because they cannot be made grammatically under any circum­
stance, as seen in:
3A . . . .  he was blamed for and I didn’t think that was fair . . .
3B . . .  what are the and uh there was a scene
3C . . .  and asks if she can have then goes to the ice cream place.
In 3A and B, we know that nouns were omitted because they were 
preceded by a preposition and a noun determiner. In 3C, the have 
requires a direct object which isn’t there. In 3C we know there has to be a 
noun as direct object, but it, too, is missing. These omissions are the 
equivalent of uttering an inflectional ending without uttering the root 
word in a declined language like Russian. There is no circumstance in 
English which allows such omissions.
These examples illustrate the dangers of mere counting in determin­
ing cohesion. If we were simply counting items left out that could fill a 
certain slot, we might easily accidentally confound these with ellipsis. 
We know that he was blamed for it and that she wanted ice cream, but 
these are as much in error as 3B in which the omission is not so readily 
retrievable. The problem inheres in the English rules for ellipses them­
selves which do not allow ellipses to operate by omitting the noun after a 
preposition, an article or a transitive verb. Pronouns are required in 
these positions.
Although, in most instances, the intended word could be retrieved by 
the listener since she had viewed the videotape with the patient, still 
such omissions are not allowable ellipses in normal speech. This kind of 
ellipsis is not cohesive. There is no reason to assume that the person who 
makes such an erroneous ellipsis8 does so voluntarily. It seems truly 
dysfunctional, a conclusion bolstered by the fact that only schizophrenics 
did it. Rochester and Martin do not mention this kind of ellipsis, but it 
certainly occurred in my own study and only in schizophrenics.
Given the generally strong evidence that the patients were trying to 
cooperate in the task, and given their other genuine disruptions in 
speaking ability, disruptions which occur in many patients diagnosed as 
schizophrenic, and disruptions in speech competence not readily con­
trolled by speakers, such as producing word salads, glossomanic strings, 
and leaving out a vital element in a syntactic construction, it seems most 
likely that these omissions are a product of deficit in speech production. 
3A, B, and C illustrate. All occurred in patients with discharge diagnoses
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of schizophrenia. All were contained in narratives elicited by watching 
the same videotape.
[5] A naphora and Pro-words.
Anaphora is also achieved by systems of pronouns and equivalent 
replacement forms for other parts of speech. For instance,
3A. Max had been looking at the sprawling bright green ramshackle 
Victorian house on the com er that looks like a haunted house. He bought 
it the other day.
3B. I ’d like a blue one myself.
The it, like all of the pronouns commonly referred to as the “personal” 
ones, replaces the entire noun phrase starting with the determiner the 
and ending with the complete prepositional phrase ending in haunted 
house. In 3B, we see the phenomenon of the pronoun one which replaces 
every word in the noun phrase except for the one word which is different. 
In this instance, the adjective green  is replaced by blue. Although not 
always recognized as such, one functions as an anaphoric pronoun which 
allows modifiers to be used with it, giving the meaning of “one just like 
the noun phrase just mentioned except for this one distinction.”
In the following, we see both personal pronouns and the verb replacers 
do  and so do. For the sake of convenience, I call these pro-verbs.
4A. Max and Alex steal cars for a living and so do Rob and Bob. 
They will all go to prison someday.
4B. Max steals cars for a living and so does Alexis. She was influ­
enced by him.
4C. Max stole cars for a living and so did Alex.
There are other such replacement words like that way and like this 
which replace adverbs of manner and such which replaces adjectives.
5. Marilyn bakes wonderful bread by kneading the dough with her 
feet, so I always do it like that.
6. Heloise wears sexy, clingy, vinyl outfits I wish I could wear such 
outfits.
If such cohesive devices are not used, the result can be near chaos, as 
in
Well I want to work for god in the mission and to work for god in the 
mission you have to be able to speak and think in a lord tongue in
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my opinion now to speak and think in a lord tongue you have to 
have to be able to memory the process memory the parle—the 
process in the bible9 the thought pattern the brain wave and your 
thought process must be healthy enough and your legs must be 
healthy enough to when you want to study and and from when you 
want to study and progress in the way of the lord you should read 
the bible and as you read the bible you should if you are in good 
shape physical and mental and mental good shape and physical 
good shape you should be able to acquire the memory knowledge 
necessary as to study the bible to speak and think in a lord tongue 
you should be able to memory all the knowledge down on down on 
the page in the bible book to work for god in the mission now in the 
position I am in now with the medicate and with the hospital 
program I am being helped but at the same time that I am being 
help with the food and medicate the food and medicate and the the 
food and medicate and the and the ah rest I feel that I still do not 
have this I still not have the thought pattern and the mental process 
and the brain wave necessary to open up a page open up the old 
testament and start to memory.. . .  (courtesy of Bonnie Spring).
Had the speaker used do that for all his expressions of wanting to be 
able to study the bible and think in the lord’s tongue, this would be far 
easier to follow, as it would be if he had employed pronouns and used 
ellipsis for the repetitions of food  and medicate. In language, less is 
definitely more.
[6] Lexical Cohesion,
Another Hallidayan category, l e x i c a l  c o h e s i o n , presents even greater 
problems. Here, an apparent cohesive device turns out to be the antithe­
sis of cohesion and coherence. Lexical cohesion consists of words which 
are semantically related (Halliday and Hasan 1976, pp. 318-320; Halliday 
1985, pp. 310-313; p. 317). For instance, if I am speaking of my house, 
and then say “the door . . . , ” lexical cohesion is effected, provided that 
I am speaking of the door to my house. Even if words in adjacent 
sentences or within a sentence can be shown to have a semantic con­
nection, they may not cohere. Consider this segment produced by 
patient X, a segment abounding with lexical cohesion. She is discussing 
her medication:
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. . .  Speeds up the metabolism. Makes your life shorter. Makes your 
heart bong. Tranquilizes you if you’ve got the metabolism I have. I 
have distemper just like cats do, ’cause that’s what we all are. Felines. 
[pause]. Siamese cat balls. They stand out. I had a cat, a manx, still 
around somewhere. You’ll know him when you see him. His name 
is G I Joe he’s black and white. I had a little goldfish too like a clown. 
[pause] Happy Halloween Down.. . . ” (Chaika 1974, p. 261).
It is precisely the fact of lexical cohesion that makes this narrative 
deviant, giving it its schizophrenic flavor (Lecours and Vanier-Clement 
1976; Werner, Lewis-Matichek, Evans and Litowitz 1975; Maher, 1972; 
Chaika 1982a). Glossomania is lexical cohesion, although lexical cohe­
sion is not always glossomania.
Ragin and Oltmanns (1986) found that in an acute phase of illness, 
schizophrenics, manics, and schizoaffectives manifested the same amount 
of within clause lexical cohesion, but, during remission, manics and 
schizoaffectives showed a significant decrease which coincided in improve­
ment in clinical ratings of their speech. Schizophrenics, however, showed 
no such decrease in within clause lexical cohesion. Unfortunately, these 
authors, like so many psychologists, failed to give speech samples, so I 
am assuming, and I may be wrong, that the lexical cohesion they speak 
of is the same as that described here.
Lexical cohesion in itself does not advance the topic of a discourse, so 
that a string of lexically tied sentences can form an incoherent passage 
(Fahnestock 1983). Discussing the general proposition that cohesive ties 
as a whole do not guarantee what Halliday and Hasan call texture, 
e.g., ’textness’, Enkvist gives an apparently made-up example of lexical 
cohesion which does not cohere. Comparing this with schizophrenic 
glossomania, we see the similarities:
7. I bought a Ford. A car in which President Wilson rode down the 
Champs-Elysees was black. Black English has been widely discussed. 
The discussions between the Presidents ended last week.. . .  (quoted 
in Brown and Yule 1983, p. 197)
8. My mother’s name was B i l l . . .  and coo? St. Valentine’s Day was 
the start of the breedin’ season of the birds. I like birds . . .
To my knowledge, Enkvist has done no work on the problem of 
psychotic speech; however, his reductio ad absurdem  to illustrate the 
noncohesiveness of lexical items hits the mark. What he predicted would 
happen does happen with one population, SD psychotics.
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The deviation in 8 is not caused by the untrue or bizarre semantic 
message. Enkvist’s example contains only true (or potentially true) 
information, but it is as deviant as the schizoid passage about the 
mother’s name and birds. It is possible to have fantastic and even 
absurd imagery in coherent language. Alice in Wonderland is a case 
in point. Coherence (and competence) in discourse is not a question 
of beliefs or cognition or of potentially true or untrue images and 
events. It is a matter of handling language competently. The essence 
of language is that it is tied neither to truth nor reality. Bizarreness 
in psychotic speech occurs because of incompetent handling.
Fauconnier (1985, pp. 14-15) shows that pragmatic connectors map 
what we have in our minds onto language so that a hearer can construct a 
mental representation of that. Such mapping can be achieved by expres­
sions like in reality, in Len’s painting, or the little red fox was dressed in a red 
cape. Fauconnier demonstrates that truth or possibility of what is said is 
not an issue. Fantasy is a mapping of imaginary worlds on to ordinary 
language. Error is a mapping of a wrong mental representation. The 
issue for cohesion is the link between mental representations and how 
they are mapped onto language. In such a view, psychotic speech would 
not be deviant because of what is represented, but because of how it is 
represented. In SD speech incoherence is perceived when we cannot find 
the representation of what the speaker believes because the output lacks 
consistency or the language used is so remote that the hearer can’t build 
up a mental representation. Fauconnier elaborates on a system by which 
what is in one’s mind, mental spaces, are introduced by what he calls 
space builders, pragmatic connectors to the mental space.
Until the ICS discussed here, the most systematic and thorough 
study of cohesion in a schizophrenic population, indeed, the one which 
inspired my own, was Rochester and Martin’s (1979) Crazy Talk. My 
own study was inspired by theirs, but it differed in several respects 
from it, accounting for differences in our results. However, the differ­
ences were also caused by differences in orientation in our views on 
Hasan and Halliday and on cohesion in general. The number of cohe­
sive ties in a discourse do not themselves account for coherence or 
cohesion. Apparently, psychotic deficits proceed from larger cognitive 
deficits at least at the time of psychotic bouts.
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[7] T h e  Rochester and M artin  Study.
Rochester and Martin (1979), relying on Halliday and Hasan (1976), 
characterized schizophrenic narratives in terms of failures to employ 
cohesive ties. They considered five categories: R E F E R E N C E , S U B S T IT U T IO N , 
E L L IP S IS , C O N JU N C T IO N , A N D  L E X IC A L  C O H E S IO N  (pp. 76-77). They 
further analyzed these cohesive ties in terms of whether or not they were 
endophoric or exophoric (p. 146).
They gave subjects three tasks: a half-hour unstructured interview, a 
summarizing of a short narrative, and a description of ten cartoons 
accompanied by an explanation of why they were funny. Their study 
had the merit of eliciting connected discourse in reasonably natural 
situations and of providing a context against which to check verbal 
output. This last provided an indication of what the speaker was trying 
to say. Thus any deviance between the psychotic speech and what it was 
trying to encode could be measured.
Rochester and Martin found that the psychotic patients are capable of 
creating complex syntactic structures although they relied more on 
lexical cohesion and exophora than their normal controls did. These 
researchers concluded that T D 10 schizophrenic patients “choose not to 
[use complex structural elements] when the information to be encoded is 
provided by the situational context” (p. 203). This last conclusion is 
based upon the fact that TD  psychotics used more exophora based upon 
the immediate surroundings than did others. However, the simple fact 
that patients used exophora does not mean that they chose not to do 
something else. It is as warranted to say that psychotics are not as able to 
handle complex routines as nonpsychotics are; hence, they rely more 
upon simpler kinds of cohesive devices if you believe that exophora is 
simpler than anaphora. In sum, Rochester and Martin did not deter­
mine that their results came from diminished linguistic capacity in TD  
patients. However, an assumption of diminished capacity is also a reason­
able interpretation of their data.
[8] N arrative Sampling and its Effect on Results.
Rochester and Martin (1979) utilized a random sampling of normal 
narratives for their analysis, comparing these with non randomly selected 
passages from schizophrenic narratives. The passages selected were those 
rated most incoherent by their judges. Thus, Rochester and Martin are
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really talking about passages, not speakers, in their conclusions about the 
differences between normal and schizophrenic speech. However, they 
claim that their findings refer to TD  schizophrenics.
They report that 10% of their normals did produce incoherent pas­
sages (Rochester, Martin and Thurston, 1977), but these incoherent pas­
sages were not included in the analyses unless they were randomly selected. 
Thus, Rochester and Martin by design compared the most disrupted 
schizophrenic passages with a random sampling of normal passages.
In contrast, this study compared entire narratives from each population, 
so that results are based upon comparisons between the entire perform­
ance of speakers. For this reason, the results reported here and those of 
Rochester and Martin (1979) are not directly comparable. Also, since I 
tested only for narrative ability but Rochester and Martin also tested for 
description of cartoons and for performance in an unstructured interview, 
again our results are not completely comparable.
[9] T h e Ice Cream Stories.
Because a characterization of psychotic failure in narrations did not 
seem to be captured by the Halliday and Hasan view of cohesion, I made 
an analogous study of psychotic narration (Chaika 1982e, 1983b; Chaika 
and Alexander 1986). My own procedure was somewhat different from 
Rochester and Martin’s. First, being somewhat more tolerant of exophora, 
I devised the narrative task to be set up so that the stimulus materials 
were not in view; hence, ordinary exophora would not be elicited. In the 
Rochester and Martin study, the materials upon which patient dis­
courses were based were in view. Hence, respondents could easily —and 
cohesively—use exophora. By not keeping the stimulus materials in 
view, I was successfully able to minimize normal effective exophora. To 
put it another way, Rochester and Martin’s findings of increased exophora 
amongst schizophrenics may not have been improper exophora. Of course, 
it may have been. They do not present enough of their narrative samples 
to determine this. They simply considered it undesirable. My methodol­
ogy decreased the chances of normal, proper, effective exophora, so 
when exophora did occur, it was not the most effective mode of reference. 
Narrators could not just point to the stimulus as it was no longer in view. 
Therefore, when exophora was used, it was improperly resorted to. 
Under these circumstances, exophora is less competent than anaphora 
by any standards.
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The ICS (The Ice Cream Stories) was based loosely upon Wallace Chafe’s 
(1980) The Pear Stories. In the latter, subjects were shown a movie, then 
asked to narrate what it was that they had seen. Although it was only 
about six minutes long, the movie was both too long and potentially too 
disturbing to be shown to a psychotic population as it dealt with theft of 
pears as well as a fall from a bicycle. Because Chafe wished to elicit 
narratives from speakers of a wide variety of languages, there was no 
dialogue in the movie. In terms of a psychotic population, a movie with 
its attendant paraphernalia was potentially far too distracting.
A very simple 124-second videostory, henceforth called the ICS, was 
prepared. The storyline was simple, but it related an incident familiar to 
most Americans. The first scene pans a shopping center, closing in on 
the figure of a little girl looking through the window of a Baskin 
Robbins store. The next scene shows a woman setting a table, and the 
same girl walking into the room asking, “Mommy, can I have some ice 
cream?” whereupon the mother leans down, puts an arm around her and 
says gently, “No, honey, it’s too close to suppertime.” Then a man is seen 
walking into the house. The child walks up to him, touching her body to 
his. He says, “Hello, Stefanie.” Then she asks, “Daddy, can I have ice 
cream?” The father looks into the camera with a grin, and his hand 
moves towards his pants pocket. T he next scene shows the child walking 
towards the Baskin Robbins store, entering, leaning against the counter 
as she waits fidgeting. Then a clerk comes into view, asking it he can help 
her. She responds inaudibly, but the man repeats clearly, “Double grape 
ice.” The child plays with coins, still leaning on the counter. The man 
returns with a very large double-decker cone. The girl gives him the 
money which he looks at, then rings up on the register. A bell chimes on 
the register. The man gives her change, and says, “Thank you. Come 
again.” The girl turns towards the camera with a triumphant smile, 
pushes the door and goes out. A sound of “Oh wow” comes from outside 
the door. The film ends there.
Dialogue was intentionally included in this video in order to test if 
patients comprehended normal speech. The father is not actually shown 
giving the child the money because I wanted to see if patients would 
make the logical deduction that he must have given her the money. The 
beauty of such a study is twofold. First, showing it on a small T V  in a 
lounge area emulated a common occurrence, one familiar to all partici­
pants in the study. Second, it was easy to correlate what was said to what 
it was the narrator was ostensibly trying to encode.
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[10] Procedure.
The videostory was shown to all subjects individually. Immediately 
upon its completion, each was asked to tell what it was he or she had just 
seen. Psychotic subjects viewed The ICS on a 12" JVC monitor in a 
lounge at Butler Hospital in Providence, R.I. All responses were recorded 
on an Olympus Perlcorder which subjects themselves could hold. This 
was done to make the situation as nonthreatening as possible. Normal 
subjects viewed the tape individually in booths in the Providence Col­
lege Audio-Visual Lab, and their narrations were then also immediately 
recorded with the Perlcorder upon completion of viewing. As with the 
hospitalized subjects, the normals were interviewed one at a time, not in 
groups.
This procedure of interviewing each participant immediately upon 
completing viewing ensured that the same amount of time had passed in 
between viewing and narrating for each subject. In Chafe’s study, all 
participants viewed the movie together, but then were taken one by one 
to recount what they had seen. Thus, some of his subjects had more time 
for the story to “cook” than others did.
[11] Selection of Psychotic Subjects.
As in Rochester and Martin (1979, pp. 57-60), patients who had 
received ECT treatments or whose psychoses were drug-induced or due 
to brain lesions or tumors were excluded from this study, as were patients 
who did not receive a discharge diagnosis of schizophrenia or mania.
Also, like Rochester and Martin’s study (1979, p. 58), diagnosis was 
arrived at by consensus of the attending psychiatrist, Paul Alexander, 
and other members of the treatment team. Diagnosis was according to 
DSM II  and DSM III, and all diagnoses were blind as to whether or not 
patients had been selected for this study. The preselected patients were 
then invited to participate in the study.
Because this study is concerned with structurally strange speech, not 
necessarily strange content, mental health workers on the Intensive 
Treatment Unit were briefed to note patients who evinced some of the 
features associated with schizophrenic speech: glossomania, neologizing, 
gibberish, opposite speech, inappropriate rhyming or punning, word 
salads, perseverations, or faulty cohesion (Chaika 1974, 1982a,c). The 
actual examples used were:
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• Gibberish
He had [fUc] with [theykra1mz]
• Glossomania, chaining of words or phrases which are not perti­
nent to a governing macrostructure, such as a topic of a conversation, 
as in:
. . .  My mother’s name was B i l l . . .  and coo? St. Valentine’s day is 
the official startin’ of the breedin’ season of the birds. All buzzards 
can coo. I like to see it pronounced buzzards rightly. They work 
hard. So do parakeets.. . .  ; (Chaika 1974, p. 260)
• Rhyming and alliterating inappropriate to the topic or occasion 
of the discourse: I had a little goldfish like a clown. Happy Hallowe’en 
down. (Chaika 1974, p. 261)
and, in response to “Hello, anyone here want some coffee?: “Head, 
heart, hands, health.” (Chaika 1974, p. 269)
• Neologisms: “ . . .  you have to have a plausity of amendments to go 
through for the children’s code, and it’s no mental disturbance of 
puterience, it is an amorition law.” (Vetter, 1968)
• Word salads and other disturbances in syntax: “ . . .  you should be 
able to acquire the memory knowledge down on down on the page 
in the bible book to work for god in the mission now in the position 
I am in now with the medicate and with the hospital program.” 
(Chaika 1982a)
• Inappropriate repetitions: “ . . .  I am being helped but at the same 
time that I am being help with the food and the medicate and the 
food an medicate and the an the ah rest I feel that I still do not have 
this I still not have the thought pattern . . . ” (Chaika 1982a)
It was not expected that any one would necessarily produce all or even 
most of these, and, in fact, nobody did. As with other disrupted speech 
most of each narrative was decodable, albeit not necessarily by the usual 
strategies for comprehension. Of the original 24, 2 were dropped because 
it was discovered that they probably had drug-induced psychoses. As a 
result of the selection procedure, 22 patients completed the experimental 
task. Of these, 14 had discharge diagnoses of schizophrenia and 8 had 
discharge diagnoses of mania.
Butler Hospital is a mental hospital affiliated with Brown University 
Medical School. Treatment and care is, and was at the time of this study, 
a staff matter. All mental health workers met daily with other staff,
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including psychiatrists and psychologists, and with patients. The workers, 
then, were encouraged, as a matter of policy, to pay close attention to 
patient behavior, and their observations were taken seriously. The team 
approach at this hospital lent itself well to selection of appropriate 
subjects by the mental health workers.
More importantly, confidence in their judgement was enhanced because 
of the precision of the criteria for selection. The workers and other staff 
were briefed by the principal researcher on the structural deviations as 
defined in the preceding section. These workers had no part in further 
judging the narratives. Rather, two outside raters determined whether or 
not each narrative was produced by a psychotic or a normal speaker. 
These judgments were made while listening to each tape while reading 
its transcript. Judges considered three narratives from normals to be 
psychotic and one from a psychotic to be normal. These misjudgments 
were not based upon any differences in use of cohesive ties; however, 
they were clearly based upon other features of the narratives (Chapter 8).
To assess the reliability of the lay judges’ classification of the narratives, 
a phi coefficient was calculated (phi = .91, N = 47). This confirms the 
high reliability of the two judges in making the classification of narra­
tives as produced by normal or psychotic narrators. Of the 25 normal 
narratives, 20 were judged normal by both judges, 3 were judged psy­
chotic by both judges, and 2 were judged psychotic by one judge. Of the 
22 psychotic, 21 were judged psychotic by both judges while I was judged 
normal by both judges. The reasons for these incorrect judgments were 
all related to features of the narratives as shown in Chapter 8.
Rochester and Martin (1979, pp. 58-60) used lay judges, asking them 
to judge written transcripts and to “ . . .  mark those segments which they 
had difficulty in following. . .  in which the flow of talk seemed disrupted 
(p. 59).” On this basis, patients were subdivided into two groups: thought 
disordered or nonthought disordered, a dichotomy which commented 
on extensively elsewhere by me and my colleague, Richard Lambe 
(Chaika 1974, 1981, 1982d; Chaika and Lambe 1985, see Chapter 3). In the 
ICS, lay judges selected patients on the basis of disrupted speech.
The deviant speech behaviors constitute the operational definition of 
the selection process. In short, since we wished to characterize differences 
between speech identifiable as “schizophrenic” and normal speech, we 
invited as participants only those patients whose speech was first judged 
deviant by the attending staff and, upon the initial interview, by the 
principal investigator. This particular study is concerned solely with
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ascertaining what it is in some schizophrenic speech that causes people to 
call it “thought disordered” or “crazy.” This has been the thrust in most 
of comparisons between normal and schizophrenic speech.
That the patients were preselected for deviance does not prejudice the 
formal analysis in any way since the details of the analysis are not 
evident in active listening, but required repeated reference to the written 
transcripts of the patients’ narratives. The kinds of cohesive ties utilized 
in this study and the fine grained analysis of the data are independent of 
the selection criteria. This was true also of Rochester and Martin’s study 
(1979; p. 56).
[12] Schizophrenic Versus M anic Speakers.
Several studies have shown that the performance of manics on some 
tasks is like that of schizophrenics, so that what is usually thought of as 
schizophrenic behavior, such as the constellation of speech disorders just 
mentioned also occurs in manics (Chaika 1977; Simpson and Davis 1985; 
Kufferle, Lenz, and Schanda 1985).
All psychotic subjects in this study, manics and schizophrenics, were 
receiving neuroleptic medications, as well as Lithium and antiparkinson 
medications (Alexander, VanKammer, and Bunney 1979). Since the effects 
of these medications are to reduce psychotic symptoms, including deviant 
speech, if anything they would mitigate deviation, not enhance it. Hence, 
any observed differences between the normal and psychotic populations 
may be taken to be very real.
The average stay at the hospital during the time of this study ranged 
from 11 to 14 days, and no subject had had previous long-term institu­
tionalization. All appeared to understand what was required, and gave 
every indication of cooperating in the experiment. All, of course, signed 
consent forms and were free to withdraw at any time.
[13] Cooperation.
Since the question of cooperation is of prime importance in a study 
such as this, perhaps it should be enlarged upon briefly here. It is 
especially important to establish that the psychotic population was trying 
to fulfill the experimental task. It may be argued, and has often been, 
that such patients produce deviant discourse because they wish to, either 
because they want to confound the investigator, or because they are
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especially creative, a stance with which I do not agree (Chaika 1974, 1977, 
1981, 1982a). Alternatively, one might argue that the psychotic partici­
pants in this study failed because they did not understand what was 
expected of them. If, indeed, they were not cooperating or if they did not 
understand the task, then our results would be meaningless, because 
these rest wholly on the correlation of the narrative to the videostory.
There was every evidence that the psychotic subjects were cooperating 
in the speech situation when they told their stories (Chaika 1982e, 1983b) 
Briefly, cooperation can be assumed for the following reasons:
• All told narratives that had as their recognizable point of departure, 
events from the story.
• Even when subjects digressed, the digressions had as their points 
of departure the video story, and most cycled back to the story after 
such a digression.
• Many commented on their own performances and/or remarked 
that they could not remember something.
• There were attempts to make events and comments in the digres­
sions cohere to the narrative as a whole.
• They frequently ended their narratives formally with such phrases 
as “that’s the way it was,” “that’s all,” “it made me happy to see that 
girl get her ice cream.”
Thus, there was no reason to assume that differences in performance 
between normals and psychotics resulted from lack of cooperation. Since, 
also, as noted above, none of the patients had had long-term institu­
tionalization, and their average stay at the time of this study was two 
weeks, institutionalization per se could not be posited as a principal 
cause of differences.
[14] T h e Nonpsychotic Participants.
The normal subjects consisted of students at Providence College and 
members of the community who volunteered after the project was described 
to them. The mean age of normals was 33 and of psychotics 28.2.
The psychotic population was selected on the basis of speech disorder 
as described above, as this was what we were testing. Then, a population 
of normals was matched as closely as possible in age, occupation, and 
social class. Again, these procedures conform to those used by Rochester 
and Martin (1979, pp. 57-61).
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It must be emphasized, however, that this is not a sociological study, 
and the data were not analyzed with social class as a factor. Indeed, one 
complicates an argument considerably if social class is used as the expla­
nation for schizophrenic performance on a narrative task. For instance, 
failures in narration such as using gibberish, or altering time sequences, 
or relating incidents not appropriate to the task at hand have never been 
correlated with social class, and these were the sorts of dysfluencies 
which appeared in this study.
The entire question of class-related deficiencies in narration is very 
cloudy. Early studies by Bernstein (1971) and Schatzman and Strauss 
(1972) found deficiencies in working class narrations, but later work, 
such as the Labov ouevre, found differences in narrative techniques, but 
no deficits (Chaika 1982b). More recent work indicates that the differ­
ences lie more in the orality vs. the literacy of a culture than in social 
class p e r  se (Tannen 1984). Moreover, even though Rochester and Martin 
found that schizophrenics perform like Bernstein’s working class youth, 
they did not find that only working class schizophrenics performed this 
way.
[15] Analysis.
The tapes of the narratives were transcribed by the principal investigator. 
Two judges independently verified the transcriptions by comparing 
them to the taped interviews. For the reasons discussed below, the cohe­
sive ties calculated here were not identical with the categories in the 
Rochester and Martin study. Those ties which were decided upon, below, 
were isolated and counted by three independent judges from the written 
transcription. Any discrepancies were resolved by consensus. Discrepan­
cies were found in less than 5% of occurrences of cohesive ties. The 
majority of these consisted of one judge missing an obvious tie, such as 
inadvertently skipping over a conjunction.
• anaphora (Ap) e.g., he, she, it his, they, her, him, its, their, them.
• temporals (T) e.g., now, then, after, while
• and conjunction (&C) e.g., blue and yellow plaid
• and temporal (&T) e.g., she went home and asked her mother
• other conjunctions (C) but, for, or, nor, yet
• exophora (Ex.) e.g., I, you, and instances of 3d person pronouns
not referring backwards in the narrative itself
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Given the multiplicity of cohesive devices in any language, neither 
Rochester and Martin’s (1979) study nor this one attempted to count all 
possible ties. They, however, did count lexical ties, whereas this study, 
for two reasons, did not. First, as already shown, lexical cohesion in itself 
does not advance the topic of a discourse so that a string of lexically tied 
sentences may form an incoherent passage (Fahnestock, 1983). Second, 
deciding whether usage of certain words in a discourse are instances of 
lexical cohesion is highly subjective, and is even more so when we 
consider that lexical cohesion gone awry has long been considered a 
characteristic of what has for decades been called “schizophrenic speech.” 
As has often been noted (Lecours and Vaniers-Clement 1976; Werner, 
Lewis-Matichek, Evans and Litowitz 1975; Maher 1972; Chaika 1974, 
1982a), one of the most salient characteristics of schizophrenic speech is 
glossomania, which is lexical cohesion. To count lexical cohesion, then, 
is to consider the very symptom we wish to explain. Therefore, this study 
is confined to pronominalization and conjunctions.
Another difference between this study and Rochester and Martin’s 
involves the crucial differences which may be covered by and. Because 
and clearly has both a temporal and an additive sense (Levinson 
1983:98-99), each of its senses was considered as a separate class. Those 
that meant “plus” were counted as and-conjunction (&C), and those 
paraphrasable by then were counted as and-temporal (&T), as in:
9A. Max bought poison and fertilizer.
9B. Max went to the store and he bought poison.
In 9A, Max’s purchases were poison plus fertilizer (&C), and in 9B, 
first he went to the store and then (&T) he bought the poison. Since the 
videotape offered opportunities for both additive and temporal conjoining, 
these were crucial for proper cohesion and for coherence as well.
The number of instances of each category was divided by the total 
number of words (narrative length) for each subject. The percentages 
thus formed were the data for the statistical analysis of cohesive ties.
[16] Results.
A one-way ANOVA with diagnostic type considered a fixed effect 
between subjects revealed no overall differences in mean narrative length 
(mean number of words per narrative) among schizophrenics, manics, 
and normals (F = 0.23; df = 2,44; p > .50).
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T able  1. M ean percentages of total number of words 
devoted to different categories of cohesive ties.
Category o f  Cohesive Tie
A P  & T EX T &C C Totals
Norm als 
N =  25
13.4 5.0 2.3 2.1 1.4 0.9 25.2
Schiz.
N =  14
11.6 3.9 4.5 2.4 2.1 1.4 26.9
Manic 
N =  8
14.9 2.8 3.8 2.3 2.7 0.9 27.2
Totals 13.1 4.3 3.2 2.3 1.8 1.1
T ab le  2. Summary table of the one-way, fixed-effects ANOVA 
for narrative length compared among the three diagnostic types.
Source SUMSQ d f MEANSQ F(obt) F(crit) p
Diagnostic type 1440.82 2 720.41 0.23 - >.50
Error 135508.44 44 3079.73 - — -
Total 136948.85 46 - - - -
A two-way ANOVA with diagnostic type as a fixed effect between 
subjects and categories of cohesive ties as a fixed effect within subjects 
revealed no overall differences among the three diagnostic types in the 
mean percentage of total narrative devoted to cohesion (number of 
category instances per narrative) (F = 0.31; df = 2,44; p > .50).
Considering the narratives as a whole, undifferentiated as to diagnos­
tic type, there is an overall difference in the mean percentage use of the 
six categories of cohesive ties (F = 135.5; df = 5,220; p < .01). Post hoc 
comparisons (Hays 1981; Myers 1979) revealed the following pattern of 
differences among the categories. Overall, the category with the highest 
percentage is Ap (13.1%). This is significantly higher than any other 
category. Next is &T (4.3%) which is significantly higher than all those 
below except Ex (3.24%). Ex, in turn, is not significantly higher than 
either T  (2.25%) or &C (1.38%), but does exceed C (1.06%). T, &C and C 
do not differ.
There is a significant interaction of the diagnostic types (normal,
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T ab le  3. Summary table of the two-way ANOVA on percentage of total narrative 
devoted to different categories of cohesive ties.
Diagnostic type (norm al, m anic, schizophrenic) is treated as a fixed effect 
between subjects while category of cohesive tie is treated as a sampled effect within subjects.
Source SUMSQ d f MEANSQ F(obt) F(crit) P
Between Ss 292.19 46 - - - -
Diagnostic type 4.11 2 2.06 0.31 — >.50
Error (b) 288.07 44 6.55 — — _
W ithin Ss 6333.03 235 - - - -
Category 4672.85 5 934.57 135.50 2.29 <.05
Category X  Type 142.87 10 14.29 2.07 1.91 <.05
Error (w) 1517.31 220 6.90 — — —
Total 6625.22 281 - - - —
manic, and schizophrenic) with the categories of cohesive ties (F = 2.07; 
df = 10,220; p < .05). The Newman-Keuls procedure (Myers, 1979) was 
used to further analyze the differences among the types within individ­
ual categories. Within the category Ap the schizophrenics use significantly 
less than either normals or manics who do not differ.
Within the category Ex, normals use significantly less than manics or 
schizophrenics, who do not differ. When total Ex usage is further divided 
into two categories on the basis of (a) personal reference (e.g., I  saw .,
then we . . . )  as distinguished from (b) unprepared pronominal reference 
(e.g., “she11 went home and asked her mother” with no referent for the 
she), the following pattern obtains: the three diagnostic types show no 
significant difference in personal reference, Ex(a), (F = 2.71; df = 2,44; p 
> .05). No normal subject used any unprepared pronominal reference, 
Ex(b), while 4 of the 14 schizophrenic subjects used such reference a total 
of 20 times. One of 8 manic subjects used one such reference.
Within the category &T, normals use a significantly higher percentage 
than manics, while the schizophrenics do not differ from either. In three 
categories (T, &C, and C), the three types show no differences.
To refine the interaction by comparing the categories within each 
type, the Bonferroni t-test was used (Myers, 1979). As noted above, there 
is an overall difference such that Ap has a higher percentage of use than 
any other category. This difference holds for all three types.
Overall, no difference was obtained between &T and Ex, and this 
result is sustained among the schizophrenic and manic subjects. But 
normal subjects did use a higher percentage of &T than Ex.
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The overall difference between Ex and C was reflected in significant 
differences for both normal and manic subjects, but was not obtained for 
the schizophrenics. The remaining contrasts agreed with the main effects.
[17] Discussion: Cohesive Ties and Coherence.
Rochester and Martin’s study concluded that schizophrenics chose not 
to use cohesive ties, and that they were more likely than normals to make 
exophoric reference, reference which does not refer to an antecedent 
word within the sentence or discourse itself.
This study did not confirm Rochester and Martin’s conclusion that 
schizophrenics do not use cohesive ties as frequently as normals. It was 
found that normals, schizophrenics, and manics produced narratives of 
equal mean length in the ICS task, and used the same mean total percent 
of cohesive ties. That is, schizophrenics, manics, and normals used the 
same overall percentage of cohesive ties per narrative. Moreover, each 
group showed significantly more anaphora than other cohesive ties. 
This is not unexpected, as anaphora is commonly used within sentences 
as well as across them. Also, since anaphoric words can substitute for 
virtually any lexical items, there are more opportunities to use them 
than any other type of tie.
However, although each category of respondent used more anaphora 
than any other kind of tie, schizophrenics did use significantly less 
anaphora than either normals or manics. The relative paucity of anaph­
ora in the schizophrenic stories appears to have been caused by another 
fact of schizophrenic narration. Schizophrenics were more likely than the 
others to include matters extraneous to The ICS. They mentioned people 
and occurrences that were not in the videotape, and entwined them with 
those that were. Thus they produced more novel references, giving them 
fewer opportunities for anaphora, as in:
10. I was watching a film of a little girl and um s bring back 
memories of things that happened to uh people around me that 
affected me during the time when I was living in that area and she 
just went to the store for a candy bar and by the time ooh of course 
her brother who was supposed to be watching wasn’t paying much 
attention he was blamed for and I didn’t think that was fair . . .
Note that in the above, it is not a matter of deficit in referring 
anaphorically. T he schizophrenic speaker uses anaphoric pronouns
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correctly. If she had not mentioned intrusive matters (the memories that 
were brought back, the candy bar and the brother), none of which 
occurred in the videotape, she would have have had more opportunity to 
produce anaphora which referred to the events of the tape. Instead, she 
digresses to idiosyncratic associations which are, nonetheless, clearly 
associated to the topic. The digressions, however, produce new direct 
reference rather than anaphora, thus contributing to the reduction in 
anaphora.
The ICS study does not support the conclusion that schizophrenics 
and manics lack competence in using cohesive ties. Rather, their opportu­
nity for using them is lessened because they did not adhere to a macro- 
structure in their narratives. Personal memories and other extraneous 
factors interfered. As noted above, this seems to be a cognitive factor 
associated with the conditions of the illness. There seems to be no 
confirmed explanation or intervention for this condition.
[18] T h e Problem of Exophora.
This study found, as did Rochester and Martin’s, that normals use 
significantly less exophora than psychotics, perhaps for different reasons. 
As already noted, their result may have been task related in a way ours 
was not. Rochester and Martin (1979) had subjects describe cartoons 
which were in view, whereas ours described the videotape after it was 
over, hence gone from view. If the picture being described is in full view, 
then the simplest strategy for encoding is simply to refer to it. The 
exophora produced by their subjects was, for the most part, referential 
exophora. Although, as noted previously, some researchers consider this 
inferior reference, this kind of exophora is not dysfunctional and, in 
actual interaction, cannot be shown to be inherently less precise than 
anaphora.
If, as in The ICS task, the picture isn’t in view, then the competent 
narrator will make the effort to establish who and what is being talked 
about before referring to it by a pronoun. Increased exophora in Rochester 
and Martin’s study may have been a simplification of the narrative task, a 
simplification induced by the presence of the pictures. This is confirmed 
by Rochester and Martin’s own finding that there was no difference 
between normal and schizophrenic use of exophora in tree interviews. 
The difference occurred only when subjects were asked “to describe and
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interpret pictures that are in the immediate situation, but [it d id ] . . .  not 
[occur] in other contexts” (Rochester and Martin 1979:157).
The factors in the Rochester and Martin study which elicited exophora 
were successfully prevented in the ICS, but exophora nevertheless did 
occur. When it did, it was dysfunctional as it appeared with no prior 
referent. This occurred in 5 out of the 22 psychotic narrations. No 
normal used such Exophora at all. It occurred among those with the 
most disrupted narratives so that their failing to establish a necessary 
referent was part of a larger deficit in narrative construction as shown 
below.
The following boldface examples illustrate this nonreferential exophora 
in:
11. um in an ice cream store she was looking in to see if she could 
get any she went home. H er12 mother said wait until dinner. Then 
her father came home. She asked him. He said “I don’t know. You’re 
going to ask your mother.” Then she went down to the ice cream 
store and bought her own.
There was no introduction to 11 at all, a distinct deficit in narrative 
production. Introductions are an integral part of narratives. Even 
the other disrupted psychotic narratives had introductions and part of 
the abnormality of this one was clearly its lack of one (Chaika 1982e). 
Among other functions, introductions also provide opportunities for 
later anaphora. The she probably referred to the girl in the video, 
but the exophora was unprepared and the form of the narrative was 
correspondingly degraded.
12 . . .  and I didn’t think that was fair the way the way they did that 
either, so that’s why I ’m kinda like asking could we just get together 
for one big party or something ezz it hey if it we’d all in which is in 
not they’ve been here, so why you jis now discovering it? . . .
Although 12 is a later portion of 10 above, there were no referents for 
the boldfaced pronouns. This narrative, on the sentence level, showed 
verbal disruption even to the point of “word salads.”
[19] Conclusions.
This study of narration has import both for linguistic and for psychiat­
ric theory. For the former, the findings are clear. Countable cohesive ties
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are not the sole determinant of coherence and a sense of cohesion itself. 
Apart from its usefulness in studying such phenomena as cross-cultural 
differences in narrative and other discourse studies, this has ramifica­
tions for rhetorical theory as well, an important factor in an increasingly 
mechanistic and literate world.
In terms of the problems posed by psychosis, this study found that 
overall use of cohesive ties does not distinguish between the populations 
under study. This result differs from Rochester and Martin’s (1979:85) 
which found that, according to their analysis, normals used more cohe­
sive ties overall than schizophrenics. Certainly, we did find that schizo­
phrenics used less Anaphora than did the manics and normals. This 
seems to be caused by a general inability to suppress material irrelevant to 
the situation.
[20] T h e Problem  of Nom enclature.
This inability to suppress has been noted often in the literature on 
schizophrenia, and seems to be what is meant by such terms as derailment, 
tangentiality, pigeonholing, loss o f  set, intermingling and attentional deficits. 
That is, several terms have been used over the years to describe the same 
phenomenon. Perhaps because of the great amount of cross-disciplinary 
research into psychotic speech, researchers describing the same phenom­
ena give it different names, thereby thinking they have explained, when 
all they have done is describe.
Commonly, these terms have been based upon anecdotal rather than 
experimentally-gathered evidence. Where evidence has been gathered, 
frequently, as noted above, the task has not elicited connected discourse. 
Rochester and Martin (1979) corrected that problem in their study. They 
asked subjects to recount their narratives while their stimuli, the cartoons, 
were still visible, whereas we asked subjects to recount after the stimulus 
videostory was no longer visible. This may have created the differences 
in results between their study and ours, so that the differences in their 
results and ours may be traced to differences both in the tasks and the 
methods of analysis in the two studies.
This study shows that psychotics use cohesive devices as often as 
normals, but the pattern of such usage differed, so that exophora without 
establishing prior reference occurred only in highly disrupted narratives, 
those which digressed from the matter of the videostory. This co-occurred 
with other deviations in narration.
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There was no general deficit in using cohesive ties in schizophrenics 
or manics, nor was there any evidence of deliberate choices not to use 
cohesive ties. Where differences occur between normal, schizophrenic, 
and manic populations, they seem caused by other factors, such as 
digressions which appeared to be genuinely uncontrollable by the patient.
Notes
1This is a favorite phrase of my husband’s.
2Humans naturally interpret speech by reference to the physical, cultural, and 
linguistic context in which it occurs. I say “naturally” because even toddlers first 
learning to speak clearly expect their utterances to be interpreted in context. If they 
know only one word, they will use it in different contexts, expecting adults to 
interpret the meaning in that context. If they don’t know the word for what they 
want, then they choose the one they do know that can be interpreted in context to 
give the message they want, like the toddler who uses button to mean “put on my 
clothes,” “cover me with a blanket,” and, pointing at the dog’s face, “eyes.” Babies 
and children cannot be taught to do with this language. They just know it.
3Interestingly, this derives from the Greek word for proof. When one points out, 
one proves.
4Both these and the temporal subcategories are actually subcategorized even 
further, so that, for instance, there is both Causal general and Causal specific. There 
is Temporal simple (external only), Conclusive: Simple, and Correlative forms.
5All languages utilize the same processes to effect cohesion. We know of no 
language which has no pronouns, for instance, nor do we know of any with no 
ellipsis. What differs from language to language is the specific circumstances that 
force speakers to use pronouns rather than ellipsis and vice versa.
6Rarely, for special emphasis, an interactant might repeat a known element, but 
this is done for emphasis or humor.
7The studies which “proved” this show a clear class bias, as subjects were given a 
task typical of middle-class education and then judged by middle-class standards. 
When faced with narrating the action showed on cards, nonmiddle-class speakers 
referred directly to the pictures, whereas middle-class ones were more likely to 
narrate as if the pictures were not in view a (Labov, Robins, Lewis, and Cohen 1968; 
Labov 1969; Chaika 1982; 1989J. The middle class has more experience with books 
that tell stories independently of any pictures. To illustrate: if one of the pictures 
given to subjects showed a boy standing with a bat in his hand before a house with a 
broken window, the middle-class person would say, “The boy was playing baseball, 
and he broke the window” whereas the nonmiddle-class subject would say, “He was 
playing baseball and he broke the window” without first mentioning the noun “the 
boy.”
8Given the generally strong evidence that the patients were trying to cooperate in 
the task, and given their other genuine disruptions in speaking ability, disruptions 
which occur in many patients diagnosed as schizophrenic, and disruptions in speech
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competence not readily controlled by speakers, such as producing word salads, 
glossomanic strings, and leaving out a vital element in a syntactic construction, it 
seems most likely to us that these omissions are a product of deficit in speech 
production.
9The original from which this was taken does not use capitals except on I. I have 
repeated that practice here.
10Rochester and Martin speak of TD, thought disordered, subjects. This corre­
sponds to the SD, speech disordered, label used throughout this book and my 
articles on this subject.
11Although this was technically improper because she was not in view, it did not 
impair cohesion since I viewed the video with each patient; hence, it could be 
assumed that I knew the referent.
12This and the subsequent examples of pronouns referring to the feminine 
singular could be taken as anaphoric to the first mention(s) of she.
Chapter Seven
PRAGMATICS, INTENTION, AND IMPLICATION
Many linguists have tried to sweep pragmatics under the rug as 
not being "true" linguistics, an attitude that is happily changing. 
Language production and comprehension can be analyzed only 
in the pragmatic usage. All analyses of language data have to 
proceed from a consideration of the discourses that sentences, 
both uttered and written, are embedded in. Realizing that all 
language is discourse based empowers analyses of speech and 
writing. Context-free explanations do not work. Pragmatic analy­
ses include intention and implication, both of which impel 
actual speech forms and also guide the hearer's interpretation of 
meaning.
[1] Pragm atics.
T hose aspects of meaning which cannot be explained by the break­down of words in relation to syntactic forms are often relegated to 
p r a g m a t ic s . Gordon and Lakoff (1975, p. 83) succinctly characterize this 
by noting “ . . .  under certain circumstances, saying one thing may entail 
the communication of another.” In practice, it has proven difficult to 
the point of impossible to draw borders which delimit the scope of 
semantics, semiotics, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, and pragmatics 
itself (Levinson 1983, pp. 1-15; Fillmore 1984). As Kearns (1984, p. 163) 
avers “ . . .  we do not begin with syntax and then add semantics; the 
semantics is prior.”
Many linguistic scholars have labored long and hard to maintain a 
boundary between language itself and the practical rules for its use 
(Fromkin 1975). Nevertheless, it has been abundantly clear for a very 
long time that there is no way to divide the two (Chaika 1977, 1981, 
1982b; 1989). Fauconnier (1985) emphasizes that language is pragmatics 
and is structured for pragmatic purposes. He gives as an instance that 
there is an assumption that there is a link between an author and his 
works, so that “Plato is on the top shelf” typically means “the book by
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Plato. . . ” In Faucconier’s terms, a TRIGGER, the antecedent of the 
statement, is linked to the t a r g e t , what is intended to be referred to. 
These linkages are pragmatic functions. In disrupted psychotic speech 
like word salads, it is precisely these kinds of triggers toward targets that 
are lacking.
[2] M eaning and Direct Statement.
Because language is essentially pragmatic, meanings are not always 
derivable by dissecting the words into their component features, nor by 
matching the syntax used with actual meaning. For instance,
1A. S (in a friend’s kitchen): Mmm. Something smells good.
pragmatically means “I ’d like the food that smells so good.” Note here, 
also, that although the speaker uses the indefinite something and there is 
a universe of good-smelling nonfood items, in fact 1A will be understood 
to mean “food.” The reason for this is that it is socially unacceptable to 
ask for food in our society. Hence, typically we ask for food in language 
which does not directly request, but which nevertheless is unambiguously 
a request; therefore elicits a response as if it were a straightforward 
request. Note, for instance, one possible response to 1A.
1B. H: I ’m sorry, but it’s for Mary’s birthday party.
This would appear to be a bizarre response to the actual message of 1A 
in terms of a conventional semantic interpretation according to the 
features of meaning of the component words. There has been nothing 
overtly declared in LA that the speaker of IB  could be apologizing for. 
However, if one knows the social restriction on directly asking for food, 
as well as the fact derived from experience (Kearns 1984, pp. 85-121) that 
good smelling food tastes good, such an exchange quite ordinarily means 
what it does. All that is needed for proper interpretation is reliance on 
the discourse rule that one does not state what is known to all parties in 
the context, unless one wishes to imply something else. In this instance, 
the hearer usually infers that the speaker commented on the odor because 
he or she wishes to eat (Sacks 1964-1972; Chaika 1989, p. 125).
Since we are talking about common, uneventful speech events, we 
cannot exclude them from linguistic analysis by throwing them into a 
wastebasket labelled pragmatics or semiotics. Language is pragmatic. It is 
semiotic.
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[3] Form al Rules of Syntax and Sem antics.
We have already seen that languages contain orderly syntactic rules 
that these rules in and of themselves describe how we produce our 
language. The do-support rule demonstrated in Chapter 4 is a prime 
example. T he rules for forming questions seem quite evident and 
unyielding:
in order to form questions in English invert the first member of the
verb auxiliary before the subject, but if there is no auxiliary substitute
do in the number and tense appropriate to the rest.
T he problem is that many questions in social interaction do not 
appear in question form, nor are all syntactically well formed questions 
really questions. Syntactic rules exist, but without reference to motive, 
context, and social rules of obligation, one cannot explain how syntactic 
forms are actually interpreted in given interactions. For instance, it is 
common to hear questions like:
2A. Is the Pope Catholic?
2B. Does a bear live in the woods?
These apparent questions aren’t questions at all. They are answers, 
specifically the answer “yes.” Moreover, such answers also imply “the 
answer should be obvious to you.” In order to know that, one must
• share cultural knowledge with the speaker.
• assess the context as appropriate for bantering
Although they are regarded as stringently rule-governed, overt syntac­
tic forms such as questions and declarative statements may actually take 
on different roles in actual discourse, roles not accounted for in their 
rules. A statement can actually be a question, as in 2A and B above. 
There is nothing in the actual words and syntax used that would enable 
the correct semantic interpretation. Rather, the two social conditions 
explain the meaning. The first condition is fulfilled because we know 
who the Pope is and that he has to be a Catholic; therefore, the answer to 
2A is “yes.” Instead of saying this, the speaker has offered an obvious 
question to which “yes” is the answer. We will shortly see an analogous 
situation in which a syntactically declarative sentence is a question. 
Then, too, a question can really be an imperative.
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[4] Speech Acts.
Although people usually think of speech as a way of stating proposi­
tions and conveying information, it frequently fulfills neither of these 
functions. Much speech serves the purpose of social bonding, just shootin’ 
the breeze and passin’ the time of day (Chaika 1989, pp. 43, 44, 61, 96, 
117). These are out of the provenance of this discussion.
Austin (1962) delivered a now famous series of lectures entitled How to 
Do Things with Words which introduced the idea of speech acts. This has 
been refined and expanded by numerous scholars, notably Searle (1969), 
Gordon and Lakoff (1975), Bach and Harnish (1979), and Kearns (1984), 
drastically changing our minds about how meaning is given and gotten. 
Austin claimed that much speech actually is a way of doing things like 
betting, guaranteeing, in warning, describing, asserting, commanding, 
ordering, requesting, criticizing, apologizing, censuring, welcoming, 
promising, objecting, demanding, and arguing.1 These they called the 
ILLOCUTIONARY FORCES of language.
Certain verbs known as p e r f o r m a t iv e s  have been isolated as those 
that explicitly state the illocutionary force. This does not mean that such 
verbs have to precede or follow a statement for it to have an illocutionary 
force. Typically, they don’t appear at all, but one way to test for 
illocutionary force is to preface a utterance with “I hereby” +  the appro­
priate performative, as in “I hereby warn you. . . ” If the meaning and 
force remain the same, then the original utterance is considered to have 
had the illocutionary force denoted by the performative. For instance, 
one can say
3A. Get out of here
This admits of the paraphrase
3B. I hereby command you to get out of here.
If, indeed, 3A means 3B, then we can say that 3A has the illocutionary 
force of a command. This does not mean that “Get out of here” always 
has that force, however. For instance, if my husband is teasing me, and I 
laughingly say, “Get out of here,” that can’t be paraphrased by 3B; 
therefore, in that instance, the “get out of here” is not a true command. It 
has the force of a compliment on his bantering.
3C. Someone’s a little noisy.
3D. This place stinks.
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Both of these can mean 3B “get out of here,” in one of their possible 
senses. That is, both are paraphrasable as “I hereby command you to 
leave.”2 3C can also mean “I hereby warn you to keep quiet.” 3D can 
mean “I hereby warn you to clean up.” Actually, these paraphrases are 
almost absurdly strained, and many native speakers who can easily 
understand the illocutionary force and can easily paraphrase it accu­
rately would never think of the hereby-test. I would say a better one is to 
paraphrase using the canonical syntactic form. 3C can be restated by, “get 
out of here.” This is the canonical form of an imperative. In another 
circumstance, it could be “be quiet,” another imperative.
Recognition of the illocutionary force, expressed explicitly or 
implicitly, explains the polysemy of any given utterance, and provides 
us with a heuristic for determining which meaning is to be taken in 
a given instance. For instance, if a friend, X, asks me to dinner, I 
might reply “I ’m eating with Gwendolyn tonight.” What this actually 
means depends on the relationship between X and Gwendolyn. If 
Gwendolyn irritates X, then X  will take my utterance as a warning. 
If I say the same thing to another friend who is also friendly with 
Gwendolyn and likes her, then the same utterance would have the force 
of an invitation. To yet another who doesn’t know Gwendolyn, it becomes 
merely an apology.
Additionally, as Silverstein (1987) demonstrates, there are illocutionary 
functions in language which do not have a corresponding illocutionary 
verb. One example is insult. There is no way to say “I hereby insult you that 
. . . ” although one can clearly insult another by overt words or by such mat­
ters as intonation and stress. Often insults are more indirect since insult­
ing is an overt act of aggression. Still, one can speak of the act of insulting.
We can usually recognize an insult directed at others or ourselves. 
Certainly, people sometimes fail to recognize a particular insult, just as 
they sometimes think an insult was intended when it was not. Paranoids, 
for instance, constantly misinterpret utterances as constituting threats or 
insults, even though the speaker denies such intent and others present 
do not find a judgment of insult to be warranted. It is true after all that 
speakers pretend they didn’t mean to insult or threaten when, in fact, 
they did. At some times in his or her life, the paranoid individual may 
well have been justified in assuming insult in the face of the insulter’s 
denial. The major difference between a person who is paranoid and one 
who is not is that the former more readily judge remarks as being
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insulting or threatening. If speech acts were not essentially polysemous, 
then perhaps people would not be paranoid.
Silverstein (1987, pp. 26-28) insightfully declares that explicit per­
formative constructions can be used nonperformatively as well. When 
this occurs, the performative “ . . .  constitutes the way one can DISCOURSE 
ABOUT [caps his]. . .  events of social action . . . ” An instance is warn in 
its illocutionary function as in “I hereby warn you . . . ” This has quite a 
different force than when it is used in the preterit, as in “I warned you.
There are many details of Austin’s and Searle’s formulations which 
have been validly questioned, but the basic premises hold. Language is 
essentially social. It is not necessarily utilized to inform, although it can 
be. Lecturing, for instance, is speech primarily to inform. As such, 
lecturing typically occurs in settings like classrooms and auditoriums, 
which exist for the function of informing. The degree to which society 
restricts language in its informative function is illustrated by our avoid­
ance of a person who habitually lectures, that is, informs us all of the 
time. Such a person is a bore. Informing is a part-time function of 
language.
Given the social purposes of language, one might well expect that 
psychotic speech shows rather too little illocution. Johnston (1985, p. 81) 
claims that developmentally disordered children, notably the autistic, 
show an inability to handle illocutions effectively, a finding consonant 
with the general social disability of such children. The disordered speech 
most typically considered schizophrenic also lacks illocutionary force. 
That is one of the problems with it. We can find no social purpose in 
much of it. In other words, a measure of schizophrenic social disability is 
seen in the infrequency of illocution in peculiarly schizophrenic language. 
This does not mean that schizophrenics suffer only from a social disability, 
as claimed by Rutter (1985).
Because speech act theory demonstrates that utterances can mean 
something quite different from what a segmentation of words and syntax 
would yield, some people have mistakenly assumed that one can willy- 
nilly supply “missing” phrases and sentences in highly deviant discourse 
to make it all come out normal. The reasoning seems to be, “if speech 
acts show us that much is not actually stated, then let us assume that 
deviant schizophrenic speech is deviant only because they left out a bit 
too much.” However, speech act theory allows one to fill in unspoken 
items only by principled means.3
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[5] Intention and M otive.
Meaning is dependent on perceived intent. Sanders (1987, p. 75) goes 
so far as to say that it is a truism that “uttering an expression of language 
is always volitional and therefore purposeful.” Needless to say, he was 
not talking of an impaired population, although, independently, psy­
chiatry has traditionally operated on this presumption as well.
Searle (1983, p. 150) gives a pragmatic view of intention, showing that 
rules become progressively irrelevant as one becomes proficient, so that 
one’s rules become “progressively irrelevant” and one concentrates on 
one’s intended goals. He was speaking directly about physical skills like 
skiing, but this view can be applied to language skills as well. Many 
linguistic processes do become internalized. Neural pathways get forged. 
Lieberman (1984) says this had to have happened in order for language 
to have evolved. Clearly much of our language expertise is automated. 
We don’t have to think about the initial sound in a word we intend to 
retrieve. If we intend to talk about a car, we don’t have to stop to think of 
its first sound, then the second, and the last. Years of teaching phonetics 
have shown me how difficult it is even to analyze the actual sounds one 
uses in words. Similarly, for ordinary spoken sentences, we don’t have to 
think about the grammar rules we have to apply. All we do is intend to 
convey a message and our language processors take over. It is only when 
encoding new or difficult things that conscious choices have to be made 
once one knows one’s native language. Because speech is prime, most 
people experience difficulty when having to write their thoughts down 
because that function is not so automated as speech.
Searle (1983 p. 29) declares:
It is the performance of the utterance act with a certain set of intentions 
that converts the utterance act into an illocutionary act and thus imposes 
Intentionality on the utterance.
Whereas it is true that speakers may announce their intent, typically they 
do not. If one party does announce intent, they may use a performative, 
as in
4A. Look, Mabel, I ’m telling you . . .
4B. I promise you that I ’ll go on a diet next week.
4C. I have to apologize to you for my behavior . . .
Besides the use of performative verbs, there are other devices to signal 
intent overtly such as the [Look +  NAME] construction in 4A above.
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Words like please announce a request. Expressions like let’s talk turkey 
indicate an intent to get down to brass tacks, that is, to stop beating around 
the bush and to get to the heart o f the matter. All of these indicate that the 
speaker wishes to negotiate directly without polite indirection. The 
reason that they sound so blunt is that in most social circumstances 
intention is deduced not overtly stated.
Our intention or motive shapes what we choose to say and how we are 
going to say it. Speech acts include intention as part of their meaning 
(Bach and Harnish 1979, pp. xiv-xv, 12; VanDijk 1980, p. 265; Searle 
1983, pp. 26-29; 145-155). In fact, speech acts cannot be interpreted 
unless one comprehends the intent behind them. The rejoinder, “What 
did you mean by that?” challenges a speaker’s intention in saying what 
he or she did. This is never used to mean, “What was your meaning?” It 
always means “what was your m otive?” It is never a way of asking the 
meaning of the words and syntax used. If hearers cannot ascertain that 
kind of meaning the correct response is “Huh?,” “Excuse me, but I don’t 
quite understand,” or a variety of other requests for a paraphrase or 
repetition of what was said.
An example of genuinely misunderstood intent was one that I observed 
in the faculty lounge. When a male professor said to a female one, “Lord, 
this place is dirty.” The female then got up and started to clear the coffee 
cups and napkins off the tables. The male then said, “I didn’t want you to 
clean up. Where’s the janitor?”
A playful misinterpretation of intent occurs if I murmur, “It’s a little 
noisy in here.” and my son responds, “Yes it is,” without doing anything 
to make the noise abate. He pretends that he has failed to perceive my 
intent in commenting on the noise. Like so much humor, this works as a 
play on ordinary pragmatic strategies which we share. He treats my 
utterance as a statement of fact not as a command to lower the volume. A 
good deal of humor depends on such misperceptions, as in the exchange:
[walking on street] S: Excuse me, sir. Do you know where the Palace
Hotel is?
H: Yes. [walks on]
Silverstein (1987) maintains that illocutionary acts “represent. . .  intents 
to perform effective, socially understood acts with speech” (p. 28).” Inten­
tion has to be derived as part of the meaning of the utterance. As we have 
just seen, the particular illocution that we understand depends on what 
we perceive the speaker’s intention to be, so that “it’s noisy here” could
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be an excuse for my leaving the room, or it could be a command to be 
quiet. The speech act itself is contained in the intention of its utterance.
Brown and Yule (1983, pp. 68-88; 77-78) contend that there is no way 
to analyze the topic of another’s speech without knowing why something 
was said; that is, its intent. Without knowing the speaker’s intent, there is 
no way to evaluate his or her contribution to a conversation either. We 
don’t even know if the person is cooperating and attempting to talk on 
the same subject we are. If one assumes that a speaker is deliberately 
being obscure, then one ascribes a lack of cooperation to him or her.
DeBeaugrande and Dressier (1981, p. 112) assert that the only way 
utterances can be used to communicate is if the speaker intends them to 
be communicated and the hearer accepts them as intended. Such accep­
tance is a usual practice. Hearers almost always do accept utterances as 
intended. Therein lies a problem. Intent is derived from what the speaker 
has said and the general context of utterance, such context including the 
relationship and mutual history of the interactors. SD productions do 
not provide the normal cues necessary to determine intent, hence, to 
determine meaning. If we misperceive intent we will misperceive meaning. 
Notice my contention is not that the speech is purposeless. The patient 
might very well have intended something, but could not say it coherently 
enough to be understood.
Our familiarity with the forms of speech acts also aids in our inter­
pretation. With an SD population, utterances may not be evocative of 
any particular speech acts and words may be mismatched to the context. 
The question then becomes not so much “What was the intent?” but “Can 
we interpret this at all? Can we ascertain what the intent was? If so, how?” 
For instance, what could possibly be the intent of
5. I had a little goldfish too like a clown. Happy Halloween down.
6. St. Valentine’s Day is the official breedin’ season of birds. All 
buzzards can coo. I like to see it pronounced buzzards rightly. They 
work hard. So do parakeets.
Sanders (1987, p. 76) attempts to show that it is possible to assign 
meaning even when one can not determine what illocutionary force of a 
sentence. His example is a sign:
We will be closed for inventory Sunday and Monday, June 12-13, 
and will reopen at noon on Tuesday, June 14.
He maintains that we do not know whether or not this is an excuse, a 
warning, advice, a promise, or an invitation to return. That is, we don’t
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know the intent, but we do know the meaning. It seems to me to be more 
correct to say that we understand the event described, but we don’t 
understand its meaning.
Sanders is correct that the same sentence could be used in all of those 
illocutionary forces. It is, therefore, ambiguous. However, it would be 
quite strange if the reader did not consider it first and foremost as an 
invitation to return after those dates. If the sign were posted before those 
dates, and if the store sold items that people could not readily purchase 
elsewhere, or items that cost a great deal more elsewhere, then, most 
likely, people would take it as a warning and an invitation to stock up 
before those dates. In fact, the “what can it possibly mean in this context” 
strategy (Chaika 1976), kicks in so that the reader matches the sentence 
with the date and time, the probable intentions of the poster of the 
sign, and other relevant knowledge to decide the illocutionary force. 
The illocutionary force may be potentially ambiguous, but like other 
ambiguities, it is resolvable by reference to the context. If it is not so 
resolvable, then the recipient of the message can resort to overt question­
ing like, “What did you mean by that?” or “What am I supposed to be 
getting out of that?” SD psychotics rarely can answer such questions 
relevantly.
An examination of discourse regarded as particularly schizophrenic 
reveals a paucity in the very sorts of paraphrasing and metalinguistic 
comments that show a stable intention or purpose in communication. 
Much of the speech is not paraphrasable at all, but all normal speech 
is. Nunberg (p. 204) says that we assume that “ . . .  speakers have no 
ulterior motive for behaving in a way that is irrational from a strictly 
informational point of view.” Many of the interpretations of psychotic 
speech we see (i.e., Forrest 1976; Searles 1967) proceeds from a basic 
strategy of assuming that irrational speech can derive from rational 
goals, and that the speech is merely suffering from oblique phrasing. 
If impairment of speech processes is so degraded that normal decoding 
processes do not work, we cannot assume a purpose in it.
[6] Preconditions.
Besides motive and intent, another vital pragmatic consideration fig­
ures strongly in interpretation. Part of meaning lies in the social circum­
stances in which a meaning is appropriate, the very p r e c o n d it io n  for 
its utterance. Austin’s term for these are f e l i c i t y -conditions (Lyons
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1972, pp. 604-606, 727-738). An example is the statement perceived as a 
question:
7. You live in Providence.
This evokes a reply appropriate to the question “Do you live in
Providence?” such as “Yes . . . ” or “No, I live in Foster.”
Labov and Fanshel (1977, p. 78) explain that statements will be heard 
as questions, commands, or other requests if the preconditions for uttering 
them are met. In order to ask a question successfully, one must have the 
right to ask that question, the hearer must have the knowledge to answer 
it, and in some way must have an obligation to respond. If these three 
conditions are met, then, as in 7 the hearer will act as if she had been 
asked a question in canonical question form. Similarly, in order for a 
command to be successful, the commander must have the right to com­
mand and the hearer has the obligation to obey that command or is 
willing to. If those conditions are met, then the hearer will respond as if 
the command had been given in imperative form. For instance, if a boss 
asks “Any more coffee?” the secretary might answer. “Oh, I ’ll make 
some right away.” Alternatively, she might say, “Oh, I ’m sorry, but I 
didn’t get a chance to buy any beans.” An apology for noncompliance is 
a socially proper response in our society to what we hear as commands, 
even those not in overt imperative form. The essentially social rules 
of preconditions behind utterances override the actual syntactic form 
of messages.
Labov and Fanshel (1977) show how a mother manipulates her daugh­
ter by playing with these preconditions. Rhoda is locked into a power 
struggle with her mother. The mother goes to visit a sister, leaving 
Rhoda to handle the domestic affairs at home. Rhoda does not want to 
have to admit overtly that she needs the mother at home, so Rhoda asks, 
“Well, when do you plan t’come home?” The mother responds with “Oh, 
why?” in order to force Rhoda to admit that she needs help. The mother 
clinches it by saying “Well, why don’t you tell Phyllis that [you need my 
help at home]” Phyllis is Rhoda’s sister. Labov and Fanshel show that 
Rhoda has been outmaneuvered on two counts. First, the mother has 
forced the admission from Rhoda. Second, it is up to the mother to 
decide when she is coming home. It is not Phyllis’ place to do that. 
Considering this, the mother has also managed to tell Rhoda that Phyllis 
is the favored daughter, and has done so simply by manipulation of the
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preconditions for questioning. Notice that the claim here is based upon 
general rules for interaction.
The difference between a truth-conditional interpretation and a prag­
matic one is illustrated by:
7. Max broke the crystal stemware.
If, indeed, Max has broken the item(s) referred to in 7, this would be 
considered to be in the realm of semantics. However, if this is said as 
a way of commenting on Max’s clumsiness or, alternatively, on his 
vindictiveness, then we would be dealing with pragmatics. The actual 
meaning derived depends on the context of the utterance, including 
what the speaker and hearer have already said, what their topic of 
conversation is, what they know about Max from other encounters both 
with and without him, and what their motives are or are presumed to be.
If one accepts a dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics such 
that truth conditional statements alone belong in the former category, 
then semantics can virtually never account for meaning in social inter­
action. This applies mutatis mutandis to written sentences, except, of 
course, those which have been deliberately fabricated to show a dichot­
omy between semantics and pragmatics.
Meaning is actuated as much by implication as by direct statements.4 
By definition, implication refers to meanings not directly encoded onto 
syntactic structures or on the lexical items chosen in a given expression, 
but this does not mean that an utterance means whatever we wish it to. 
There are strategies and recognized conventions in a language that 
constrain interpretation in any given instance.
Although the necessary processes in derivation of meaning in the 
sorts of actual circumstances depicted above are more than passingly 
embarrassing for those committed to context-free grammars or to the 
establishment of algorithms to explain syntax and semantics, we cannot 
simply relegate them to some convenient bin labelled “pragmatics” or 
“semiotics.” Pragmatics explains the actual sentences and words that are 
used in interactions. It is not peripheral to linguistics. In fact, any syntax 
that doesn’t include pragmatics is trivial because it doesn’t explain how 
people actually use grammar, nor does it explain how listeners derive 
meaning. Thus, it can be seen that the semantic strategies frequently 
relegated to pragmatics are part and parcel of how we produce and 
interpret language.
Fillmore (1981, p. 147) sums up the pragmatic approach to meaning
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. . .  an analysis [should be] carried out in sociolinguistic terms in which 
the identity, location, and relative social statuses of the participants in 
the communication act are taken into account, together with a descrip­
tion of the social or institutional occasion within which the discourse 
was observed or within which it could be produced. Of particular 
interest, of course, is the correlation of these items with formal linguis­
tic phenomena.
Fillmore (1984, p. 88) goes so far as to say that “there is probably no 
need for a level of semantic representation. . . ” He argues (p. 89) that 
one learns and understands words in contexts, and that words are used in 
association with those contexts. He gives as an example the term being on 
land, saying that this evokes a context of comparison with being at sea, 
whereas being on the ground evokes a contrast with being in the air. The 
truth conditional meaning, including the meaning derivable from 
dissecting each word into its component features cannot account for the 
actual meaning of any of these phrases. For instance, all one gains from 
such a dissection of being on land is that it refers to the physical state of 
being on dry land. In practice, however, that is not its meaning. If asked 
where S is phoning from, for instance, given the response “I ’m on land,” 
H would be correct in assuming that the speaker had recently disembarked 
even if H did not even know S5 much less S’s travel plans.
Fillmore (p. 91) offers yet another such example, this time the sentence:
8. The menfolk returned at sundown.
He points out, rightly I think, this sentence wouldn’t occur in an all 
male community of workers, as, in actual usage, the word menfolk implies 
a contrast with females and children. Despite the fact that the word 
literally means “men,” it cannot be used to refer to men unless they are 
in a heterogeneous community.
It is very important to take note of the kinds of arguments marshalled 
above to justify interpretation. While it is true that the actual meaning of 
an utterance may be different from what has ostensibly been said, there 
are clear bounds on possible interpretations. Appeal is made to statable 
rules of discourse interpretation, rules which include but are not limited 
to cultural and social facts, rules which are empirically verifiable by 
investigating what meanings native speakers derive from interactions 
presented to them. Such interpretations do not depend on theoretical 
constructs formulated in the absence of inquiry into actual speech 
behavior.
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[7] Im plicature and Conversational M axims.
Grice (1975; 1981) spoke of implicatures arising from the violation of 
the four c o n v er sa t io n a l  m a x im s : quality, quantity, relation, and man­
ner (p. 45). These maxims entail such principles of discourse as
• Say what you believe to be true.
• Do not say anything for which you lack adequate evidence.
• Be as informative as required for the purpose of current exchange.
• Don’t say more than required.
• Say what is relevant to the matter at hand.
• Be orderly, unambiguous, and not obscure.
It is certainly obvious that these maxims are regularly violated. People 
do lie, do give opinions with no evidence for them, do hold back 
information, are prolix, mislead intentionally or unintentionally by 
ambiguity, poor phrasing, and poorly sequenced narration. Then, too, 
what does Grice mean by required? How is one to know exactly how 
much is required? What is too little, and what too much? What will a 
hearer find relevant, and what is likely to strike a hearer as being not 
relevant or ambiguous? The partial answer to such questions is that 
whatever satisfies a cospeaker is enough. It is unlikely that we will ever 
have a firm measure which will tell us when “enough” has been achieved. 
There are sufficient linguistic and paralinguistic resources for cospeakers 
to indicate whether or not “enough” has been provided.
Grice did not say that conversants actually are cooperative, just that 
they are presumed to be, and from this, important facets of meaning 
derive. Grice (1975, p. 45) says that “Our talk exchanges do not normally 
consist of a succession of disconnected remarks and would not be rational 
if they did.” Of course, it is just such disconnected utterances which gives 
us the feeling that certain speech is “schizophrenic.” The question then is 
whether psychotic speech flouts (Grice’s term) the maxims. Certainly 
normal speakers do, but there is a qualitative difference between normal 
flouting and psychotic SD productions. The term flout itself implies 
volition and when we examine Grice’s examples of flouting we easily 
understand the volition behind them. That is the flouting is a deliberate 
way to give an implication.
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[8] Violating the M axim  of Quality.
One violation of the maxim of quality is lying. Lies do not necessarily 
violate language rules. They violate the larger conversational rules such 
as Grice’s maxim of quality, Searle’s cooperation principle, and Gordon 
and Lakoff’s sincerity principle (1975). Actually, the lie consists of falsify­
ing intent, not necessarily of falsifying information. Of course, it can 
consist of both.
The stigma of lying inheres in its status as a violation of trust. With the 
exception of “white lies,” lying is considered particularly despicable.6 
The white lie is represented as being intended to ameliorate the anguish 
that would proceed from full disclosure. Notice that this type of lie is 
representable as an innocent, hence not real, violation of the maxim of 
quality because the intent of S is beneficent.
But what of the violation that has neither an intent to deceive nor to 
ameliorate? If the S believes that the given utterance is true, then it is 
error or delusion. If S knows that it is not true and is not offering it as 
truth, then it is fantasy. A genuine lie occurs only if S knows that it is not 
true and intends to offer it as truth.
Carlson (1983, pp. 103-104) denies that implicature is derivable from 
violations, asserting that if true violations of conversation occur, then 
incorrect implications result. It is true that people deliberately deceive, 
but in that case, the speaker is banking on the hearer’s interpreting 
according to usual premises. The lie works only if the hearer assumes 
that the truth has been told.
[9] T h e  M axim  of Q uantity: Inference.
There are always meanings left unsaid, indeed, which must be left 
unsaid. To specify each and every meaning and connotation intended 
would slow down interaction drastically. Because this would also lead 
to tedious belaboring of point upon point, cospeakers would get so 
mired in detail that they would lose the thread of organization in the 
communication. A plethora of information makes it difficult to get the 
point of what is being said. Moreover, as we have seen (Chapter 6), 
cohesion is enhanced by having hearers match the utterance to the 
context and fill in what has not been said.
Levinson (1983, p. 106) shows how the maxim of quantity adds “ . . .  to 
most utterances a pragmatic inference . . .  to the effect that the statement
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presented is the strongest, or most informative that can be made in the 
situation.” as in
9A. Nigel has fourteen children.
The implicature here is that Nigel has no more and no less than 
fourteen children. This is readily seen if one adds only to 9A, as in
9B. Nigel has only fourteen children.
9A and B are usually assumed to be synonymous. It would be more 
than passingly odd, indeed irritating, if, the speaker of 9A at a later time 
said, “Now, Nigel’s fifteenth chi ld. . . . ” An appropriate response to that 
would be “I thought you said that Nigel has only fourteen children!” 
This response proves the implication that has been given when using the 
nonmodified term of quantification, as in 9A above.
The bizarreness of some psychotic speech is explicable in terms of a 
violation of quantity. The following response is to a request to identify 
the color on a chip from the Farnsworth-Munsell disc #39 (Cohen 1978, 
1-34). The comment within the parens is Cohen’s).
10A. Green (SHOUTS!). Hold on, the other is too! In the garden 
such a green is unlikely. The other is more gardenreal, piecemeal, 
oatmeal green, greenreal, filmreal, greenreal.
The patient correctly identifies the disc, but then goes on to add 
clearly extraneous material which goes way beyond what is needed to 
identify the disc. Moreover, as the response continues it adds on increas­
ingly extraneous verbiage.
[10] T h e M axim  of Relation: Relevance.
The maxim of relation could well be termed the maxim of assumed 
relation. As part of our making sense of utterances, we assume a rele­
vance (Chapters 9 and 10). Our doing this leads to some interesting 
implications. For instance, one of the ways that people waffle, is to imply 
relevance where none exists.
For instance, Z wishes to take a day out of work for personal reasons, 
but has no “personal days” left, so he informs the boss that he is not 
coming in Monday. When the boss asks why, he responds, perhaps with 
truth, “I ’m having some nasty physical problems I ’d rather not talk 
about.” The boss naturally assumes that the day off is related to the 
problems, even if it is not. Moreover, the boss assumes that the problems
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are not self-imposed, like having a hangover from a wild party Sunday. 
Here the maxim of relevance leads to implications based upon the 
hearer’s strategy of assuming relevance.
Perhaps the trait many would consider most characteristic of schizo­
phrenic speech,7 is its frequent inappropriateness to whatever task is at 
hand, or, rather, the difficulty in uncovering any relevance. Again using 
Cohen’s (1978) data elicited from Farnsworth-Munsell disc #39:
10B. T he eentsy beentsy spider went up his m other’s spot. Out
came the rain the color of green snot.
10C. T his isn’t such a bad green. Reminds me of a picnic on the
green. Yes! Picnic green.
One problem with 10B is that the situation called for a direct answer as 
the first part of the response. T h e patient nowhere indicates that this is 
an answer to the question posed. One supposes it must have been an 
answer only by the reference to green snot. Similarly, 10C starts with a 
value judgment rather than the direct labelling of the color. Then, in the 
reverse order of what the speaker of 10A did, he goes from the extraneous 
to the specific. Neither the value judgment nor the comparison is called 
for here, as the conventions of American questioning demand that first 
one must answer the question asked as directly and economically as 
possible.
[11]  T h e  M axim  of M an n er: Orderliness.
T he maxim requiring speakers to be orderly results in the implication 
that if actions are presented in a certain order, that is the order in which 
they occurred. For instance, to use his example
11A. Taking off his trousers, the King of France went to bed.
11B. T he King of France took off his trousers and went to bed.
11C. T he King of France went to bed and took off his trousers.
T he implication is clear in the first two that the King took his trousers 
off first, but in the third, he went to bed before divesting himself of 
trousers. It is, of course, possible to present events out of their actual 
order, but only by using words indicating the actual order, as in
11D. Before he went to bed, the King of France took off his trousers.
11E. After he went to bed, the King of France took off his trousers.
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Similarly, cause and effect can be implied by order of presentation, 
as in
12A. She went skiing and broke her leg.
The implication is that the skiing was the cause of the injury. Notice 
the change in meaning of
12B. She broke her leg and went skiing.
So strong is the assumption that the order in which utterances are 
given is significant for interpretation that some implications can simply 
occur by juxtaposing two comments. Sometimes this itself creates a lie. 
For instance, consider this exchange
13A. Max: Bobby’s gas station was robbed last night.
13B. Tony: I saw Melvyn there at midnight.
The implication is that Melvyn must have committed the robbery. 
Why else would Tony have made that remark localizing someone’s pres­
ence at a time that qualified as being the time of robbery. Note that this 
implication can be directly negated
13C. Max: No, dummy. Melvyn noticed the open door and went to
check it out. He was the one who called the police! He couldn’t have
done it.
The very denial in 13C shows the implicated meaning caused by the 
juxtaposition. Like the giving of false information, creations of false 
implication do not always proceed from the desire to deceive. There can 
be many sources of violations. They can be a result of poor judgment of 
what the context requires, of cross-cultural differences in communicative 
practices, of misexecution of intended speech, or of impaired faculties.
Violation of orderings abound in schizophrenic speech, so much so 
that that even simple cause and effect relations are misordered. This 
occurs when there is no implication derivable from such misordering, as 
in
14A. She . . .  leaves the ice cream and eats it.
14B. She ate the ice cream and brought it home.
Insufficient contextualizing also causes problems of interpretation. 
Fauconnier (1985) lays the blame for ambiguity on uncertainties in the 
discourse situation itself. Context also changes our perception of presup­
positions (Gazdar 1978). Carlson (1983, p. 152) claims the contrary situation: 
that one can almost always invent a context for any sequence of sentences
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which seems unrelated. This is too strong a claim. First, in order to prove 
such a contention even for normal speech, we would have to present 
subjects with a potpourri of sentences, possibly taken from widely different 
sources, and then see if they could invent contexts for such a conglomerate 
of sources. Second, he was speaking of normal linguistic production. 
One of the problems with disorganized psychotic speech is that it defies 
our ability to provide a context to make it intelligible. A reprise of two 
utterances shows the problem:
15A. After John Black has recovered in special neutral form of life 
the honest bring back to doctor’s agents must take John Black out 
through making up design meaning straight neutral underworld 
shadow tunnel (Lorenz 1961)
15B. . . .  you have to have a plausity of amendments to go through 
for the children’s code and it’s no mental disturbance of puterience, 
it is an amorition law. (Laffal 1965)
Finally, even if one can find a context in which those utterances would 
fit, one still cannot be sure that the speaker intended the unrelated 
sentences to belong to the invented context.
Along with being disorderly, schizophrenics may also appear obscure 
and ambiguous, Grice’s term for other violations of maxim of order,8 
seen in 15A and B above. If we assume that speech has been purposely 
produced in accordance with the maxims, the very terms Grice has 
chosen, obscure and ambiguous, carry as part of their semantic load the 
“deliberate obfuscating.” Hence, except perhaps in scholarly writing, 
these terms comprise negative evaluation.
[12] T h e M axim  of Response.
To the above maxims, Grice (1981, p. 189) later added yet another: 
Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply.
In other words, cospeakers assume that they are to respond according 
to the form and content of each others’ utterances. This is both a social 
and a linguistic matter. Obviously, such matters as topic and lexical 
choice are constrained by previous utterances in an interaction, by those 
of previous interactions or other matters pertinent to the context of 
interaction. Constructions are also syntactically formed so that certain 
replies are both possible and invited. To illustrate, how, who, what, when,
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and where all are words referring to specific constituents of the sentence 
or of the discourse, asking the cospeaker(s) to supply, respectively, a 
reason, a person, a thing, a time, and a place. Here, too, one sees that 
much speech disordered schizophrenic speech is not formed so that it 
controls responses. For instance
16. My mother’s name was B i l l . . .  And coo? St. Valentine’s day is 
the start of the breedin’ season of the birds. . . .
[13] Violations.
The maxims which Grice proposed will generate meaning as much by 
their being breached as by their being honored (1975, pp. 52-56). Under­
standing their role in meaning equips us to explain many implicatures9 
in a non-ad hoc manner. For instance, Grice (1982, p. 184) demonstrates 
the effect of a speaker’s deliberately violating the maxim of quantity 
by damning with faint praise when asked to give a recommendation is 
such an example. Consider the situation in which X has applied for a 
teaching job in a philosophy department, and his mentor, A, writes as a 
recommendation:
Dear Sir, Mr. X ’s handwriting is clear and he is always neatly 
dressed.
This strongly implies that X is not a good philosopher. Why else 
would A not mention his abilities? It is not that A is uncooperative. If 
that were the case, then he or she wouldn’t have written at all. Similarly, 
if A is X ’s mentor, then A must know X ’s worth as a philosopher. Since A 
knows that the future employer is expecting to hear about a person’s 
abilities relevant to the job being applied for, he or she can assume that if 
A doesn’t mention those, but instead mentions clearly irrelevant facts, 
then the employer would get the implication that speaker doesn’t want to 
say that the person has poor capabilities. A failure to mention relevant 
information is clearly perceived as evasion, and evasion itself is fre­
quently perceived as an unwillingness to give bad news, in this instance 
that the candidate is not fit for the job.
What the violations show is that we cannot assume that speakers 
always or even usually follow conversational maxims, but that cospeakers 
typically assume that the maxims are being followed. In other words, 
maxims characterize effects on the hearer. They don’t necessarily charac­
terize speaker behavior.
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Sanders cautions that the possibility of an implicature does not guaran­
tee that one will be inferred (1987, pp. 67-68). Even when an implicature 
can potentially be achieved by a breach of a maxim, H may attend only 
to the propositional content of the utterance. This, of course, can also 
occur when H realizes that an implicature has been made, but chooses to 
ignore it. In this instance, H may decide to comment on or otherwise 
respond to an implicature at a later date as if it had actually been 
encoded in words.10
[14] Modality.
The very syntax of a language itself has syntactic forms designed to 
express the speaker’s attitude towards what he or she is saying. These are 
m o d a l it y  markers. The examples that spring to mind are the m o d al  
AUXILIARIES like can, m ay, m ig h t, sh o u ld , co u ld , w ill, w ould, and m ust. 
Introductory adverbs like p ro b a b ly , su rp ris in g ly , d o u b tfu lly , and phrasal 
adverbs like it is certa in  that and it is su p p o se d  that all fill this function.
[15] M itigating.
MITIGATORS are speech forms which background their messages, 
lessening the possibility of overt confrontation. They may be used to 
deny what one feels. These are directly involved in what is called sa v in g  
fa c e  (Goffman 1955), and are important determiners of how messages are 
given. We have already seen these in the guise of commands or questions 
that are couched in apparently ordinary statements. Language abounds 
with mitigators, such as
17A. You’ll never believe this, but . . .
17B. I know I ’m no expert, but . . .
17C. And I haven’t got into that but—I don’t know—I —I just—like,
you have your set way of doing things and you’re in control. . .
This last, 17C, comes from a conversation between a female schizo­
phrenic and a medical student (Chaika 1981, 1983a). The patient is 
speaking, trying to indicate disagreement with the medical student. 
Because social and professional power clearly reside in him, she has to 
mitigate her expressions of doubt (Chapter 11).
Robin Lakoff (1975) documents such excessive mitigating as being 
typical of women, showing that they are actually inferior to men in social
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status even under the best of circumstances.11 O’Barr (1982) amends this 
to include males in an inferior position as well, a discovery he made 
while investigating weak versus powerful language amongst witnesses in 
court trials.
Fowler (1985, p. 73) includes mitigators in the category of modality, a 
sound practice since they can often be used interchangeably, so that the 
following seem to be equivalent for many contexts
• I might accept his apology.
• Perhaps I will accept his apology.
• It is possible that I will accept his apology.
Fowler also shows that tag questions are mitigators, often used as 
expressions of doubt. Robin Lakoff pegged these early on as being 
softeners of assertions, as in
• You’re not going, are you?
• Tastes good, doesn’t it?
All of the mitigators in language are so pervasive that we frequently 
don’t notice the effect they have on our judgments about the speaker. 
Sometimes our “intuitive” feeling that someone is especially uncertain 
and ill at ease arises because of the number of mitigators in his or her 
speech.12
[16] Indirect M eaning.
We have already seen that meaning can be gained directly from the 
semantic features on words. Factorial analysis of features explains some 
IMPLICATIONS as well (Chapter 5). Many words in and of themselves 
connote opinion: riot or demonstration; invade or land; instigate or encourage, 
all can be used to indicate whether or not the speaker approves of what is 
being spoken. Such terminology is not confined to the press. We even see 
it in putative objective scholarship. In his book on psycholinguistics, 
Mowrer speaks of Chomsky as instigating a theory of grammar. The verb 
alone tells us of Mowrer’s disapproval of Chomsky.
Sometimes word choice can indicate far more reaching implications, 
as in:
18A. The tuna fishermen are still murdering the dolphins.
18B. The tuna fishermen are still killing the dolphins.
T he word murder literally means that killing was done by a human to
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a human. This is what distinguishes it from kill for instance.13 As part of 
the actual meaning of the expressions in 18A, simply by my choice of 
murder I have claimed that, in my eyes, what the fishermen are doing is 
as bad as killing humans. We assume that this is my belief because I have 
chosen that particular verb and it is always presumed that an utterance 
reflects the speaker’s point of view. This, of course, has tremendous 
implications about my belief systems, my moral codes, and my empathy.
In contrast, although 18B can be used to express my disapproval of 
what the tuna fishermen are doing, it does not necessarily entail my 
belief that causing dolphins to suffer is as wrong as causing people to. 
However, in context it certainly could both mean and imply what 18A 
does if, for instance, prior experience with me or overt statements made 
before 18B established such feelings.
[17] Im plicature and the Sentence.
Implication can be effected on the level of the sentence by using or not 
using certain paraphrases. Thus, one reason for using the passive is to be 
able to omit the agent or cause, but all the while implying that one was 
there. Even if the agent or cause is omitted, the implication of a passive is 
that one or the other was involved, that the proposition is not about 
something which just happened. This is the difference between “he 
died” and “he was killed.”
Another implication of an agentless sentence is that the agent is not 
important enough to mention, or that such mention is beside the point. 
In this category, there is what I call the “housewifeless” passive, as in
19A. The beds got made.
19B. The dinner is cooked.
19C. The house was cleaned.
These examples of agency or its lack thereof by no means exhaust all 
of the resources of sentence grammars to create implications, but is 
sufficient to the task at hand. Kearns (1984, p. 67) maintains that sen­
tences are fundamental in imparting inferential meaning, as we have just 
seen in the instance of agentless passives [not his example]. The very use 
of a certain grammatical form creates entailment.
My oft-quoted example (from Cohen 1978) is an interesting example 
of incompatibility between terms and sentences:
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20. Looks like clay. Sounds like gray. Take you for a roll in the hay.
Hay day. May day. Help! I need help.
Clay is both a tactile and visual stimulus, so the first simile is fine, but 
gray is a color, not a sound, so that the “Sounds like gray” is incompatible. 
The subsequent sentences in this uttered passage do not add any informa- 
tion which would modify the oxymoronic construction entailed by the 
reference to gray as a sound. Nor do they give any clue as to how 
sounding like gray is relevant to looking like clay. The individual terms 
in this utterance cannot be forged into a discourse because of the their 
fundamental incompatibility. This is not to say that someone could 
never forge such incompatible terms into a coherent structure by adding 
other terms to it. That is not the issue. The issue is that the speaker of 20 
above has not done so and has given no clues in the given utterance that 
would allow us to make such additions or to normalize the sequence in 
any way. Consequently, part of the abnormality of this utterance lies in 
its incompatible entailments.
[18] Testing for Im plicature.
Since Grice attempts to distinguish between implicated and direct 
meanings, he adopts verification procedures in order to provide criteria 
for determining whether or not a meaning is implied at all as well as for 
exactly what it is that has been implied. Grice naturally assumes that if 
there are two kinds of meaning, one inhering in lexical items and 
syntactic form, and another not arising from linguistic constructions per  
se, but derivable by implication, then these should be distinguishable by 
different modes of analysis (1981, p. 185). His first criterion is that what is 
conversationally implicated is not part of the meaning of the expressions 
used to convey the implicature. Obviously, if it is part of that meaning, 
then it is direct statement, not implication. Grice suggests three salient 
criteria to distinguish implicatures. They are:
• d e n ia b il it y , e .g ., they can  be d en ied  by d e m u rrin g  “but not 
n ecessarily  in that o rd e r” o r  “but not in the usual m ean in g  of that 
w ord.”
• n o n d e t a c h a b il it y , e .g ., synonym s give sam e im p lication .
• CALCULABILITY, e.g., they constitute a reasonable inference in the 
context assuming the cooperative principle; The first criterion sim­
ply means that you can deny an implication. For instance, the
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implicature that the order of encoding is the order of occurrence 
can be denied by saying “ . . .  but not necessarily in that order,” as in
21. T he King of France went to bed and divested himself of his 
trousers, but not necessarily in that order.
T he order of narration in “She ate the ice cream and brought it 
home” is literally impossible. Adding “but not necessarily in that 
order” does fix it, but, in this case, the fix is perceived as a correction 
to a slip-of-the-tongue.
Grice’s second test (1981, p. 186) that of synonymy, says that if syno­
nyms of the expressions actually used provide the same implicature, 
then it is unlikely that the implicature inhered in the original words. 
Rather, it occurs because of a conversational situation that calls for the 
given semantic message. Nunberg (1981), objects that nondetachability 
fails as a necessary test for implication because semantic entailments of 
conventional messages also are preserved if one uses the right synonym. 
Thus, a test based upon synonymy does not separate out implicature 
from meanings derivable directly from the expressions used.
Both of these opinions presuppose that exact synonyms can usually be 
found for all or most expressions. It is important to note that it is actually 
extremely difficult to find individual words which are truly synonymous 
in the sense of complete substitutability. In the first place, it is quite 
usual for synonyms to require somewhat different syntactic frames, as 
shown below. Furthermore, typically, as a perusal of any thesaurus 
shows, each word has its own network of meanings, and synonymy is 
typically a case of partial matches of meanings. For instance, consider 
this set: belief, tenet, thought and conviction. Although one can find con­
texts in which any one of these can be selected without changing meaning, 
one need not stray far to find contexts in which their synonymy fails.
For instance, I can utilize each of the above nouns in the context of 
expressing my belief in God as One. The sentence frame might have to 
be changed in accordance with the syntactic frame the different syno­
nyms demand, but I can still say the following are synonymous:
I abide by a belief in God as One.
I hold a tenet that God is One.
I hold the thought that God is One.
I have a conviction that God is One.
All of these entail an implicature that I am either a Jew, a Unitarian,
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or a Moslem, but not a Christian, because Christians believe that God is 
a Trinity. Although synonymy works well for the religious senses attaching 
to these words, it certainly doesn’t work if conviction is used in the sense 
of a prosecutor getting a conviction, or if belief is used in the sense of my 
belief that the color of a tomato I am looking at is red, or if thought is 
used in a complaint that I just lost my train of thought.
Grice (1981, pp. 187-191) is very adamant that neither deniability nor 
synonymy comprise final tests for implicature. They are but rules of 
thumb. The final test rests on his third criterion, calculability, that one is 
able to give a derivation of the implication. For a derivation to be valid, 
a principled connection must be constructed between the overtly expressed 
proposition, the maxim it breached and the resulting implication (Sanders 
1987, p. 61). The major obstacle in applying the test of calculability is the 
degree to which one can come up with an apparently consistent and 
all-embracing interpretation which impresses by its brilliance and origi­
nality but is not verifiable by anything except the analyzers intuitions. 
Chomskyan linguistics ultimately failed because of its reliance on intuition. 
The same problem occurs in fields as diverse as literary criticism and 
psychotherapy.
Nunberg (1981, p. 202) mitigates this danger by offering more precise 
guidelines for a “satisfactory pragmatic explanation” of an expression.
• specifying its conventional use
• the use to be explained
• information speaker and hearer presuppose about each others’ 
intentions
• background knowledge
• physical setting
• . . .  a demonstration, usually in the form of a set of inferences, 
that the use in question is the best way available to the speaker to the 
accomplishing a particular conversational purpose . . . ”
I would amend this last to “ . . .  the way that works at the moment 
to attain one’s purpose.” If it does not, the cospeaker may indicate 
linguistically or not that there is a communicative glitch and the speaker 
can take another turn, so to speak and reformulate.
In practice, formal distinctions between implied and overtly encoded 
meaning may not always be easily achieved, because linguistic units do 
not form an algorithm from which meaning is automatically derivable. 
Extracting meaning directly from the expressions used relies on prag-
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matic strategies (Chaika 1976) as well as syntactico-semantic factoring of 
meaning. Early on, Gordon and Lakoff (1975, p. 83) showed that implica­
tions have their usual literal meanings as well as their implied ones. One 
of their more amusing examples illustrates this beautifully. If a friend of 
mine comes up to me and out of the blue confides, “Your husband is 
faithful,” I would take that as meaning that he is, in fact, being faithful, 
but I would also get the implication that he has not been faithful in the 
recent past. If I had earlier voiced doubts about my husband’s faithfulness 
to this friend, then her comment would be a reassurance that my suspi­
cions are unfounded and no negative implications would be derived. If I 
had not, the friend’s words would be tantamount to letting me know that 
I had been deceived.
Sweetser (1987, p. 45) puts it well, pointing out that implication and 
other indirect speech is parasitic on informational speech. In other 
words, the indirect meaning is based on the actual utterance in oblique 
but derivable ways. Some speech inappropriate enough to render usual 
decoding strategies inoperable may still be at least partly interpretable 
by reference to normal expectations combined with an analysis of what 
seems to have gone wrong. We will take this matter up subsequently 
(Chapter 11) but first other treatments of the question of maxims and 
implicature.
[19] Decision-theoretic Strategies.
Sanders (1987) declares that there is no objective rule which will tell us 
that a maxim is breached. Rather, in conversations, cospeakers subjectively 
judge whether or not each others’ contributions are irrelevant, imprecise, 
insufficient, or insincere. He (p. 64) offers the interesting suggestion that 
this is done by identifying the cospeaker’s state of mind about whatever 
is being communicated. For instance, if an utterance does not seem 
relevant, then the hearer assumes that the speaker thinks that something 
in the present or past shared context should be bridging the gap between 
what has just been said and the general topic.
Sanders (1987, p. 65) offers a similar explanation for what happens if 
the maxim of manner is breached, the maxim which says the speaker 
must be clear and precise, “ . . .  there is a state of affairs that (the speaker 
considers sufficient to prevent or dissuade him/her from being clearer.” 
Therefore, in his view, the hearer searches for the implication that 
results from the disparity between utterance and breached maxim.
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By way of demonstration, Sanders offers scenarios, such as that in 
which a student asks a professor what should be done to prepare for a 
forthcoming exam, and the professor replies “Read the book.” Because 
the professor clearly knows the content of the exam, this response breaches 
the maxim of quantity. Therefore, it may imply at least one of the 
following or all three:
• it is up to the student to figure that out
• offering advice would reveal too much
• reading is the best preparation.14
The student takes the meaning that best fits his or her view of the 
professor’s beliefs and attitudes.
Sanders offers an interesting and, I think, important approach to 
meaning. This is not to say that this is all there is to it, however. Even in 
such a simple scenario, other implicatures can be taken. If the professor 
intended to convey the second implication above, the response could 
easily have responded, “I ’m sorry, I can’t help you with that without 
giving away too much.”
Certain implications arise from a curt, “Read the book.” One implica­
tion is that the professor doesn’t like the inquirer, or that the professor 
considers him or her stupid.15 This comes about from the very obviousness 
of the response. One of the working assumptions of education is that one 
must read the assigned book in order to prepare for an exam.16 The 
professor’s words can also be construed as being sarcastic, saying, in 
effect, “You’ve got to be pretty dumb to ask me that ”
If prior experience warrants it, the student may simply assume that 
the professor is in a bad mood that day. This highlights the truism that 
the more experience cospeakers share the more accurate they are in 
interpreting the other’s implicata. It is for this reason that one feels 
another “isn’t so bad” as one gets to know, hence to understand, him or 
her. This proposition entails a discussion of relevance and of mutual 
knowledge. Before tackling these, we must examine Carlson’s (1983) 
game-theoretic model of discourse and compare it to the decision-theoretic 
model presented by Sanders (1987). The model of social interaction as a 
game is a persistent one. Carlson, for instance, adopts it from Wittgenstein.
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[20] Conversation as a  G am e.
Carlson (1983, p. 102) claims that specific implicatures arise as a result 
of DIALOGICAL ENTAILMENT. By this he means that the implication 
arises because it is logically binding given the position of the sentence as 
a move in the dialogue. That is, implication results from the dialogue as 
a whole and the position of each sentence within it. As true as this might 
be, neither context nor position within the sentence guarantees that any 
given implication arises as the singular logically binding one. If it did, 
there would be no ambiguity, no misinterpretation, and, probably, no 
paranoia.
Carlson’s central metaphor of conversation being a game, leads him to 
portray specific utterances as moves in a game in order to achieve one’s 
goals, thereby winning. If one wins, then another loses. This implies that 
one party to an interaction wins to the detriment of the other. In his view, 
a coherent text is “ . . .  (well-formed) if  it can be extended into a well-formed 
dialogue gam e” (p. 146). This sounds like a debate or a jury trial, not a 
dialogue.
Both Carlson’s teleology and metaphor are suspect. His redefinition 
of implication presupposes that participants always have in mind clear 
goals and that each sentence is produced deliberately in order to achieve 
those goals. It is well known that at least some conversation is produced 
PHATICALLY, that is for the purpose of social bonding or to conform to 
cultural norms. Conversations about the weather and inquiring after the 
health of acquaintances fall into this category, but so may discussions of 
the upcoming elections, the dissolution of social values, or how funny a 
recently seen movie is. Although there is conversation designed to 
achieve goals, much ordinary talking is not so ordered. Patricia Strauss 
(personal communication) points out that some games are cooperative, 
therefore do not have winners and losers. This kind of game might 
provide a better metaphor for conversations.
A major problem with viewing conversation as any kind of game is 
that speakers can never predict the hearer’s response to any conversa­
tional “move.” Even in complex games like bridge or chess, there are 
rules which limit, hence help predict, possible actions, and in coopera­
tive ones the goals are clear even if they aren’t about winners and losers.
This is not at all true in conversation. As Sanders (1987, p. 183) 
demonstrates, a game-theoretic model “assumes that the competing agents 
have to share the same finite pool of resources in pursuing their own
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interests.” Each person’s language stock is dependent upon his or own 
personal histories and there is no way to know all of a cospeakers 
motives. The research on language acquisition has shown beyond a 
doubt that children figure out language by themselves from what they 
hear around them. It has also been known for a long time that no two 
people have quite the same grammatical system in their heads even if 
they are native adult speakers (Quirk and Svartvik 1966; Gleitman and 
Gleitman 1970).17
Then, too, what each cospeaker offers affects what the other will then 
say, and each chooses from an array of multiple messages neither known 
to nor always guessable by the other, although the messages are usually 
immediately interpretable. In any conversation, one never knows for 
sure where the entire is going until it has gone there, no matter how 
goal-directed the participants were at the outset. Even such goal-directed 
activities as lecturing may become derailed by unexpected comments or 
questions. Only in the most formal of speaking activities such as sermons 
or lectures by invited exalted personages can we be assured of sentences 
produced so that the conglomerate achieves a predicted goal. If dialogue 
were truly a game, social interaction would become as glacially slow as 
an expert chess game, with each participant mulling over possible strate­
gies before entering his or her own move. In actual fact, dialogue with 
the aim of winning a point or an argument is a special activity, one not 
necessarily engaged in by most people much of the time. Scholars and 
attorneys do engage in such competition, but this is part of their profes­
sional life, and, as such, acknowledged to be a special activity.18
Carlson claims that implications do not arise from violations of maxims. 
Rather, he says, “ . . .  they play a prominent role only when they are 
brought in to account for apparent violations. . . ” (p. 103, italics his). 
Therefore, he defines implicature as arising from “ . . .  an assumption 
that has to be made about a player’s aims or assumptions in order to 
construe his choice of strategy as a rational one” (p. 103). The problem 
with this formulation is that it describes all social interaction, not just 
those construable as violations of maxims. As we saw in the discussion of 
intention earlier on in this chapter, part of the meaning we get from any 
utterance depends on the assumptions we make about the person’s inten­
tion in saying what he or she did. This holds for even apparently 
uncomplicated straightforward messages like “Joey got mud on the floor.”
If I call Scrooge “miserly” but his brother “thrifty” I am certainly 
implying quite different things, but in no sense can I be said to be
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violating rules apparent or not. If I say “I always knew Max to be 
honorable” I am implying a doubt that is not there in “I always knew that 
Max was honorable.” If I say “Max was murdered,” I am implying that 
someone did the dastardly deed again without my violating any rules.
T he overriding fact uncovered in all objective studies is that meanings 
are given and gotten in a very great number of ways. What we can do is 
chart those ways and interpret in their light, and not resort to nontestable 
and nonobservable phenomena. Nor should we be seduced by a meta­
phor purporting to explain all interaction. There are many different 
kinds of interactions, each yielding its own set of viable interpretations. 
Neither game theory nor, as we shall see, Freudian theory explains all. 
Each has its verities, but each is incomplete. Intensive work in socio­
linguistics (Chaika 1982b, 1989) and related fields has shown us the 
multiplicity of interactions occurring in any society, each with its own 
purpose, its own strategies, and each with its own ego-fulfillment for the 
individual as well as its social purposes.
Notes
1John Lyons (1972, pp. 725-744) does not approve of the term speech acts for these 
phenomena as they don’t actually refer to an act of speech, but to a semantic 
phenomenon. He also demonstrates that speech acts can be carried out without 
speaking, as in waving someone away. However, he uses the term because, as he says, 
that is pretty much what everyone else uses. I agree with him on all counts.
2If the situation is one in which the speaker had agreed to allow someone to stay 
in the room on the condition that she be quiet, then “get out of here” is an 
appropriate paraphrase. In other circumstances it might simply mean, “be less 
noisy” or “be completely quiet.” Similarly this place stinks can mean “get out of here” 
or it can also mean “let [all of] us get out of here” or “clean this place up,” or “I have 
to clean this place up.”
3Of course, one of the reasons that paranoids can be paranoid is also that people 
do lie about their intent.
4There is also purely social speech such as greetings, untruths intended to “butter 
people up,” and ritualized complimenting as at a wedding. Such speech has been 
extensively studied ever since Malinowski’s insights into phatic communication. We 
are indebted to the extensive oeuvre of scholars like Harvey Sacks and Erving 
Goffman in delineating such speech (Chaika 1988).
5This is not so farfetched as one would imagine. As the wife of a trial attorney, I 
frequently get phone calls late at night, and, in response to questions about 
whereabouts, I am often given analogous answers. For instance, “I’m at the airport” 
tells me that they are at Greene Airport, Rhode Island’s only commercial one. If 
they say, “I’m at North Central,” I assume that they pilot and/or own a plane. If they
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say, I'm in Dallas, I assume that they are likely to be in the airport, at a hotel, or in 
someone else’s home, so that their usual home number will not be operative.
6Falsehoods strike at the heart of society. Our actions are predicated upon what we 
perceive are the motives of cospeakers as well as upon their representation of facts.
7And, to be sure, general behavior.
8All speakers are sometimes ambiguous, but in pathological cases, it seems as if 
the speaker cannot disambiguate. Of course, we could claim that the one who cannot 
actually will not, so that it is a matter of cooperation, not pathology. But then we 
have to ask why this is so typical of schizophrenics and aphasics, but not of people 
adjudged not afflicted with either condition.
9Meaning is not wholly derivable by reference to these maxims, as shown in the 
sections in this book devoted to semantics, syntax, and cohesion in sentences as well 
as in discourse analysis.
10Although I have no hard data from experimentation on the phenomenon, I 
have noticed that people often store in memory an implication heard but not acted 
upon, later recalling it as if it had actually been said. Similarly, they will note a 
facial expression or kinesic cue, and store its meaning as if it had been said. This 
seems to account for the situation in which one is retroactively blamed for saying 
something which one has never said. For instance, one may be accused of having 
made a negative evaluative comment, when, in fact, the sole “comment” made was 
by implication or expression. The idiom “turn up your nose at . . .  ” characterizes 
such meanings.
11 As I write this in 1988, I realize that this may have changed for many women in 
the years since Lakoff, although my students claim that this is true in mixed gender 
discussions. However, since the interaction in question took place before 1977, we are 
dealing with a double whammy: a patient who, by definition, is in inferior status, 
and by being a woman as well, was in actuality in an inferior position. Hence, the 
extreme mitigation evidenced.
12In speech, mitigation can also be effected by prosody, voice quality, amplitude, 
tempo, pausing, or false starts. In general, paralinguistic cues like these also indicate 
the speaker’s stance towards what he or she is conveying (Kreckel 1981).
l3Kill itself is distinguished from die in that kill means that someone or some­
thing caused something else to die.
14It seems to me that this last is a direct answer not an implicature.
15This is an implication that students are wont to take. They tend to interpret 
almost all even remotely negative speech as the professor’s not liking them. Perhaps 
this occurs because of the fact that the professor has to judge the student’s worth. 
Like the sufferer of paranoia, students seem all too often ready to ascribe dislike 
when it isn’t intended.
16The truth of this assumption is not the issue. There are courses in which one 
need not read the books; however, it would be the rare professor who admits that.
17For instance, in an investigation of subject-verb agreement in Brown University 
undergraduates, I found that people didn’t agree with their own judgments. Follow­
ing Quirk and Svartvik, I first administered a written test in which students were 
given a test which of the same sentences, but with the verb form already selected.
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They were asked to reject or accept the sentence. To my astonishment, people often 
rejected the very forms they had previously selected. This was not random behavior. 
In all such cases there were clear disparities between the meaning of the noun and 
the correct grammatical form of the verb. For instance, some chose a singular verb 
for T h ere  has always been a time to speak and a time to be silent, but when given this 
identical sentence later on, they rejected it, saying it should be there h a v e . . .  More 
recently, I have discovered a disjunction in acceptability of Let no man rejoice until he 
find life. About half the students in one class no longer would use that subjunctive, 
insisting on Let no man rejoice until he finds life. Those who, like me, can use both get 
the meaning in the first that he is not likely to find life, whereas the latter indicates 
he has a good chance. Others who only allow the first got no such meaning 
differential, and simply found the second wrong.
18Additionally, those persons who treat each dialogue as a game from which they 
have to emerge as a victor is highly confrontational, and are often perceived as 
having an ego problem, not to mention obnoxious.
Chapter Eight
THE ICE CREAM STORIES: 
A STUDY OF NARRATION
The study of psychotic and normal narratives discussed in Chap­
ter 6 demonstrated speech disruptions peculiar to psychotics.
Some occurred only in schizophrenics. Normals produced as 
much error, but it was different both in degree and in kind from 
the pscyhotic one. Both normals and psychotics had the same 
amount of misperceptions, but these were often mutually exclu­
sive to each population. This study showed that psychotic devia­
tion is neither normal nor creative.
[1] T h e Nature of Schizophrenic Error.
C lose examination of the narratives in the Ice Cream Story task discussed in this chapter revealed that Fromkin (1975) was in error 
when she claimed that schizophrenics make the same kinds of errors that 
normals do. It will be shown here that the former population differs 
from the latter both in degree and in kind of error. Psychotic error is 
very real and displays a true disintegration of linguistic ability on every 
level except, perhaps, the phonemic, but word retrieval, syntactic error, 
narrative construction, all the facets of informing and commenting indi­
cate a far from intact linguistic ability even in the very simple task 
presented to the population discussed here.
More recently Allen (1985) maintains that schizophrenic speech, both 
SD and NSD, can be reliably discriminated from normal speech by a 
clinician with acumen, but that the ways it is different cannot be specified. 
Actually, as we have seen, it has long been known that even laypersons 
can discriminate schizophrenic speech from normal. It is no surprise 
that a clinician can do so reliably, but to say that this is only because of 
acumen, not from specifiable features is a strange conclusion by a scientist. 
It is true that people do seem to react intuitively towards language, but it is 
still possible to analyze the bases of intuitions by comparison between pop­
ulations. True, the average clinician has not studied much linguistics, but
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there are linguists of many stripes who study language objectively. As we 
saw in Chapter 1, the features of schizophrenic speech can be depicted.
T h e ICS studies described here directly compare the features of 
schizophrenic, manic, and normal speech elicited by the task discussed 
in the previous chapter.
[2] R atin g  an d  Testing of P articip an ts.
As we have just seen, the differences between normal and psychotic 
narrations are not necessarily caused by differences in the number of 
cohesive ties used by each population. Nor were they caused by differ­
ences in the length of narrations between the two populations, nor, as 
we shall see here, are they caused by differences in the amount of 
misperception by each group. Rather, as shown below, other features of 
the narratives were implicated. There are real differences between the 
two populations, psychotics and normals, and these coincide with those 
features of speech long known to be pathognomic of schizophrenia. One 
psychotic was judged normal, but he was taped at the time of discharge. 
Upon his initial selection his speech did show deviation but had improved 
by the time of his participation.
Two normals were rated as schizophrenic by one judge. A third normal 
was rated that way by both judges. T he normals erroneously judged as 
schizophrenic produced features in their narratives which correlated 
with the deviations in the psychotic group. Whether or not these normals 
were at risk for schizophrenia or whether their deviations could be 
attributed to excessive nervousness or the like could not be determined 
within the confines of this study. T he procedures for testing were particu­
larly nonthreatening. All subjects were even allowed to hold the tape 
recorder in their hands to lessen anxiety. All we can say is that there are 
definitely features of narration which lead to judgments of psychosis and 
some ostensible normals may evince these. One conclusion that can’t be 
made, however, is that SD schizophrenics speak normally during their 
psychotic bouts.
It bears repeating that we must test for those skills necessary for daily 
speech activities. We must ensure that our explanations take into account 
the skills needed for normal speech production because speech readily 
labeled “schizophrenic” is evident in ordinary interaction. It is equally 
vital to employ a narrative task that can be matched to what the partici­
pant is trying to encode so that we can compare the utterance with its
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target. Narration, in itself, also requires the encoding of ongoing events, 
which in turn demands temporal sequencing and shifting references, 
thus testing for a variety of speaking skills and simulating everyday 
speaking situations.
The narrative task employed here also carries a lighter cognitive load 
than did Rochester and Martin’s. Explaining the points of cartoons, 
retelling anecdotes, and describing unusual colors are not everyday 
activities and would seem to present a greater cognitive load than a mere 
retelling of an ordinary sequence of events. As a result, it is sometimes 
difficult to correlate utterances with intended meaning. As Maher et al. 
(1966) and Maher (1972) noted, the more unconstrained the speech 
activity, the more disorganized schizophrenic speech becomes.
Because of the strong constraints put on responses in the task reported 
on here, glossomanic chaining, for instance, in its above-shown “classic” 
forms did not occur, although a variant of it did. What is perhaps most 
surprising is that patients did utter both gibberish and agrammatisms 
despite the constraints on the task, and despite claims of researchers that 
such aphasia-like symptoms are rare in schizophrenia.
As previously explained, actively psychotic patients frequently have a 
short attention span so that the ICS could not be as complex as Chafe’s 
Pear Story. Still, some extraneous material was included because one of 
the characteristics of the speech of schizophrenics frequently mentioned 
in the psychiatric literature in their veering from the topic at hand. 
Given hypotheses about the nature of schizophrenic malfunctioning in 
attention and filtering, it was expected that the extraneous material 
would cause derailment. Actually, when derailment occurred, it was 
from the essential plot and appeared to be caused by intrusions from 
memory, as is shown below.
Despite its simplicity, the Ice Cream Stories tested for many language 
skills and attentional and logical phenomena. For instance, the viewer 
had to leap one important gap. The father is not actually seen giving the 
child money, nor does he answer her in words. When one sees her 
walking in to buy the ice cream, one might surmise that the father must 
have given some money to her. Scenes such as one showing the mother 
setting the table were included to see if they would cause the narrator to 
be deflected from the major progression of action, perhaps starting off on 
something relative to mealtimes or mothers or family incidents (Chaika 
1982a; Lecours and Vanier-Clement 1976). However, deflection caused 
by these side actions did not happen.
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The 124-second story proved to be well within the attention span of all par­
ticipants. The opening shot, panning a shopping center, focusing on a child 
wearing a plaid skirt and vest with a long-sleeved jersey peering into the 
window of a Baskin Robbins, took 20 seconds. Later, when the child enters 
the ice cream store, it takes 23 second for her to be waited on. In terms of 
effects on the narrations, these seemed to be the only significant time spans.
Originally, there was to be a memory task as well, in which I asked 
subjects to recall what they had seen the previous week. Unfortunately, 
too often patients were discharged before the week was up or received 
EC T in the interim which wiped out their recall entirely. Consequently, 
although I may allude to the memory task from time to time, no attempt 
was made to analyze their relation to the first narrative or to run any 
kind of statistical measures on them.
[3] Selecting Participants.
All patients were being treated with antipsychotic medication as well 
as antiparkinsonian medication designed to mitigate the side effects of 
the former. All also were receiving lithium (Alexander, VanKammer, 
and Bunney 1979). T he effect of these is to lessen the effects of psychosis, 
so that speech is made more normal. T his makes even more important 
the very real differences found between the normal and psychotic 
narratives. T he average stay at the hospital during the time of this study 
was less than 2 weeks. No participant had been institutionalized or 
heavily medicated for long periods. Hence our results could not be 
traced to social or cognitive deficits on those grounds.
Twenty-five normal volunteers matched the psychotic population as 
closely as possible in age, occupation, and social class. Both groups 
consisted of blue-collar workers and college students. As is usual between 
psychotic and normal groups, the normals were somewhat higher in achieve­
ment. This effect was mitigated by including normal college students 
with working-class parents and psychotics with college-educated parents.
As already discussed, social class is not a factor in this study. Patients 
were selected solely on the bases of diagnosis and observed speech 
dysfunction. However, we still have to contend with Bernstein’s theory of 
restricted and elaborated codes. He assumed, and so have his followers, 
that working class is limited in their ability to discuss issues intellectu­
ally because they have been socialized to speak of the here and now 
rather than of hypothetical and abstract issues. Because both our patient
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and control populations came from mixed social backgrounds, we could 
observe any mitigating effect of early socialization on speech performance.
Bernstein’s theory of differential narrative adequacy rests upon a 
theory of socialization such that, if it were valid, parental status should 
be as important as earned achievement, especially for nonachieving 
children of educated parents. One could argue that those who rise from 
the working class do so because they somehow learn on their own what 
Bernstein calls the elaborated code (Bernstein 1971). However, it is 
difficult to claim the reverse, the scions of the middle class sink, as it 
were, because they, despite their socialization, only learned a restricted 
code, for Bernstein’s claim is that the latter is different in kind from the 
former, not just in degree and that this is a product of different communi­
cative styles of families who come from different social classes (Chaika 
1982b, 1989 for further arguments against Bernstein’s theories). In any 
event, the data presented here correlated with diagnosis of psychosis 
versus normality, not with social class. There was no effect traceable to 
social class, but there certainly was one related to illness or lack of it.
The three normals judged psychotic by both raters were all college 
educated. Their narratives showed definite correlates with the psychotic 
ones. Rochester and Martin (1979) likened increased use of exophora by 
schizophrenics to Bernstein’s theory of restricted code amongst the work­
ing classes. No evidence emerged that differential social class member­
ship affects reference.
[4] Intentionality and Cooperation.
Intentionality is always an integral part both of speech production and 
of meaning itself (Searle 1983. (p. 3). He defines intentionality as 
directedness, and shows that meaning is comprised of “ . . .  Intentional 
content that goes with the form of externalization” (Searle, pp. 28-29). 
Thus normal comprehension demands that we derive Intentionality as 
well as truth value (Chaika 1982b, p. 71, 1989; Goody 1978). If speech is so 
deviant that we cannot do so, then we fault the speaker. If the speaker 
does not encode so that his or her Intentionality (or truth value) can be 
derived, and, if further, the speaker cannot explain when asked, we fault 
the speaker, not the hearer. Hence, we consider the opaque or deviant 
speech of psychotics as evidence of a person’s being “out of his/her 
mind.” Similarly, as Searle (1983 (p. 43) shows with visual perceptions,
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when people see things that are not objectively there, we say “ . . .  it is the 
visual experience and not the world which is at fault.”
Searle (1983, p. 147) introduces another component to meaning, one 
especially valuable in this discussion: the Background. He defines this 
as “. . . .  capacities and social practices.” Hence, Background includes 
“ . . .  skills, preintentional assumptions and presuppositions, practices 
and habits” (Searle 1983, p. 154). Under this view, a breakdown in surface 
performance is a failure of “ . . .  preintentional capacities that under­
lie the intentional states in question” (Searle 1983, p. 155). To treat that 
which arises from faulty Background as if it were “ . . .  a sort of Inten- 
tionality, it immediately becomes problematic” (Searle 1983, p. 159).
What this means here is that we assume that narratives which are 
deviant arise from impaired skills in narration, not from a separate 
language or an attempt to hide taboo desires or an attempt to convey 
what it means to be schizophrenic or the like. T his applies to deviation in 
what is reported or in the way that it is reported. T his is the simplest 
explanation that fits the facts; therefore, in accordance with the applica­
tion of Occam’s razor, it is the one adopted in the explanations below.
We have already seen that there are five reasons for believing that the 
participants in this study understood the task, were cooperating in it, 
and intended to fulfill it. T he following passages from SD narratives 
show this. Even those whose narratives were not accurate took as their 
point of departure the sequence shown. Moreover, when they digressed 
from this, they related stories similar to that on the screen, and kept 
returning the events (boldface) actually shown them, as in
1A. What do you want me to say? I  say my brother Gene. He says he 
said I buy the things I wanted. I saw a little girl who wanted ice 
cream. Today you have to pay for it. Today she paid for i t . . .
T his starts out with an irrelevant comment about her brother, but 
quickly reverts to the business of the video. Actually, since this was about 
somebody wanting something, even the bit about her brother Gene 
saying that she should buy what she wanted can be seen to have been 
triggered by the video.
Second, where someone hallucinated or misperceived action, he or 
she indicated an effort to integrate it into the story. In 2A, for instance, 
when the patient says, “I don’t know what . . .  that was about,” he indi­
cates that he cannot fit what he perceives into the story. T he description
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of the cars was also accurate, although he misperceived that the girl was 
moving a counter and was looking in a trash can:
2A. I saw a little girl who was moving a counter for some reason 
and I don’t know what the heck that was about. She was pressing 
against it okay. In the beginning I saw a white car with a red vinyl 
top and then this little girl was lookin’ in the store was looking in the 
trashcan or something and then she turned around and she went on 
she talked to her mother and her father and neither one of them was 
listening to h e r . . .
Here, note also the “okay” as indicating that although he didn’t “know 
what the heck that was about” he was going forth with the narrative 
anyway. Interestingly, the following week, on recall, the same patient 
said
2B. . . .  I remember seein’ the little girl I don’ know if her head was 
in a trash, she was lookin’ in the trash or she was lookin’ in the window 
to a store . . .
He did not mention moving a counter, but he had obviously recalled 
his misperception about the trashcan. In both narratives, the patient 
proceeded to recount the events clearly triggered by the videostory, 
although lexical selection was clearly deviant, a matter discussed below. 
the first mention of trash either omitted can or or used a instead of the 
the. Since trash belongs to the category of m a s s  n o u n s , 1 therefore cannot 
be used with a.
Third, several made overt comments about their ability to speak or to 
remember something on the tape. For instance, one apologized:
3 . . .  she just cunna’s cunna get anything home so she’s hafta go out 
on her and get it. okay. I’m sorry. I’m sorry. I ’m sorry about my 
speech. I stutter a lot though. That’s about it.
Another indicated that he had a “memory lapse.” This also shows an 
effort to recount what was shown:
4. . . .  and I noticed a little girl looking into the window and I guess 
he walked back into the store and then a [kif] thing switched where 
the girl was at home and I dunno asked her mother for something 
and she had a kni- got a little memory lapse there. Then it switched 
again and her father came in . . .
Self-corrections also indicated the patient’s attempts to recount the
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story, thus to cooperate in the task as did expressing happiness that the 
girl got her ice cream, both shown in:
5 . . . .  so then she went and she went to the candy store by herself or 
ice cream shop and bought a double-decker ice cream cone. That 
actually brought me happiness to see that little girl with a mind of her 
own. Okay.
Even the most deviant narratives signalled endings formally, marking 
the narrative as an entity. The “That’s about it” in 3 above is one 
example, as is the “Okay” in 5. Normals often ended their narratives the 
same way.
[5] Visual and Verbal Scanning.
The parallel between visual scanning and narration made by Chafe 
(1980) was borne out in this study. His claim is that the narrative itself 
progresses in a fashion similar to the way the eye searches a scene. As we 
have already seen, there is a correlation between schizophrenic dysfunc­
tion in visual tracking (Holzman et al. 1978; Holzman 1978) with dysfunc­
tions in their free speech. Chaika (1982a) showed that both the sacades 
and the spiky-type movement are analogous to schizophrenic utterances. 
The sacades show lack of focusing ability, a deficit in tracking, what 
Holzman terms a failure to turn on the system. The spiky type move­
ment represents perseverations along associative pathways. The entire 
narrative from which 1A above comes illustrates these remarks:
1B. What do you want me to say? I saw my brother Gene. He says 
he said I buy the things that I wanted. I saw a little girl who wanted 
ice cream. Today you have to pay for it but today she paid for it.I 
want Gene to come visit me soon at 1:30 and I saw a little girl with 
the baby and her father’s gonna be home and and oh yeah and 
[hehe] my mother loves me [aw hehe] I don’t know what I want to 
say. Can I stop now?
Note that the first question is entirely appropriate as a narrative 
opener. However, the story line is intertwined with her memories and 
desires. She “sees” her brother Gene and even gives a sentence to expand 
on her mention of him. Except for the fact that the video had nothing 
whatsoever to do with Gene, the opening statements are appropriate for 
a narrative. It can be seen that the sentences about the brother were
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triggered by the video and were a parallel encoding to the tale about the 
girl wanting to buy ice cream. This is analogous to what Holzman found 
in visual sacades. The story is not tracked from start to finish.
In the next sentence, the narrator jumps back to the videostory proper. 
Since this does deal with buying which entails paying, she veers off the 
narrative track to the cliche, today you have to pay fo r  it, then changes the 
pronoun to one appropriate to the story, but today she paid  fo r  it. Note the 
slight mismatch of meaning and the story. Today you have to pay fo r  it 
implies that yesterday you didn’t which is patently untrue. In its sense as 
a cliche, this refers to moral issues, not money.
This patient gives other verbal sacades. She first follows her inner 
story about Gene, then jumps to the videostory, then jerks back to Gene, 
then jumps to a girl with a baby, then the father who is going to be home 
then her mother who loves her.
Another patient encoded a visual pun. He noticed a similarity in 
stance between two actions and attributed it to the wrong one despite the 
fact that the context itself did not lend itself to this alternate interpretation. 
This occurred in the statement “I saw a little girl who was moving a 
counter for some reason and I don’t know what the heck that was about.” 
The girl’s stance, leaning forward against the ice cream case as she is 
waiting to be served, is similar to that when one is moving a heavy 
object. Such similarities in body positions are not usually noticed when 
the circumstances eliciting them are so very different. Nothing else in 
the video lent itself to a theory of “moving a counter,” and one doesn’t 
usually even think of moving counters, and one especially would not 
think that a child would be moving the counter. Still, the narrator gave 
the wrong interpretation to this stance. We can only be reminded of the 
wild puns that schizophrenics fall victim to, such as the punning of wise, 
whys, noble, and no-bill, connections that most others would not notice.
The opening scene, 20 seconds long, started with almost random shots 
of a parking lot: people walking by, cars pulling in. Because of this, there 
was a verbal parallel to the visual process upon first seeing a scene and 
not having a frame to put it in. Not knowing what is going to be relevant, 
the person tries to note everything that is going on until he or she figures 
out a frame for the unfolding scenario. Once this frame is constructed for 
normals, only matters relevant to the story line get mentioned. Because 
all participants, normal and psychotic, were recounting the story imme­
diately after seeing it, they didn’t all get the correct frame at first. Those 
who displayed this searching behavior spoke as if their initial narration
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was wholly unedited, so that they verbally recounted the visual scanning 
upon first seeing a scene. Many of both populations started by describ­
ing the cars and the people in the opening scene. Note the similarity of 
the normal opener in 6A to the psychotic one in 6B.
6A. First I saw a parking lot with a lot of cars and I noticed an ice 
cream shop I think it was a Baskin Robbins store. A woman walked 
by and another gentleman came from the opposite direction and he 
walked past the screen and then I noticed a little girl standing 
outside looking into the ice cream shop . . .
6B. Okay. There’s a lady who was walking toward the car and I 
forget it she was wa—she walked by the car is what it was and they 
went past the car and a man walked by a store a Baskin and Robbins 
sign it was the scene before so wa let’s see then one once they went 
past the man zooming in they they zoomed in on a g i r l . . .
There is no substantive difference between these narrations up to this 
point. T he psychotic rendering is more detailed than any normal one 
was, but still, up to this point, 6B above is well within the bounds of 
normal.
T he differences between populations occurred right after these initial 
scannings. Once normals zeroed in on the girl staring in the window, 
they related only those points of action that furthered the plot, typically 
that the child went home, asked her mother for ice cream, the mother 
refused her because it was too near suppertime, the father came home, 
the child asked him for ice cream, the child went back to the ice cream 
shop and ordered ice cream which she received.
This “zeroing-in” tactic, also a finding in Chafe (1980), is easily seen 
in the degree of detail in description of characters first seen, such as 
noting that “a man with a three-piece suit minus the jacket walked by” 
or that a woman with a shopping bag also walked by. However, such 
matters were never again mentioned once the narrator got his or her 
bearings. T his was true of normals and psychotics. Not one person 
mentioned the clothing of either parent, although each was on film 
far longer than the casual passersby at the outset. Similarly, many care­
fully described the opening parking-lot scenario but the kitchen, which 
was important to the plot, received only one mention and that, by a 
psychotic, commented on color: “There were cur-blue curtains. It was 
kinda brown the room they’re in.”
This scanning was not the only initial tactic. Some immediately focused
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on the girl. Again, the two populations made substantially similar 
openings. For instance, compare the normal
6C. It began with a girl staring through a window at a Baskin 
Robbins store
to the psychotic
6D. I seen a little girl looking in the window and she want some ice 
cream .. . .
[6] T em poral O rdering.
After the openers just illustrated, differences between the two popula­
tions quickly became evident. Once normals got their bearings, so to 
speak, they usually followed a strict temporal ordering in narration. 
They gave the impression of play-by-play description. First this happened, 
then that, and that, and so on to the conclusion. For example, the 
following is an exceptionally detailed opening scene by a normal who 
seemed to have a bit of a problem knowing what to zero in on. His 
narrative was the most detailed one evoked.
7A. When it first came on a car drove by and then we were looking 
at the Baskin-Robbins store and another c a r . . .  As we closed in 
towards the store the [pause] picture started and stopped, stopped 
and started2 and we saw a man walk by and then came into a little 
girl no it was a lady walked by then we came in to a little girl 
standing by a window in a plaid dress and a white, it appeared to be 
a white, long sleeved shirt. Then we went to a home and it was the 
same little girl asking her mother if she could have something and 
then her mother said no, it was too close to supper. Later, she went 
up to her father who had just walked in the door and asked him if 
she could have some ice cream which is I guess what she asked her 
mother and we didn’t hear her father’s answer but then we return to 
Baskin-Robbins and she walked into the door and ordered some 
kind of ice it looked like raspberry and um the man she waited for 
the ice cream cone at this time her shirt appeared yellow. [heh] and 
the man gave her the ice cream cone, she paid for it and left.
In contrast, psychotics often failed to create an orderly progression. 
For instance, the following is a psychotic rendering with a detailed
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opening. Despite the fact that it is longer than 7A, it does not provide as 
much detail.
7B. All right. The first thing we see is an ice cream ayuh it could’ve 
been a shopping center with two cars parked in front or drives up in 
front and waits get the impression that someone goes [au] out of the 
car and walks in front and sees in the window of the same one of 
these shopping center stores a little girl waiting for some ice cream 
or something or other because she goes home to her house asks her 
father for ice cream he says well what the heck give it to her 
[noowee] Sh-sh- she’s a little daughter so he gets her the coins and 
she goes up ice cream stand and stands in line3 and gets a giant sized 
cone and she uh is so happy with her ice cream a simple pleasure 
but that’s what kids are like these days always have but th- it means 
that [shinchuer] her parents that she’s [shuh] so proud of she goes 
out leaves the ice cream ’n eats it and on the way ’n we don’t know 
what happens [smae] the fact. You can interpolate and say that 
she ate the ice cream and brought it home and said thank you daddy 
or thank you mummy but she still is her destination is not known in 
a few minutes and you say that’s just one pen memory in the brain? 
How does that how does that able to reach that conclusion.
Besides the neologisms, the boldfaced segments are narrating completely 
impossible temporal sequences. In the second sequence, the action has 
been flip-flopped. She would have had to take the ice cream home and 
then eat it. T he first sequence involves mutually exclusive occurrences. 
If the ice cream is eaten it can’t be left, and if it is left then it can’t be 
eaten if the girl goes out. Notice that the individual items in each phrase 
are linguistically correct. They just have not been organized correctly 
into the narrative. Additionally, for all its verbiage, this telling omits 
the entire scene of the child asking the mother for ice cream, but it 
does contain matters absolutely underivable from the video, such as 
the girl’s being proud of her parents. With all its length it shows far 
less detail of what had transpired than did short normal narratives, 
like:
8A. I saw a little girl looking into an ice cream store and she went 
home and asked her mother if she could have some ice cream and 
her mother said no because it was too close to supper and then she 
asked her father and her father gave her the money and she went 
back to the ice cream store and bought some ice cream.
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Comparing this with a short narrative from a psychotic, we still see a 
similar disparity in reporting of detail and the actual events encoded, as 
in
8B. A little girl wanted things and her mother said no and her 
father came home and she asked for some ice cream and then she 
went back to the store and then she ordered some ice cream and the 
man said thank you.
In 8B, there is no introduction at all. It says that the girl wanted 
“things” which is not an accurate encoding of the desired commodity. No 
reason is given for the mother’s refusal. Although the patient did say 
that the girl went back to the store, nowhere previously did it say that she 
had been at a store. There is also a strange gap between the girl’s 
ordering ice cream and the man’s thank you. No little gaps like this occur 
in normal narratives. In those, the “thank you” might not be mentioned, 
but the g irl’s receiving the ice cream was.
Actually, 8B was very accurate and even detailed for a psychotic 
narrative. Consider the paucity of:
8C. Well I saw a young lady peekin’ in a win- no lookin’ through the 
window an ’uh other men passing by and then she went in there an’ 
she bought some ice cream for herself. Um I really don’t know what 
else to say um because that’s all I saw.
Although the germ of the story is there, that the young lady bought ice 
cream, all the other detail is missing. The significance of the men, and 
what in there refers to are never explained. There’s no plot or purpose to 
this.
8D. All about ice cream ’n I coulda really went for a cone. . . .  I 
saw a parked car near an ice cream parlor ’n a little girl wantin’ 
ice cream her m other refused her but her father gave her the 
money for it. And she bought the ice cream ’n she was gonna neat 
it.
Often the poverty of the narrative in terms of what is included and the 
order of presentation is matched by other disintegrated speech:
9A. A little girl, she’s uh she’s on her own. She’s so [weh] she gets 
her [ausoh uh uh ou] after she ask her own father if she can go out for 
ice ice cream and he says eh answers her [shi] dunno and get ice 
cream for herself ice cream for herself and [ess] pass by [sh wu] and 
so it all happened [eh] that they’re all happy . . .  She just cunna’s
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cunna get anything home so she’s hafta go out on her and get it. 
Okay. I ’m sorry, I ’m sorry. I ’m sorry about my speech. [me: your 
speech is fine]. I stutter a lot though.
9B. Well I saw it divided up into three segments. First segment was 
outdoors. It involved automobiles and a small child and it was kind 
of disturbing because to me because I don’t like the noises of cars. 
The camera was quite shaky um that was sort of disturbing but that’s 
usually happens with videotape um kinda worried me to see the girl 
leaning her head against the glass that’s kinda disturbing um only 
because I identify with that um the second segment was filmed in 
almost an orange very warm sort of color.
9C. What I saw? Uh, a car waiting in front of an ice cream shop a car 
drove by a girl looking through a window into an ice cream shop uh 
mmm a man a lady walkin’ by with groceries [uhnu] when she switched 
into a family’s house the girl talking to her mother her mother her 
mother setting dishes her father came through the door there were 
cur- blue curtains ’n it was kinda brown the room they’re in uh ask 
girl if she din’t have ice cream ’n the girl went and bought ice cream.
These psychotic narratives supply detail not germane to the plot and 
omit essential ones. The color of the curtains had no relevance to the 
story nor did an orange tone in the second segment. T he repetitions 
about feeling disturbed, the shakiness of the camera, none of these were 
made relevant. Even though one narrator said that she identified with 
“that,” ostensibly with the girl looking in the window, we are not told 
why she identifies with that, what import it had.
Some psychotic narratives did manifest detailed tracking, as in
10A. Okay. There’s a lady who was ah walking towards a car and uh, 
I forget it she walked by the car is what it was okay and then uh it 
zoomed in past the car ’n they went past the car a man walked by a 
store a Baskin-Robbins sign it was the scene before [laughs] so wa 
le’s see. Then once they went past the man they zoomed in on a girl 
and the girl looking in a window so wa- from there they were on that 
for a while then they switched to the family scene where ah the 
lady. . .  I guess the girl was asking the mother for ah some money 
for ice cream ’n I guess she didn’t give her any ’n her father came in 
[shavaw]4 they switched to the front door5 ’n her father came in ’n 
the girl ran up and asked for some money. I guess he gave in ’n
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[laughing] he gave her some money. So wa she ran down to the ice 
cream store and bought a double scoop of chocolate ice cream.
The difference between this and the normal narratives above, is that 
the greatest detail occurs at the outset with extraneous matters. Fully half 
of this is concerned with the lady, the man, and the cars. Even so, it does 
not encode the opening sequence so that a hearer can form a picture of 
what happened. It was impossible for anybody not to walk by or towards 
a car in the crowded parking lot portrayed. Neither walked to any 
particular car, nor were they shown getting out of cars. We simply see 
them walking separately. This is encoded as if the focus was on the 
pedestrians and it wasn’t. For instance, notice that the patient says that 
“once they went past the man they zoomed in on a girl.” This sounds as if 
these actions were related and they weren’t. After all opening detail, we 
are not told what kind of window the girl is looking in, the phrase 
“switched to the family scene” is a vague encoding. The patient does 
mention that the girl requested ice cream from the mother, but she is said 
only to ask her father for money without specifying what for. This is 
recognizably psychotic, but there is no bizarre imagery; it does pretty 
much say what was on the video; it is grammatical. It is the narration itself 
that is perceived as abnormal.
In contrast, in all narratives judged normal regardless of length, the 
narrator typically tracks the events. Even if undirected visual scanning 
occurs at the outset, once the participant gets his or her bearing so to 
speak, the events are encoded as they happened with no crucial part of 
the story being left out, crucial in the sense of what motivated subsequent 
action. One normal narrator adjudged psychotic by both raters failed to 
mention that the girl asked the mother for the ice cream and failed to 
maintain temporal ordering6:
10B. A young girl getting ice cream at a ice cream parlor. Let’s see 
what are the—and there was a scene with her and her parents. She 
asked her father if he would give her some money to get the ice 
cream and before that she was hanging around outside the ice cream 
parlor. Okay, let’s see. How about she had a yellow shirt on. Whatever. 
A sort of jumpsuit.
10C was judged psychotic by one of the raters. In part, this may have 
been because of his faulty tracking.
10C. What I saw was [uh] a young girl looking through uh an ice
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cream parlor window I saw her go home to her parents, I guess they 
were her parents, I saw her go home and ask what I assume to be her 
parents if she could have an ice cream. I saw her get rejected by one. 
I saw one give in and gave her money to go get an ice cream cone. 
She went down she bought it and left.
He starts out correctly saying that first she looked in the window, then 
she went home to her parents. Then he backtracked and said he guessed 
they were her parents, and then said he assumed they were. He was the 
only normal who perseverated on a point. This kind of overprecision is 
otherwise seen only in psychotics. Like the previous narrator erroneously 
judged as psychotic, this one collapses the request to “a scene with her 
and her parents.” Notice that neither of these encodes error. “Asking 
parents” certainly would be an acceptable paraphrase of a child’s asking 
first one parent and then the other, but in this task, hearers apparently 
expect certain kinds of orderly encoding of events. As we shall see with 
misperceptions, it is not truth p er  se that causes speech to be judged 
normal or abnormal, but structure.
All other normals said that the girl wanted ice cream, asked her 
mother for some, was refused, asked her father, and then went back to the 
store to buy her ice cream. T he only point of difference in this tracking 
of events was whether or not the narrator mentioned that the father must 
have given the child money. Apart from the two exceptions mentioned 
above, if normals evinced a gap it was that they simply didn’t mention if 
the father gave her the money. For instance:
10D. I saw [uh] a young girl enter the kitchen ask her mother if she 
could have an ice cream cone and the mother says no it’s too close to 
your dinner and she walked out of the room and a moment later her 
father walked in from work an’ she says to her father, “Can I have an 
ice cream cone?” and the next sequence showed her walkin’ into an 
ice cream parlor an’ buying the ice cream cone and walkin’ out.
10E. . . .  her father walked in from work and’ she says to her father, 
“Can I have an ice cream cone?” an’ the next sequence showed her 
walkin’ into the ice cream par lor . . .
10F. . . .  she asked her father who she bumped into7 As he walked 
through the door same question he didn’t answer [ah ne] it all it 
does show her go walking into the ice cream stand . . .
These gaps are exact renderings of the video in which the child asks 
for ice cream, but the father’s response is not given. Six normals encoded
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the gap, but since it was a factual tracking of the video, none were judged 
psychotic.
Another apparent exception to temporal ordering in a normal seems 
to have been a slip of the tongue. One subject said, “He [her father] stuck 
his hand in his pocket and then the film ended,” but then proceeded to 
describe the girl going back to the store and buying the ice cream. 
Apparently, what this subject was encoding was that the scene in which 
the father is seen putting his hand towards his pants pocket is abruptly 
cut off. She did not mean that the narrative was through. She was rated 
normal by both judges and her narrative conformed to the normal ones 
in every other way.
[7] N arrative Glitches.
Both normals and psychotics produced glitches which interrupted the 
flow in the narratives. Fromkin’s (1975) assertion that schizophrenic error 
is not different from normal error was not borne out as there were three 
categories of glitching produced only by psychotics, and one produced 
only by normals. Both populations started a word, broke off, and then 
restarted as in
S T A R T -R E S T A R T
11A. f-f-for
11B. she we-went
11C. the way the way they did that either.
but only normals started a phrase, broke it off to insert a prior event or 
a comment on their word choice and then resumed the phrase as in 
(underlining shows interrupted phrase and its pickup. Boldface is 
interruption):
C O M M E N T -C O R R E C T IO N
12A. and then she—her father came home from work, whatever — she 
asked her father for money.
12B. and a white—it appeared to be white - long-sleeved shirt 
12C. so when her father came home—or the man who came in the 
door I thought it was her father — came in the door.
In contrast, if psychotics broke off in the middle of a phrase, they 
never picked it up, creating strange syntactic gapping.
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Both populations evinced false starts but only the psychotic ones were 
unrelated to the ultimate selection of words as in
12D. he ch- told where to go
Some of the neologizing and gibberish below could also be counted as 
evidence of such unrelated false starting. In contrast, normal false starts 
could be seen to be self-correction, as in
12E. she-we saw
12F. it looked like a chocolate su- a chocolate ice cream cone
The first involved a correct pronoun change, and in the second, the 
speaker apparently started to say sundae, but corrected it to the proper 
word cone. T he perceptual error of calling the ice cream chocolate was 
one made by many normals, none of whom corrected it.
Only psychotics produced words which rhymed with the apparent 
target, as in
13A. he twitched through the door.
13B. that’s all I can stew
T he twitch was probably intended to be switched as it was a reference to 
the camera action and the stew was apparently a misretrieval for do  as it 
ended the narrative.
[8 ] Neologizing and Gibberish.
Neologizing and gibberish occurred in psychotic narratives, although 
one normal also produced a short stretch of gibberish. Given the con­
straints on the task this was not wholly expected. Actually, there were no 
neologisms comprised of recognizable morphemes, such as puterience or 
plausity. All of the examples here could as easily be called neologisms or 
gibberish. What occurred is a stretch that sounded like a short word in an 
otherwise comprehensible passage or two or three syllable stretches. We 
have already seen some of these like k if in 4 above. T his is unusual in 
that there.were few other such errors in that narrative. Typically, non- 
words like [ausoh uh uh o u], [shi], [ess], [sh wu] [cunna’s cunna] were 
produced by patients who displayed other lexical problems as in
14A. a little girl taking a dit asking for ice cream from her mother 
her says says that it’s too close to dinnertime so she goes to her father 
an’ asked if she can have then goes to the ice cream place and orders 
a double scoop of something which I didn’t understand just taking
T h e  Ice  C ream  Stories: A  Study o f  Narrations 201
efu taking control away from her mother asking mm asking her 
father fsh if her father said no she should’ve gone to her mother.
Besides the obvious neologizing, dit, efu, and fsh, we see nonaccurate 
lexical choice or circumlocution as in speaking of the ice cream place, 
rather than parlor  or shop, and something which I  d idn ’t understand instead 
of a cover term like “ice cream.” (See sec 10 for syntax error.) The patient 
above who said [shinchuer] and [smae] showed other not quite normal 
lexical choices such as “she’s a little daughter.”
There was even one normal lapse into gibberish
14B. So therefore she etuh she ed she listened.
Even though this normal produced these apparent neologisms in her 
two false starts, she recouped almost immediately finishing the construc­
tion she had stumbled on. In all other respects her narrative was normal. 
It encoded the events correctly. Given her recouping here, this is more 
like the c o m m en t -c o r r e c t io n  of normals seen above. She starts out 
with an error but is able to go back to the target utterance despite the 
interruption. There is still control. 9
[9] Lexical Choices.
There were three other problems with lexical choice. The first involved 
selection of words that rhymed with the apparent target word, but bore 
no semantic similarity with it, as in 13A— B above. The second was inexact 
wording, using a HYPONYM, the general classification under which the 
word falls, rather than the exact word for the meaning. The third 
consisted of selecting several words to add up to a target word. These 
typically overinflated what was intended.
The use of hyponyms is illustrated by subjects who said that the girl 
wanted things or something  rather than saying she wanted ice cream fell 
into this category. The one normal who did this, in A above, recouped 
later on in the narrative, indicating that he realized his error, by saying 
she asked her father for ice cream “which is I guess what she asked her 
mother.” In contrast, vague wording by psychotics did not get corrected. 
Notice the misencodings of
15A. What I saw. Uh a car waiting in front of an ice cream shop a 
car drove by a girl looking through a window into an ice cream shop 
uh mmm a man . . .  a lady walking by with groceries [uh’n nu] when 
she switched into a family’s house the girl talking to her mother her
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mother setting dishes her father came through the door there were 
cur- blue curtains ’n it was kinda brown the room they’re in uh ask 
girl if she din’t have ice cream ’n the girl went and bought ice cream.
Notice the inexact wording. The scene changed to “a family’s house.” 
It is usually assumed that families reside in houses so that one doesn’t 
qualify by specifying that. The opposite occurrence, a house occupied by 
persons other than a family, is the one that has to be specified, even with 
today’s current changes in family life. This improper specification is 
matched by the fact that the narrator uses the indefinite article a rather 
than the specific her in introducing the house. This is as much a syntactic 
error as a lexical one as the grammar of English requires that a marker of 
old information, such as a personal pronoun or the, introduce an item or 
location belonging to some one who has been introduced. Then, the 
narrator encodes the girl’s request to her mother as “talking to her 
mother.” Nowhere is it mentioned what she is talking about. Another 
patient made an analogous error:
15B. He says well what the heck give it to her [nooee] sh-she’s a little 
daughter.
Strictly speaking, all girls are little daughters, but usually, when 
someone mentions a little daughter they precede it by a possessive, such 
as saying that Betty is “Max’s little daughter” or that the girl over there is 
“my little daughter.” Other than that, one might say of someone else’s 
child, “she’s like a little daughter to me,” but the plain unvarnished 
“she’s a little daughter” is not usual.8
Some psychotic lexical choices are reminiscent of mild anomic aphasia.9 
For instance, when the child pays for her ice cream, one patient encoded 
this as
15C. The cash register man handled the financial matters.
Calling a clerk a “cash register man,” although readily understandable, 
spreads the semantic features adhering to clerk over too many words. 
Using such a roundabout phrasing implies that the “cash register man” is 
not a normal clerk. In this instance, such special implications were not 
appropriate. The clerk behind the counter who dipped the ice cream was 
in every respect an ordinary young male clerk. Similarly, handling 
financial matters refers to transactions far more glorious and important 
than ringing up the sale of an ice cream cone.
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Another patient, C.T., couched the act of the father’s giving the child 
money thusly:
15D. He says “well, what the heck give it to her [nooee] she’s a little 
daughter so he gets her the coins . . . ”
To speak of getting the coins implies that one is fetching some coins of 
great value or those in a coin collection. T he father gives her change or 
money.
C.T., the patient who uttered both 15B and 15D above also created 
several neologisms indicating that he had a general problem in lexical 
retrieval. He frequently used literary words, such as saying
15E. You can interpolate and say that she ate the ice cream and 
brought it home and said thank you daddy thank you daddy or 
thank you mummy but she still is her destination is not known in a 
few minutes.
In such a narrative, one would expect “I ’m not sure she went home.” 
both the word destination and the passive voice is not known are the wrong 
register for the situation. Although this patient spoke copiously, his 
speech was larded with such inappropriate phrasings. A straightforward 
misencoding occurred as he was setting the scene
15F. All right. T he first thing we see is an ice cream [ayuh] it 
could’ve been a shopping center with two cars parked in front car 
drives up in front and waits get the impression that someone goes 
out of the car and walks in front and sees in the window of the same 
one of these shopping center stores a little girl waiting for some ice 
cream or something or other . . .
T he girl is looking in the window, but she is not in the window. Notice 
also the inappropriate reference to the “same one of these shopping 
center stores.” He has not singled out which store that is. The same one 
can only refer back to a previously mentioned item. This is clearly a 
circumlocution, again evidence of his difficulties in lexical selection.
An analysis of these wordings as being evidence of a linguistic deficit 
is reinforced by his frequent neologizing and his grossly misordered 
sequences. It was also C.T. who said
15G. . . .  that’s what kids are like these days always have but th- it 
means that [shinchuer] her parents that she’s so proud of she goes 
out leaves the ice cream ’n eats it on the way ’n we don’t know what 
happens [sme] the fact . . .
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[10] Syntactic Errors.
However we wish to term it, the undeniable fact that emerged from 
this study was that psychotic speakers do show genuine disruption in 
syntax. Because, as we have seen, the borders of language tend to be 
fuzzy, certain errors can be assigned either to the lexicon or to the 
syntactic system. Those mentioned above dealing with choice of indefi­
nite or definite noun determiner are cases in point. If a patient uses an a 
in lieu of a correct the or my, it is true that he or she selected the wrong 
word, but it is equally true that he or she failed to use the proper 
syntactic marking for indicating definite versus indefinite mention.
Apart from these fuzzier matters, however, psychotic narratives showed 
agrammatisms, hard instances of agrammatisms. For instance, let us 
reprise from C.T.’s narrative:
• . . .  that’s what kids are like these days always have but th- it
• . . .  she still is her destination is not known in a few minutes.
In the first of these, C.T. has not completed the construction started 
with have. There is no prior phrase to which this is anaphoric reference. 
Similarly, in the second the is requires an adjective, noun or verb to 
complete it. Again this is not anaphoric reference. There is no hesitation 
or backtracking in either of these to indicate that the speaker has started 
to say something and then has changed his mind. The patient simply 
starts the construction and changes to a different one with no warning or 
later correction.
This kind of error, what I call syntactic gapping occurred only in 
psychotic patients. This is another category of error not produced by 
normals, again proving that Fromkin is in error in her claim that schizo­
phrenics evince the same errors as normals. Not surprisingly, the gap­
ping occurred in patients who evinced other linguistic disabilities like 
neologizing, imprecise lexical retrieval, and misordering of temporal 
events. Other examples are
• he was blamed for and I don’t think that was fair the way they did
that either
• what are the and uh there was a scene
• and asks if she can have then goes to the ice cream place.
• Another car pulls and then a little girl is peeking___
It must be emphasized that errors like these were not only exclusive to 
psychotics, but the sentences in which they occurred were said as if
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nothing had been omitted. There was no break in intonation or stress, 
but a vital word to a syntactic construction was never uttered. In contrast 
to this kind of gapping there exist devices for starting a syntactic 
construction, then before completion abandoning it and starting anew. 
We see the difference in the reprise of:
I saw a movie with a girl and she wanted ice cream and it wasn’t 
really ice cream she wanted, it was uh she ordered frozen grape ice, a 
double order, and her mother said no and her father said no and it 
seemed like she defied them and went for it anyhow.
The speaker started to say “it was..” This could have been the comment 
on the previous sentence, as in “it wasn’t really ice cream she wanted, it 
was grape ice.” He indicates that he is breaking off to rephrase the 
sentence by the uh followed by a pause. Then he restarted with another 
whole sentence which fit the context including the observation that she 
didn’t want ice cream. In contrast, in the gapping above, there were no 
pauses to indicate a rephrasing and what follows is not a new phrasing. It 
just continues as if the prior constructions were complete.
Both normals and psychotics evinced a less disruptive kind of syntactic 
error.
16 . . .  he charged it for her
17 . . . .  it’s too close for dinnertime
18. . . .  two three minutes for get waited on (see 20 below)
19. There was and when she got home there was too near suppertime.
The first of these, from a normal, was simple reversal of words. It 
should have been “he charged her for it.” The next two both substitute for  
for to. This is not so surprising as it might appear at first blush. For—to 
together constitute the infinitive after some verbs,10 as in “I would love 
for you to come.” In 16 and 17 the for  is not grammatically correct, but it 
is easy to see that this is a typical slip-of-the-tongue error of substituting 
one word in a set for another. 16 was said by a normal and 17 by a 
psychotic. The last, 19, was said by a psychotic. Both it and there can 
function as dummy subjects as in “it’s raining out” and “there are nap­
kins on the table.” Unlike for  and to, however, they never occur in the 
same construction. Complex syntactic rules determine which can be used 
in a given instance.
Some patients displayed common errors in pronoun selection of the 
kind prevalent in slips of the tongue.11 However, when this occurred in
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psychotic narrative, it typically persevered over a stretch of several 
references. The underlining shows the wavering between pronoun choices.
20. I seen a little girl looking in the window ’n ah say wan’ some ice 
cream but didn’t have money to get it so she asked her mother ’n her 
mother said not now because it’s too near suppertime uh the kid was 
put down so he goes to the father ’n the father ch-told where to go ’n 
gave him the money so she could buy ice cream. While she was in 
the ice cream parlor she was sittin’ there waitin’ for somebody to 
get—musta waited two three minutes for get waited on a place like 
that should have it all the time soon as she comes in the door. Then 
finally she got the ice cream. She was happy ’n that’s the way it is.
Again this passage shows how difficult it is to discuss a level of syntax 
separately from one of semantics and lexical choice. The incorrect pro­
noun usage can be viewed as opposite speech which we think of as a 
problem of lexical choice. Another example of undeniably opposite 
speech in 20 occurs when the speaker said the girl was sitting there. She 
was actually standing there. The boldfaced segments highlight other 
deviations here: a syntactic error, and another improper lexical choice. 
Unless one is specifically giving directions, usually in response to a 
question, telling another where to go usually means you have been 
refused roundly.
One patient with speech disintegrated to the point of gibberish also 
produced word salads. Underlined words indicate faulty pronoun refer­
ence, another semantic-syntactic category:
21. Okay. I was watchin a film of a little girl and um s bring back 
memories of things that happened to uh people around me that 
affected me durin’ the time when I was livin’ in that area and uh she 
jus’ went to the store for candy bar and by the time ooh of course her 
brother who was supposed to be watchin’ wasn’t payin’ much atten­
tion he was blamed for and I didn’ think that was fair the way the 
way they did that either so that’s why I ’m kinda like askin’ yah could 
we just get together and try to you know work it out all together for 
one big party or something ezz it hey if it we’d all in which is in not 
they’ve been here so why you jis now discoverin’ it. You know they 
they’ve been men will try to use you every time for everything he 
wants so ain’t no need and you tryin’ to get upset for’t that’s all that’s 
all.
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This, of course, fails on every level. The narrative tracking is off. 
Personal memories intrude on the narrative. Very little of what was seen 
in the film ever gets encoded. There is syntactic gapping (he was blamed 
for and I didn’t think . . . ) ,  gibberish, word salad. Generally, narratives 
deviant enough to manifest severe syntactic and lexical retrieval prob­
lems are those which manifest about every other evidence of disinte­
grated discourse abilities.
[11] Misperceptions.
One unexpected finding was that normals do about the same amount 
of misperceiving as do psychotics. The differences lie both in the order 
of scanning the memory which seems to underlie narrative production, 
and the kinds of misperceptions which each group had. This last was 
partially a result of the first.
The misperceptions of the two populations were almost mutually 
exclusive. Misperceptions by normals arose out of their summing up the 
action in order to get a smooth, logical progression of activity, all 
subordinated to what was apparently seen as the central theme: the girl’s 
desiring and then getting ice cream. Hence, many normals, but not 
psychotics, reported that the father as well as the mother refused the 
child. The story could be told either way. Normals ignored the mother’s 
affectionate and kind refusal. Rather, it became converted to a flat, even 
unpleasant, denial of the girl’s request. It was this scene that caused one 
normal to say that the child was “rejected by one [parent].” Another 
reported the mother as giving an abrupt “nope.” What is essential for the 
overall story line is that the mother refused the request, or else there was 
no reason for the girl to ask her father. Therefore, normals not only said 
that the mother refused, but they grossly misrepresented the character of 
the refusal. One normal even misinterpreted the father’s putting his 
hand in his pocket as a specific gesture:
22 . . .  she asked her mother if she could have some ice cream and 
the mother said not it’s too near supper so then the girl’s father, I 
assume it was came home and she asked the father the same ques­
tion and he sa— . . .  He didn’t actually say but he gave the gestures 
for no and the next scene was the little girl went to an ice cream 
store and she ordered a double grape ice and the man gave it to her
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and she paid the man and he said “Thank you come again,” and she
left the store.
Similarly, it made no difference to the story exactly what flavor ice 
cream the girl gets, so normals did not seem to process the clearly 
enunciated “double grape ice” in the videostory. So far as the central 
storyline goes, it makes no difference if the mother is preparing dinner 
rather than setting the table. Consequently, a normal misperceived this 
sequence as well.
Two normals misperceived the white cases barely visible through 
the window which the child was looking into in the opening scene. 
One termed the store a deli, and the other thought it was a laun­
dromat. Although the cases do look like those in delicatessen’s or laundry 
equipment, it was surprising given the entire videostory that they did 
not perceive that she was looking at ice cream cases, especially given 
the normals’ penchant for fitting the facts to the perceived story. How­
ever, even these errors did not mar the storyline. Neither of these mis­
perceptions caused a rating of psychotic. In sum, normals do misperceive 
even in such a short and simple task as this was, but their misperceptions 
fit into the gist of what they assume the story to be about. It is as if 
normals first figure what the point of the story is, and then fit facts in 
to suit.
Psychotic misperceptions, although no more frequent than normals, 
are far more disparate. Sometimes in what appear to be psychotic 
misperceptions, we are not sure if the patient is hallucinating, acciden­
tally accessing chance associations to the target utterances, or simply is 
suffering from difficulties in lexical retrieving. For instance, in 2A, the 
manic narrator says that the girl is looking in a trashcan, a statement 
repeated the next week on recall. There is no way to know if he was 
actually hallucinating this, but it seems unlikely because he says, “This 
little girl was looking in the store was looking in a trashcan or something.” 
The “or something” indicates that he was not discussing a hallucinatory 
trashcan, but that he could not recall what she was actually looking into 
or that he had not registered that information or couldn’t think of the 
correct word. This usage of “or something” is frequently used to indicate 
that a word just selected is not quite on target. Alternatively, the word 
trashcan might have been a syntagmatic association. The phrasal verb 
looking in can be completed by trashcan, although it does seem quite
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farfetched. Although one can look into a trashcan, looking into windows 
and stores is far more likely.
The patient who reported the father’s question as asking the girl if she 
had ice cream, was a clear misperception. The girl did the asking and 
she didn’t ask if anyone had any. She asked for ice cream directly.
Another misperception of dialogue seems responsible for
23. Ummm. First one car pulls up near an ice cream parlor. Another 
car pulls ’n then a little girl is peeking in a ice cream parlor ’n’ then 
later after that the little girl is at home and she asked her mother she 
wants to eat supper and her mother says it’s too early. Then her father 
walks in and she says, “Hello Daddy”12 an’ the next thing she goes 
back to the ice cream parlor an gets the ice cream and walks out and 
meet her friends waitin’ for her.
The misperception of what the girl asked is especially blatant since it 
does not cohere with any of the action at the ice cream parlor. In contrast 
to the normal misperceptions, this did not fit in with any overall action. 
Indeed, the misperception disrupts the story.
When a psychotic encodes the child’s request to her parents as “She 
talked to her mother and father,” we do not know if he actually saw the 
child conversing with, but not requesting anything from, her parents. 
Whereas requesting is a form of talking, still talking is not a usual 
synonym for it. It is as if the patient hit upon a hyponym under which 
requesting or asking is categorized, but did not quite get to his goal. 
Similarly, some psychotics spoke of the “candy store” rather than the ice 
cream store. Interestingly, in Rhode Island, one does not buy ice cream 
at a candy store. One purchases it from a dairy, creamery, ice cream 
parlor, supermarket, variety store, or spa. Only gourmet candy is bought 
at a candy store. Every one of the subjects who substituted candy store for 
ice cream parlor came from Rhode Island, as did all but one who said the 
girl was going for a candy bar instead of an ice cream cone, and she 
seems to have been speaking of a hallucinatory girl with a baby. Whether 
those who spoke of a candy store and candy bars misperceived or simply 
made lexical errors could not be determined.
[12] Constraints, Organization and Psychosis.
In sum, although both normals and psychotics were astonishingly 
prone to errors even in such a simple task, this study verified that there
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are distinct differences in the kinds of errors each produces. Only psy- 
chotics manifested syntactic gapping.13 They alone generated word salads 
and made slips of the tongue based upon words rhyming with their 
targets. With only one exception, it was they who produced neologizing 
and only they uttered false starts with elements unlike those that followed. 
They alone produced narratives with events misordered, cause and 
effect reversed, and interpolations of personal memories and conjectures 
not germane to the film.
Only psychotics created unusual, almost literary circumlocutions as in 
“he gets her the coins” and “the cash register man handled the financial 
matters.” Unfortunately, these were their only felicities. T he other fea­
tures peculiar to psychotic narratives were disruptive, not creative. Psy­
chotic speech was not indicative of exceptional creativity as posited by 
Forrest (1976) and Lecours and Vanier-Clement (1976). So infelicitous 
were all the other features of psychotic narrating that the few unusual 
circumlocutions seem to have been accidental, a result of a general 
difficulty in getting the correct word for the situation. These fortuitous 
circumlocutions were overshadowed by opaque unbeautiful meaning­
lessness of the rest.
In sum, it was found that psychotics produced error at almost every 
level of speech: word formation, sentence production, and narrative 
production. With the exception of cohesive ties, their errors and those of 
normals were almost entirely mutually exclusive. T h eir speech was 
characterized by a general deficit in ability to order and to organize. 
There were individual differences among the patients in the levels of 
speech that were affected as well as in the severity of disruption, but the 
general pattern was the same for all. Those normal narratives judged 
psychotic shared one or more of these features, although no normal 
failed to complete the telling of the events of the narratives. Normals 
always were able to recoup.
Normals organize their narratives far more tightly than do psychotics, 
utilizing temporal order and attempting to reproduce the details of what 
they have seen. Although they do display linguistic errors, their target is 
easily retrieved by hearers. Not surprisingly, normals are both capable 
of self-correction and likely to indulge in it. Where they err in reporting 
events, they do so because they produce a coherent whole, so that they fit 
the facts to what they perceive to be the central issues in the story. They 
also suppress personal associations to events depicted. They did not 
comment on the outcome of the story nor did they “remember” personal
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events. Interestingly, several normals at the end of the taping commented 
that they used to play one parent off against the other as did the girl in 
the film, but none told me this as part of their narrative.
In contrast, psychotics were often unable to repress internal stimuli, 
such as the patient who introduced the narrative with “All about ice 
cream ’n I coulda really went for a cone.” Shortly thereafter the patient 
said “neat” for eat. Another correctly said the girl got a cone of double 
grape ice and then interpolated, “my favorite flavor.” Only psychotics 
commented that they were happy that she got her ice cream or even that 
she was happy. Only psychotics mentioned that certain things disturbed 
them or got them angry. C.T., to use his own word, interpolated all kinds 
of comments about what kids are like these days, the girl’s pride in her 
parents, and her probable “thank you’s” to “mummy and daddy.”
Typically, the more such extraneous matters intruded, the more 
disrupted the entire narrative was. C.T.’s was the one with the bizarre 
temporal misorderings as well as neologisms and other disruptions in 
lexical retrieval. In the most disrupted narratives, personal memories 
blended with the events on the screen, as in the narrative that spoke of 
“memories of things that happened to uh people around me that affected 
me durin’ the time when I was livin’ in that area and uh she jus’ went. . . ” 
Where the area was; who “she” was, indeed, the entire leaping from one 
event to another with lapses into word salad and neologizing show a total 
lack of organization and of repression of matters extraneous to the matter 
at hand. Because of their inability to filter out stimuli not relevant to the 
task at hand and to organize, psychotic misperception, unlike that of 
normals, does not form a coherent narrative.
Their deviations were not what Lecours and Vanier-Clement call 
“plus deviations.” They were almost all “minus deviations” hindering 
comprehension and/or failing to encode the story. Because in a variety 
of ways they showed that they were trying to narrate it, one can conclude 
that they were not always able to say what they meant. This argues for 
disrupted speaking skills. This disruption includes hard instances of 
agrammatism. Moreover, such instances were not at all difficult to find 
even in a short task given to short-term patients.
We can characterize a general dysfunction caused by a generalized 
lowering of constraints in speech activities. It is possible, indeed it does 
happen, that in some psychotics, at least some of the time, the lowering 
of constraints can be controlled enough to produce artistic endeavors 
like the wildly creative poetry of a patient reported on in Hallowell and
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Smith (1983), for instance. In one of those, the patient describes his terror 
as being like a plummeting toward acid and spikes, cobra spears, and 
tiger-hunting forks, and he says that he is impaled upon a dozen blades. 
As vivid and really wild as some of his imagery is, it is all in control, all 
subordinated to his description of his feelings. Furthermore, this poem 
is appropriately rhymed and was written down by the patient, correctly 
spelled and lined up as poetry on the page. However, this certainly is not 
the usual psychotic speech. As we have seen in the Ice Cream Stories, the 
problem is that the productions are not subordinated to form or to a 
coherent meaning. They are not controlled, and control is the essence of 
art and of ordinary communication.
Many theories advanced for the oddities of schizophrenic speech have 
discussed its strange associational character, including this mix of memo­
ries with other verbal output. Terms like “filtering defects,” “faulty 
pigeonholing,” “attentional deficits,” and “weakening of constructs” have 
all been used both as explanation of the cause of such language and as a 
description of it. All of these terms seem to be referring to the same 
phenomena. This study indicates that schizophrenic and manic narra­
tion is marred by intrusions from personal memory, such that it seems to 
be suffering from “faulty filtering” mechanisms. It should be stressed, 
however, that other terms might be—and have been—used to label the 
same phenomena. In short, the Ice Cream Stories support the model of 
disrupted speech with the analogous disruption in visual tracking as 
discovered by Holzman.
Notes
1Mass nouns are those which cannot be counted. That is, one cannot say “one 
trash,” “two trashes.” Also, if one puts some in front of a mass noun, the noun 
remains singular, as in “some trash." With count nouns, if one puts some in front of 
them, they become plural, as in “some apples.”
2He was referring to the rather jerky camera action at the outset of the video. It 
literally did stop and start.
3There is no line
4This was a neologism
5There was no switch to the front door. The father clearly entered by the kitchen 
door clearly visible in the room.
6This subject was exceptionally nervous when recounting the narrative. He 
gripped the tape recorder tightly, was flushed, and appeared unsure of himself. 
Since he had volunteered for the project, his behavior was inexplicable. Normal
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participants were not asked if they had schizophrenic or otherwise mentally ill 
family members, but studies have shown that people genetically at risk for schizo­
phrenia do show abnormalities in speech similar to schizophrenics. Whether or not 
this person is at risk I do not know. As we saw in the last chapter, Rochester and 
Martin also found that they got some highly deviant passages from normals.
7She actually walked up to the father and made body contact with him as she 
makes the request.
8A similar phrase is fine, however, as when one says “she’s a little sister” or “she’s a 
little lady” when explaining someone’s role behavior.
9Notice that I am not claiming that the patient does have anomic aphasia; only 
that his or her wording is like that.
10This is a matter of dialect as well. Some dialects use both the for and the to 
where others would be more likely just to use the to. I would be more likely to say, 
“I’d love you to go.” Either encoding seems to be equally socially correct and all 
English speakers at some times at least would use both for  and to.
11We have to exclude here the confusion between the gender marking on English 
pronouns by native speakers of languages like Chinese and Filipino. Because these 
languages use one pronoun for all genders in the singular, speakers often confuse he. 
his, she, and her. Lest the English speaking reader feel superior, I must point out that 
English shows no gender marking in the plural.
12The patient’s voice dropped and she adopted a very seductive tone and elon­
gated the words “hello Daddy.”
13This is not a claim that psychotics are the only population who ever produce 
these. In more open-ended situations, more exciting or fatiguing ones, or amongst 
other impaired populations, we might find these as well. In this situation, one which 
required narration of a relatively simple and short (124 second) videostory, only 
psychotics omitted head words of constructions.
Chapter Nine
RELEVANCE
Schizophrenic speech is notoriously irrelevant, although this 
has been called by many other names such as being tangentia l 
or derailed. What is it that causes such evaluation? What exactly 
is relevance? How can we determine whether or not speech is 
relevant? How is relevance achieved? This chapter will show 
that relevance and truth are not the same thing, that utterances 
may be untrue, impossible, even fantastic, but still be relevant.
Allied to relevance is the problem of establishing mutual ground, 
including the ways that this is done. The factors leading to 
judgments of irrelevance can be isolated so that schizophrenic 
and other psychotic speech can be analyzed as relevant or not 
by objective standards.
[1] Relevance.
F or those involved with psychotic speech, the problem of relevance is especially pressing because the most remarked upon feature of schizo­
phrenic speech is its lack of relevance. Labels like incoherent, tangential, 
and distracted are all commonly applied to describe schizophrenic speech. 
Before discussing these, we need to consider what it is that makes sen­
tences relevant to the context so that a topic can be inferred in oral and 
written communications. What is it that leads to the judgment that what 
has been said is coherent, relevant, and sensible.
Relevance has two faces: first, how speech is connected to the interac­
tion under examination; and second how it relates to a topic. It is, 
admittedly, difficult to separate the two as they are Siamese twins. One 
keeps to a topic by making relevant allusions to it. The overlap is 
unavoidable, but we can still see a difference between them. Relevance is 
an ongoing cognitive process. Topic, a m a c r o s t r u c t u r e  category, is 
more directly concerned with syntax.
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[2] Common Ground.
In order for successful communication to take place, common ground 
has to be established between participants in the interaction. Obviously, 
the longer their mutual history, the more that each can assume the other 
(or others) know and this will affect what they have to overtly encode 
(Kreckel 1981). Beyond these social conditions there are syntactic con­
structions which indicate that a constituent in the sentence or the dis­
course is CO M M O N  g r o u n d . What interests us here is the sorts of devices 
speakers use to establish common ground without participants’ overtly 
reviewing their m u t u a l  or s h a r e d  k n o w l e d g e  in each interaction.
We typically take anything in the physical environment as being 
Common ground, and we encode on that basis. For instance, if we are 
sitting at a restaurant table, and there is a candle burning on the table, we 
could at first reference say, “The wax is getting all over the tablecloth.” 
One need not mention that there is a candle, it is burning and it is 
melting. Indeed, to mention that would be odd since anyone sitting at 
the table can see (or, if blind, feel) the flame. It is just such extraneous 
mention which we associate with schizophrenicity.
Common ground also comes about by simple mention. If someone 
says, “Dam, the books are on the table,” nobody would think that all 
books on all tables were meant. Rather a hearer would look for a likely 
table nearby or in view. Failing that, if the interactors had just left a place 
with a table upon which relevant books could have been left, the state­
ment would cause a hearer to think back to that spot or would assume 
that the speaker had left the books on some table before meeting up with 
the hearer. Mention, then, simply because it has been made indicates 
that a certain scenario must have taken place, in this case, leaving books 
that the speaker wants or needs. Mention need not be represented as 
truth. Within a story or other fiction a character might say, “Drats! 
They’ve painted the roses red.” So long as the narrator then mentions 
causes or consequences of the painted roses, listeners will consider their 
existence common ground in that fictional world. If no prior or further 
reference is made to them, then their mention is perceived as odd, not 
relevant. In fact, at the end of such a story, someone might say, “But what 
about the roses?”
Mention of items that cannot be located by such natural strategies may 
be taken as evidence of a wandering or otherwise incapacitated mind, 
especially if the mentioner cannot direct the hearer to an appropriate
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scene or object. For instance, if one meets up with a person who sud­
denly says, “Darn , the books are on the table!” with nothing in the 
environment or present interaction accounting for this exclamation, the 
hearer might well ask, “What books?” Presumably, then, the original 
speaker might answer, “Some books that are 30 days overdue at the 
library.” That explains the expletive and the concern. If, however, the 
original speaker responded with “Tippecanoe and Tyler too,” the hearer 
would be justified in thinking something was wrong with that speaker, 
unless, of course, the interaction was taking place in an American history 
lecture or the hearer knew that the speaker was a specialist in American 
elections. We don’t feel an abnormality in the response unless there is no 
context, including mutual personal knowledge, that the present item can 
be fit into. Given the very wide latitude and longitude that we have in 
establishing common ground, the speaker who fails to do so can be seen 
to be suffering from a serious, indeed primary, deficit.
Mutual cultural and personal knowledge such as matters pertaining to 
a given job or profession are also givens in establishing common ground. 
Frequently, at parties when people ask what kind of job I have, and I 
respond that I teach, they will say things like “Oh, I better watch how I 
talk.” In our society, teachers are the repository of socially correct speech.
Until the past few years if someone told me that they had to prepare 
for a Passover Seder I would assume that they were Jewish. Now that 
Catholics are having seders on Maundy Thursday, that assumption 
cannot be made. However, if the person were preparing for a seder but 
not on Maundy Thursday, I would then be justified in still assuming 
that the person was Jewish.
This last example pertains to another facet of establishing common 
ground. Peter Seuren (1985, p. 65) reminds us that the lexicon is dynamic. 
It is not a simple store of meaningful building blocks for sentences. 
Rather, the lexicon is “an extremely rich quarry whose creative prin­
ciples are of the highest explanatory value in linguistic theory.” Certainly, 
speakers can tap into each other’s lexicons forcing new connections 
between elements and adding meaning to preexisting items. Frequently, 
this is how common ground is achieved. To give a trivial example, this 
sort of thing is frequently done with food. Trying to describe Vindaloo to 
a novice in Indian food, I said, “Try to imagine the hottest chili you ever 
tasted. Real Tex-Mex. It’s hotter than that.” another party present added, 
“Try to imagine food so hot your ears hurt by the second bite. That’s 
Vindaloo.” My comment then was, “Imagine the smoke coming out of
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your ears. That’s Vindaloo.” Each of these images extended the novice’s 
idea of what hot food could be as well as defining Vindaloo. Notice that 
both real and imaginary experiences may be blended in order to extend 
meanings and relationships between items in the lexicon. People don’t 
necessarily associate pain in the ears with spicy food, for instance, and 
outside of a Mel Brooks’ movie, smoke doesn’t come out of people’s ears. 
No matter how outlandish such images are, they are not taken as evi­
dence of insanity or other incapacity. What counts is that they have been 
presented skillfully enough so that the hearer can find their relevance to 
the topic.
Another technique for establishing mutual ground, one which also 
can cause shifts in the lexicon, is to localize something in a known shared 
experience and then extend it from there. For instance, “You think Jerry 
used to be fat! You should see him now. His stomach looks as if he 
swallowed a 20 pound watermelon.” or “You know the gown Liz wore for 
her wedding? Well, this looked exactly the same except there were about 
double the pearls on the neck—sort of like a turtle neck all with pearls 
sewn on.”
Clark and Marshall (1981) maintain “The world in which a thing is 
claimed to exist can be real or imaginary, past, present, or future.” They 
give the example of a possible world in which the following can be said:
1. A deer and a unicorn were grazing beside a stream when the
unicorn complimented the deer on his beautiful extra horn.
By virtue of the verb tenses and the adverbials beside a stream and 
when, 1 is presented as a factual occurrence. What occurs to me is that we 
don’t have to posit a possible world; we start with this one. Except for 
very young children, hearers know that unicorns don’t exist and that 
animals don’t talk, although herbivorous, animals do graze by streams. 
Therefore, hearers know that they have to suspend some reality when 
they hear sentences like 1. At the same time they can imagine the event 
because of the inclusion of the real. The imaginary is imaginary because 
of what we know of this world. It seems to me that hearers don’t maintain 
several worlds in their brains. If they did communication would require 
longer processing time because a great many extraneous questions would 
arise: how much of the “possible worlds” would need constructing; 
would we be forced to imagine possible weather systems? Housing forms? 
Vegetation? It’s not so much a case of possible worlds which are constructed, 
but of this world with some imaginary elements.
218 Understanding Psychotic Speech
Utterances, written or spoken, that do not establish enough common 
ground so that we can cycle into a subject matter, are incoherent even if 
the individual phrases and sentences used are normal enough. For 
instance, part of what is wrong with the following is that we can find no 
common ground on which to build up an event or explanation.
2. After John Black has recovered in special neutral form of life the 
honest bring back to doctor’s agents must take John Black out 
through making up design meaning straight neutral underworld 
shadow tunnel. (Lorenz 1961)
We can assume that there is a person named John Black and that 
something was wrong with him from which he recovered, but what a 
“neutral form of life” is remains a mystery. Similarly, although we can 
assume that a person can be brought out of a tunnel, we aren’t given a 
clue as to what a “design meaning straight neutral” tunnel can be. This 
can be seen as a failure to provide proper syntactic cues, but even if these 
were present, common ground as to the kind of tunnel still has not been 
established. That is, there may be a syntactic deficiency, but there is also 
one in the larger discourse task of providing common ground:
Similarly, despite the syntactic errors, the bizarre quality of 3 comes 
about because it fails to establish what should be answered and the 
relevance of Paradise to the rest of it.
3. Mill Avenue is a house in between avenues U and avenue T  I 
live on Mill Avenue for a period of for now a period of maybe 
fifteen year for around approximate fifteen years I like it the fam—I 
like every family on Mill Avenue I like every family in the world I 
like every family in the United State of America I like every family 
on on Mill Avenue I like Mill Avenue is a is a block with that is busy 
cars always pass by all the time I always look out the window of my 
front porch front porch at time when I s- when I ’m not sure if it’s 
possible about the way I think I could read people mind about 
people’s society attitude plot and spirit so I think I could read their 
mind as they drive by in the car sh- will I see Paradise will I not see 
Paradise should I answer should I not answer I not answer w- their 
thought of how I read think I could read their mind about when 
they pass by in the car in the house pass by in the car from my house 
I just correct for them for having me feel better about myself not 
answer will I should I answer should I not answer will I see paradise 
will I not see paradise I just correct them to have me feel better
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about myself about the way I think I can hear their mind r- about 
the way I think I could read their mind as they pass by the house . . .  
(data courtesy of Dr. Bonnie Spring)1
Interestingly, the matter of reading people’s minds as they drive by 
in their cars is established as this is part of a response about what it 
is like living in the patient’s neighborhood. After localizing the street, 
the patient then comments on people riding by in cars, and expresses 
doubt that their minds could be read and that there might be plots in 
the minds of the passers-by. Note that this is understandable despite 
the syntactic errors in the passage, but the syntactically intact questions 
about seeing Paradise and answering are precisely what are incompre­
hensible. “Should I answer, should I not answer” and “will I see paradise, 
will I not see paradise” are well-formed, but they don’t many any “sense.” 
Thus, although they would appear to be contradictory, common ground 
can be established in otherwise disrupted speech and syntactically 
undisrupted speech can yield a feeling of incoherence. Common ground 
and relevance are not wholly a matter of sentence structure.
Whenever someone speaks, in the absence of other evidence, we assume 
that at least part of his or her utterance is true. In fiction, we assume that 
we are to take it as true. Grice (1981) offers:
4. The King of France is bald.
In such a sentence, the hearer takes as factual the underlying proposi­
tion that there is a king of France. It is not that someone could not deny 
that there is a king of France, but, in practice, one is more likely to deny 
that he is bald, not that there is a king of France. Grice (1981, p. 190) feels 
this is so because both the speaker and hearer usually assume that at least 
one conjunct in a sentence is undeniable thus having common ground 
status. Even if the hearer has never heard of an existing king of France, 
much less whether or not he is bald, still the hearer will assume that the 
speaker is correct and that such a person exists.
I find another reason for such an assumption. The article the specifically 
has the meaning of mutual knowledge. That is, by prefacing a noun with 
the, the speaker is asserting “this noun is one that we both know of.” 
Hence, for instance, if one American says to another “The President,” in 
the absence of more restrictive context, both will assume that the speaker 
meant the current President of the United States. Additionally, the topic 
of the sentence, the first NP, is often taken as given and the predicate is
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taken as the comment on that topic. This is what demagogues or even less 
venal politicians bank on. The hearer assumes that part of the sentence 
containing the topic is common knowledge and regards it as common 
knowledge.
Grice adds that another way to achieve undeniability is to mention 
uncontroversial matters, i.e., “my aunt’s cousin.” Noone would question 
that you have an aunt or that she has a cousin. To this, one could add a 
whole host of people whose existence you would accept as real: my 
husband, my high school English teacher, your nemesis, or his brother. 
None of these need any particular introduction as we assume that just 
about everyone has or has had such human relationships. Moreover, the 
possessive my like the is used to signal something already known to 
participants.
Similarly, “my home” used to be taken as a given, because in America 
everybody supposedly had a home. Now that has changed, so in a 
circumstance in which the speaker is homeless and says to the hearer, 
also homeless, “My home is comfortable,” the hearer knowing that the 
speaker is homeless, could easily deny that the speaker has a home. For 
that matter if someone was laden with overstuffed bags and had a general 
ragged look, almost anyone might doubt that he or she really had a 
home. It is not necessarily the case that certain utterances or positions in 
sentences are automatically taken as true or not.
Both Sanders (1987) and Kreckel (1981) stress that a history of shared 
interactions leads to more accurate understandings between parties. There 
are more bases upon which to establish common grounds. Shared histories 
mean that less needs to be said to indicate what common ground is to be 
assumed, and the more accurately implicatures will be achieved. However, 
even strangers have ways of establishing common ground.
[3] Relevant Contributions.
Apart from formal cohesive devices like conjunctions, relevance can 
be achieved by the meaning of sentences themselves. If I am talking 
about rules, for instance, and suddenly mention infractions, relevance is 
achieved simply because that word is semantically relevant to our con­
cept of rules. All that is necessary for relevance is that the talk of 
infractions relates to the rules that were discussed previously, or to ones 
that are going to be mentioned. In contrast, the semantic chaining in
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schizophrenia does not refer to other segments of the discourse in ques­
tion and does not stand in any logical or real-life relationship to them.
Fauconnier’s (1985) metaphor of mental spaces pertains to relevance as 
well as to pragmatics. He says that language forms refer to elements 
which are set up and mentally pointed to. Language makes its own 
constructions, building up mental spaces, the relations between them 
and the relations between elements within them. He portrays language 
forms as being plucked out of internal networks and pointing outward, 
perceiving speakers as creating mental spaces which are then populated 
with language. It seems to me that this view has special explanatory 
significance for the analysis of schizophrenic speech. Whereas relevance 
is achieved by mental pointing, schizophrenic irrelevancies seem to be 
caused by roaming around in internal networks without indications of 
connection between exterior or interior relations.
Sanders (1987, p. 186) maintains that relevant entries in a discourse 
affirm, deny, add, or seek information about a proposition or combina­
tion of propositions already mentioned. I would amend this to include as 
well entries which have been suggested laterally, so to speak, by some­
thing just said. These are shown to be relevant by further propositions 
which develop another aspect of the proposition or even a new proposition. 
Thus topics can and do advance and change within one normal discourse 
provided that entries are relevant. It is not change of topic per se, then, 
that gives some discourse its schizophrenic flavor, nor is it necessarily the 
formal ways of indicating change. It is that schizophrenics do not then 
produce subsequent entries which affirm, deny, add, or seek information 
about what they have just said. This is one of the things wrong with the 
following:
5A. Looks like clay. Sounds like gray. Take you for a roll in the 
hay. . . .  (Cohen 1978)
5B. I was watching a film of a girl and um s bring back memories of 
things that happened to people around me that affected me during 
the time when I was living in the area and she just went to the store 
for a candy bar and by the time ooh of course her brother who was 
supposed to be watching wasn’t paying much attention he was blamed 
for and I didn’t think that was fair the way the way they did that 
either so that’s why I ’m just asking yah could we just get together 
and try to work it out all together for one big party or something ezz 
it hey if it we’d all in which is in not they’ve been here so why you
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just now discovering it. You know they they’ve been men will try to 
use you every time for everything he wants so ain’t no need and you 
trying to get upset for it. T hat’s all. T hat’s all.
5C. You want me to talk about -um- last week experience I had?’n it 
was funny, ’is experience seems to sum up all of what’s been goin’ on 
because I ’ve been walkin’ around recitin’ things. I ’ve written to 
people and people been listening but then when you get down to it 
you’ve got to scrub your own dishes or else nobody’s gonna an’ I ’ve 
just been so totally against the idea of people feelin’ they have a 
ticket to carry them along because it’s a ticket is not an easy trip 
along by no means is probably harder if you understand what I 
mean.
In 5A the first phrase, looks like clay is accurate, but the next sounds like 
tells us nothing about looking like gray, and taking someone for a roll in 
the hay advances neither preceding proposition. T he only way to make 
sense out of this is not to try to understand what it means, but to 
understand the processes that could have produced it.
5B starts out just fine with a recollection brought about by the film. 
Then the brother is mentioned and the fact that he was supposed to be 
watching but didn’t do it. T hen the statements cease to advance the topic. 
We never find out what he was blamed for, nor who they are nor what 
they did, nor do we find out what relevance the party has to the preceding. 
The word salad “hey if it we’d all in which is in not they’ve been 
h e re . . . ” cannot be interpreted in terms of relevance at all, since we 
don’t know what it means,2 but the irrelevancy of the entire is not caused 
by this lapse.
5C was produced in answer to the question, “Do you remember the 
video you saw with me last week?” T his is acknowledged in the first 
statement. Actually, it is possible to give an interpretation of the entire. 
It seems as if the patient is commenting on the need for self-reliance, of 
not depending on anybody else. T his assumption is based upon the 
passage when you get down to it y ou ’ve gotta scrub your own dishes and the 
references to a ticket. In that context, it is reasonable to assume that the 
patient is talking about people getting a “free ride.” As with so much of 
SD speech, it is interpretable if you tape it and then examine it at leisure. 
The irrelevancies get in the way of ordinary interpretation in face-to-face 
interactions. We are not told how the experience “last week” pertains to 
his walking around reciting things. There is no elucidation of things, nor
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are we told what he has written and what people have been listening to. 
The but, far from introducing a contrastive statement to what has gone 
immediately before simply introduces another statement not made 
relevant, nor are we told why having a ticket makes things harder. This 
lacks sufficient relevant entries although it is loaded with expressions of 
time, place, and cohesion.
Normal discourse does not always shows adherence to one topic. As we 
saw earlier, it often doesn’t. In some instances, in normal conversation, 
overt topic changing markers are used, such as “ooh, that reminds 
me . . . ” or “not to change the subject, but. . . ” which are instructions not 
to interpret following remarks as belonging in sequence. Stubbs (1983, 
p. 183) points out that these are used strategically, but are not required in 
the sense that certain syntactic rules are.
Even if such markers are not used in normal discourse, the new topic 
itself becomes the source of other entries relevant to it. In glossomania, 
often within sentences, our feeling that a topic is not being adhered 
results from the lack of affirmations, denials, additions, or questions 
about any of the propositions singly or in combination. Our sense that 
there is no STRATEGY in schizophrenic passages like 5A and B, our sense 
that the sentences seem to be thrown together arises from the absence of 
such relevant additions to anything mentioned. That is what makes 
people characterize schizophrenic speech as having “loose associations.”3
In order to make entries relevant, one need only formulate in any way 
possible structures which can be construed as adding to the macro-topic 
or otherwise alluding to it (Chaika 1976). Relevant entries in and of 
themselves effect coherence and cohesion aside from any particular 
overt syntactic cohesive devices which may be used. vanDijk (1977, 
p. 148; 1980, pp. 105, 194) himself frequently confirms that local coherence 
is not a matter of connecting facts linearly, but of connecting them to the 
topic of the sequence. Sanders says:
For strategic purposes, the disposition to say or do something in 
particular is a secondary consideration to the following ones: (1) 
whether that utterance . . .  can be relevantly entered in the discourse 
or dialogue at that juncture, and (2) which outcomes become pos­
sible (i.e., relevant) and which do not if contemplated utterances. . .  are 
entered at that juncture. (Sanders 1987, p. 11)
VanDijk (1980, p. 77) further points out that macrostructures allow us 
to “ . . .  specify a set of possible inferences . . . ” These are not paraphrases
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of the actual sentences used, but are semantic transformations which reduce 
and organize information as well as limit the conclusions. Well-formed 
macrostructures consisting of relevant microstructures allow such trans­
formations, but ill-formed ones do not. We often find it impossible to 
infer anything from schizophrenic discourse by referring to the macro- 
structure itself. Similarly, and from the same cause, we have difficulty 
coming to conclusions about what the schizophrenic meant. Perhaps 
because of this, the history of psychotherapy has largely been a history of 
trying to devise extraordinary ways of achieving inferences and conclu­
sions (Chaika 1981).
For instance, the preceding paragraph can be summarized by saying 
that well-formed macrostructures allow us to make inferences and conclu­
sions in a non-ad hoc manner. From that paragraph, one can conclude 
that I believe this is one definable difference between normal and schizo­
phrenic discourse. One can also infer that I believe that psychotherapeutic 
analyses are fallacious.
Note that these observations are not to be construed as saying that 
schizophrenic speech never allows inference and conclusions. Some of it 
obviously does. Some of it can be summarized. In fact, 5B above can be. 
With some justice, one can even infer that the speaker feels that it is 
useless for women to complain about being used by men, but the passage 
is still recognizably schizophrenic (Chaika and Alexander 1986 and Chap­
ter 1).
In contrast, “my mother’s name is B i l l . . .  and coo” is not amenable to 
summarizing beyond saying something like “T he speaker talked crazy 
about her mother’s name and birds.” We are told that the speaker likes 
buzzards and thinks they and parakeets work hard, but what can we infer 
from the rest? About all we can do is repeat what she has said.
We cannot suppose, however, that relevance is foreordained by the 
macrostructure. We must also allow for the skill of the speaker in creat­
ing newly relevant sentences by making connections never before made. 
This is quite usual in scholarship, for instance. In fact, creating new 
relations is inherent in scholarship, but is not at all confined to it. 
Anyone who has a different slant on things can make sentences relevant 
to a topic that has not previously been conceived of as being relevant. 
This effectively excludes glossomanic chaining as being in any way a 
manifestation of intact linguistic ability (Fromkin 1975). Although the 
patient is connecting sentences and phrases in wholly new ways, these
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cannot be construed as being relevant. For precisely this reason, such 
chaining has always struck observers as being pathological.
[4] T h e Decision-theoretic Model.
Sanders (1987) calls his model of relevance a decision-theoretic model 
of meaning because, he says, speakers make decisions about what to 
present as the discourse unfolds. They decide what will best achieve 
their goals, whether or not a certain utterance is relevant. These deci­
sions change as the situation unfolds. The decision-theoretic model has 
the distinct advantage of accounting for the ways that relevance is achieved 
in interaction and what happens and why when it does not. It also avoids 
the problem of topic-centered theories of discourse in that it shows 
how topics do get changed in an ongoing interaction with no overt 
announcement.
Despite his theory of macrostructure, Van Dijk (1980, p. 215) implicitly 
admits that the construction of relevance is ongoing in a conversation or 
other discourse mode. He asserts that a proposition is irrelevant if “ . . .  it 
is not an interpretation condition of a following proposition in the 
sequence.” This claim should be amended to recognize the reversibility 
of relevant utterances. Thus we can say that a contribution is relevant if it 
influences a subsequent contribution or if a subsequent contribution is 
interpretable by reference to a prior one. That is, for any sentence in a 
discourse, we can determine relevance either by its influence on a subse­
quent sentence or by determining that it has been influenced by a prior 
one.
A contribution need not be specifically relevant to its immediate 
progenitor, nor to its immediate successor. We have already seen the 
samples of glossomania in which phrases are contiguous but nonsensical. 
Proximity is no guarantee of relevance. The requisite condition is just 
that some subsequent or prior contribution relate to it. To my knowledge, 
nobody has yet computed exactly the degree of proximity requisite for 
one sentence to be counted as relevant to another in the discourse. It may 
be that there is no such metric, at least not as a hard and fast rule. We 
might sensibly expect that there is individual variation in how much 
space or time can elapse before entries are too far apart to be perceived as 
relevant.
In any event, there are many linguistic devices which serve the pur-
226 Understanding Psychotic Speech
pose of reminding a cospeaker or reader that a nonimmediately prior 
statement is to be taken as relevant. Typical examples are:
• As noted above . . .
• T he reader may recall th a t . . .
• As I was saying before we got off the track . . .
• Well, look, to finish what I was telling you about. . . .
• Oh, remember what I was telling you . . .
• To get back to what happened last n ight . . .
• Do you remember when we went to the Yale game last year?
These last can be used to refer to a discourse prior to the current one. 
Relevance can be created when the mutually influential sentences are 
not adjacent simply by localizing the time and place being spoken of, or, 
in Fauconnier’s terms, by mentally pointing to them. By the use of 
HYPOTHETICALS, even imaginary events or events not shared mutually 
are made relevant.
Even within the context of one discourse mutually relevant normal 
utterances may not be proximate for several reasons, including, but not 
necessarily limited to:
• intervening material which elucidates a prior or coming utterance
• reference to a disturbance in the physical atmosphere
• deliberate digression to recount a non-relevant experience or
idea which the speaker has just been reminded of and is afraid of
forgetting
• apology for content or mode of presentation
• correcting a cospeaker’s misinterpretation of a prior utterance
Sanders (1987, pp. 175-206) shows that any entry in a discourse has 
further entries as its consequence, but no single entry must be made. 
T he possibilities of what can be made is constrained but not ordained. At 
each juncture, the situation changes, and with it, so do the co-speakers’ 
options. As it unfolds, the speaking situation allows each participant to 
project different consequences of what must be said next. Of course, this 
also means that cospeakers cannot predict each other’s reactions with 
complete certainty. Besides the obvious problem that each person relates 
what is said to his or her personal experiences, there is also the fact that 
comprehension is not effected by an algorithm any more than speech is 
produced by one. Rarely does an utterance mean only one thing, and 
one cannot predict exactly what meaning a cospeaker may derive from it.
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When it does become evident that the cospeaker has misinterpreted, 
correction can be made. This, then, further affects subsequent relevant 
contributions. It strikes me that Sanders’ model of relevance explains 
one important facet of conversation that no other model does: the ways 
that topics change during the course of a conversation.
It cannot be stressed too much that these conditions of interpretation 
in the light of the unfolding of meaning in a discourse are based upon 
verifiable strategies and canons of comprehension, and that any mean­
ings not so derived are suspect.
An integral part of a decision model of discourse is projecting how 
one’s contribution will advance the goal of the interaction. The goal 
need not be a definite one; it can be nothing more than a desire to 
promote self-interest no matter what occurs in the situation (Sanders, 
p. 178), or it can be purely phatic such as “shooting the breeze.”
We can even rehearse our contributions as in those conversations we 
have with ourselves in which we project what the other person is going to 
say and how we will, therefore, answer. Of course, the same can go on 
after the fact when we ruefully think of what we should have said and 
how it would have affected the outcome. The latter activity is proof of the 
difficulty of responding adequately in the midst of conversation to the 
cospeaker, all the while trying to formulate how self-interest is best 
served in the situation. This problem is compounded by the necessity of 
making our contribution relevant both to our goals, and to what has been 
said or implied by each cospeaker in this interaction or prior ones.
For that matter, it is not inconceivable for our goals to change during the 
course of an interaction. Perhaps the cospeaker turns out to be far nicer 
and more accommodating than originally thought. Perhaps he or she turns 
out to have been duplicitous or guilty or suddenly revealed to be quite 
stupid and uncomprehending. Whichever, each contribution to the con­
versation can change its course all the while remaining relevant in terms of 
what has gone before. Sanders himself assumes a steadiness of goal or of self- 
interest, but there is nothing in his presentation that denies such changes.
In sum, cospeakers who are perceived as maintaining relevance make 
their contributions in light of what has been said. They may change the 
subject, but this is done in orderly ways, such as
• Not to change the subject, but. . .
• That reminds me . . .
• Before we go on a tangent.. . .
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Then new entries into the conversation will refer to the new topic. 
Topics are continuously being negotiated in the course of an interaction 
or in the course of reading. Contributions heard as schizophrenic do not 
do that. As we have seen, these utterances are often governed by chance 
phonological or semantic features of a prior utterance.
This conception of the sequential nature of the consequences of what 
has been said illuminates the difference between SD psychotic utterances 
and those heard as normal. As we have seen, SD narratives and conversa­
tions frequently start out all right, but as they go along they become 
progressively more deviant. A sequential model of discourse predicts 
such derailing in a group generally acknowledged to suffer from cogni­
tive deficits. The longer the conversation the more that must be kept in 
mind in formulating next entries. This is true within one turn. The 
longer the dialogue, the more challenging it is to remember all that one 
has said.
[5 ] Syntax and Relevance.
There are syntactic clues which interpreters can look for in determining 
the relevance of statements to the time of speaking or writing as well as 
for determining semantic relevance. The syntax of English4 has codified 
relevance onto the system of verb tense and aspect. Robin Lakoff (1972) 
noted that it is not possible to say
• Shakespeare is a noted drunkard. 
but that it is fine to say
• Shakespeare is a noted playwright. 
and, if we believe it true
• Shakespeare was a noted drunkard.
T he reason that we can use the present tense of his being a playwright 
is that his literary works are still relevant to his reputation, but that his 
being or not being a drunk is not. Similarly, if one says “my uncle had 
blue eyes,” the very use of the past tense indicates that my blue-eyed 
uncle is dead.
In contrast, if someone says, “My dog died,” one would be surprised 
to discover that this occurred 25 years ago. T he use of the unadorned 
past tense here indicates that the death was in the recent past. I suspect
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that the reason for this interpretation is that we usually qualify a change 
of state with an adverbial of time, especially if the change was long 
ago. That is, if the event is proximate, we signal that by not mentioning 
time. If it is distant, then we do mention time.
There is a corollary presumption of relevance when mentioning 
locations. The very fact that a place is mentioned5 without a qualifying 
locative term often means that it is relevant because it is close by. If 
Myrtle tells me, “I found the greatest place to get Liz Claiborne clothes 
cheap!” because I live in Rhode Island, I would not expect the store 
to be in California. I  assume that the store will be within an hour or 
so’s drive. Otherwise, Myrtle should append something like, “too bad 
it’s 3000 miles away” or “I found the greatest place in L.A.” or the 
like.
Presumed relevance is a key ingredient in how we understand. As the 
above sections show, we ordinarily assume that speech is relevant to the 
topic and, therefore, the context. Such an assumption underlies our 
interpretation of when the dog died or where the Liz Claiborne store is.
[6] Relevance and Comprehension.
Part of our ordinary conversational strategy is to figure out how what 
has been said can be relevant to the matter at hand. The relevant meaning 
is the one we take as having been meant. In instances of ambiguity we 
disambiguate, or try to, in terms of what is relevant, ignoring any irrele­
vant meanings which may accidentally inhere to the words and grammar 
used. For this reason, failure to “get” a pun is not unusual, nor does 
it seem easy for most people to create puns. Therefore, it is a true dys­
function in schizophrenia that patients are conscious of meanings which 
are irrelevant for the context, a circumstance apparently leading to the 
glossomanic punning so characteristic of that population. Maher (1983, 
P. 8) gives as an example
6. To Wise and Company,
If you think that you are being wise to send me a bill for money I 
have already paid I am in nowise going to do so unless I get the 
whys and wherefores from you to me. But where fours have been 
then fives will be and other numbers and calculations and accounts 
to your no-account no-bill, noble, nothing.
Here the name Wise becomes the source of puns on wise meaning
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“wiseguy,” nowise, and whys, just as noble forms a punning relations with 
no-bill which is a pun on no-account (in the meaning of account which 
means “bill.” The inherent abnormality of this is that the puns are not 
relevant to anything except their chance resemblances to each other, and 
relevance assumes meaning coherent with the context.
[7] A chieving R elevance.
Oddly, it is possible to have a highly deviant passage in which one can 
find the relevance of the parts to the whole. Consider the entire passage 
presented as failure of cohesive ties in Chapter 6:
7. Well I want to work for god in the mission and to work for god in 
the mission you have to be able to speak and think in a lord tongue 
in my opinion now to speak and think in a lord tongue you have to 
have to be able to memory the process memory the parle—the 
process in the bible the thought pattern the brain wave and your 
thought process must be healthy enough and your legs must be 
healthy enough to when you want to study and and from when you 
want to study and progress in the way of the lord you should read 
the bible and as you read the bible you should if you are in good 
shape physical and mental and mental good shape and physical 
good shape you should be able to acquire the memory knowledge 
necessary as to study the bible to speak and think in a lord tongue 
you should be able to memory all the knowledge down on down on 
the page in the bible book to work for god in the mission now in the 
position I am in now with the medicate and with the hospital 
program I am being helped but at the same time that I am being 
help with the food and medicate the food and medicate and the the 
food and medicate and the and the ah rest I feel that I  still do not 
have this I still not have the thought pattern and the mental process 
and the brain wave necessary to open up a page open up the old 
testament and start to memory it the old te- the old new testament 
page of the bible start to have me- memory knowledge necessary to 
speak to think in the lo- speak and think in the lord’s tongue while 
you study while you study the bible while you study the bible the 
memory the knowledge necessary to go to work for god in the 
mission so when your thought problem your brain wave and your 
mental process is quick enough you will be able to memory the
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knowledge in in the old and new testament bible and from memory 
knowledge in the old testament and new testament bible you are 
able to memory the knowledge necessary necessary to think and 
speak in the lord’s tongue and go to work for god in the mission. 
(courtesy of Dr. Bonnie Spring)
There are some grammatical errors here, notably the lack of derivational 
morphemes like -tion on medicate and -ize on to memory. Even without 
these we feel that this is highly deviant. We understand that the speaker 
wishes to work in a mission, is concerned with being able to read both 
testaments, and needs help for his brain problems before he can do this. 
He also acknowledges that the food and the medication are helping him, 
but they haven’t yet allowed him to fulfill his goals. Additionally, he 
seems to be concerned with his memory which he feels is not up to the 
snuff required for biblical study. The problem with the passage inheres 
in the constant repetitions which do not advance any message; indeed, 
they get in the way. The entire does not progress. It has a distinct 
circular movement, starting and ending on the same note, with the same 
phrases being recycled.
Sanders (1987) concerns himself with the things that can ordinarily go 
wrong in a conversation. He does not deal with pathologies of any kind, 
although he does account for cross-cultural miscommunication. Still, his 
observations bear fruit. Speaking only of normal interactions, Sanders 
points out that disordered conversation can result from poor exercise of 
what he terms as s t r a t e g i c  O P T IO N S . That is, when faced with a juncture 
in conversation, cospeakers choose from various options. If the speaker is 
not successful in those choices, then disorder can result. Thus Sanders 
locates the source of incoherence6 specifically in choices made in accord­
ance with the utterances in the developing conversation. Incoherence 
results when relevance to the context cannot be ascertained by cospeakers. 
However, this is not just a problem on the part of hearers.
Incoherence ultimately rests upon the choices of speakers or, as seems 
probable at least some of the time with schizophrenics, the lack of 
choices. The most disrupted speech, glossomania, seems to be choiceless. 
The curiously “automatic” flavor of such speech seems to derive from 
this sense we have that no choices were made, except perhaps for the first 
part of the utterance. Such7 speech seems to derive from distraction so 
great that speakers cannot focus on what needs to be said to advance a 
discourse coherently. As shown in Chapter 2, SD speech shows the kinds
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of patterns one would expect if automatic language functions took over, 
so to speak, precluding direction afforded by choice. The result is inco­
herence and irrelevance.
Sanders’ insights do give us a working definition of what makes schizo­
phrenic speech tangential and obscure even when it is not accompanied 
by disruptions in word formation and the structure of the individual 
sentence. Simply put, it does not seem to contribute to any agenda. 
Cospeakers cannot find a connection between the schizophrenic speech 
and what has transpired previously in the interaction, nor can they find 
an appropriate response. This is because the schizophrenic’s contribution 
may not itself set up the condition for possible responses.
[8] Cognitive Strain.
If Sanders account is correct, and I feel that it is substantively so, there 
is a great cognitive burden on conversants. They must manage turntaking, 
consider the effect of their speech and of their silence on the ongoing 
interaction, at the same time divining others’ intentions in order to 
understand in the manner intended.
. . .  conversants must. . .  [identify]. . .  transition boundaries within 
turns and topics, distinguishing between entries intended to be 
contributions and spurious ones, and organizing contributions into 
coherent wholes (e.g., episodes). (Sanders 1987, p. 210)
It is no wonder, then, that schizophrenics so often seem to fail in 
conversation, even when they are evincing no apparent breakdown in 
structuring sentences. Sanders specifically talks about populations with 
presumably intact linguistic and cognitive processes, not aphasics or the 
mentally ill.
Considering peculiarly schizophrenic speech as emanating from the 
cognitive strains of conversation makes explicit the connection between 
SD and NSD schizophrenics. Incoherence proceeds on a cline of severity 
from structurally well-formed but inappropriate responses to a general 
disintegration of sentence structure and word formation that in the worst 
cases manifests itself as gibberish and word salads. Dealing with speech 
as a competency in itself allows us to formulate a coherent account of 
the illness, one that shows us the connection between SD and NSD8 
schizophrenics. It also explains why some patients manifest different 
degrees of pathology in their speech.
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The cognitive strains spoken of here are not necessarily limited 
to those patients who are so often called thought disordered. They, 
of course, show the greatest cognitive disruption. Many patients who 
would be termed NTD, whose speech doesn’t consist of word salads or 
glossomania, but is considered merely obscure or peculiar can be seen to 
be evincing cognitive strain. They are not up to the strains of monitoring 
cospeakers, figuring out what words and syntax were used by cospeakers, 
figuring out their intent, matching utterances to context, choosing words 
and syntax themselves to encode responses relevant to the cospeakers 
contributions and to their own goals, figuring out how the cospeakers’ 
utterances as they unfold are relevant to what has been said previously, 
and figuring out to keep their own relevant. Grice (1975, p. 45) points out 
that Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of 
disconnected remarks and would not be rational if they did.” Of course, 
it is just such disconnected utterances which gives us the feeling that 
certain speech is “schizophrenic.”
[9] Constrained Verbal Forms: Narratives and Responses.
Relevance is also achieved by conforming to a g e n r e  of discourse. A 
genre is a speech form such as a joke, a sermon, or a narrative. These can 
vary widely in different cultures. Dennis Jarrett (1984) makes an excel­
lent case for his proposition that blacks understand the genre of the 
blues, but that whites and Hispanics find that the lyrics don’t quite make 
sense, but in the black culture they do. The blues are intended to 
describe the singer’s feelings and to satirize aspects of black life, such as 
preachers. For this reason, they never mention nature.
The genre typically has an opener which announces which genre it is. 
For instance, if someone in mainstream American culture hears, “The 
King of Tobolopol proclaimed an edict,” he or she would then expect a 
fulfillment of the genre of fairy tales or an opera. The use of the definite 
article presupposes that one is to believe that there is a king. That the 
king is fictional is established in the predicate “proclaimed an edict.” 
This is a typical opener in fantasies like fairy tales and operas. It is not 
used in spy stories, so far as I know, or even in historical romances. Real 
life knowledge plays a part in this as well. There is no country called 
Tobolopal. If the hearer later found out there is, he or she could revise 
that judgment. However, fantasy-hood still would not be ruled out because 
nowadays only fictional kings proclaim edicts. The hearer also knows
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that the fairy tale ends when he or she hears the words “and they lived 
happily ever after.”
Narratives are a ubiquitous genre, both in the telling of real-life 
happenings and in fiction. Deborah Tannen notes that both in written 
and spoken language, narrative has distinctive structure. T he ways that 
psychotic speech are not relevant are illuminated by a comparison of a 
narrative fragment to a response to an open-ended question, both pro­
duced by schizophrenics. T he narrative is a portion of one of the ICS 
(Chaika and Alexander 1986; Chapter 8). Here a subject is describing the 
final scene in the videotaped story of a child who has managed to get 
some ice cream:
8A. . . .  she goes out leaves the ice cream and eats it and on the way 
and we don’t know what happens [sme ] the fact you can interpolate 
and say that she ate the ice cream and brought it hom e. . . .
Here, with the exception of the [sme ] all words and phrases are normal, 
but still the entire is not. Its failure resides in the two temporal mis- 
orderings of the encoded events, both impossible according to what we 
know of the real world. T he first error lies in the statement that the 
girl leaves the ice cream, but then eats it after she has left the store. The 
second impossible sequence relates that she has eaten the ice cream, but 
brings it home. T he events themselves are correctly encoded. They fail 
at the level of the macrostructure, the discourse itself.
T he phrase “and on the way” in 8A is misplaced. T his is one of a class 
of phrases I call n a r r a t i v e  d e i c t i c s . These are employed to help 
hearers/readers keep their mental places. This one is proper to narratives. 
It just has not been placed properly.
Because of the general constraint on narration which demands that 
correct temporal ordering be followed, 8A is erroneous. Real life con­
straints apply here. We know that certain events have to follow certain 
temporal orderings. This may be done in two ways. First, one may 
simply relate the events in the narrative in the order in which they 
occurred or are imagined to occur. Second, one may indicate the correct 
ordering lexically or syntactically without necessarily presenting events 
in the order in which they occurred. For instance, 8A could have been 
correctly phrased as
8B. She eats the ice cream on the way [home], after she goes out [of 
the store]. [Actually], we don’t know what happens but you can
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interpolate and say that she ate the ice cream [before] bringing it 
home
The words in brackets represent words not actually used by the narrator. 
I am not claiming that he intended to say 8B, just showing how it could 
have been said nondeviantly employing syntactic devices to indicate 
ordering. Notice that I have not added to the meaning of the information 
given. All I have done is to make it cohere.9
Another sort of ill-formed speech on the level of discourse is seen in 
examples in 9 and 7 above.10 Forgetting for now the obvious errors in 
syntax, these are deviant because of their lack of relevant progression. 
Their “schizophrenic” flavor inheres primarily in their repetitions. The 
sheer number of them makes each passage very difficult to understand, 
and contributes to our feeling that they are inherently abnormal. As we 
have seen, in order to achieve coherence in discourse, speakers must not 
repeat words, phrases, or sentences. Rather, appropriate anaphoric words 
or ellipsis must be used. For instance, perfectly prosaic and reasonable 
information is imparted in
9 Mill Avenue is also a place where people gather in back yards to 
have people gather in back yards to have a barbecue in the back yard 
to have relative over to have friend over to talk in the back yard to 
be merry with each other.”
What makes it wrong is the repetition to no apparent purpose of 
“people gather” and “in the back yard.” As we have already seen, such 
repetition is a hallmark of schizophrenic speech, evincing itself on every 
level. It is also what causes us to feel that such speech lacks relevance. 
The repetition creates circularity as it fails to advance topics.
There is another problem with the responses in the examples in 3 and 
7 as well. They do not adhere to the requirements of the macrostructure 
which was elicited, that of the answer. Answers require that one encode 
only that information which is relevant to the question asked, and when 
that information is given, it is proper either to stop speaking or to ask the 
equivalent of “Is that sufficient?” or “Did that tell you what you want to 
know?” When one is asked what one’s neighborhood is like, it is not 
appropriate to interject over and over again one’s inner doubts about 
going to heaven or about one’s ability to read people’s minds or one’s 
need to speak in a lord tongue.
People who are bores or nags do repeat the same information cyclically 
over and over, but the repeating in 3 and 7 above are clearly not the work
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of sane bores or nags. For instance, one of the oddities in each are their 
respective r e f r a i n s . Let’s consider one11 of those in 3:
1 0 . . .  will I see paradise will I not see paradise should I answer 
should I not answer.
This is a direct repetition of the same words and syntax such as one 
gets in songs or poems. In songs and poems, the refrain reinforces the 
topic and is clearly related to it. In contrast, the refrains here does 
neither. At no time in the discourse of which 10 is a part does the speaker 
say what it is he should or should not be answering. In normal refrains, 
the entire is sung or said at stated intervals. In the schizophrenic refrains, 
the repetition does not come at such regular intervals, after a verse, for 
instance. Moreover, this refrain frequently starts in the middle of a word, 
as in
sh—will I see Paradise will I not see paradise should I answer 
should I not answer I not answer w- their mind
It seems to be randomly accessed both in terms of where it falls in the 
entire discourse and even at what point in the refrain the patient picked 
it up. In context it seems as if the “sh-will” started out to be the “should” 
of “should I answer” and the “w-their” started out to be the “will” of “will 
I s e e . . .  ”
In contrast, the repetitions of bores and nags are tied to their topics, 
often with a dreadful relentlessness. Moreover, the repetitions of bores 
and nags repeat the information, but not the actual phrasing as is done 
in a refrain. Nags may also preface their repeated remarks by complaints 
like “I told you . . . , ” “How many times do I have to tell y o u . . . ," and 
“You never listen. . . ” Such remarks indicate that the nag is in control 
and is aware of the repetitions. Similarly, bores may ask rhetorically,
“Did I tell you about. . . ” and “That reminds me of. . . . ” T he point here
is not that bores and nags always preface their remarks this way, but that 
they may. The fact of their being bores or nags rests ultimately upon 
their propensity for repeating information beyond necessity to inform, 
the nags combining this overinformation with complaints about the 
hearer.
Most importantly, the criterion of relevance demarcates the repetition 
of bores and nags from the psychotic repetition above. To be relevant, an 
answer should contain the information requested. T he response should 
have been confined to information about the physical properties of
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Mill Street and its inhabitants. Some digression or added explanation is 
always allowable in an answer, but only insofar as it advances the topic 
requested. Bores are guilty of overinformation, of adding too much, but 
their “too much” is of the nature of providing excessive information 
which is, however, connected to the question asked. For instance, a bore 
might tell you that his grandparents first bought their house on such a 
street and that he grew up with his uncle Teddy, and he had certain 
neighbors who always did certain things, and changes that were wrought 
when so-and-so moved away.
In contrast, in number some of the overinformation above is not 
relevant to the questions asked. In our culture one’s religious beliefs and 
deepest doubts are not appropriate responses to a question about one’s 
neighborhood. Far from reaching a conclusion or advancing a topic, the 
profusion of verbiage is simply circular, a jum bling of words and phrases 
in an almost random ordering. What eventually does get said in sample 
above, that the neighborhood is one in which people get together to have 
a good time, is an appropriate enough response. It gets drowned in a sea 
of verbosity not subordinated to the question asked.
Notes
1Dr. Spring does not necessarily endorse my interpretations of these data, however.
2This doesn’t mean that people won’t try to assign an interpretation to it, but there 
is no way to verify what it actually means because of its syntactic deviance.
3Actually, the problem is more of “tight” associations, not loose ones. Each word 
is glued to the next by associations that nonschizophrenics usually don’t notice, and 
if they do notice, they still refrain from saying unless they can worm it into the 
conversation as an apropos bit of wit or topic change.
4It is not possible to say whether such relevancy marking operates in all languages, 
but it does operate in many others. However, it may not inhere so closely to verb 
tense selection as it does in English. In other words, one cannot expect it to be 
encoded exactly as it is in English. One has to find the equivalent construction.
5Time and space frequently are governed by the same words and conventions of 
usage. For instance, both time and space may behind us. One event can take place 
after another, just as one person can be after us. Notice that an event “takes place” in 
time, just as one event follows the other. It is as if we perceive.
6Sanders (pp. 220-228) also speaks of conversational disorder, by which he means 
people’s interrupting others, controlling the topic, and other such “disorderly” 
behavior. This is quite different from the kinds of disorder we are discussing here. 
Typically, there is no problem understanding what is meant, what the speaker’s 
agenda is, etc. Furthermore, such behavior varies greatly with different social
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groups, so that it is perceived as disorderly by some, but simply normal warmth and 
interest by others (Tannen 1984; Chaika 1989, pp. 100-106)
7This is possibly true for other kinds of incoherence as well, such as that proceed­
ing from alchohol, drugs, and brain injuries. Since I have made no in-depth study of 
such populations, I do not make any claims for the provenance of incoherence in 
them, but I suspect they have a great similarity.
8Traditionally called TD and NTD patients. In my view, the latter terminology is 
oxymoronic.
9It is necessary to make this point as so many have attempted to “explain” 
schizophrenic speech by adding elements that change its meaning or by interpreting 
as if it had had such meaning (see Chapter 11).
10In the original transcript furnished to me, there was no capitalization of street 
addresses or of recognized terms for nationalities like Italian. I have added those 
capitals so that the written form of the data looks no more deviant than it actually is. 
That is, we are used to the convention of seeing capitals on proper names and to 
omit them is likely to be interpreted as evidence of an even greater deviance than 
it is.
11There are actually many refrains in both passages, but whatever theoretical 
point can be made of one can be made about the others.
Chapter Ten
TOPIC
The literature on schizophrenic speech teems with reference 
to the lack of discernible topic. This chapter demonstrates what 
a topic is and how it is signalled by the syntax of the language.
There are two kinds of topic: that of the sentence and that of the 
discourse as a whole. These are determined in different ways as 
each is expressed in somewhat different ways. Fortunately, there 
are tests which can be applied to determine what the topic is.
The difference between normal changes of topic and schizo­
phrenic ones is elaborated. The ways that topic is used to 
express the speaker's empathy towards the topic being expressed 
are also explored here.
[1] Topic.
The word topic refers to two distinctly different entities: the topic of the discourse, and the topic of the sentence. The discourse topic is 
at the heart of relevance because all entries in a discourse are relevant by 
reference to their topics. The discourse topic need not be overtly expressed. 
It derives from the text as a whole, “ . . .  what the upshot is. ” (VanDijk 
1980) of the information provided by the discourse as a whole. It pro­
vides the linguistic context. The topic of the discourse works to constrain 
meaning by making individual sentences relevant to it. Thus, the topic is 
the prime disambiguating force in language. In other words, each sen­
tence is interpreted as if it is relevant to the topic, which is why topic is so 
strong a determiner of meaning. If a global topic cannot be ascertained 
for any group of sentences, then the language used is perceived as 
obscure, strange, vague, or incoherent, and we are baffled.
The topic of the sentence, also known as the s u b j e c t  of the sentence, 
differs from the discourse topic by adding information to it. VanDijk 
explains that the subject of a sentence is
. . .  the semantic-pragmatic function that selects which concept of 
the contextual information will be extended with new information. 
(1980. P.97)
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In the previous chapter we considered such selection in terms of 
relevance. In this chapter first we examine the factors leading to the 
choice of the subject itself, and how it pertains to the speaker’s point of 
view. Then the topic of the discourse and its relation to our understand­
ing of psychotic speech will be analyzed.
[2] Subject of a Sentence.
Traditionally, it has been assumed that the basic structure in language 
is the sentence, and that the sentence is composed of the subject and 
predicate. We intuitively recognize that the subject-predicate relation­
ship gives a c o m p l e t e  S T R U C T U R E ; hence the common misconception 
that sentences are complete thoughts. Case grammars (Chapter 4) have 
shown us the many kinds of relations subsumed under the rubric of 
“subject of the sentence.” As we have already seen, these deeper relations 
explain aspects of meaning, implication, and even permissible para­
phrases of a given proposition. More recently, relationships have been 
found between the noun chosen for the subject and the empathy and 
general perspective of the speaker.
[3] Empathy and Syntax.
Kuno (1987, pp. 203-267) develops the interesting proposition that the 
syntax chosen for a given sentence corresponds to the perspective of the 
speaker. Kuno (p. 204) explains that
. . .  speakers unconsciously make the same kind of decisions that 
film directors make about where to place themselves with respect to 
the events and states that their sentences are intended to describe . . .
Such decisions are describable in terms of empathy. Kuno shows, for 
instance, that 1A is an unmarked empathy condition. It projects an 
objective view. In this encoding, no particular empathy is being shown 
either to John or to Bill. It merely states that John initiated the blow and 
that Bill has received it:
LA. John hit Bill.
However, if the same speaker says 
1B. John’s brother hit him.
he or she has identified more with John than with his brother. Kuno
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observes that it “seems commonsensical” that the possessive chosen, here 
John ’s brother, would be used to refer to Bill only “ . . .  when the speaker 
has placed himself1 closer to John than his brother.” This is because the 
brother is seen in this construction only through his relationship with 
John, not as an independent person. In other words, John’s relationship 
is more important than the independent characterization of calling him 
Bill.
Yet another empathy condition occurs in passives:
1C. Bill was hit by his brother.
1D. Bill was hit by John.
Kuno says that passives always indicate empathy, because they show 
that the speaker has identified with the subject of the passive verb, in this 
instance, Bill. Kuno observes (p. 205) that the subject of the passive is 
“new” because the passive is formed by placing the object in what is 
usually the subject position. Doing this is more unusual so that hearers 
perceive the extra effort, so to speak, as a signal of empathy. If a speaker 
creates a m a r k e d  construction, hearers will suspect that some special 
message is being implied. Actually, each of these has done something 
unusual, thereby creating empathy for Bill.
In 1C, the very fact that the brother’s name is not mentioned is an 
overriding empathy condition on two grounds. First, use of a possessive 
ordinarily indicates the point of view of the possessor. The second is that 
failure to directly name someone whose name you presumably know, 
shows empathy for the one whose name you did use. Using a person’s 
name indicates familiarity. Identifying another person simply by an 
anaphoric possessive like his again shows that one is telling this from the 
point of view of the named person. We shall see clear instances of this in 
the Ice Cream story narratives discussed below.
In 1D, the message indicating empathy for Bill works because passives 
with one word agents like John  are rarely made (Svartvik 1966). Even if 
the passive were selected, ordinarily the agent wouldn’t be mentioned. If the 
agent must be named, then the sentence usually would be in the active 
voice as in 1A above. The passive is used most habitually to enable the 
speaker to omit the agent or cause. There are two reasons for keeping the 
agent in at the end of the sentence. The first holds if the agent is heavily 
modified as in 1E and F. 1F is awkward. One expects that the sentence 
stopped too short as one would expect the object to be at least as long as 
the subject.
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1E. Bill was hit by the short, skinny guy with curly red hair.
1F. T he short, skinny guy with the curly red hair hit Bill.
There is a strong tendency in English to throw heavy constituents to 
the end of the sentence. A heavy constituent is one with a great deal of 
modification: adjective, relative clauses, and the like. These are either 
newly introduced items, hence the modification, or they are being espe­
cially emphasized. In 1D, since there is no heavily modified agent, 
choosing the object, Bill, to be subject indicates that there is some 
out-of-the way connotation. Hence, the reason for putting the agent at 
the end must be because the speaker wishes to emphasize who did it. A 
major reason for emphasizing the agent is that he or she is blameworthy.
Kuno uses empathy and perspective almost interchangeably as in his 
discussion of the choice between comes/came up to and goes/went up to. 
He says that this indicates the speaker’s “camera angle” and empathy 
(p. 225)
2A. So Mary comes up to Max and says___
2B. So Mary goes up to Max and says___
In 2A, the action is being seen from M ax’s angle, whereas in 2B, it is 
seen from Mary’s.
Kuno’s approach to sentence analysis has a great deal to offer. He 
points out that certain verbs demand certain kinds of subjects. For 
instance, the agent of assassinate (example mine) has to be reprehensible 
and the object has to be a victim, which implies “not reprehensible.” It is 
difficult to express empathy for an assassin. If we wish to we have to use 
other terminology, such as freedom  fighter. Other verbs, like hit and go 
can be designed (Kuno’s term) in terms of perspective; hence, they can 
be manipulated to imply empathy or its lack.
T he reader must beware, however. Although Kuno formalizes his 
rules (p. 206), thus lending them a scientific air, he relies largely on his 
own intuitions. As with the judgments of other linguists2 who have done 
the same, the reader too often finds that his or her intuitions don’t match 
those of the author’s. He does mention that “many speakers” find a 
sentence acceptable or not (p. 209), but does not show how he verified 
this. Consequently, we run into the same problem with him as we do with 
other intuitive linguists. Using myself as a point of reference, I find that 
some of the sentences he uses as proof for his interpretations don’t mean 
to me what they do to him. Some of those he stars (*) are fine with me,
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and some which he doesn’t star I would. These data cry out for verifica­
tion by careful investigation like that pioneered by Quirk and Svartvik.
Still, Kuno’s work has a great deal of appeal. He is right often enough 
to be exciting. It certainly makes sense that empathy is a condition on 
syntax. After all, language did evolve so that we may inform others of 
our feelings and to express the world from our perspective. Just as 
concepts like agency and negativity occur in all languages because of the 
need for all humans to express them, so is empathy a linguistic universal. 
Recognizing this possibility when interpreting another’s speech can enrich 
understanding. Kuno gives us another place to look, so to speak, in the 
analysis of discourse making us more sensitive to the possibilities for 
empathy and perspective. These can be used along with an understand­
ing of semantic feature analysis to enrich our insights.
[4] Subjecthood and Perspective.
Nomi Erteschik-Schir (1981) establishes the pragmatic basis of syntac­
tic transformations. She suggests that a constituent in a sentence is 
dominant if the speaker intends to direct the hearers’ attention to its 
intension, i.e., its full potential meaning. Dominance of a constituent, 
then, is what the sentence is about, and has ramifications for what kinds 
of transformations can apply. For instance, she shows that the kinds of 
questions that can be formed from a statement depends upon whether or 
not the NP is the dominant one. Consider the simple statement
3A. Jack eats candy.
One can form a question by using the wh-word that stands for Jack, 
which is who or the wh-word that stands for candy, which is what. Two 
questions, therefore, are possible,
3B. Who eats candy?
3C. What does Jack eat?
In essence, a wh -question is a kind of “fill-in-the-blanks” device. The 
who says fill in the blank in “X eats candy.” The what says fill in the blank 
in “Jack eats X.” In each instance, the X is the constituent the question is 
about. Therefore, in 3B, the question is about Jack, and in 3C it is about 
candy (or foodstuffs). One can ask 3B if one assumes that the corresponding 
declarative sentence would be about Jack. In contrast, one can ask 3C if it 
can be assumed that the declarative counterpart would be about candy.
244 Understanding Psychotic Speech
Another pair even more graphically illustrates,
4A. I like the gears in that car.
4B. Which car do you like the gears in?
4C. I like the girl in that car.
4D. Which car do you like the girl in?
Erteschek-Schir contends that the unacceptability of 4D arises from 
the fact that the phrase “in the car” in 4C cannot be dominant in that 
sentence, therefore it cannot be the topic, but “in that car” in 4A can be 
dominant, hence 4B can be asked. She demonstrates that the reason that 
in the car in 4A can not be dominant, hence cannot be extracted to ask a 
question about, is that girls are not equipment on cars. She speculates 
that 4D would be fine in a society in which every car came with a girl so 
that choice of car also involved choice of girl.
The selection of the subject depends on such things as cultural facts 
and other pragmatic concerns. This is well illustrated by another fact. 
For instance, I can think of a setting in which 4D might very well be 
asked and would not be starred. Many young American males think that 
they will have an easier time getting a girlfriend if they have the right 
kind of car (with right kind referring to a much admired sports or luxury 
car). They also assume that different girls will be attracted by different 
cars. Imagine, then, a typical American high school parking lot with 
girls sitting in several cars waiting to be driven home by their boyfriends. 
In that cultural climate, a boy about to buy a new car could properly ask 
another, “Which car do you like the girl in?”, the object being to match a 
car to the particular girl.
Erteschik-Schir gives another test for determining potential topics of 
sentences, the which is a lie test. In this, the topic of a sentence can be 
referred to by which is a lie. This phrase cannot be applied to an NP 
which is not dominant. For instance,
5A. Sam said John wrote a book about Nixon.
5B. Which is a lie —it was about a rhinoceros.
Here we know that people write about presidents so that focussing on 
the prepositional phrase “about Nixon” is fine. She opposes 5A and B to
6A. Sam said John destroyed a book about Nixon.
6B. Which is a lie —it was about a rhinoceros.
Here Erteschik-Schir posits that 6B would be possible if we know that 
John habitually destroyed books. Otherwise one would assume that the
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focus of 6A is on the act of destruction. If the topic of the discourse had 
been about Nixon or the Republican party, then John’s choice of book to 
destroy becomes relevant. For instance, as my proof that John is not a 
loyal Republican, it would be natural for me to produce 6A, and for 
another person defending John to produce
6C. Which is a lie, it was about Johnson.
6B is odd because we expect the name of another president or of 
a well-known politician or statesman as a response to 6A. We do not 
expect another mammal, especially one so far removed from American 
presidencies. Note the acceptability of 6C as a response to 6A
6C. Which is a lie. It was about his dog.
Here the relevance is twofold. It is primarily signaled by the possessive. 
Americans do have dogs and they are important to them. The “which is a 
lie” test is useful for picking out topics, but, still, pragmatic conditions 
prevail. We can negate a statement but only if our negation is related in 
some obvious way to the prior statement, the one we are negating. My 
judgments about negation rest upon the very criteria Erteschek-Schir 
offers: a given paraphrase of a sentence may be determined as grammati­
cal or not on the basis of pragmatic and discourse possibilities.
Kuno (1987, p. 16) explains that the concept of topichood has ramifica­
tions in the syntax, or perhaps more accurately that hearers assume 
topichood in the presence of certain constructions. For instance, a sub­
ject is typically taken to be the topic. If it is not the topic but there is a 
possessive, the latter is taken to be the topic.
7A. The man bought the woman’s portrait of the clowns.
In an “out-of-the-blue” situation, the hearer will assume that this is 
about the man. Kuno says that this is the “easiest” interpretation. If 
subsequent conversation shows that the man is not the topic, then it is 
next taken to be about the woman. It is most difficult, although possible, 
to take it as being about the clowns.
There are ways to check whether or not a constituent is or can be the 
topic. Besides the kind of questioning Erteschek-Schir offers, there are 
regular rules of grammar which can be called upon as well as lexical 
items which exist specifically to announce a topic, that is to t o p ic a l iz e  
constituents, usually nouns. These are called upon when the speaker 
wishes to ensure that hearers assign topichood to the intended constituent. 
One syntactic mode of topicalizing is a process called c l e f t in g . This
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puts a dummy subject like it or this before the noun which is the topic 
and its puts its verb into a relative clause, as in 7B and C (clefting 
elements boldfaced):
7B. This is the man who bought the woman’s portrait of the clown. 
7C. This is the woman whose portrait of the clowns was bought 
by the man.
In 7B the subject is the man. This corresponds to the reading of 7A in 
which one assumed that the sentence is about the man. T he second 
reading of 7A, that the woman in the possessive is the subject, is 
paraphrasable by 7C.3
[5] Beyond the Sentence.
We have already seen that both the syntax and meaning of a sentence 
are dependent upon the discourse or text in which it appears, what 
VanDijk (1977, 1980, pp. 94-106)) calls macrostructures. He claims 
(1980 131, 229-242) that these differ from phenomena variously known as 
FRAMES, SCHEMATA, SCRIPTS and STRUCTURES OF EXPECTATION (Chaika 
1989, pp. 11-114). Since they have been variously defined and studied, 
calling upon those terms can constitute serious ambiguities. For these 
reasons VanDijk’s term is preferable when discussing such matters as 
relevance and topic. However, it must be borne in mind throughout that 
we are discussing speech produced in interactions with schizophrenics. 
We are not discussing problems arising from schizophrenic failure to 
behave as expected in certain social frames. We are discussing why their 
discourse fails as discourse linguistically. This may entail the giving of 
socially inappropriate responses, but it also entails linguistic aberrations 
definable by linguistic analysis apart from failures in interaction.
Macrostructures are g l o b a l  structures to which individual sentences 
are subordinated. They determine what kinds of sentences are to be 
produced, what sequencing is allowable, even what kinds of vocabulary 
may be used. Macrostructures are as various as poems, novels, sermons, 
classroom lectures, conversations, and dissertations, and even this listing 
is far from exhaustive. Moreover, all of these can be further subdivided. 
Conversations, for instance, may range from arguing to kidding to 
informing, and each of these range from serious to nastiness to frivolity. 
Although we think of both written and oral communication as ways of
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communicating ideas, some macrostructures have no such purpose. For 
instance in conversation of the “shmoozing” or “shooting the breeze” 
type, the content of what is said is of little or no importance at all. What 
is important is its having been said. This is phatic communication, which 
is also seen in such matters as greetings, congratulating, complimenting, 
and even ritual insulting.4
Each kind of macrostructure demands its own forms. The kinds of 
words and grammatical forms demanded of casual phatic conversation 
are quite different from those demanded in a sermon. “Hi guys, whatcha 
doin’ ” is appropriate for quite different social situations than “Sirs, 
mesdames, may we proceed to the lecture hall.” Similarly, both the 
syntax and vocabulary of formal written language are different from 
spoken in many respects. These comments may seem to be so self- 
evident that they hardly bear mentioning, but they must be kept in mind 
because breaches in the selection of vocabulary and sentence types are 
deviations as much as inappropriate neologisms are.
Although each evokes different kinds of speech activities, each with its 
own particular form, all macrostructures are similar in that they proceed 
from old to new information. That way the hearer/reader is oriented. 
The explicitness of the orienting segments ranges from the obligatory 
review of the literature or a summary of experiments in a scholarly 
publication to a brief phrase or sentence which plugs a cospeaker into 
the implicit assumptions of personal mutual knowledge in ordinary 
conversation. The purpose of the speech act and its locus of delivery also 
influence its form. A sermon in a cathedral is obligatorily more structured 
and limited in subject matter and form than is an informal chat in the 
party room of the same edifice.
The macrostructure itself entails or presupposes certain meanings as 
well as certain forms, and, by so doing, creates coherence. VanDijk (1980) 
explicitly argues that coherence is effected simply by producing what 
belongs in the given macrostructure. It seems to me that this position is 
an entirely expected result of the fact that all utterances bear meaning in 
reference to their context. A macrostructure forms a context, just as it 
itself is formed by the locale and purpose of a speaking activity (Chaika 
1989, pp. 182-184).
Brown and Yule (1983, p. 83) advance the interesting concept that the 
communication source activates a pool of presupposition in the receiver, 
a pool including both personal and cultural knowledge. As we shall see,
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there are ways of introducing information which can not be presupposed 
to be shared.
Constructs like “topic of conversation” or “topic of discourse” refer to 
semantic properties beyond those of individual sentences within the 
discourse. Implicata, for instance, are influenced by what we perceive to 
be the topic of the macrostructure (Chapter 7) strongly influencing our 
interpretation of what we hear. For instance, consider
8A. Ms. Jones cheats all the time.
8B. She loses all the time anyway.
On the one hand, if we think we are overhearing a conversation about 
dieting, then 8A gives us no reason to make a negative moral judgment 
about Ms. Jones. Moreover, in such a context 8B may be an admiring or 
jealous comment or both. On the other hand, if we think the speaker is 
talking about an exam, then we do have reason to make such a negative 
judgment, and 8B becomes a triumphant or vindictive comment. In a 
sermon, the same sequence would not only be interpreted as a moral 
discussion, but an example of a greater theological belief, namely that 
sinners get punished not rewarded for their sins.
Our dependence on perceived topic explains some jokes, like
9A. Z: (coming out of movie): There’s nothing better than a good
love story.
Too bad this wasn’t one of them.
Here, the humor lies in Z’s apparently setting up the topic of how 
good the movie is, so that the negative evaluation contradicts the topic.
[6] T h e  Discourse T opic.
Topics, especially in open-ended oral communications, unfold, with 
exchanges potentially opening up new topics. Even in volatile conversa­
tions with a great many topic switches, comments referring to previous 
contributions can be charted, just as the topic-producing ones can be. If 
no such linkages can be ascertained, then we judge the speaker as rambling, 
drunk, or crazy.
VanDijk (1980, p. 43) contends that we infer a MACROPROPOSITION 
from the sequence of propositions in discourse. He was actually talking 
of texts here, but the principle is the same in speech. He offers as a test 
for macropopositions the fact that they can be summarized. However, in
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spoken interactions, it is frequently not so easy to find a single global 
proposition. Typically, there are many topics in a conversation. This is 
true of extended pieces of writing as in books or even lengthy articles. 
Therefore, it is usually more accurate to say that one requires a series of 
summaries which account for changing of topics (Brown and Yule 1983). 
It must be stressed that these changes are not chaotic. They are intro­
duced in orderly ways.
No one constituent of the discourse or even of a sentence within it 
need overtly encode what the topic is. A statement of topic should be 
able to complete the phrase “This is about.. . . ” Outside of grammar 
handbooks, topic sentences are not always overtly encoded in speech or 
in writing. However, coherent discourse can somehow be summarized as 
having what Carlson (1983) calls “aboutness.”
This does not mean that all parties to an interaction or all readers of a 
book agree on what the topic is, or, for that matter, what is being said 
about it. The speaker may think he or she is speaking on one topic, 
whereas the hearer may perceive it to be on another. This is usually not 
fatal to the communication process, however, because participants, when 
made aware of misunderstandings, can say or write, “You misunderstand. 
By X, I did not mean Y. I meant Z.” 7
[7] Topic and Schizophrenic Speech.
In one way or another, many who would explain schizophrenic speech 
comment on its lack of topic. Such vague—and traditional—terms as 
loose associations or flight o f  ideas were clearly an attempt to describe such 
a situation. In order to remedy this imprecision, Andreasen (1979a,b) 
devised an apparently more precise set of criteria for schizophrenic 
speech, carefully defining them. Among them, she presents the follow­
ing as separate diagnostic criteria5 defining them as follows:
• d is t r a c t ib il it y , w hen a patien t breaks off rep eated ly  “ in the 
m id dle of a sentence o r  idea and changes the subject in response to 
a n earb y  stim ulus.”
• t a n g e n t ia l it y , irrelevan tly  answ ering a question.
• d e r a il m e n t , w hen “ideas slip off the track  onto  an o th er one” 
w hich m ay be obliquely o r com pletely  u n related .
• in c o h e r e n c e , incom prehensible speech in w hich a “series of 
w ords o r  phrases seem  to be joined  tog eth er arb itrarily  and at
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random,6 speech lacking “cementing words” such as subordinating 
and specifically coordinating conjunctions, and “adjectival pronouns” 
[terminology hers]7 such as the and a(n).
Andreasen’s careful definitions were an important step towards much 
needed precision in the psychiatric discussion of language data. How­
ever, as she defines them, the above four terms are all actually instances 
of straying off a topic, whether that topic is introduced by a co-conver­
sationalist who asks a question, or is one brought up by speakers themselves.
Andreasen’s definition of incoherence above specifically mentions 
some of the syntactic categories which are designed to indicate the relation­
ship between phrases and sentences to an overriding topic: the conjunc­
tions and the noun d e t e r m in e r s  (articles) the and a(n). Determiners 
have the function of announcing whether or not nouns are encoding 
NEW INFORMATION or OLD in f o r m a t io n . The latter is called GIVEN 
INFORMATION by some. By indicating whether or not a noun is one that 
has been mentioned before, noun determiners tell us whether topic is the 
same or whether a new one is being introduced. That is how these work 
as “cementing words.”
The indefinite article signals new information, that not previously 
mentioned, and the definite one signals old information as in the inter­
play between a and the below:
10A. A dog walked in the room.
10B. The dog was carrying a bone.
10C. The bone was messy.
Names8 typically do not appear with articles because they are speci­
fied by the use of the proper noun itself. Often the name introduces a 
specific individual or location. Thereafter, pronouns or omissions indi­
cate that the same person is being talked about.
Topicalizers, TOPIC m a r k e r s , also serve to mark out new information. 
Typically, they set up the hearer’s expectations that a stretch of discourse 
will be following. Unlike the clefting and passive transformations they 
usually operate on more than a subject of a sentence. The nominal which 
comes after expressions like the following are taken as the topic:
• About last n ight. . .
• As I was saying
• Speaking of [nam e]. . .
• Do you remember [nam e]. . .
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• You’d never believe it, b u t. . .
• The subsequent sections deal with . . .
• Today we take as our verse . . .
Some of the most basic rules of grammar have as their raison d ’etre the 
signalling of new and old information. The deployment of such simple 
devices as the and an in English has such a function. So do such mun­
dane matters as the dummy it and there, which allow the topic to be 
thrown to the end of the sentence. This is the part of the sentence which 
typically takes the strongest stress in English.
11A. It is nice that Bob asked you to the prom.
11B. There’s milk in the fridge.
[8] Titles.
Brown and Yule (1983, p. 71-73) discuss the function of a title as a way 
of announcing topic. In writing and in certain kinds of formal speech 
these function as topicalizers. People typically assign meaning according 
to an announced title. Hearers may even complain if they feel that the 
title did not fairly represent what was actually said. The title functions as 
a guide to understanding. One of the schizophrenic participants in my 
study of narration complained that she could not complete the task 
because she didn’t know what the title of the videostory was. This 
conversation ensued:
12A. I don’t know what the title was. [pause] How can I tell you? 
(Me: What do you think a good title for it is?)
A pleasant day at the ice cream store. uh [pause] ’n fek [pause]. 
That’s all ike I have to say. [long pause]. A pleasant walk to and from 
[pause] home to the ice cream store. That still isn’t right. I should 
be . . .  It should say that it should say that they went in and bought 
the ice cream and they came out and that’s it.
[to me, clearly ex cathedra] You wait a minute. I ha e to get my 
lighter. . .  ]
What? Did they sell everything? I didn’t observe because I kept 
fiddling around.
Actually, the patient did summarize the story correctly if you allow for 
her use of they rather than she. The girl did go in and buy ice cream and 
did come out, and that is the end of the story. The patient became
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derailed over the question of the title, apparently feeling that a video 
presentation should have one.
Another patient ascribed a title to the video with quite different 
results
12B. [enunciates clearly with equal stress on each word indicating 
this is a title] Everyday Life in America.
Little girl in candy store. Runnin’ free.
Her parents don’t really care. So she gets up and takes to the 
a i r . . .
This was said as if it was intended to be a poem with regular recurring 
strong beats and pauses at the end of each rhyming word. Before announc­
ing the title, he had created another rhyme
12C. Little girl in candy store. Mommy and Daddy away.
[pause] That day.
[9] U tterance Pairs.
Across speakers, perhaps the most extreme instance in which topic 
constrains what may be said is seen in u t t e r a n c e  p a ir s , variably 
known as a d ja c en c y  p a ir s  (Sacks 1964-1972; Chaika 1989 pp. 119-131). 
The former term is preferable because such pairs may not always be 
adjacent in the conversation. Specifically, utterance pairs occur when 
one utterance elicits another of a specific form and content. These 
include phenomena like
greetings —> greeting 
questions —> answers 
compliments —> acknowledgements 
complaints —> excuse, apology, or denial 
request/command-acceptance or rejection.
Whoever receives the first part of the utterance pair has to somehow 
respond with the other. T he first part of the utterance pair constrains 
both the form of the response and the possible subject matter, that is, the 
topic. If someone says “hello,” the other has to give a greeting. The only 
way to get out of it is to pretend not to see the greeter, or to be drunk, 
stoned, or otherwise mentally incapacitated.
It is no accident that so many greetings take the form of questions 
since in mainstream society, at least, the norm is that questions must be
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answered. Moreover, the question must be answered according to the 
form used by the questioner. A question preceded by what demands a 
noun, one preceded by a why demands a reason, and a who demands that 
a person be designated. A yes-no question of the “Are you going?” type 
must be answered by a yes, no or “I  don’t know. The squiggles discribed in 
Chapter 11 are utterance pairs. Hallowell and Smith (1983), as part of 
therapy for a schizophrenic patient, offered the patient a line, typically 
only part of a sentence and the patient completed the sentence. This 
worked like questions and answers because responses were directly 
governed by the immediately preceding phrase and left little room for 
wandering on to other matters.
An answer to a genuine question can often be deferred, as in, “I ’m not 
sure. Let me get back to you later.” The degree to which we are con­
strained by the topic of a question is beautifully illustrated by INSERTION 
SEQUENCES (Schegloff 1971). In these, a question is asked as a response to 
another question, as in
12A. Wanna come to a party?
B. Can I bring a friend?
A. Male or female?
B. Female.
A. Sure.
B. Yeah, I ’d like to come.
The responses are severely constrained here both as to order and to 
kind of response. B starts the insertion sequence by asking if he can 
bring a friend. Then A asks about the gender. Then, in the reverse of the 
order in which they were asked, all three questions get answered. Some­
times when such sequences become derailed, later on in the conversation 
or even in a subsequent one, one person will answer it, prefacing his or 
her remarks so that the original question will be recalled or the asker 
will remind the other to answer:
13A. Oh, gee, I never got around to answering your question . . .
13B. You asked about the party and I meant to tell you . . .
13C. We got so sidetracked that you never told me if you . . .
Such verbal placemarkers seem rarely to be used when psychotics 
become derailed. Whereas normal conversation loops back to an earlier 
exchange and then builds on it, schizophrenic ones sometimes just keep 
going linearly, so to speak (Chapter 8). Normal looping adds new mate-
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rial to the topic. In contrast, schizophrenic perseveration is characterized 
by not adding new information. Schizophrenics have two difficulties 
with topic: progression away from it or repetition of phrases without 
advancing it at all.
[10] Patient X  and U tterance Pair Analysis.
Because of the strong constraints on responses, we would not expect 
such exchanges to be deviant, but in patients who evince a great deal of 
disintegration this does occur. Even so, Laffal (1965) reports that his 
patient, Dean, whose speech was so disrupted that he uttered both 
gibberish and opposite speech, still attempted to answer questions, as did 
Robertson and Shamsie’s (1958) patient who apparently produced copi­
ous amounts of gibberish. The following exchange transpired between 
X, reported on in Chaika (1974), and an unidentified woman poking her 
head into the room and asking
14. W: Hello. Anybody here want some coffee?
[pause]
X: Head, heart, hands, health.
The [h]’s in W’s pronunciation of “Hello” and “here” were aspirated 
with unusual strength and held longer9 than usually, sounding on the 
tape almost like slight short-term hissing. What is noteworthy about X ’s 
response is that it was clearly motivated by the sound [h], not by the form 
or content of the question. This, of course, is never normal. One has to 
respond to both the syntactic form and semantic content of a question.
Sometimes schizophrenics do respond correctly to questions and other 
utterance pairs. X herself did “answer” the question, bizarrely to be sure, 
but still recognizably an answer. She just responded to the wrong part of 
the message. Laffal (1965) reports that his patient, Dean, whose speech 
was highly disrupted, also attempted to answer questions, as did Robertson 
and Shamsie’s (1958) patient who produced gibberish. They interpreted 
his gibberish as real language, volitionally produced, explaining that his 
gibberish responses arose from his not being “prepared” to answer any 
inquiries about what it meant. The validity of such an assertion aside, 
even so severely disordered a patient as they describe still attempted to 
answer questions, that is, to obey this essentially social requirement. It 
was his linguistic ability which was not up to the task. If people are being
Topic 255
uncooperative, they do not answer at all or evade the issue by trying to 
initiate a new topic.
[11] T hem e Versus Subject.
An added complication to the notion of subject o f  a sentence is the 
relationship between the subject and the t h e m e  of the sentence as 
opposed to what is being said about it, the r h e m e . These are often 
referred to as the t o p ic  versus the c o m m en t  and coincide with what 
traditional grammars call the subject and the predicate.
Halliday (1965, p. 37) explains that the first constituent of the sentence 
is the theme, “ . . .  [the] speaker’s point of departure for the clause. He 
believes that the theme and the subject are not necessarily the same 
constituent of the sentence, a position independently arrived at by Jeng 
(1982) from his studies of Mandarin Chinese. According to Halliday, in 
15A, the theme and the subject do coincide, but in 15B they do not since 
the theme is yesterday but the subject is they:
15A. They freed the whales yesterday.
15B. Yesterday, they freed the whales.
There are difficulties with the absoluteness of Halliday’s analysis 
(Lyons 1977, p. 508), not the least of which is that considering the first 
element as the theme no matter what that element is, is circular. The 
theme is the first element and the first element is the theme. In addition, 
the first element in the sentence may be a topicalizer. What follows that is 
the theme, but the first element is not itself the theme.
The theme in the sense of aboutness can be expressed also by such 
devices as anaphora and deixis. Undoubtedly the reason that it is so 
common for sentences to start with pronouns is that they signal that the 
speaker is still talking about the same person or thing. In such a case, the 
first element is the theme. Another objection to the equation of theme 
with sentence position is that often, introductory adverbs and adverbial 
clauses like yesterday or because o f you serve the purpose of orienting one 
to the discourse following. That is, these provide a context, but the actual 
theme of the discourse is about someone or something else. Where there 
is a choice of subject, as in a trivalent verb that allows a subject, object or 
dative, the particular noun chosen is often the theme, although, as we have 
seen at other times the choice of subject is dictated by a desire to waffle or 
to avoid repetition.
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Carlson (1983, pp. 242-246) demonstrates that one can make a case for 
all or at least more than one of the constituents in a sentence being what 
the sentence is about, showing that
16A. Mr. Morgan is a careful researcher and a knowledgeable 
semiticist, but his originality leaves something to be desired. (Carlson, 
p. 243)
can be construed as being about Mr. Morgan or about his scholarly 
abilities. Similarly, in an ordinary spoken sentence like
16B. Max gave Griselda a diamond ring.
we can say that the sentence is about Max, Griselda, the diamond ring, 
or the act of giving which, in itself, implies that Max intended to become 
engaged to Griselda by his offering.
So long as we are hung up on the notion of the sentence as the bearer 
of topic and theme, we will continue to face such uncertainty. The 
problem disappears when we consider that the sentence is part of a 
larger construct: the discourse and its context of utterance or text. Con­
sidered this way, theme is what the entire discourse is about, which each 
constituent in the sentence “may pick out, refer to, or stand for” (Carlson, 
p. 244). T his requires one modification: the theme is what a stretch of 
discourse is about, for topics do change in discourses.
Lyons neatly explains how the theme may influence at least some 
passives. He (1977, pp. 510-511) asserts that humans naturally are more 
interested in humans than in other entities, and that this interest explains 
which constituent was chosen as the subject. In turn, this can lead to the 
passive if the object was made subject. For instance, he gives as examples:
17A. A man was stung by a bee in the High Street today.
17B. A bee stung a man in the High Street today.
Lyons contends that 17A is more usual than 17B because humans are 
more interested in men than in bees. Hence, in Hallidayan terms, it is 
more natural to select man as the theme as in 17A, than it is to use the 
active as in 17B. Kuno would say that the perspective is from the human’s 
point of view. In other words, the selection of the object as subject here 
arises from a natural tendency to thematize human perspectives.
The role that theme, subject, and empathy play in actual narrative is 
illustrated in the following collected as part of the Ice Cream Stories. 
Both were produced by patients with the discharge diagnosis of schizo-
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phrenia, but the first was not an SD schizophrenic and the second was. 
The boldface in each indicates each topic and theme encoded:
17C. A little girl was looking in a window of a Baskin-Robbins ice 
cream shop ’n she wanted some ice cream and uh she went home 
and asked her mother if she could have some ice cream and her 
mother said it’s too close to supper an’ she asked her father for some 
ice cream an’ her father gave her some money an she went down to 
the ice cream parlor and bought a double scoop of ice cream.
17D. One was about I think a little girl or boy having a ball and 
having to be real careful about crossin’ the street an’ I might be 
mistaken. I was just thinking of movies I ’ve watched . . .  It seems like 
what children do in their actions just exemplify what grown-ups are 
like an’ it just gives grown-ups a better idea to think that they are 
necessarily better than children y’know an’ I think it’s time to really 
talk now approaching 1980’s,10 And peop’—kids goin’ to college and 
things like that. I haven’t even finished ya know it’s ridiculous.
The first is well formed discourse as well as consisting of well formed 
sentences. T he very first sentence thematizes girl by mentioning it first. 
The anaphoric reference she ties the next three predicates together to 
this first mention. T hen the anaphoric reference her links the mention of 
her parents to the preceding. The parents are seen only in reference to 
the girl’s wishes, which is as it should be. T he anaphoric reference in the 
last sentence ties it all up. Moreover, it consistently encodes the action 
from the perspective of the little girl, showing empathy for her.
In contrast, although 17B like 17A shows no disruption in sentential 
syntax or word choice p er  se, it is deviant. It is only when one examines it 
from the point of view of the theme and subject of the sentences that we 
see what is wrong. T he sequence opens with a recognized and correctly 
used topicalizer, “one was about . . . ” which introduces the little girl or 
boy. First the speaker correctly topicalizes with [was about +  mention of 
NP], here, the child. Both the facts that the child was “having a ball” and 
“crossing the street” are possible and logical, and ellipsis is used correctly 
in not repeating the subject before both verbs.11 Given the clearly marked 
topic the next sentence should deal with the child and crossing the street. 
Instead, a second topic is announced, the movies the narrator had seen. I  
think o f  is often used as a topicalizer, so is it seems, the opener of the very 
next sentence. The reference to kids’ going to college is completely 
unprepared. Being careful about crossing the street and kids’ emulation
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of adults are tenuous threads to the remark about the 1980s and higher 
education. So far, we have seen three topicalizers and not one theme. 
None of the topicalizing sentences are followed by any expansion of the 
topic, although it is not hard to explain why the speaker introduced 
these three topics together:
• the video was of a child
• videos remind people of movies
• children do imitate adults
The semantic content of each sentence is fine, but our feeling that the 
speaker is flitting from topic to topic is explained by the successive 
topicalizing with no elaboration. The speaker is flitting from topic to 
topic. At the third, it seems as if the speaker has finally settled on 
children as his theme, but the conjoined mention of grown-ups’ thinking 
that they are superior to children is a jolt because now the theme has 
become g ro w n -u p s  just when we thought it was children. There is also no 
consistency of perspective. It, too, flits from the narrator to the child to 
the narrator. 12
[12] Given and New Information.
After its introduction, the theme is given information, referring to 
something already present in the verbal and nonverbal context (Lyons 
1977, p. 508; Halliday 1985, p. 275). The sentence is composed of a theme 
and a r h e m e  or c o m m e n t . Some scholars speak of the th e m e  versus 
r h e m e  of the sentence, and other refer to the topic v ersus c o m m e n t  of the 
sentence. For the most part, these are simply different terms for the same 
thing, although the pairs are not interchangeable. If one decides upon 
th em e, then it must be opposed to rh e m e , and topic  has to co-occur with 
co m m en t. Often, in fact, usually, these coincide with the traditional 
co m p lete  su b ject  and co m p lete  p red ica te . All of these actually refer to the 
flow from old to new information that sentences within a discourse 
ideally have. Such notational variants using different terms for the same 
entity and the same terms for different ones afflicts all scholarly fields.
No matter what they call them, discourse analysts agree that many 
naturally occurring sentences have a given and a new component (Lyons 
1977, pp. 508-510; Brown and Yule, 1983 pp. 153-189). Van Dijk (1980, p. 94) 
elaborates, saying that the subject (a.k.a. topic, t h e m e )  the part of the 
sentence is “information that is already in tro d u c e d  ( . . . )  already su p p o s e d
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to be known . . . ,  or otherwise given or started from” and the predicate 
(a.k.a. comment, rhem e) expresses “new, unknown, unpredictable,... infor­
mation” about the topic (all italics his).12 For this reason, such markers of 
old information as pronouns or deictics usually occur in subject position. 
As already shown in discussing cohesion, given information can also 
refer to information known by previous interactions, the physical context 
or cultural knowledge. T his leads to the optimal flow of old to new 
information with heavily modified constituents at the end of the sentence.
When new information can fill the subject position, there is a very 
strong tendency to throw it to the end of the sentence leaving a dummy it 
or there as the subject, as in
18A. Roses are on the table.
18B. There are roses on the table 
18C. That you came was nice.
18D. It was nice that you came.
As valid as these examples are, and as accurate as the observation is 
that sentences tend to flow from old to new information, it is still a 
dubious claim to say that is how all sentences progress. Sentences in 
isolation do travel from old to new information, as do many sentences in 
a discourse but, again within the discourse, many sentences in their 
entirety simply repeat the information or messages given before although 
not necessarily in the same words and syntax. Culturally known items 
might be mentioned. This can be done very effectively—or annoyingly—to 
emphasize a point or to mark out for the hearer that something prior is 
being brought up again. T he flow from old to new information is also a 
feature of skillful rhetoric, but not all rhetoric is skillful and that which is 
not is not necessarily psychotic or deranged. In a psychotic population we 
would expect that flow to be interrupted more than it is in normals since, 
as a byproduct of psychosis, a speaker may not be in control. T he defining 
difference between normals and psychotics is the way that distinctly 
psychotic speech does not flow. It is blocked by perseverations of all sorts 
(Chapters 1 and 2). In contrast, normal speech which is faulty in presen­
tation of new and old information is clumsy or boring (e.g., Williams 1981).
L o o k in g  ag ain  at th e  follow ing resp o n se to th e  q u estio n  ab ou t w here  
the p a tien t lived  an d  w hat it was like liv in g  in th at p lace , we see the  
exten t of d ev ia tio n  possib le in  sch izo p h ren ic p ersev era tio n s.
19. Mill Avenue is a house in between avenues U and avenue T  I 
live on Mill Avenue for a period of for now a period of maybe
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fifteen y ear for aro u n d  ap p roxim ate  fifteen years I like it the fam—I 
like every family on Mill Avenue I like every family in the world I like 
every family in The United State of America I like every family on on 
Mill Avenue I like Mill Avenue is a is a block w ith th at is busy cars 
always pass by all the tim e I always look o u t the w indow  of m y front 
p o rch  front p o rch  at tim e w hen I s- when I ’m not sure if it’s possible 
about the way I think I could read people mind about people’s society 
attitude plot and spirit so I think I could read their mind as they drive 
by in the car sh- will I see Paradise will I not see Paradise should I 
answer should I not answer I not answer w- th e ir  tho u gh t of how  
I read think I could read their mind about when they pass by in the 
car in the house pass by in the car from  m y house I just correct for 
them for having me feel better about myself not answer will I should I 
answer should I not answer will I see Paradise will I not see Paradise I 
just correct them to have me feel better about myself about the way I 
think I can hear their mind r- about the way I think I could read their 
mind as they pass by the house Mill Avenue is also Mill Avenue is also 
a p lace of g reat event for all the families that live on Mill Avenue 
always eh t- receive world wide attention and I am  o- I am  just one of 
the families live on M ill A venue that always receive world wide 
attention so therefore [unintelligible] to receive world wide attention 
is receive world wide attention is som e som e you should  be p ro u d  of 
you should be p ro u d  of world wide attention [unintellig ible] there’s 
the fam ily are  just too out in the open  not to have world wide 
attention so they all have world wide attention by the cars pa—that 
pass in the front cars that pass by all the time so therefore Mill 
Avenue is also a a I like a quiet residential n- block like a quiet 
residential block w ith a Italian  p eop le talk outside by the fence 
discuss th eir feelings th eir attitudes th e ir  opinions op in io n  about 
any story feeling co n cep t idea o r sentence that they m ay  have and  
once again w hen I look outside the w indow because I think I could 
read people’s minds about people’s society attitude plot and spirit 
w-should I answer should I not answer will I see Paradise will I not see 
Paradise I not answer co rrect them  have m e feel about better about 
m yself like I said before I ’m not sure if it’s possible about the way I 
think I could read people mind about people’s society attitude plot 
and spirit so I not answer them I just co rrect them  have m e feel 
better about m yself Mill Avenue is also a place w here people gather 
in back yards to have people gather in back yards to have a barbecue
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in the back yard to have relative over to have friend over to talk in 
the back yard to be merry with each other. (data courtesy of Dr. 
Bonnie Spring)13
There is neither a flow from given to new information, nor is there 
any relevance achieved. Rather the same phrases are repeated cyclically 
and no connections are made between the problem of seeing Paradise 
and the street where he lives. Perhaps he is reminded of death, hence 
Paradise because of the connection between people’s plotting and death. It 
is possible to make some sense of this, at least from the written transcript 
which gives us the luxury of slowly analyzing what was said. Spoken, as in 
the original tape recording, one makes no sense out of it at all. The lack of 
pronouns seriously impedes our understanding. Even in writing, our 
usual means of comprehending do not work. As with glossomania, we can 
only seek an explanation of why these phrases are juxtaposed.
[ 13] New and Brand New Information.
Prince (1981), with much justice, complains that different scholars 
have used the concept of given versus new information in three some­
what different ways, thus rendering the concept imprecise. Given infor­
mation has been considered to be information which is predictable, 
shared, or salient. If the information is predictable, then it is recoverable 
from the context if it is not fully expressed. We have already seen the 
importance of anaphora in showing whether or not a constituent has 
been already introduced.
Prince (1981), discriminates between two kinds of new information: 
salient and brand new information. Givenness in the sense of being 
salient refers to information that the speaker assumes to be in the con­
sciousness of the hearer (Chafe quoted by Prince, p. 228). In this sense, 
for an NP to be properly signalled as a given entity, it must have been 
mentioned in the discourse, or be in the same category of something 
which has been mentioned. A third possibility is that the NP can refer 
to something in the physical context of the interaction. For instance, 
in the Ice Cream Stories (Chaika and Alexander 1986; Chapter 8), many 
people spoke of a little girl asking her mother for ice cream, with­
out introducing the mother as new information. The fact of having 
mentioned the child was sufficient for the existence of the mother, as 
in:
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20A. A little girl was looking in a window of a Baskin Robins ice 
cream shop ’n she wanted some ice cream and uh she went home
and asked her mother if she could have some ice cream. . . .
20B. Um — in an ice cream store she was lookin’ in to see if she could 
get any she went home her mother said. . . .
In both of these the mention of the mother is the first mention in the 
discourse. Mothers are salient because children are presumed to have 
them and it is also presumed that they are the ones to give permission to 
eat ice cream.
Prince suggests that the term shared knowledge be replaced by assumed 
familiarity, since all anyone can do is assume what another knows. She 
suggests that there are two different kinds of new information. If the 
hearer already knows about the entity being introduced, it is simply new. 
In contrast, if the speaker introduces something the hearer doesn’t know 
about, then that entity is brand new. Brand new information has to be 
created in the hearer’s mind. This, of course, puts a greater burden on 
the speaker in presenting enough information so that the hearer can 
create what was intended.
To see the difference between these two types of new information, 
consider the following (examples and analysis mine):
21A. Freud certainly shook up the world of medicine.
21B. Jerry Jones certainly shook up the world of medicine.
21A is fine. I have invoked mention of someone my readers have 
knowledge of. They know he lived. They know he was a physician, and 
that he had radical ideas about the human mind. They also know that he 
has had a great influence on 20th century thought. I am introducing him 
as new to this discussion, but I don’t have to create him in the reader s 
mind. In fact, I can say many things about him without very much 
preparation because I assume familiarity. 21 A works very well as an 
utterance bringing up new information.
In contrast, 21B doesn’t work well at all for introducing new information, 
unless fortuitously some reader knows a Jerry Jones who had a strong 
effect on the world of medicine. Here, Jerry Jones has to be created (in 
Prince’s sense) in the reader’s mind by syntactic and lexical choices, as in
21C. I used to know this guy who was named Jerry Jones and he 
sure shook up the world of medicine when he . . .
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21D. A man named Jerry Jones had a profound effect on the medi­
cal community because h e . . . .
Mechanisms for introducing brand new information abound in both 
speech and writing. In 21C, the expression this guy is a colloquialism 
indicating “I ’m going to tell you about someone you don’t know of.” The 
indefinite a in 21D can be used for salient and brand new information, 
but the clincher for brand new information in this sentence is the phrase 
named Jerry Jones. This always indicates that nonsalient new information 
is being introduced. Relative clauses and participles both are frequent 
markers of brand new information, as in 21C and D respectively. For 
instance, note the disparity in
21E. *Our mother named Tessie Dorgan gave you this note, dear.
The distinction between the two kinds of new information appears 
to be useful in analyzing schizophrenic discourse. When discussing exo- 
phora, I noted that using a she for first mention of a girl shown in a 
video was not deviant if the patient had viewed the video with the experi­
menter. The child in the video was in the patient’s consciousness and, 
presumably, mine since we had both watched the video together. Hence 
the patient could assume that the reference was salient.
However, in the following, failing to introduce something as brand 
new information contributes to the deviation of the passages. In 22A, 
brand new information is presented as if it were simply new salient 
information. This narrative also contains gibberish, so that the failures 
in presenting information as brand new or not is matched by a general 
disruption in linguistic ability.
22A. Okay. I was watching a film of a girl and um s bring back 
memories of things that happened to people around me that affected 
me during the time when I was living in that area and she just went 
to the store for a candy bar and by the time oooh of course her 
brother who was supposed to be watching wasn’t paying much 
attention he was blamed for and I didn’t think that was fair the way 
the way they did that either so that’s why I ’m just asking yah could 
we just get together and try to work it out all together for one big 
party or something ezz it hey if it we’d all in which is in not they’ve 
been here___
In 22B, we see typical schizophrenic repetition about his sleeping for 
11 weeks. Then the the patient erroneously signals the man as if it were
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given information, but this is the first mention of the man and he is 
nowhere introduced. Then the narrator fails to tell us why his father told 
him to call the police. Here, the why is the essential brand new informa­
tion to ground the events of the narrative. Since she was not dealing with 
the kinds of data presented here, Ellen Prince (1981) claimed that her 
formulation of new and brand new information always falls on nouns, 
but examples like this show that adverbials also may be involved. In 
the following, an adverbial clause is required in order to explain the 
reason.
22B. I was sleeping in bed on top of my bed from the last time I got 
out of the hospital which was about 11 weeks that I was released I 
was lying top of bed for the 11 weeks that I was released and and my 
father told to call the police car and the police car enter over my 
house the man stepped out of the police car and he w—entered my 
house with two patrolmen and they patrolman cherry and patrol­
man alcolino. . .
One problem in trying to use distinctions such as Prince’s in the 
disordered speech of schizophrenics is that some might say that neolo­
gisms and even outright gibberish are brand new information that hasn’t 
been introduced correctly. I would put limits on any analysis of new and 
old information, such that we presume an error only if we can recognize 
the words and the markers themselves such as articles, pronouns, adjectives, 
relative clauses, or any other recognizable construction that is used to 
identify new information or refer to old. 14
[14] Em pathy and Point of View.
Kuno (1987, p. 17) coins the term HYPER-TOPIC to indicate “a para­
graph topic or a conversation topic” as distinct from the subject of a 
sentence. He offers an important insight, that there is a LATENT TOPIC as 
well, and this usually is the speaker, the first person, the ego, the I . That 
is, it is assumed that whatever we say we are talking about our own 
perspective and experiences. He shows how the hyper-topic interacts 
with the latent first person topic, as in the following example, which for 
brevity’s sake I have here paraphrased.
23A. I have been collecting pictures of movie stars, and I can show 
them to you, but I cannot show you my picture of Marilyn Monroe.
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Kuno points out that such a discourse is, indeed, on one level about 
the first person. This constitutes the latent or hyper-topic, but the picture 
of Marilyn Monroe is what Kuno terms the p r o m in e n t  topic. Notice 
here that the actress mentioned can be isolated with clefting,14
23B. It is Marilyn Monroe’s picture which I cannot show you.
But it is odd to topicalize I  or even my,
23C. ?It is I who cannot show you my picture of Marilyn Monroe.
23D. ?Regarding me, I cannot show you my picture of Marilyn
Monroe.
23E. S: I took aerobic dancing until I broke a toe.
H: Oh, how is it?
S: I don’t know. It wasn’t my toe.
I suggest that 23C and D are strange because it is rarely the case that 
speakers have to emphasize that the discourse is about themselves. That 
is presumed, hence latent. If it is already presumed to be a topic, then 
there is no reason for topicalizing it. We topicalize only new or brand- 
new information. Similarly, the humor of 23E resides in the expectation 
that S is talking about herself, the latent topic being I. Notice that none 
of these violate syntactic rules. There is no grammar rule which would 
exclude them. By themselves, they are perfectly good English, question­
able only in terms of requirements of discourse.
Notes
1Here and elsewhere in actual quotes, this sexist choice of pronoun is Kuno’s.
2Although they might prefer to have their tongues cut out with burning pincers 
rather than admit it, the transformationalists did the same thing that traditional 
grammarians had always done: they invented sentences and rules based upon their 
own notion of their own speech.
3Kuno says that all NP’s in a sentence cannot be topicalized. He finds it impos­
sible to topicalize clowns as in *These are the clowns who the man bought the 
woman’s portrait of. Kuno claims that the strangeness of this is caused by the 
possessive. I suspect that another reason this paraphrase seems queer is the very 
complexity of the sentence which entails one’s keeping track both of the noun that 
goes with the preposition and even the distance of the clowns from its preposition.
4Typically, these are insults clearly given in jest. Socially, they relieve hostilities 
safely in tense situations. In some cultures they are readily used to test verbal 
prowess, as in adolescent male “your mother” jibes. These originated in black male 
verbal contests called variously sounding, chopping, cutting, ranking, and ragging.
5These are only some of the criteria on which she diagnoses schizophrenia.
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6Andreasen also includes under this term such phenomena as word salads and 
schizophasia.
7The determiners the and an are not pronouns. They do not replace nouns or any 
consitutent of a sentence. Nor do they function as adjectives. Adjectives come 
between the determiner and the noun; moreover, they can take a word indicating 
degree as in “very happy” or “most generous.” There is no category of “adjective 
pronouns” in syntax.
8Actually, in English, names for animate creatures, most countries, states, cities, 
and towns do not have articles before them, but rivers, oceans, and mountain ranges 
do, as in The Mississippi, The Atlantic, or The Rockies. Lakes and individual moun­
tains do not take the article, but they are typically preceded or followed by the words 
Lake and Mount(ain), respectively. Such variation clearly serves the function of 
building up redundancy in the message, while still specifying exactly.
9When speaking about duration and strength of an individual sound, it should be 
realized that we are talking about milliseconds. The human ear is able to recognize 
as distinct differences between sounds that are almost imperceptible on a spectograph, 
and sounds that differ in length so slightly that special equipment is needed to 
record them.
10These data were collected from 1978-1980.
11However, it is inaccurate. The video did not show a child having a ball in any 
sense of those words, nor was there anything about crossing the street. These 
inaccuracies aren’t linguistic ones, just perceptual ones. Additionally, this was 
elicited one week after viewing the video. He wasn’t sure how many videos he had 
seen; hence, the use of one rather than it.
12Notice that these findings, that the flow of information in the sentence should 
go from old to new information, therefore the unstressed to the stressed, from short 
structures to long is diametrically opposed to what students learn in school. They 
are told to put the important information first. This is always the new information. 
One of the reasons for the denseness of scholarly and bureaucratic writing is that it 
violates the flow from old to new information.
13Dr. Spring does not necessarily endorse my interpretations of these data, however.
14All of these examples and topic tests are mine, not Kuno’s
Chapter Eleven
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: BEYOND FREUD
Ever since Freud, the question has arisen of how a discourse 
should be understood. How do we interpret discourse? What 
can be assumed and what are the bounds on derived meaning? 
The fragmented nature of normal discourse is presented. Then, 
four modes of interpretation of patients' speech are offered 
along with a discussion of elicitation and its effect on speech. 
This includes such matters as resistance to therapy.
[1] Justifiable Interpretation.
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The stunning force of Freudian interpretation burst upon the 20th century revolutionizing our perception of human behavior. Ulti­
mately, it affected psychiatry, psychology, literature, the graphic arts, 
and, eventually, society itself by forcing reexamination of family structure, 
including the child’s obligations to the parent and the blaming of the 
parent for the child’s insecurities, obsessions, and transgressions. All of 
this occurred because of Freud’s mode of interpretation of discourse.
It is not too much to say, for instance, that Bateson’s double bind 
theory could not have been formulated without a prior belief in Freud­
ian analysis, nor, of course, would we have the interpretive methodologies 
of Harry Stack Sullivan, Harold Searle, Silvano Arieti, Ernest Jones,1 or 
the now popular Lacan. All such interpreters depend upon the basic 
Freudian assumption that language at no level necessarily means what it 
says. Interpretation derives not from the actual words and grammar as 
used by nonpsychotic patients, but from reference to beliefs about Oedi- 
pal bonds, castration fears, homosexual panic, and even paranoia induced 
by feelings of inadequacy. Lacan roots his interpretations in the linguis­
tics of de Saussure, but still employs a Freudian model of the uncon­
scious to which the psychiatrist is supposed to be talking. He envisions a 
dialogue between the Other, the analyst, and the Other, the patient’s 
subconscious (Holloway 1977, 1978; Haskell 1978). Psychosis is believed 
to stem from avoidance of intolerable feelings.
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Analysts differ considerably in their treatment of schizophrenia, rang­
ing from Rosen’s belief in uncovering “vivid and shocking interpreta­
tions of a primarily oedipal nature,. . .  [he] bypass[es] the ego and . . .  
communicate[s] with the unconscious id material” (pp. 149-150). Analysts 
were trained by other highly respected senior analysts, so to speak, who 
offered interpretations of the patient’s speech based upon his or her view 
of what caused the neurotic or psychotic illness. Although all such 
analysis emanated from Freudian theory, individual analysts departed 
from this theory to a greater or lesser degree (Hallowell and Smith 1983).
One issue has been the mode of analysis to follow in treating schizo­
phrenics. Analysts perceive themselves as teachers and their mode of 
analysis is aimed at teaching the patient to cope. Hallowell and Smith 
(1983, pp. 149-156) summarize some of these methods and the rationale 
behind them. Some analysts believe that their task is to restore defective 
ego boundaries. This resulted in an “intrusive, even persecutory style [of 
analysis] (p. 150). Others believe in entering the patient’s psychotic 
world and then by building trust, help the patients to reintegrate them­
selves into the world left behind by the psychosis.
The relative validity of any and ad of these beliefs about therapy is not 
the issue here. The issue here is solely the differences in orientation of 
various analysts and analyzers of discourse, because these lead to very 
different kinds of interpretations of what a patient has said. It is the 
relationship between analysis and theoretical positions that have to be 
examined. We have already seen that interpretation is based upon various 
strategies, and that these strategies include our ascribing intention to the 
speaker. We also consider mutual histories of interactors. The influence 
of theory and of being in a therapeutic setting, then, are important 
determinants in analysis.
All Freudian or post-Freudian theories rest upon a view of the dynam­
ics of mind and speech that cannot be verified by overt observation or by 
experimentation. One either believes them or one does not. This doesn’t 
mean that they are valid or not valid. It is just that they are not provable 
by the usual scientific procedures. There is no way to disprove Freud or 
his followers, including Lacan, but there is no way to prove that they are 
correct either. Ultimately, one believes or not according to one’s intuitive 
sense that psychoanalysis strikes a responsive chord. Those who do not 
intuit this may be, as the analysts claim, simply denying what is true, 
burying it, even perhaps resisting treatment.
Linguistics itself did not offer many guides to interpreting even nor-
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mal discourse to Freud or his contemporaries. In fact, psychoanalysis 
predated linguistics by decades in realizing that language must have 
some kind of deep structure as well as surface forms. Psychoanalysis also 
predated linguistics by decades in realizing that the encoding of a mes­
sage is dictated partly by the speaker’s intent, and the meaning a hearer 
derives depends on the intent that he or she ascribes to the speaker in 
formulating that message. Until relatively recently, linguists rested seman­
tics upon the flimsy undergirding of sentence grammars and the doc­
trines of separation of linguistic levels, and that was when meaning was 
considered at all.
Under the aegis of philosophers of language like Austin and Searle 
and linguists themselves like Lyons, Fillmore, and Halliday, the context- 
sensitive view of language finally offered some alternate procedures for 
analysis. We can make a case nowadays that matters of justifiable 
interpretation, even of metaphor, seem to be bounded by rules and 
strategies, so that we are justified in speaking of the grammar of the 
discourse. It is time to reexamine Freudian inspired modes of psychoana­
lytic interpretation in the light of our new understandings, not with the 
view of invalidating psychoanalysis, but to enhance its insights by pro­
viding a firmer base upon which to ground interpretations, and, in some 
cases, to provide alternate interpretations.
[2] Psychology, Psychiatry, and Linguistics.
Psychiatry and its sister disciplines generally downplay the public 
and social nature of language. Rather, language is treated as a private 
system which each person can and does use pretty much as he or she 
wishes. Typically, meaning of a discourse is taken to be holistic with little 
or no attempt to justify it on the basis of actual syntax or lexicon used. 
Meaning is assigned to the discourse as a whole according to the analyst’s 
perception of the patient’s intent; thus, discourse is taken as a strategy, a 
cryptic rendering of a person’s real, hidden meaning.2 Imaginative 
exegesis, as in literary analysis, is admired, and certain analysts, such as 
Freud or Searles, are often used as guides to interpretation of given 
utterances because of their acknowledged superior ability to see into the 
true meaning of discourses. T he Seeman and Cole analysis of Carrie’s 
speech, presented below, is an example.
Linguistics also acknowledges that each person’s language is, to some 
degree, unique. It has long been said that, ultimately, we each speak an
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idiolect, as well as a dialect of a language. However, the idiolect arises 
because individuals may have learned a few rules of language somewhat 
differently from others, and because words and even syntax can change 
over a person’s lifetime. Still, idiolectal variation refers to language 
being used to convey messages to others. For instance, several of my 
students say and write “concern to” rather than “concern with.” This use 
of to seems to be spreading virtually person by person and students even 
from the same region differ, some keeping the older with, and some not. 
At this point in time, we can only say that there is idiolectal variation of 
the particle used with the verb concern.
We must not assume that the flow of linguistic understanding always 
proceeds from linguistics to psychiatry. Sometimes the reverse is true. 
Long after psychiatry, for instance, linguistics has finally begun to con­
sider the roles of motivation and presupposition in meaning, as well as 
implication derived from both roles.
Still, there are definable differences in orientation between psycho­
analytical and linguistic analyses of discourse. It bears repeating that 
linguistic analyses proceed from actual words combined with actual 
syntax, and their relation to social context. Implicitly or explicitly, 
utterances are judged as normal or deviant, idiolectal or dialectal. Lin­
guists are primarily concerned with uncovering regular rules and strate­
gies for conveying meaning; why, for instance, “It’s cold in here” may be 
construed as a command to close a window, or “You live on 56th Street” 
may be heard as a question (e.g., Ervin-Tripp 1972; Labov and Fanshel 
1977; Goody 1978). Such a concern with rules and strategies entails 
another assumption, that we are all using language, or trying to, in 
pretty much the same ways (e.g., Searle 1975, pp. 63, 73; Austin 1962; 
Lyons 1977, p. 735.) Problems naturally arise when language is clearly 
not being used correctly, when it deviates from linguistic norms. Such 
speech often cannot be understood by usual decoding strategies. Typically, 
linguists have treated such error by comparing it to normal production, 
assuming that the speaker intended to use language so that it could be 
understood, but that normal production processes have been disrupted 
(e.g., Fromkin 1973; Clark and Clark, 1977, pp. 211-215; Buckingham 
and Kertesz 1974; Chaika 1974a, 1977). In such instances, extraordinary 
measures are employed to gain understanding, but these are based upon 
normal decoding practices.
Four separate discourses will be presented here, each resulting from 
data collected in different ways and upon different assumptions, and
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each interpreting those data according to somewhat different constructs.
The first is based upon poetry as a mode of communication between 
therapist and patient (Hallowell and Smith 1983). The second, Labov 
and Fanshel (1977), analyzed five therapeutic episodes between a thera­
pist and her patient in the light of strategies of ordinary conversation, 
developing what they call a p r in c ip l e d  e l a b o r a t io n  of meaning.
In what is perhaps its most shaky premise, classic psychoanalysis 
guarantees that the analyst can never be successfully proven wrong. 
According to this theory, the more one denies that one meant what the 
therapist says one meant, the more one really meant it. For instance, if an 
analyst tells a woman that she is consumed by penis envy, the more she 
says she isn’t, the stronger her envy is presumed to be. Her denial 
constitutes proof of her neurosis. The same is true of the man who denies 
that he is consumed by Oedipal desires. As a concommitant of this 
premise, analysts speak of the period of resistance, a period of time 
during which the patient evinces resistance to the therapeutic situation. 
There is, undeniably, a period that can be called resistance, but I suspect 
that there are many reasons for resistance, and, in some instances, it is 
not real resistance at all.
We now examine interpretations of speech data from three patients. 
These data were elicited in three different ways: squiggles, an ordinary 
therapeutic interview, and unbounded conversation.
[3] Squiggles and Therapy.
Hallowell and Smith, being highly influenced by Arieti’s compassion­
ate view of the psychotic’s unbearable sadness and loss, developed a 
mode of analysis in which they adapted a game of squiggles as a way of 
offering the patient the therapist’s ego as a bridge, but one which also 
allows the therapist to “enter the metaphor of the patient’s world.” The 
squiggles game consisted of the therapist or patient providing a verbal 
opener, and the other responding with a short line. Some of these 
rhymed, some did not, but the result in each instance presented formed a 
joint dialogue cast into poetic form, as in:
1A. Th.: They said I am a hopeless case
Pt.: Not I, a member of the human race, in disgrace 
Th.: I wish they wouldn’t say that 
Pt.: In a nonjoking way 
Th.: It makes me
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Pt.: Suspicious 
T h .: And angry and sad
Pt.: Which aren’t the strongest emotions I ’ve had 
Th.: The strongest are 
Pt.: Composed of these 
Th.: Combined into 
Pt.: Something I don’t want to feel 
Th.: Something like 
Pt.: Rage, but not quite 
Th.: Also like 
Pt.: An intense feeling
(p. 142)
The patient’s rhyming here is controlled, fits the meaning of the 
entire squiggle. This patient had unusual facility with language, writing 
superb poetry. He fits the pattern of the negative symptom psychotic, 
speaking little. He presented poems both on the day of admission and the 
next day, but did not talk (Edward Hallowell, personal communication). 
What is noteworthy about these squiggles is that they provide a structured 
enough frame so that a dialogue can proceed without the patient’s 
becoming derailed. The therapist is able to constrain the topic, and, at 
the same time, to allow the patient free expression. This constituted an 
opening for therapy itself “ . . .  the more personal, affective part of it, 
especially in the beginning, was contained in the squiggles” (Hallowell 
and Smith 1983, p. 143). Hallowed’s skid in presenting the right kinds of 
openers for the patient himself must not be overlooked.
Hallowed and Smith do not give any extraordinary interpretations of 
what the patient has said in these squiggles. They take 1A as a straightfor­
ward expression of his feelings. Similarly, he expresses his need to cut off 
feeling, in
1B. Pt.: Nothing lasts forever 
Th.: No one lives that long 
Pt.: Not on earth
Th.: Sometimes I want to get away 
Pt.: Into the body of a robot 
Th.: No feelings there. Just safe steel 
Pt.: No way to get hurt or die 
Th.: Sometimes I want to die 
Pt.: To live in heaven forever
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T h .: Where people stay with you 
Pt.: And never leave 
Th.: Leave, leave, leave
Pt.: I wish my feelings would leave sometimes 
Th.: But they stay 
Pt.: And haunt
(pp. 143-144)
The degree to which squiggles could be applied to all patients has not 
been determined, but, given the results in this case, it certainly seems 
promising.
[4] Schizophrenic Chaining: T hree Interpretations.
In Chapter 5 we saw that Forrest interpreted the following as being a 
metaphorical way to express what it is like to be schizophrenic:
2. Doctor, I have pains in my chest and hope and wonder if my box
is broken and heart is beaten . . .  (Maher 1968 cited in Forrest 1986)
Forrest believes that all language is metaphor (1976, p. 296), that 
schizophrenic speech is especially poetic and that associational chaining 
is a way of affirming the “right of choice which exists in thought and 
language,” of “look [ing] for extra connections in words . . .  to firm up the 
connection between ideas we feel are related” (Forrest 1965).
Such an explanation ignores the fact that normal speakers do not firm 
up connections between ideas by uttering glossomanic chains. Rather, 
the many modes of effecting cohesion firm up those connections as do 
the ways that sentences are made to fit to a topic.
Another example of chaining, here a response to a question, is here 
reprised:
3. Looks like clay. Sounds like gray. Take you for a roll in the hay.
Hay day. Help! I just can’t. Need help. May day. (Cohen 1978, p. 29)
As explained earlier, several patients named the disc in question as 
being either clay-colored or salmon-colored. Cohen, a psychologist 
oriented towards behaviorism, explains chaining responses as in 3 as 
resulting from “anticipation of social punishment contingent upon the 
emission of a sampled response (1978, p. 21). He says that schizophrenics 
cannot effectively reject punishable responses to referents, they .. . break 
the perseverative cycle by shifting to different referents. One way to do
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this is via chaining.” He admits that “ultimately” their responses become 
“remote from the original referents and from the listener’s standpoint, 
seriously tangential to the conversational context.” Given such an expla­
nation for the cause of schizophrenic speech, there is, of course, no 
reason to search for meaning in sequences of chaining, and, indeed, 
Cohen does not.
In terms of behavioral theory, however, it is puzzling how the chaining 
can proceed from a need to avoid punishment, since the first sentence is 
the most correct, and, indeed, the only correct one. It is the phenomenon 
of chaining itself which is incorrect. Furthermore, as Cohen himself 
admits, the chaining always moves further away from a correct response. 
Hence, according to behavioral psychology, no chaining should ever 
occur because it leads to the very punishment that Cohen says the 
patient is trying to avoid by chaining.
Also, Cohen’s explanation rests upon a belief that the patient has 
actively chosen this means to avoid punishment. Since other examples of 
chaining do appear in the literature, and appear as examples of speech 
especially pathognomic of schizophrenia, his explanation assumes that 
schizophrenics as a group are very likely to choose this behavior for 
avoiding punishment.
The problem is that the chaining is bizarre precisely because there 
seems to be no normal speech behavior like it. Certainly, this is not the 
kind of speech behavior one calls upon to avoid punishment. Thus there 
is no possibility it has been learned, except, perhaps those unfortunates 
who have been hospitalized for long periods with SD schizophrenics. 
Cohen offers no proof that his patients have “learned” to speak this way. 
Although I have heard anecdotal evidence that some psychotics have 
learned to “speak schizophrenic” as a result of hospitalization, I have yet 
to find hard data to support such a possibility. Even if someone does 
present such data, it would still beg the question of why only schizo­
phrenics seem to speak this way whether through learning from other 
schizophrenics or from internal speech difficulties.
If it were an isolated instance, or if it were reported only of members 
of one social group, however defined, we can explain it as a learned 
response. Rather, it is reported only of schizophrenics,4 and of schizo­
phrenics who come from all social classes and nations, and who speak a 
great many different languages. Since there is no evidence that it is or 
even can be learned,5 the natural assumption is that it is caused by the 
disease. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that schizophrenics
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typically create glossomanic chains only when they are being schizophrenic. 
If they chain deliberately to avoid punishment, why don’t they do this 
when they are in remission? It seems to me that the schizophrenic 
condition itself is responsible for the chaining.
[5] R hoda: T h e Jo in t History of the Participants.
Labov and Fanshel (1977) provide an exceptionally detailed and per­
ceptive analysis of a therapeutic situation involving a girl named Rhoda, 
an anorexic in conflict with her mother. The mother is a clever manipulator 
of discourse and Rhoda has to learn to deal with her by some means 
other than starving herself to death. In the segment described here, the 
mother has left Rhoda to take care of their shared home while she, the 
mother, is taking care of Rhoda’s sister’s children, staying away too long, 
thus interfering with Rhoda’s schooling. Rhoda cannot cope, but to 
admit this overtly to her mother would be yielding to her mother’s 
opinion that Rhoda is not capable, an opinion fatal to Rhoda’s desire to 
prove her worth by proving she can cope. This power struggle between 
Rhoda and her mother is complicated by Rhoda’s anorexia. It is this last 
which is being directly treated, with the therapist trying to allow Rhoda 
to see that her refusal to eat is, indeed, a power play.
Labov and Fanshel (1977, p. 53) demonstrate that one of the specific 
characteristics of the therapeutic situation is that both patient and thera­
pist are presumably working towards making explicit those propositions 
which underly the problem leading to the therapy. As we have seen, in any 
situation, part of the meaning derived comes from the personal history 
of the interactors. Labov and Fanshel, Kreckel (1981), and Sanders (1987) 
all stress the relationship between the richness and accuracy of interpreta­
tions and extensive mutual interaction. Labov and Fanshel (1977, 
pp. 351-352) stress that one cannot interpret individual texts by themselves, 
noting that they collected many conversations in which one interpretation 
seemed correct, but that somebody who knew the interactors better than 
they was able to show that it was not. For example, a seminar was shown a 
video of a married couple conversing. At one point, the wife remarked 
that blood was thicker than water, whereupon the husband turned his 
head away. The members of the seminar assumed that the husband was 
angry because the wife had implied that her relatives were more important 
than he. One viewer knew the parties in question, however; consequently, 
he was able to give quite a different interpretation of this scene. Knowing
276 Understanding Psychotic Speech
the family dynamics, he demonstrated that the wife was complimenting 
the husband, indicating that he was as much blood to her family as she 
was because he shared her concern for them. When the husband turned 
away, far from being in anger, he was being modest, turning aside when 
complimented.
[6] R hoda: Propositions as Reference Points.
As a working guide towards establishing what a given patient is refer­
ring to, Labov and Fanshel isolated potential conflicts between Rhoda 
and her mother. They operated under the assumption that anorexics 
stop eating as a way of defying authority, in this instance, the mother. As 
they emphasize, nobody knows how to make someone eat if they don’t 
want to. Whether or not all anorexics become that way as a defiance of 
authority, such as may be embodied in a mother, I do not know, but that 
Rhoda had a severe problem dealing with her mother is undeniable. As 
the section shows, one evidence of that is her strategies for mitigating 
requests to her mother.
Labov and Fanshel isolated several topics that Rhoda refers to which 
clearly are causing conflict. One way one can tell that these are central to 
Rhoda’s conflict is her direct mention accompanied with the implied 
request for approval,
4. I don’t . . .  know, whether . . .  I —I think I did—the right thing,
jistalittle situation came up___an’ I tried to uhm . . .  well, try to . . .  use
what I —what I ’ve learned here, see if it worked” (p. 363)
She goes on to explain that her mother, as in the past, has gone to her 
sister Phyllis’s house to babysit, leaving Rhoda at home to care for the 
house, a task which Rhoda finds too difficult as she is also attending 
school. The opener, “I don’t know whether I did the right thing,” means 
“did I do the right thing?” It is a way of asking for confirmation, 
otherwise why mention it at all, much less mention it with a disclaimer 
that shows doubt? She does understand clearly that the sessions are to 
teach her to deal more effectively with her mother.
Labov and Fanshel isolate several recurring propositions in Rhoda’s 
therapeutic session, a partial list of which is (not their words):
• The patient should gain insight into his or her own emotions.
• One should express one’s needs and emotions to relevant others.
• Rhoda’s6 obligations are greater than her capacities.
• Rhoda is a student who has a primary responsibility to study.
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Labov and Fanshel term these, respectively, the propositions of 
{INSIGHT},{S}, {STRN}, and {STU D-X} (notation theirs). By isolating 
these propositions, they often can relate comments in the therapeutic 
interview to these, showing how frequently they are alluded to as well as 
justifying their interpretation of what she meant. For instance, 4 above 
refers to the propositions of {INSIGHT}, {S}, and {STRN} as the situation 
that came up was her mother’s remaining at Phyllis’s house too long, 
leaving Rhoda to cope at home and what Rhoda did was call her mother. 
She had the dual task of letting her mother know that the mother was 
shirking her responsibility and that Rhoda herself could not cope. What 
made this especially difficult is that Rhoda did not want to mention that 
she couldn’t cope because part of the conflict with her mother was that 
the mother felt that Rhoda was not competent.
Clearly, the propositions become identified through a series of inter­
views Labov and Fanshel (1977, p. 149) insist that any abstract structures 
that the therapist claims should be equally available to a native speaker. 
What they are saying is that the strategies for interpretation in a clinical 
setting are not different from those in ordinary interactions. The differ­
ence is that, in daily interacting, much of what is said is evanescent, 
simply reacted to. Certainly, interactors do remember prior dealings 
with each other and judge others’ motives or worth on that basis. In the 
therapeutic situation, participants ruminate on the entire history of the 
sessions themselves, correlating them with the patient’s personal history 
and present situation as revealed in the course of therapy. Still, normal 
modes of analyzing speech are not abandoned even in psychotherapy.
These normal modes do include such matters as taking into account 
the ways that preconditions for making statements lead us to interpret. 
We have already seen that a statement will evoke a response of an answer 
to a question if the conditions for questioning are met. Labov and 
Fanshel demonstrate that elaboration of comments must be principled, 
verifiable by appeal to ordinary language behaviors. They provide detailed 
arguments for their interpretations and stress that to expand the full 
meaning of an utterance, including what was not overtly stated, one must 
draw upon the whole body of shared knowledge that can be recovered 
from all the therapeutic interviews. These should include conversations 
between the therapist and client. This, of course, mirrors the meaning 
that we get in ordinary daily interactions. If we presume different strate­
gies in the therapeutic situation, we are in the strange position of asserting 
that once one retreats behind the therapist’s door, all normal speech 
practices are subject to idiosyncratic change.
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As we have seen, part of the meaning of any linguistic production is 
constrained by the intent or motive we attribute to the producer. Truly, 
the purpose of the therapeutic interview certainly helps determine the 
topics of conversation and what is made of them, but the strategies for 
understanding what is meant from what is said are quite ordinary. As we 
saw in Chapter 6, it is rarely appropriate for somebody to say absolutely 
everything he or she means. Because so much meaning is hinted at 
rather than directly encoded we usually have to expand on what is said 
to get the actual meaning. This expansion constitutes a derivation of 
meaning. As such, it includes the kinds of “filling-in” of omissions of 
repetitions already seen, knowledge of utterance pairs and other discourse 
devices, reference to topic at hand, all of the modes of inference we have 
seen, references to context, even kinesics and paralinguistics.
Labov and Fanshel maintain that expansion can be open-ended, but 
their own explanations remain quite close to the bone. If we confine our 
interpretation to what can be expanded from given utterances, we do 
find natural bounds. What does happen—and should—is that subse­
quent interviews might call for reinterpretation of previous ones. The 
important thing is that expansions derive from the ordinary meanings of 
what has been said, not from a preexisting theory of what someone must 
be meaning.
[7] T h e Many Faces of Resistance.
In traditional psychoanalysis, we frequently saw the antithesis of the 
the give and take we call conversation. There was no negotiation of 
meaning. Rather, the therapist told the analysand what the latter meant. 
If the analysand objected or misunderstood, then he or she was consid­
ered to be in a stage of resistance. This ended when the analysand finally 
accepted the therapist’s interpretations and learned to utilize the same 
terminology as the analyst.
Labov and Fanshel (1977, pp. 34, 306) depict a patient as resisting 
therapy by denying the strength of her emotions as well as by not 
following the therapist’s advice. Thus, for instance, they assume that when 
Rhoda says she was bothered she was using a euphemism for the truth, 
that she was angry. They consider such euphemizing to be a mitigation 
of her real feelings, hence, to be a way of resisting therapy. This conclu­
sion is reinforced because she precedes bothered by just, a further mitigator. 
The patient, Rhoda is being treated for anorexia, a result apparently of 
the power play between her and her mother.
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They also claim that an even more extreme form of resistance is for a 
patient to resort to saying nothing at all, something which Rhoda also 
does at certain times, admitting that in a therapeutic situation, unlike 
ordinary conversations, the therapist is “ . . .  sometimes able to say more 
definitely what another person feels than that person can say himself.” 
This can be extremely threatening of course. Traditionally it has been 
assumed that the patient cannot yet admit the truth because his or her 
feelings would be too intolerably intense if he or she did. This is 
undeniable, but there may be other reasons for such resistance as well. 
The operative term here is as well. It seems to me that there can be 
several reasons for apparent resistance and that they may operate 
concurrently, serially, or singly.
It seems to me that an alternate reason that patients may resist is that 
they do not agree with the analyst’s interpretation of their feelings, 
feelings which patients certainly must know since only they can feel 
them. Labov and Fanshel (pp. 62-64) term these a- e v e n t s , events known 
to the speaker but not necessarily to another. At times, a patient might 
refuse to talk because the analyst persists in attributing feelings that are 
A-events to the analysand. Then, the analysand, not being believed, 
simply doesn’t talk. Notice that this is not necessarily the cause of 
resistance. It is only possibly the cause. On the one hand, the analysand 
may be seen as simply not being ready for such truths, thereby resisting 
the analyst. On the other hand, the analyst may be wrong.
Labov and Fanshel (p. 36) also comment on the fact that psychoana­
lytic terms like
“interpretation,” “relationship,” “guilt,” “to present oneself,” “working 
relationship,” and so on
are used primarily by the analyst in this situation because the patient 
they are studying is not as “mature” as many analysands. This lends 
credence to a suspicion I have long harbored that some of what is called 
resistance is unfamiliarity with the discourse rules of the therapeutic 
interview.
Another possibility is that the patient has not yet learned the jargon of 
analysis. Clearly, one goal of analysis is to teach the analysand to label 
his or her feelings with the distancing terms of analysis. There is no a 
p riori reason to label one’s relationship with one’s mother as a “working 
relationship” or to say of one’s persona that one “presents oneself as . . .  ” 
Language is eminently paraphrasable, as we have seen.
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There are other ways that patients have to learn how to have therapy. 
Wooton (1975, p. 70) cites a good example
5. Patient: I ’m a nurse but my husband won’t let me work.
Therapist: How old are you?
Patient: Thirty-one this December.
Therapist: What do you mean, he won’t let you work?
Here, the patient answers the psychiatrist’s first question as if it were 
bona fide, a real-world question. The psychiatrist was not really asking 
her age, however. He was trying to lead her to see that she should be 
making up her own mind, that she is old enough to do so. The patient 
did not yet realize that the goal of the therapist’s questions are rarely 
factual information. Rather, they are intended to aid in a process of 
self-discovery.
In sum, resistance—or what appears to be resistance—is not necessar­
ily a unitary phenomenon. The patient may not yet be able to handle the 
power of emotions that would surface if he or she admitted something, or 
the patient genuinely does not feel what the analyst says he or she should 
be feeling, the patient may be uneasy in the situation having been made 
to feel that he or she is a fool in prior sessions, or that the patient either 
hasn’t yet figured out what the analytic jargon is or has not yet figured 
out the modus operandi of the therapeutic session.
[8] M itigating.
The traditional explanation for resistance, that it would prove too 
painful for the patient if he or she got too close to the truth, is probably 
also valid. There are truths too painful for many of us to acknowledge 
even outside of the therapeutic situation. It is well-known that many 
social routines are couched in a mitigating fashion. For instance, rather 
than saying, “Shut the door!” to one of our colleagues, we would more 
likely couch the command as a request, even a pleading one, like “Please 
shut the door” or, “Would you please shut the door?” Similarly, language 
abounds in other kinds of mitigating words and phrases commonly used 
to soften assertions, such as “I may be wrong, b u t. . .  ”; “This might 
sound silly, bu t. . .  ”7
Labov and Fanshel are very aware of mitigation used both in softening 
assertions, as above and in reporting one’s feelings as well. They give an 
exceptionally apt example (p. 96) while demonstrating that a rule of
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interaction could be called the “rule of overdue obligations.” This is 
alluded to whenever one reminds another of something that should or 
should not have been done. Therefore, Rhoda phones her mother and 
asks, “When do you plan to come home?” rather than, “When are you 
coming home?” If she had not used the word plan (p. 50), her question to 
her mother could have been taken as a challenge, meaning, in effect, 
“You belong at home and you’ve been staying at my sister’s long enough.” 
The word plan makes it sound as if the mother not only has full author­
ity to do as she wishes, but that it is she, not Rhoda, who is determining 
the length of the stay (Labov and Fanshel p. 50, 96.) Not only has Rhoda 
avoided challenging her mother by mitigating with plan, but she has also 
downplayed her own need to have her mother home. That is, Rhoda 
tries to mitigate the fact that she cannot indeed cope without her mother.
[9] How Shall a Discourse Be Understood: T h e Case of Carrie.
The therapeutic situation does provide its own special contexts, includ­
ing an uncovering of personal histories that do impinge on meaning. As 
we have seen, all utterances are abbreviations for meaning in that they 
assume certain cultural and personal shared knowledge, as well. The 
question arises of when extraordinary measures are justified in interpreting 
a discourse. Remember that only some schizophrenics display structurally 
abnormal speech, and of those, most use structurally normal speech 
when not in the throes of a schizophrenic bout. We are entitled to adopt 
extraordinary measures only when speech is clearly deviant in structure. 
Then exegesis must proceed on the basis of similarity of sentence structure 
to normal possible productions and only to the extent that such matchings 
can be made. If the speech is nondeviant in structure, then, in the 
absence of strong case history or contextual clues, it should be interpreted 
in the same way as a nonschizophrenic person’s would.
If the context simply does not fit what has been said, then one is 
justified in searching further for special meanings. If what is said is 
structurally abnormal, then one must try to compare it with the closest 
linguistic structure that seems to fit the situation. One can be guided by 
the voluminous research on the forms of slips of the tongue and speech 
produced by those with known injuries to the brain. If it still cannot be 
understood, we must admit simply that we don’t know what the subject 
was trying to say. If the utterance appears to be structurally normal, but 
is highly obscure, we might still suspect disruption in communicative
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ability, including such problems as lapses in the ability to monitor 
another’s reactions, to paraphrase what one has just said so that the 
hearer can understand, or to judge what is necessary to provide in order 
to allow the co-conversationalist to hone in on what one is trying to 
communicate. None of these skills in inconsiderable, and all are requi­
site to successful comprehension.
As an illustration of the above points, it is fruitful to consider a 
virtually classic case of psychoanalytical interpretation, in this instance 
guided by the tenets of Harold Searles. This particular case was chosen 
for illustration because the authors of the study discussed below, Mary 
Seeman and Howard Cole (1977), were unusually explicit in delineating 
why they interpreted as they did (Chaika 1981). They presented the 
discourse of Carrie, a twenty-nine-year-old diagnosed schizophrenic, 
along with their gloss of that discourse. It must be emphasized that their 
interpretations are quite solidly in the tradition in which they were 
trained and, within that tradition, their analysis was both sensitive and 
sound.
It must be emphasized that, at the time of Seeman and Cole’s investi­
gation,8 there was little reason to delve into the linguistic literature on 
discourse analysis. With the exception of Labov and Fanshel’s ground- 
breaking study which was published the same year as Seeman and Cole s, 
the linguistic literature was largely hobbled by sentence grammars. Dis­
course considerations were still being labeled pragmatics. Linguistics at 
that point was just beginning to show its efficacy and relevance to 
psychiatric research. There are psychiatrists and clinical psychologists 
who still doubt the value of an interloping researcher from the field 
of linguistics. If nothing else, however, the comparison presented here 
at least shows how far one’s assumptions can take one in what one 
comprehends.
Seeman and Cole’s (1977) analysis was chosen because the authors were 
unusually explicit in showing exactly what they were interpreting, how 
they interpreted it, and why. Also, felicitously, they provided compara­
tive data which examined the speech of one patient produced under the 
same conditions within the same experimental context. This provided a 
sharpness of focus so that the central issue of how a discourse should be 
interpreted would not be lost.
They used as their authority the analyst Harold Searles, a practice 
dating from Freud. That is, they applied Harold Searles’ guide to what a 
schizophrenic means given the nature of the illness to what Carrie
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actually said in the interviews. In contrast, Carrie’s utterances are here 
compared with those gathered from ostensible normals in naturalistic 
settings. This comparison suggests that Carrie’s speech, for the most 
part, is nondeviant, therefore, in my judgment, not amenable to extraor­
dinary interpretation.
We have already seen that there is high interjudge reliability as to the 
schizophrenicity of some discourse (Maher, McKeon, and McLaughlin 
1966). Nancy Andreasen’s widely used diagnostic criteria rest primarily 
on such shared perceptions of speech.
Seeman and Cole apparently address themselves to the well-known 
fluctuation of schizophrenic speech disability. They (p. 283) explain that 
“interpersonal intimacy” is threatening to schizophrenics. The purpose 
of their study was to “illustrate with verbatim speech samples the daily 
progression of change” showing that the patient becomes more and more 
disorganized in her speech as intimacy increases. To this end, they 
devised an ingenious study in which they had Carrie meet with a first- 
year medical student, John, for daily discussion of neutral topics such as 
fashions and learning a foreign language (Seeman and Cole 1977, p. 284). 
In their article, the authors present excerpted samples from the corpus 
they obtained. The capital letters represent Seeman and Cole’s own 
numbering of the speech samples.
They judge this monologue as being inscrutable, saying that she 
[Carrie] switches topic constantly, talks in riddles and ambiguities, aban­
dons the rules of grammar so that it is impossible to know what she is 
referring to (Seeman and Cole 1977, p. 289).
(A)[Carrie’s discourse]
You know what the experiment is 
geared to find is how vulnerable, I 
guess, and you know, if you get close 
to this person and how you feel about 
it and some pretty basic questions 
like it may have something to do 
with psychiatry, I don’t. I’m begin­
ning to think psychiatry is rather old- 
fashioned, you know there are young 
people on Yonge Street selling books 
about, I don’t even how to label them, 
but there are new ways for man cop­
ing with the environment and the
[Seeman and Cole’s commentary]
The whole segment can be taken to 
mean: Do you like me, and if you 
do, that puts me in an intolerable 
position. And if you don’t, that’s 
unbearable. There seems to be no 
solution.
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people in it. And I haven’t got into 
that but, I don’t know I, I just, like, 
you have your set ways of doing things 
and you’re in control. You know and 
you’re talking about yourself person­
ally yesterday, you know, and I walked 
out of here yesterday and I didn’t 
really have any feeling at all. It was 
kind of like a release. I like people 
to confide in me, but, like, where is 
it going? What, it must serve some 
purpose, I don’t have any theories 
about it. All I know is what I do get 
involved with people and it usually 
ends the same way I, I become very 
angry and you know something, well 
not always, but I always get taken, I 
get sucked in, you know, and I, I was 
just immobilized last night I didn’t 
accomplish anything and here again 
today I, I haven’t accomplished any­
thing and I thin it’s a hang-up I have 
got with you but I, I don’t think I’m 
alone maybe maybe it’s your hang-up 
too, I, I really don’t know. But I do 
get involved in, with and when some­
one tells me I want to help out, and I 
want also to give something of myself 
like I’m older than you like I would 
like to give you some of my own 
insights and I, I don’t know if it’s 
appropriate what are we talking about 
what is it we’re talking about? We’re 
just talking about relationships and 
they’re different, you’re a man and 
I’m a woman and I guess I identified 
a bit with your girlfriend because 
I ’ve done that with my boyfriend.
(B) Yeah, I don’t like this book, uhm, 
there’s a dictionary that I was think­
ing of buying. It’s 75 cents. I might
This means: I could be like the dic­
tionary bright, compact and precise, 
but why should I put out such an
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buy it just for my own use but it’s 
very compact and it’s just it’s yellow 
and red, you know, it’s very compact 
and precise. It’s too bad in a way. I 
was, I was thinking of buying it but 
you know, I kind of resented having 
to pay out money you know.
(C ) . . .  time when I first moved into 
the house, my landlord and land­
lady had me down to dinner and I 
was using the living language course 
which is different and I was using 
the words of (Italian) and going along 
with it. But that was when I first 
moved in. They haven’t invited me 
down for dinner for a while so, and I 
when I get angry at someone I just 
shut their language out the way I 
shut them out, you know, and it’s 
reflected in the way I shut them out, 
you know, and it’s reflected in the 
way I ’m learning it.
(D) I think I became jealous of the 
relationship the landlady has with the 
lady on the second floor. They seem 
to be really good friends, you know, 
and I feel kind of out of it. Some­
times I get awfully mad in my room 
listening to them talk, you know, and 
I was sure she, they were talking about 
me one day, that much I know, I can 
pick up when I ’m being talked about 10
[10] T h e Bounds of M eaning.
effort? I don’t know if you’re worth 
it. The displacement and identifica­
tion with an inanimate object is char­
acteristic of Carrie (cf Searles p. 122) 
“ . . .  it is nonhuman roles which pre­
dominate, more than any . . .  human 
ones in the life of the child who even­
tually develops schizophrenia.”
Both passages (C) and (D) seemed 
out of context to John and he could 
not comprehend the vehemence with 
which they were spoken. Carrie seems 
preoccupied by the question of how 
important John is to her. As in the 
dictionary segment she seems to be 
wondering whether he is worth the 
effort. This makes the suspiciousness 
of the last two segments understand­
able. To quote Searles again (p. 125) 
‘‘That the paranoid individual expe­
riences the plot. . .  as centering on 
himself is in part a reaction to his 
being most deeply threatened lest he 
be as insignificant as outside every­
one else’s awareness, as he himself, 
with his severe repression of his own 
dependent feelings, tends to regard 
other individuals as being (1977, 
pp. 287-288).
Carrie’s words seem to mean something quite different from Seeman and 
Cole’s translation of them. This, in itself, does not necessarily invalidate 
the interpretations, however. It is well-known that the force or meaning of 
an utterance may be quite different from the literal meaning of the words 
used, but when this occurs, we can point to general discourse practices.
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In contrast, the Freudian theory of communication assumes that virtu­
ally anything a patient says is subject to special interpretation and that 
this interpretation can be given only by those with specialized training. 
These interpretations differ greatly from whatever the ordinary meaning 
would be. Moreover, there is no check on what the analyst says the 
utterance means. In such a system, yes can mean “no,” good  can mean 
“bad,” boy can mean “girl,” and “there’s a dictionary I was thinking of 
buying. . . ” can mean “I could be like the dictionary.. . . ” Certainly, 
what people say is not always what they mean. Certainly, much of what 
people say means something quite different from what it literally says. 
However, the problem still remains of what constitutes a normal and 
usual decoding of someone else’s speech, what constitutes a justifiable 
construing and what does not. Examination of discourse under a wide 
variety of conditions has provided us with some guidelines for determin­
ing what is and what is not a justifiable rendering of another’s meaning. 
Before considering these, however, let us look at the properties of nor­
mal spoken discourse as this impacts on the question of is and what is not 
deviant.
[11] Deviance in Discourse.
Discourse analysis by linguists or philosophers is based upon the 
speech of normals. By normal, I mean usual, unremarkable, not apparently 
deviant because of drugs, illness, injury, or other incapacitation. Notice 
that normal can also refer to the deaf10 or those who stutter or lisp, as 
these populations may still both give and get meaning by usual strategies. 
The question is, what constitutes normal speech? We have already seen 
that laypersons mistake written language as being real language, not 
being aware that normal oral language is loaded with hesitations, false 
starts, and errors. The ear somehow smooths these out in ordinary 
conversations, so that when written transcripts are produced of actual 
speech, the effect on many people is that they think the speech is 
abnormally disjointed or defective.
Seeman and Cole overtly claim (p. 288) that they interpret her speech 
as they do because she is a schizophrenic. Their reasoning seems to be 
“Since Carrie is diagnosed as a schizophrenic, her speech is schizophrenic, 
and should be interpreted according to special rules of schizophrenic 
discourse as explicated by interpreters like Searles. “Such a belief regards 
all the speech produced by a diagnosed schizophrenic to be deviant, and,
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therefore, to necessitate interpretation by other than normal means. The 
reason for my assumption that Seeman and Cole would consider any­
thing said by a diagnosed schizophrenic to be aberrant, therefore liable 
to exceptional interpretation, is that all the samples they present of 
Carrie’s speech are quite normal and easily interpreted by normal decoding 
strategies. That is, there is no other a priori reason to assume that Carrie 
is saying anything more of less or different than what her sentences 
would mean if produced by a normal.
Compared to spontaneous speech at, say, an academic seminar, Carrie’s 
speech, as reported in Seeman and Cole (1977), is remarkably lucid and 
well-formed. “Spontaneous speech in the raw can be very raw indeed” 
(Clark and Clark 1977, p. 260). The more difficult the ideas to encode, 
the rawer the speech” the more false starts, filled and unfilled pauses, 
erroneous lexical choices, and assorted slips of the tongue. If each 
phrase, so far as it goes, is of normal structure, if each slip of the tongue 
is explicable in terms of that structure, and all is subordinated to an 
inferable topic appropriate to the occasion, then the speech is most likely 
normal (Chaika 1974, 1976, 1977; VanDijk, 1977: 121, 134.) Language is so 
constructed that encoding of ideas need only be exact enough so that 
hearers can infer what is meant. There are many kinds of difficulty 
which can lead to raw speech: complex ideas, embarrassing, exciting, or 
controversial issues.
For instance, consider this passage from a speaker who is embarrassed 
or uneasy speaking to the police
6. P: Do you know the names of any of these boys?
C: Ahh, gee, I hate—I do? One of them, but I don’t like to say 
anything, you know. (Sharrock & Turner 1978)
C apparently starts to say that he hates to finger any of the boys. Before 
completing the construction, however, speaker breaks off to ask “I do?” as 
if he didn’t know any of the offenders. Then, apparently realizing that 
the “I hate” implied an admission of knowledge that could not be 
counteracted by the innocent sounding “I do?” he answers the policeman’s 
question admitting that he does know one of them, finishing with the 
statement he started with, that he hates to give evidence.
The pause-laden speech in 7 arises from what appears to be happy 
excitement from two males talking about an exciting subject, racing 
cars:
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7. ’N challenge Voodoo to a race. I mean the hell with drag strips 
you gotta have ten thous’n bucks ready t’spec—hh I wanna build a 
street machine . . .  It’s a 55 Chevy. It’s bright orange, and it has it 
had hhu lemme tell y’about this car. Hh a three twunny seven Vet in 
it uhyih an’ if wiz, uh, hh dual quads, hh hadda full roller cam 
[pause] four speeds hydrostick.. . .  (Jefferson, 1978, p. 237-238)
In 7, an intrusive thought disrupts the speaker’s sentence “ . . .  ready 
t’spe—hh I wanna build a street machine.” Here the break was right in 
the middle of a word. Later, he stops after has, changes its tense to had, 
then still doesn’t tell us what it has or had. Instead he starts all over with 
“lemme tell y’about this car.” The if  in “ . . .  an if wuz uh . . .  ” seems to be 
a normal slip of the tongue explicable by the phonetic similarity between 
it and if.
Raw speech is not hard to find even from brilliant academics who 
make their living by talking. In 8, we see a sample of spontaneous speech 
about a complex subject (slashes indicate false starts):
8. As far as I know, noone has yet done the/ in a way obvious now 
and interesting problem of [pause] doing a/in a sense of structural 
frequency study of the alternative [pause] syntactical uh/ in a given 
language, say, like English, and how/what their hierarchical [pause] 
probability of occurrence structure is. (Reported in Clark 8c Clark 
1977, p. 260) (from Maclay 8c Osgood 1959, p. 25)
Twice here the speaker starts to utter a noun phrase and twice changes 
his mind after selecting the article, first the and then a.
The literature on discourse analysis abounds with samples of normal 
speech like the three above. Here they are discussed only as a yardstick 
by which to measure Carrie’s speech. Unfortunately, Seeman and Cole 
did not indicate in their data information about pausing or false starts. If 
that information were deleted from the above segments, or, alternatively, 
if slashes or [pause] were inserted in Carrie’s speeches, then the similar­
ity of her speech to the normal samples would be evident. A closer 
examination of where these occur in the normal speech, along with a 
more detailed analysis of Carrie’s, might further indicate the essential 
normalcy of her discourse.
If we assume11 that Carrie’s speech did contain pauses such as those in 
the three samples of normal discourse above, then we see her speech is 
quite normal. One reason we might assume this is that the researchers 
made no reference to her evincing pressured speech, the term used for
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manic and schizophrenic speech that has no pausing and no false starts, 
nor is there evidence of glossomania, which is typically produced with 
no pausing before the chained segments. Since pausing and false starts 
indicate planning stages in speech, that which does not contain them 
appears to be essentially unplanned speech, speech on automatic pilot, 
so to speak.
Pausing during encoding of thoughts (i.e., putting them into words) 
with or without pause fillers like uhh, hu, mmm, you know, and the like is 
normal as is making false starts and slips of the tongue (Fromkin 1973). 
Pausing occurs at the beginning of major constituents in sentences (e.g., 
Boomer 1965; Goldman-Eisler 1958; Rochester, Thurston, and Rupp 
1977) and represents a planning of what is to come next. It is easy to see 
why such pauses might increase as encoding difficulty increases. It is also 
easy to see why speakers disrupt their own sentences. They start to say 
one thing, preplanning to the end of, say, a clause, then realize that their 
wording is not felicitous. Thus they pause, replan, and start over.
Evidence for such planning stages comes from such phenomena as 
slips of the tongue. These most often are an anticipation of a word 
selected during the planning stage (Lashley 1951) or selection of another 
word that belongs in a set with the intended word (Fromkin 1973; Chaika
1977) or a normal intrusion (Dell and Reich 1977) caused by disruption 
in the context. Like pausing, slips seem related to planning and increase 
with excitement and embarrassment. 12
[12] W h at Does Carrie M ean?
One thing to note in the samples of normal speech above is that each 
of the fragments can be restored by English speaking hearers. That is, 
based upon what they know about English and the American culture, 
hearers can with a good degree of certainty, fill in what has been left out 
or correct what has been mis-said. No one needs training in this skill 
(Gleitman, Gleitman, and Shipley 1972). It comes from being a human 
being who has learned a language. This is what is meant by normal 
decoding strategy. It is the tacit understanding that people can do this 
which leads to testing procedures such as the Cloze test which has been 
used to analyze schizophrenic speech (e.g., Salzinger, Portnoy, and Feldman
1978) . Being able to decode imperfect speech allows people to under­
stand young children, those with foreign accents or speech impediments, 
as well as speech produced under noisy conditions. A second thing is
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that all the speech in the above discourses, including errors and false 
starts is subordinated to a general topic, an important feature of normal 
discourse (VanDijk 1977, p. 122; Chaika 1974, p. 275).
Carrie, in common with many younger speakers today, uses “you 
know” as a pause filler. Goldman-Eisler (1961) says that fillers increase 
with heightened emotions. We can see why her emotions may be 
heightened when we consider her situation. Examining Carrie’s speech 
in the light of the well-known fact of the imperfect nature of ordinary 
conversation, it does not seem so incoherent. Indeed, applying the twin 
tests of reconstructability and subordination of utterance to topic to 
Carrie’s speech reveals it to be quite normal. Assuming that it is, it is 
possible to come up with an unstrained gloss of what she meant. Carrie 
appears excited and embarrassed in (A) above when she says
You know what the experiment is geared to find is how vulnerable, I 
guess, and you know, if you get close to this person and how you feel 
about it and some pretty basic questions like it may have something to 
do with psychiatry, I don’t. I ’m beginning to think psychiatry is rather 
old-fashioned, you know there are young people on Yonge Street 
selling books about, I don’t even how to label them, but there are new 
ways for man coping with the environment and the people in i t . . .
Her embarrassment is quite justified since she is telling a medical 
student in a psychiatric hospital that she doubts the efficacy of psychiatry. 
This constitutes a challenge (Labov and Fanshel 1977, pp. 96-98), which 
they define as
. . .  a speech act that asserts or implies a state of affairs that, if true, 
would weaken a person’s claim to be competent in filling the role 
associated with a valued status.
They stress that this does not necessarily mean that the person chal­
lenged will suffer an actual loss of status. The challenge is to the claim 
alone.12
To tell people who have authority by virtue of position and education 
that they do not know what they are talking about is supremely difficult 
for those of lower status, normal or not. It seems to me that the operative 
words in Labov and Fanshel’s definition are valued status. By virtue of 
such status, one should be immune from criticism from subordinates. 
One decides how one fulfills the higher role. That is part of what it 
means to have valued status. Parents, for instance, are considered to have 
the right to rear their children as they see fit. The child has no right to 
tell the parent how the parent should behave. Only “spoiled brats” do
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that. Often adolescents, as part of their ascent into adulthood, do chal­
lenge their parents and other adults in authority. This marks their 
imminent entry into adulthood, a valued status.
Labov and Fanshel (1977, pp. 124-125) analyze Rhoda’s challenge to 
authority. Like Carrie’s challenge, hers was very indirect, but still heard 
as a challenge. As part of her complaint that her mother has stayed too 
long at her sister’s home, she says “Look— uh — I mean y’been there long 
enough.” Labov and Fanshel interpret the look as a way of calling her 
mother’s attention to the fact that Rhoda’s needs aren’t being met. It 
seems more overt a challenge to me. Saying “look” warns the other that 
one’s patience has worn thin. This always signals a challenge. The 
correctness of this interpretation is demonstrated by the especially softened 
language following the look. First there is the weakening pause. This is 
followed by the hesitation marker uh. Then comes the softened phrase “I 
mean,” and then the rest of the challenge. It is a challenge because a 
child ordinarily has no right to tell her mother how long to stay anywhere. 
A major goal of Rhoda’s therapy has been to teach her to stand up to her 
mother. Even so, she challenges by indirection.
Comparing Rhoda’s challenge with Carrie’s, we see a great deal of 
similarity. Rhoda has been taught through therapy to stand up to her 
mother. Carrie has not been taught to stand up to her therapist. To the 
contrary, she is expected to respect his authority. Not surprisingly, her 
challenge to his superior status, shows even more indirection and hedg­
ing than Rhoda’s did. There has been a great deal of evidence amassed 
which demonstrates that women have more difficulty than men in 
criticizing or challenging, especially in male-female situations; therefore, 
they hedge their remarks more than men (Lakoff 1975; Eakins and 
Eakins 1978, pp. 23-52, 66-72). Considering these factors, we are reason­
able in expecting Carrie to have many hesitations, false starts, and filled 
or unfilled pauses in the situation eliciting her speech.
Actually, the comparison of her speech with that of normal males above 
shows she is no less fluent than they are (as has been already noted).
As with the normal speech presented above, Carrie’s false starts are 
readily retrievable. Although she appears to be switching topics constantly, 
her adherence to a general topic and the movement within it seem 
normal in every instance especially when we add dashes to indicate 
probable false starts, and repunctuating to indicate new sentences when­
ever they occur, using the usual convention of periods followed by 
capitals.
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. . .  I ’m beginning to think psychiatry is rather old-fashioned. 
You know, there are new —there are young people on Yonge St. 
selling books about—I don’t even know how to label them, but there 
are new ways for man coping with the environment and the people 
in it. And I haven’t go into that but —I don’t know —I- I just like, you 
have your set ways of doing things and you’re in control.
As she starts to explain why psychiatry is old-fashioned, Carrie stops 
after new. Apparently, a word like ideas was intended, or, as appears later, 
ways. The reason for the hesitation seems straightforward enough. She is 
not sure of the label, and, when she does get the notion coded, it is with a 
whole sentence, “there are new ways for man coping with the environ­
ment and the people in it.” However, she cannot get all this out until she 
has invested these ways with the authority of other people, young people 
and books. In a society which values both youth and newness, to claim 
that youths have new ways, and in a society which values the printed 
word over the spoken, to note that youths and books are promulgating 
new ways, gives the new ways more sanction than if they were something 
that Carrie, a woman and a mental patient, dreamed up. To have just 
continued talking about the new ideas or ways would have placed too 
much of the blame on Carrie herself. Besides, the appeal to authority is 
always more convincing. Just look at the references in scholarly articles 
even for quite mundane and self-evident notions. If someone else said it 
or wrote it, it makes it better than if we have stated it all by ourselves.
Carrie herself explains why she stopped after about. She doesn’t have a 
ready label for the concepts which in her opinion are rendering psychia­
try old-fashioned. What is important is that the discourse strategy she 
employs, a false start, followed by “I don’t even know how to label them,” 
is entirely usual, one we have all probably used at one time or another. 
Common paraphrases are “I forget it/his/her/ name.” “I don’t know the 
word for it,” “you know what I mean,” or even “whatchamacallit.”
T he next set of false starts is especially interesting.
And I haven’t got into that b u t , - I  don’t know I , - I ju s t,- lik e , 
—you have your set ways of doing things and you’re in control. You 
know—and you’re talking about yourself personally yesterday, —you 
know, —and I walked out of here yesterday and I didn’t really have 
any feeling at all. It was kind of like a release. I like people to 
confide in me, —but, —like,—where is it going?
These, as a set, imply that she disagrees with the student and the 
psychiatrists that he is representing. Again, this is a normal strategy, a
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way of letting the other person know that you disagree without your 
actually doing so in overt words. The passage may look disjointed, 
appearing as it does in an orthography which normally admits of no 
false starting, but when read aloud, it does not sound particularly 
disjointed.
It is significant that the hesitations and false starts cluster at the point 
at which one would expect Carrie to be stating that she is disillusioned 
with psychiatry. “I haven’t got into that but . . . ” seems like a normal 
entry into “the new approaches that might be better than psychiatry,” or 
some such paraphrase thereof. Instead, Carrie stops after the but, the 
word which leads one to expect a disclaimer. Then she demurs with the 
feminine “I don’t know” (Lakoff 1975, pp. 15-17) which has the effect of 
softening any assertion. She starts giving her opinion again, saying “I,” 
then starting all over again with “I just.” This just is similar in force to 
the preceding but which initiated this string of false starts. It announces 
that she holds an opinion different from the establishment’s as if she 
were trying to say “I just don’t believe in you anymore.” This is not to say 
that those were necessarily the next words she intended, but that the just 
in the given context does have the force of a disclaimer, and she has 
previously voiced doubt about the efficacy of psychiatry. She stops short 
of having to put herself overtly on the line, although she has signaled 
enough for us to infer what she is getting at.
The like following the false start “I just” is often used in precisely the 
way Carrie uses it to mean “what follows is not a direct expression of 
what I mean, but I ’m finding it difficult to say exactly what I mean.” In 
one afternoon’s office hours, I collected these samples, all from female 
students, all in far less socially precarious positions than Carrie.
9. I don’t know, but—like, I can’t get my act together ever since I got 
back from Spain.
10. Yeah, like — like — it’s interesting, y’know
11. . . . -like,—now I got rid of him, like—I dunno I just feel —I 
found myself.
What Carrie does is most interesting, and most skillful. She has set her 
hearer up for criticism of psychiatry; then, without really giving that 
criticism, she tells John, “You have your set ways of doing things.” That 
is, even if other things are better, you’d not be likely to change your 
mind. “And you’re in control” seems to mean just that. He is in control of 
the situation and himself. Interestingly, the authors themselves stress the
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businesslike air of the student (p. 284) confirming Carrie’s perceptions.
The thesis of the Seeman and Cole paper is to show how Carrie’s 
speech becomes more disorganized as she feels the “intimacy of the daily 
meetings” (p. 289). In a large sense, this is undoubtedly true. Intimacy 
makes Carrie dare to question her therapists, but the daring does not 
extend to her speaking her mind openly. Surely, there is veiled meaning 
in her words, but the kinds of veiled meaning and the ways she expresses 
it seem wholly usual and normal, conforming to regular discourse 
strategies. She is cognizant of social situation, and, contrary to expecta­
tion (Rochester and Martin 1977; Rochester, Martin, and Thurston 1977) 
gives the listener ample information to know what she is referring to.
Unlike the passages just discussed, the rest of Carrie’s speech is straight­
forward if one decodes it as one would normal speech. Her topic at the 
outset of (A) is the experiment in which she is a participant. She is 
correct that this experiment is to see if her speech becomes disorganized 
as the topic become more personal. Seeman and Cole (p. 284) had told 
her this. In other words, as Carrie says, the experiment is to see how 
vulnerable she is. She is also correct in assuming the experiment has 
something to do with psychiatry. This is the lead-in to the indirect, but 
recoverable critique of psychiatry that we just saw. As part of this critique, 
she complains that the previous day’s session left her devoid of feeling, 
like a release of tension, a common enough aftermath of a talk session, 
but she still doesn’t see the purpose of the sessions.
She continues the monologue with the unfortunately common human 
plaint that she is always the loser in human relations. This does not seem 
to be an inappropriate switch as she is talking about the relations with 
John. The previous night after the, to her, pointless gab fest, she could 
not get anything done, nor does she feel that her talking that day has any 
purpose. She wants to help the experimenters out by participating. Also, 
being older than John, she feels that she should be giving him insights, 
but does not know if that would be appropriate, nor, actually, what she 
and John are talking about. Here I must point out that Carrie is not 
being particularly obtuse. Nowhere in the transcription is there any 
indication that John has responded to anything she has said. Apparently, 
he just lets her rattle on. This constitutes a highly abnormal situation. 
Normal conversation consists of turn taking (Sacks 1967-71; Jefferson 
1978). Even very normal confident people find it upsetting to be in a 
situation where they are supposed to be carrying on a conversation and 
the other person doesn’t carry the ball. If one adds to this normal
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discomfort, the social convention that it is up to the female to draw the 
male out and to keep the ball rolling in social situations, especially in 
one-on-one occasions like dates, Carries’ speech is all the more normal. 
The situation she finds herself in with John is the same as if she were his 
girlfriend. In short, John’s failure to take his rightful turns in the conver­
sation such as answering Carrie’s questions forces her to fill up the 
silence with a monologue. She is obeying normal everyday conventions 
of our society13 when she does so.
Carrie’s comments about the dictionary are also amenable to quite 
ordinary meaning rather ordinarily phrased. These occur in the context 
of her attempts to teach John a foreign language (Seeman and Cole 1977, 
p. 287) Many people have ambivalent feelings about buying books and 
her wording about this ambivalence seems unremarkable.
Carrie’s feeling that the landlady and the other tenant are talking 
about her (passages C and D) may be paranoid, but the structure of the 
language she uses to express that feeling is perfectly normal. It is 
puzzling, however, that John could not comprehend the vehemence with 
which Carrie’s complaint was spoken (p. 287). Even normal people get 
angry if they feel that they are being snubbed for no good reason, and 
even normals are jealous of friendships between people who exclude 
them.
Many might object that as a schizophrenic, Carrie’s speech must be 
interpreted differently from that of normals. In other words, the diagnosis 
determines the meaning. If she had not been diagnosed as schizophrenic, 
then her words could be taken to mean something entirely different from 
what they mean in light of a diagnosis. In essence, those who feel that the 
prior diagnosis determines the mode of interpretation claim that they 
are among those with a key to it, a key supplied by Freud, Sullivan, 
Searles, or another analyst.
In contrast, my interpretations of Carrie’s speech depend on the assump­
tion that anyone using English is using it in the same way as normals do 
provided it has normal structure. There may be deviant schizophrenic 
speech just as there is deviant aphasic speech or heavily accented speech 
or imperfect toddler speech. However, all such speech, if interpretable at 
all, is interpretable only if the hearer can match the deviation with the 
nearest possible rules which produces an utterance appropriate to the 
given context (Clark and Clark 1977, pp. 211-215).
John Searle (1975, p. 63, 73) says that one assumes that someone 
speaking to us is cooperating in the conversation so that his/her remarks
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are intended to be relevant. This does not mean that speakers don’t 
lie, do not use language metaphorically, or do not use one utterance 
to imply something different from, what is said. Speakers do all of 
these things but lying, metaphor, and implicature are all rooted in 
normal uses of language and the shared conventions of speakers of a 
particular language. For instance, when someone lies, he or she depends 
on the hearer’s understanding of the lie to mean what it normally does. 
That is, the lie does not consist of unusual uses of the words in the 
utterance. To the contrary, it depends upon a normal reading of the 
words. If Max says, “I didn’t cut the meat with a cleaver” when in 
fact he did, the lie is not in the negative -n’t. T he lie works only if 
the hearer interprets -n’t as usual, as a denial.
To assume that some conversations must be interpreted by extraordi­
nary means is to assume that the incredibly complex sets of rules which 
enable us to handle human language, both as a system in itself and as a 
social system, can be wholly altered by one class of persons, the mentally 
ill. As John Searle (1975, p. 67) said in a somewhat different content, 
“ . . .  an ordinary application of Occam’s razor places the onus of proof 
on those who wish to claim these sentences are ambiguous. One does not 
multiply meanings beyond necessity.” Nor, I hasten to add, does one 
claim idiosyncratic meaning when conventional meaning is retrievable 
by conventional means and fits the social context.
Then, too, to assume that schizophrenics abandon the usual meanings 
of words without clear evidence such as semantic anomaly raises some 
very sticky questions. If the schizophrenic’s meaning can be so very 
far removed from normals, how does anyone know what the schizo­
phrenic means? At what point in a patient’s illness does one suspend 
the normal rules of decoding and substitute the schizophrenic ones? At 
what point in remission does one abandon the schizophrenic interpreta­
tions and go back to the ones shared by other speakers? Or is the schizo­
phrenic’s speech always governed by the rules of schizophrenia? If 
so, should these rules be applied retroactively, say, perhaps, to five 
years before the visible onset of illness? Or does one start interpret­
ing differently at the precise moment when schizophrenic illness is 
diagnosed?
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1Jones also had a great impact on literary criticism by psychoanalysis of such 
figures as Hamlet, claiming, for instance, that Hamlet was suffering from a severe 
Oedipus complex.
2A major problem with this view of language is that it seems improbable that 
language could have evolved as a means of an intensely personal system of communi­
cation to be utilized to express cryptically one’s unconscious thoughts. Language 
had to have been developed as communication in social relations, and there is no 
actual evidence that it has evolved further to act as Freud and his followers assert.
3A major problem with this view of language is that it seems improbable that 
language could have evolved as a means of an intensely personal system of communi­
cation to be utilized to express cryptically one’s unconscious thoughts. Language 
had to have been developed as communication in social relations, and there is no 
actual evidence that it has evolved further to act as Freud and his followers assert.
4The literature on aphasias and normal speech errors report errors made because 
of intrusions of related words. In normals, however, these never take the form of 
chaining of related words, and in aphasia, if chaining does happen, it is rare. It is 
not a usual occurrence as it is in speech disordered schizophrenics.
5I am aware of studies by Singer and Wynne and others that tendencies towards 
glossomania can be found in close relatives of schizophrenics and in those at risk for 
the disease, but this means that whatever causes schizophrenia causes the glossomania. 
Not all schizophrenics can be shown to come from such families, however, nor has it 
been shown that all members of schizogenic families create associational chains. The 
enormous literature on language acquisition does not offer any parallels to children 
learning to speak in such a deviant fashion. Rather, it has been shown that they 
speak like their peers. Children from families of foreign speakers do not themselves 
speak with a foreign accent.
6They actually couch these as “X’s obligations. . . ” and use the masculine pro­
noun as in “his capacities.” It is very obvious that they are speaking of Rhoda. In 
general, however, Labov almost always uses the masculine pronoun as generic to 
include a female even when he is speaking of a female.
7Such mitigators seem to be used more by women than by men, although men in 
the weaker position in an interaction may use them as much as women (O’Barr 1982; 
Lakoff 1972, 1975).
8Actually, their investigation and subsequent articles about it must have taken 
place well before the publication date.
10The manual languages of the deaf have been shown to be structured remarkably 
like oral languages and they make slips-of-the-hand in a manner parallel to slips-of- 
the-tongue. Likewise, the deaf may suffer from aphasia in which case they make 
analogous errors to the speech errors of hearing aphasics. I know of one bit of 
anecdotal evidence that schizophrenic deaf patients may produce the counterpart to 
oral gibberish in their sign language.
11Perhaps it should be noted that I have had personal correspondence with Dr. 
Seeman about her studies of Carrie and she did not contradict my assumption that 
Carrie’s speech had pausing and false starts.
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12The reader should be aware that Labov and Fanshel provide a detailed and 
precise anatomy of what constitutes a challenge and why, along with precise mathe­
matically precise rules to characterize challenges and the other speech events that 
they explain. It must be remembered that their book is not so broad in its presenta­
tion as this one is, but their work makes up for breadth in depth. In this work, space 
does not permit a full a rendering of their rules. Nor would a nonlinguist necessar­
ily find these of practical help. However, and this cannot be stressed enough, their 
careful attention to proving what something can reasonably be assumed to mean is 
invaluable, and this can be understood without re-creation of their meticulous set of 
rules. In this book, I present their methods and conclusions only, but I urge the 
reader to dip into their work.
13Societies vary greatly in this matter. Americans and Canadians typically feel 
that one must “keep the ball rolling” with chitchat, but in other societies, such as 
many Native American ones and the working-class Irish in Belfast, long silences are 
perfectly companionable (Chaika 1989, p. 107).
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allophones 116
am biguity 84, 117, 1 5 9 , 167, 178, 229, 257 
analysis (psycho-) (see psychoanalysis) 
anaphora 123, 124, 128, 132, 144, 145, 255, 257, 
261
schizophrenic use of 144 
and, tem poral and additive 141 
anger 85
anticipatory slip  12 
antonym s 1 5 ,  19, 20, 22, 23, 269 
and glossom ania 23 
aphasia and schizophrenia 7, 52 
aphorism  79 
apology 154 
appeal to authority  294 
articles, d efinite  vs indefinite 121, 250 
articulation 88 
assertion, softening 295 
associational chain ing 13, 32, 64, 66 (also see 
glossom ania or chaining) 
associative networks
and eye pursuit movem ent 44 
assonance 74 
assumed fam iliarity 262 
attentional deficits 16, 45, 147, 185, 212 
autism 155
autom atic processes 14 
interference from 43
avoidance 267 (also see therapeutic situation)
Background 188 
beat 74
behaviorism  65, 74, 80, 104, 117, 266 
and chain ing 274 
and perception in language 91 
bores 236-237 
brain 74
brand new inform ation 262-264
C arrie 283-285, 290-291, 292-295 
case gram m ar 101, 103
and analysis of SD  data 104 
castration fears 267 
cataphora 123 
cause and effect 210 
om ission of 172 
chain ing
phonetics 13, 24, 32, 36, 79, 136, 140 
associational 274 
sem antico-syntactic 37 
synonym ic sets 24 
also see glossom ania 
challenge by patient 291-292 
ch ild , as active investigator 70 
choices, effects on language 41 
Chom skyan paradigm  99-100  
circu lar reasoning 55, 62 
circum locution 21 
clang response 17 
clefting  245, 250 
cliches 40
Cloze procedure 39, 291
codes, restricted vs elaborated 186-187
cognition and speech 55-57 , 59, 69,
260
cognitive load 232 
cognitive skills, testing for 67 
cognitive tasks, language-less 59
315
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coherence 120, 125, 131, 139, 147, 173, 214, 
223, 247 
creating 235 
vs cohesion 119
and incoherence of lexical ties 129, 141 
cohesion 94, 119-125, 130-132, 135, 141, 
144-145, 147, 164, 220, 223, 273 
lexical 16, 123 
refrains 36 
collocations 13 
com m on ground 215-219 
com m on knowledge 120, 123, 126, 220 
com m unication failure 120 
com m unicative ability 283 
com paratives 121
com petence vs perform ance 63, 81, 262-264 
com ponential analysis and English verbs 21 
com prehension 83, 284 
conclusions 224
concrete language and m etaphor 115 
concrete thinking 67 
conjunctions 121, 122 
connotation 115, 171 
constituents of a sentence 77 
constraints, lowering of 211 
constructs 65, 96 (also see words) 
context 9 -1 1 , 13, 22, 84 -85 , 100, 107, 132, 139, 
151-152, 159, 161-162, 174, 176, 178, 191, 
216, 226, 247, 281, 293 
and intended m eaning 96 
inventing for sentences 101, 167 
m atching utterance to 96, 101, 164, 270 
context-free gram m ars 84, 85, 161 
contrastive situation 106 
control of linguistic processes 29, 130, 212 
conversation 247, 271, 279, 295 
cognitive load 232 
cooperating in 297 
gam e-theoretic m odel 179 
goal-directed 179 
in therapy 279 
m any topics in 249 
new entries in 225-228 
conversational m axims 163 
co-occurrence restrictions 13 
cooperation 127, 138-139, 188, 190 
cooperative princip le 163 
cospeakers 83, 179, 226 
counterexam ple 99, 100
counting cohesive ties, dangers of 127 
creativity 10, 133-134, 139 
and re-em ploym ent 33 
and rules 87
criticism  and social status 290 
cultural orig ins of learn ing 71
data, accounting for 65, 98 (also see
psychoanalysis, verfiabilitv of ans 
explanation) 
dative 103
decision-theoretic m odel 225 
declaratives as questions 152 
decoding strategies 11-12, 32, 87, 270 
deep structure 99 -101 , 269 
deficits, cognitive 131, 186 
definite one  250 
deixis 112, 121, 124, 255 
delusions 51, 164 
dem onstratives 121 
denials 223
derailm ent 147, 185, 266 
derivation of m eaning, validity of 175 
details, crucial 197 
deviance, judgm ents of 86
and speech dysfunction 56, 116 (also see  SD 
productions)
diagnosis 7, 52, 53, 135, 254 
T D  vs N T D  53, 254
dialect differences in discourse rules 85 
d ialogical entailm ent 178 
dialogue 179, 273 
and the O ther 267 
dictionaries, u nreliability  of 93 
digression 49, 145, 237 
d irect statements 161 
d isclaim er 295
discourse 25, 83, 85 -86 , 88, 100, 110, 119-120, 
125, 151, 221, 227, 223-224, 246, 250, 257, 
265, 281
advancing goal in 227 
analysis of 243 
circu lar m ovem ent 231 
as cryptic 269
and decision-theoretic m odel 177, 227 
deviance in 85-86 , 88, 138, 159, 224, 231, 
246, 256-257, 259, 261, 286, 289 
eliciting  121, 132
Subject Index 317
discou rse (con tin u ed ) 
flow o f 259, 261 
gam e-theoretic m odel o f 177 
genres 86 
goal ch an g in g  227 
gram m ar ru les 265 
m ean in g  247, 269, 286 
n orm al e rro r  in 289 
psychotic 101
sentences in , o ld  to new in form ation  in
259
seq u en tial m odel of 225-228  
d iscou rse strategy 292 
disgust 85
d isord ered  conversation 231 
d isord ered  speech (see speech d isord er) 
d isru p tion s, sch izophrenic 127 
distracted  214 
d ou b le  bind  theory  4, 267 
d ysfluencies (IC S ) 140
ego 268
ego bou ndaries, d efective 268 
eg ocen tric  speech 67 
cu ltu ral variation  in 71 
e llip sis  122, 126, 127, 257 
sch izop hren ic 127 
em pathy, how shown 241-243 , 256 
in IC S  257
en cod in g  d ifficu lties, n orm al 65 
en cod in g  thoughts, preverbal stage 71 
en dop hora 123 
en ta ilm en t 172
error, norm al and schizophrenic 58, 83, 164, 
183, 210, 218-219 , 270 
and co m p rehen sib ility  219 (also see  slips 
o f the tongue) 
eup hem ism  278
excitem ent and stress, effect o f 42 
exegesis 281
exop hora 123, 1 2 4 ,  132, 133, 144-146, 187, 263 
exp an sion , p rin cip led  277 
ex p e rien ce  and m eaning  151 
exp lan atio n , valid  28, 41, 46, 65 
and im p u tin g  o f m otive 41 
ex tern a l speech, ch ild ren ’s 67 
eye pu rsu it m ovem ents 4 4 -4 5 , 190-191  (see 
sacades)
false starts 200, 210, 287, 288, 291. 292.
293
fantasy 164
faulty p ig eon h o lin g  212 
fe licity  co nd ition s 159 
filte rin g  defect 185, 212 
first langu age acq u isition  57 
fixedness in language, lack of 65 (also see  
words)
fram es 101, 103-104, 246
fram e sem antics (see case gram m ar)
Freu dian theory  267 -2 6 8 , 286, 295
function words 95
fuzzy borders 88, 94, 108, 150
g ibb erish  5, 8 -1 2 , 8 7 -8 9 , 91, 116, 133, 135,
1 4 0 ,1 8 5 ,2 0 0 -2 0 1 ,2 0 6 -2 0 7 ,2 5 4 ,2 6 4 ,1 4 0 , 
259
re-em p loym ent o f 6 
conform ing  to p honotactics 43 
given inform ation  250, 258 
erron eou s sig n a llin g  o f 264 
global stru ctures (see m acrostructures) 
g lossolalia  59
glossom ania 13 -14 , 16 -17 , 125, 127, 130, 132, 
134-136, 141, 148, 222-225, 233, 261, 266, 
289
and lex ica l cohesion  as incoherence 129, 
141
as u n con tro lled  process 43 
Forrest’s view of 273 
p u nning in 32
relation  to m ental lex icon  108 
from  sch izophren ic co n d ition  275 
gram m ars 85, 100, 102 
and en ta ilm en t 172-173  
as autom atic process 125 (also see 
d iscourse) 
gram m aticality  127 
ju d g m en ts o f 84, 103
h allu cin atio n s 46, 251, 259 
hed ging  and hesitation  29 1 -2 9 3  
hom osexual panic 267 
hyper-topic 264 
hyponym  201, 209 
hypotheticals 226
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Ice  C ream  Stories (IC S) 6, 17, 131. 134, 
145-146, 183-185, 197, 234 
in terrater re liab ility  137 
and p atient selection  135 
id 268
idea (see thought) 
id iolect 269
illocu tion  153-154, 157-158
and SD  schizophrenic speech 155 
relevant know ledge 159 
im agery 74, 131 
im aginary  worlds 217 
im plication  101, 103, 151, 161, 166-167, 
173-178, 220, 270, 290, 296 
by overstating 151 
and perceived topic 248 
request for approval 277 
incoherence 41, 66, 131, 214, 219, 231-232 (also 
see  C oherence, L exical ties) 
ind irection  291 
ind irect requests
and social ru les 151 
processing tim e 113 
inference 164, 224, 278 
vs observation 62 
inform ation
taken as given 219 
old  and new 247 
inh ib itory  dysfunction 4 1 -4 2 , 45 
in n er conflicts, assum ptions o f 48 
in n er speech 66, 267, 269 
insult 154
in tellig en t activity 8 3 -8 4  
intended  word (see intent) 
intension 243
intent(ion) 10-11, 139, 156-159, 179, 232, 243, 
269, 278
ascrib ing  to speaker 268 
ch a llen g in g  of 157 
and ly in g  164, 297 
and m eaning 156, 159, 187 
in term inglin g  o f ideas 48, 147 
internal d ialogu es 66, 267 
in ternal stim u li, psychotic response to 46,
211
interp retation  159, 162, 269, 273 
and diagnosis 295 
global vs w ord-based 110 
ju stifiab le  281-283
and m utual history 277 
pragm atic and tru th -cond ition al 161 
and precon ditions 277 
ru les for 269
on untestable, u nobservable th eo ry 180 
psychoanalytic 269
in terrater re liab ility  o f SD  speech 52, 84,
283
intim acy, effect of 283, 294 
intru sions 16-17, 185, 212, 138 
in tu ition  and language 3, 175, 242 
invitation , force of 154 
involu ntary  attention 44 
IPA  9 
irony 108
isom orphism  87, 88 
ju d g m en t o f d eviance 183, 270 
kinesics 279
know ledge, m utual (see  com m on know ledge) 
language
autom ation of 156 
com petence in 80 
com p lexity  of 41 
context-d ep en den ce o f 51, 84 
differences in p h on etic  system s 87, 89 
and lack of isom orphism  33, 7 3 -7 4  
ob jectiv e study of 184 
orality  o f 74, 75 
processing 52 
social ch aracter of 155 
vs speech 51, 252 
language acquisition 4, 69 
language and thought (see  speech, syntax, 
and thought) 
language change 4, 264 
language data (see  data, accou nting  for) 
language and in tern al networks 221 
language h ierarch y  (see  su bord inating  
structures) 
latent topic 264 
letters re lation  to sounds 93 
levels in language
correlation  with SD  d eviations 116
Subject Index 319
levels in language (con tinu ed) 
d isintegration of 89, 116 
disruption in 31 
separation of 269 
and Chom sky 104 
lexical choice 83, 168, 201-202, 206 
lexicon 64, 84, 91, 204, 216-217 , 269 (also see  
m ental lexicon) 
linguistic ability  183 
linguistic analysis of speech 3, 53 
linguistic processes, internalization of 156 
listener, needs of 66 
literacy 74-75 , 140 
localizing 219, 226 
looping in conversation 253 
loss of set 147
m acro m eaning 120 
m acroproposition 248
macrostructures 85-86, 119, 123, 139, 214, 224, 
235, 246-247 
lack of in SD  patients 39 
m anics 53, 138, 144, 147 
m anipulation of preconditions 161 
m axim s of conversation 164-168 
breaching o f 176, 179 
and schizophrenic speech 165 
violations of and im plicatures 164, 169 
m eaning 10-11, 17, 87, 180, 217, 227, 277-278 
(also see  context) 
changes 64 
and context 161 
conventional 296 
cultural base o f 105 
discourse, ho listic 269 
figurative 109, 113 
and intent(ion) 156-157, 269-270  
and m utual interaction 277 
force vs literal 109, 153-154 
from dissection of words 151 
princip led  elaboration of 271, 286 
rational derivation of 116 
as response to stim uli 117 
requesting 157 
and shared history 275 
in social interaction 161 
truth-conditional 162 
therapeutic situation
m edication 47, 138, 186 
melody 74
m ental lexicon 12, 54, 107, 141 
com plexity  of associations 37 
com plexity of networks in 108 
likened to encyclopedia 108 
organization of 108 
m ental spaces 131, 221 
m ention 278 
messages 85
m etaphor 75, 96, 108-115, 269, 271, 273 
as norm al 296
psychoanalytical exegeses of 109 
metonymy 108 
m icrostructure 85, 224, 139 
m isinterpretation 178 
m isjudgm ents in rating narratives 137 
m isperceptions, norm al vs psychotic 207 
m itigating 170-171, 276, 278, 280, 292 
m nem onic devices 74 
m odality 170, 171
m orphem es 9, 22, 25, 91 -92 , 134, 138, 231 
m otivation, lack of (see involuntary attention 
44)
m otivation see  intent(ion) 
m otive 179, 279 
and m eaning 152 
m ultilingual production 9 
mutual ground, establishing 215, 217 
m utual knowledge 177, 215-216, 219-220, 247
nagging vs psychotic repetition 236 
narrative 6, 70, 86, 128, 140, 147, 183, 203, 234, 
256
correlation with diagnosis 187 
deictics 234
deviant vs norm al 132, 184, 188, 190, 
194-197, 206-207, 210-211 
e liciting  of 134 
glitches 199 
introductions to 146 
scanning 190, 192, 197 
schizophrenic and m anic 212 
shifting references in 185 
skills 188
tem poral orderin g  185, 193-194, 199, 234 
personal m em ories in 43 
structure, gram m ar of 85
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native speakers and in terp retation  277 
negation 105, 245
neologism s 8 -1 1 , 87, 116, 133, 135, 140, 194, 
200, 210, 264, 266 
netw orks 64
new inform ation  242, 250, 259, 264 
sa lien t and brand new 261 
n ond ecod ab ility  11, 133 
nonsense words, n orm al 58 
non-seq u itor responses 66 
non-thought d isord ered  (N T D ) 53, 60 
non-w ords 9
n orm al speech, errors in 54, 133, 144 
notational variations 87 
noun p ositions in sentence 102 
noun d eterm iners 250
o b ject 103
O ccam ’s razor 188, 296 
O ed ip al bonds 267, 268 
old  inform ation  202, 250 
old  words, m eaning  change 87 
om issions 126-127  
op posite speech 19, 20, 135, 206, 254 
ora l vs w ritten language 93, 247, 286 
o rd erin g , v io lation  o f 167 
ord in ary  interactions 277 
o r ie n tin g  segm ents 247 
orth ograp hy  75, 78 
and intonation  76 
com m as and voice in 76 
u n re liab ility  o f 94
ov erin form ation  and in co m p rehen sib ility  39 
overp recision  198 
oxym oron  173
p arad igm atic associations 20 
paralingu istics 279 
p aralle l en cod in g  191 
paranoia 154, 178, 267, 295 
paraphrase 6, 21, 65, 73, 74, 106, 125, 153, 159, 
172, 223, 257, 265, 279, 282, 293 
and im p lication  103, 172 
p articip les 263 
passive 172, 241, 250
path control 46 (also see  SD  produ ctions) 
p atient selection  (IC S ) 135-137
pauses 287, 288
p ercep tu al error, n orm al 200
perform ance vs com p eten ce 6 2 -6 3 , 81
p erform ative 153-155
p erseveration 6, 25, 129, 134-136 , 140, 254
ph atic com m u n ication  178, 247
p honem es 8 9 -9 0
phonetics 64, 8 8 -8 9 , 156
sound com b in ations possible, unused 87 
p ig eon h o lin g  147, 261 
p oetic devices 7, 75 
p o larity  105-106  
polysem y and p aran oia  154-155  
p opulations tested, psychotic vs no rm al 186 
pragm atics 150, 161, 221, 250, 282 
linkages 131, 151 
in hu m or 157
p recon d itions 159-160 , 277 
p red ictability  in d iscou rse 226 
pressured speech 288 
p resupp osition  247
p rin cip led  elab o ratio n  o f speech 277 (also see  
m eaning)
p roblem -solv ing  sk ills 59 
p rom in ent in form ation  265 
pronouns 121, 123, 127, 128, 206 
and word cou nt 94
p ronu nciation  d ifferences cross-lingu istic  90 
p ropositions 219, 276 
pro-verb 128
psychoanalysis 224, 271, 278 
as teaching 268, 279
verifiability  of 10, 53-55 , 57 -58 , 63, 98, 250, 
268 -2 6 9 , 278 -2 7 9  
and Chom skyan theory  98 
p sycholingu istics 88, 150 
psychosis 147
and syntactic e rro r  204 
psychotic speech as social dysfunction 26 (also 
see  sch izop h ren ic speech)
Puluwat 60
p u nish able responses 41, 275 
pu nn in g  7 9 ,  135, 131, 140, 229 
visual 191
purpose 39 (also see  in ten t(ion)
qu estions 88, 159, 223, 166 
in analysis 281
Subject Index 321
questions (con tin u ed ) 
as declaratives 152
random  triggering  in sem antic networks 48
reciprocal verbs 21
reconstructability 290
refrains 36, 236
relative clauses 263
relevance 177, 196, 214, 217-227, 223, 228-229, 
230, 233, 235-236, 239, 261 
rep air 120
rep etition, norm al vs psychotic 236 
replacem ent words as cohesive 128 
resistance 271, 279
retrieval 18, 58, 136, 138, 143, 183, 204, 207 
rhetoric 147, 259
Rhoda 160, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 291 
rhym e 15, 24, 36, 74 -75 , 135, 140, 200, 273 
ru le of overdue obligations 282 
rules of language 80-83, 87-89, 91-92, 156, 162, 
270, 296
context-sensitive 85 
discourse 80 -83 , 88, 92 
do-support (in English) 82 
variability  of 83 
w riting vs speech 156
sacades (see  eyetracking) 
salient inform ation 261 
sam pling
com parison of unlike populations 4 
random  vs non-random  passages 132 
saving face 170 
schem ata 246 
schizoaffective disorders 3 
schizophrenic speech, features of 3 -1 6 , 51,
184
schizophrenic, negative symptom 273 
schizophrenics vs m anics 53 
scripts 246
SD  patients, self-awareness 30
SD  speech 3 -5 ,7 ,1 0 ,1 8 ,3 0 -3 1 ,4 0 ,4 2 ,8 1 , 
88-89, 92, 97, 1 2 5 , 128, 129, 133, 138-139, 
142, 146, 1 5 1 , 158, 166, 184, 221, 223, 228, 
246, 250-252, 256, 258, 265-266 , 281,
287
circum locution in 6
clin ician ’s acum en in determ ining 52 (see 
interrater reliability) 
conversation, cognitive strain in 232, 233 
cyclicity in 3, 1 3 1 , 140, 261 
deviant vs norm al 297 
failures to subordinate 38 
faulty topicalizers 258 
flouting m axim s 163 
inappropriateness of 166 
and inner speech 68 
interm ittent nature of 31, 281 
in terpretation of 3, 10, 11, 222, 281-283, 
295-297
lack of control 16, 34 
lack of developm ent in 34 
learn ing  of 276
lexical ties in 129, 130, 132, 141 
loose associations 223 
and m orphophonem ic ru les 92 
and norm al word flex ib ility  97 
and N SD  d isruption 232 
as poetry 41, 273 
refrains 236 
repeating 235
structural abnorm alities in 41, 51, 104, 172, 
281
structurally norm al 4, 5 
selectional restrictions 107 
selection of controls (IC S) 139 
self-correction 189, 200 
self-interest 227 
self-m onitoring 58 
sem antic chain ing 220 
sem antic connection (see lexical ties, 
incoherence, coherence) 
sem antic features 19, 21, 22, 106, 107, 243 
in antonym s 69 
appropriateness to context 107 
choices, autom atic 125 
differences in synonym s 13, 22 
and networks 64 
SD  errors in 107
sim ilarity , partial and glossom ania 15, 20 
transfer of 106 
violation of 106 
sem antics 102, 150, 161, 269 
frame 101 
level of 162
relation to syntax 102, 150
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sem antics (co n tin u ed )
tr ig g erin g  retrievals 16, 21, 23 
sem antico-syntactic category 206 
sem antic transform ations 224 
sem iotics 150, 161 
sentence stru ctu re 21, 79, 240 
agent as su b ject of 241 
ap p rop riateness 85 
d om in an t co nstitu ent in 243 
dum m y su bject in  246 
m ean in g  o f 85
old  to new inform ation  241, 258 
p erspective 242 
topicaliz ing  o f 245 
sentence gram m ars 269 
sentence su b ject
and d eviant narrativ e 257 
em pathy and p erspective 240 
sentences
as com p lete  thoughts 240 
in terp retation  of 120 
and speaker’s “cam era angle" 242 
top ic and  com m ent 220 
sentence su bject
re la tion s to verb 240 
and pragm atics 244 
sep aration  o f se lf from  others 70 
serm ons 86
shared know ledge 215, 279 
sim ile  108
sin cerity  p rin c ip le  164 
slips o f the tongue 1 2 ,  120, 78, 79, 8 3 ,  174, 283, 
289, 265, 269, 287 
n orm al vs sch izop h ren ic 12 
social ru les and m eaning  152 
socialization  and speech 187 
socio lingu istics 150, 180 
sounds and letters 75 
space bu ild ers 131
speakers, lay and ab ility  to ju d g e deviance 
52
sp eaking in  tongues (see  g lossolalia  59) 
speech  74, 75
d eviant and  d eriv in g  in tention  187, 295 
equ iv alence to thou ght 31, 50, 55, 57, 61, 
67, 251, 257, 259 (also see thought and 
language)
errors norm al 40, 52 
figu rative 75
and im p aired  co g n itio n  59 
langu age 51
lapse in  m on itorin g  282
m anic 184
n orm al 183, 291
no rm al vs d evian t e rro r  287
as overt beh av ior 60
p lan n in g  291
sch izop hren ic 183, 185, 214 
and aphasia 185 
skills, testing  for 184 
social b o nd ing  by 153 
spontaneous 287, 288 
as stating p rop osition s 153 
and goals 83 
speech act 153, 158, 292 
and in ten tion  157
p recon d itions for in terp retation  160 
and p rin cip le d  co rrection  o f SD  speech 
155
pu rpose and  form  247 
sp eech  vs langu age 51 
sp iky-type eye m ovem ent (see  eye pursuit 
m ovem ents) 
squiggles 271, 272, 273 
stim u lus and  response (see  behaviorism  91) 
story te llin g  85
strategic op tions and SD  speech  231 
strategies 83, 87, 227, 294
and d eriv atio n  o f m ean in g  269, 270 
and relevance 215 
for co m p reh en d in g  116 
for com p rehen sion  113 
for u n d erstand ing  278 
in  d eriv in g  m ean in g  268 
p ragm atic and m ean in g  176 
sem antic 161
strategies for in terp retation  
and therap ist 277 
strategy
for d eriv in g  m ean in g  159 
stru ctural gram m ar 100 
stru ctu ral gram m ars 104 
stru ctu re 101
stru ctures o f exp ectation  246 
su b ject 256 
su b ject o f sentence 
and em phasis 242 
su b ject-p red icate  re la tion sh ip  240
Subject Index 323
subject vs predicate 255 
com plete 258
su bordinating structures 38 
surprise 85 
synecdoche 108 
synonym s 13, 24
as cause of glossom ania 13 
non-substitutability between 13 
synonym y 174
and m eaning networks 174 
synonym y of have and be  21 
syntactic boundaries 76 
syntactic construction
leaving out elem ent in 127 
syntactic error 202, 205, 207 
syntactic form, 
overriding of 160 
as rule-governed 152 
syntactic gapping 199, 204, 210 
syntactico-sem antic rules 103 
syntactic structures 79
com plexity  in psychotics 132 
processing of 77 
punctuation in 77 
syntagm atic associations 34 
syntax 78, 84, 214, 269
correct, incom prehensible 219 
discourse-based 100 (also see  context-free) 
explanatory power of 98, 100 
interpretation of 152 
and lexical choice 83 
and thoughts 54, 255 
system atic delusions 46
tangentiality 147, 214 
targets 151
T D  vs N T D  schizophrenics 132, 137 
tem poral m isordering 86, 204, 210, 234 
term inology 123, 254 
aphasia 52
description vs explanation 147 
non-speech disordered (N SD ) 4 
psychoanalytic 279 
speech disordered (SD ) 4 
term inology (see thought disordered or non- 
thought disordered 53) 
testing 34, 289 
text-as-product 125
texts
m any topics in 249 
them e 255, 256, 257
and discourse deviance 257 
and given inform ation 258 
and hum an interest 256 
vs rhem e 255, 258 
theories
accounting for data 28, 131, 140, 100,
103
and interpretations 268 
T h e  Prague School 83 
therapeutic interview  271, 275, 278 
avoidance of 19 
as context 281 
therapist 277, 278 
therapy, goal of 276 
thought 31, 50, 56-57, 62, 251, 259 
intrusive in norm als 288 
as non-visible process 60 -62  
without verbalizing 60 
relative to syntax 54, 255 (see also speech, 
equivalence to thought) 
thought d isorder (T D ) 31, 53 -54 , 56, 59, 251, 
253, 255, 256, 260, 266 
correlation with speech (see speech, equiva­
lence to thought) 
in m anics 53
non-specificity in diagnosis 54 
thoughts, kinds of 60 
title
and IC S task 252 
and m eaning 251 
T L C  54
topic 16, 17, 133, 138, 168, 214, 217, 221, 223, 
237, 239, 245, 249, 240, 290, 294 
advancem ent of 130, 136, 222 
agreem ent on 249
changing of 18, 223, 225, 228, 239, 248,
291
constraining of 272 
as determ inant of m eaning 39, 239 
discourse and sentence 248 
expansion of 258 
extraneous m atters 39 
global 239
identifying conflict 277 
and new inform ation 239 
and point of view 240
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topic (con tin u ed )
ren eg otia ting  of 228 
as sou rce o f relevance 223 
sch izophren ic problem s with 254 
shown by lex ica l item s 245, 250 
statem ent o f 249 
su bord ination  to 290 
and su m m aries 249 
and which is a lie test 244 
topicalizer 257
topic, term in ology  for 249 -2 5 0  
topic vs com m ent 255, 258 
trad ition al gram m ar 100 
transform ational gram m ar 84, 85, 99, 100, 
263
triggers 151 
truth 131, 215, 219 
turn  taking 295
T yp e-T oken  R atio  ( T T R )  fallacy of 94
unconscious, the 267 
u nderstand ing task (IC S ) 139 
utterance p air 252, 254, 278
valency 102 
verb 126-127
perform ative 156 
stative 87 
transitive 79 
verb choice
and context 100 
and sentence stru cture 102 
tense and m eaning  105, 217 
verbal ch a in in g  (see glossom ania) 
verbal p lacem arkers 253 
verbal p rodu ctiv ity
m anic vs schizophrenic 53 
verb au x ilia ries, catenative 94
verify in g  Freu dian theory  
im p ossib ility  of 268
w eakening o f constru cts 212 
w ell-form edness 
ju d gm en ts of 85 
word
borrow ing 87 
creating  new 87 
orth og rap hic d efin ition  o f 93 
word associations 78, 137, 266 
and sch izophren ic speech 78 
testing 79
w ord association testing 
valid ity  o f 61 
word choices
norm al vs. sch izop hren ic 6, 10 
word cou nting  93 
fallacy in 93 
word, d efin ition  of 93 
word fin d in g  d ifficu lties 5, 6 ,  10, 1 3 0 ,  133 
word retrieval
d ifficu lty  in 11, 2 3 ,  116 
words, changeable m ean in g  in 9 6 -9 7  
e lic ita tio n  problem s 93 
p roblem s in co u n tin g  93 
R ussian 96
Sw ahili-English  equ iv alence 95 
w ord salad 5, 11, 24, 127, 1 3 5 ,  1 4 0 ,  146, 206, 
207, 210, 233, 254, 266 
words,
com pound, stress pattern  of 94 
and gram m atical m orphem es 95 
function 95 
w riting  74, 75
conventions o f (also see  orthograp hy) 75 
“zeroing-in” tactic 192
